Brexit and the Future of EU Politics by Eijsbouts, Tom et al.
Brexit and the Future  
of EU Politics
Ingolf Pernice | Ana Maria Guerra Martins (eds.)
A Constitutional Law Perspective
European Constitutional Law Network-Series 
Vol. 10
Nomos
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748903246, am 21.11.2019, 13:37:49
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
European Constitutional Law Network-Series
 
edited by Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Ingolf Pernice,  
Walter Hallstein-Institute for European Constitutional 
Law (WHI)
Vol. 10
BUT_Pernice_6208-8_OA.indd   2 26.09.19   15:25
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748903246, am 21.11.2019, 13:37:49
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Ingolf Pernice | Ana Maria Guerra Martins (eds.)
Brexit and the Future  
of EU Politics
A Constitutional Law Perspective
Nomos
BUT_Pernice_6208-8_OA.indd   3 26.09.19   15:25
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748903246, am 21.11.2019, 13:37:49
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
The publication of this work was supported by the Open Access Publication Fund of  
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the 
Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data 
are available on the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de
ISBN 978-3-8487-6208-8 (Print)
 978-3-7489-0324-6 (ePDF)
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN 978-3-8487-6208-8 (Print)
 978-3-7489-0324-6 (ePDF)
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Pernice, Ingolf / Guerra Martins, Ana Maria
Brexit and the Future of EU Politics
A Constitutional Law Perspective
Ingolf Pernice / Ana Maria Guerra Martins (eds.)
278 pp.
Includes bibliographic references and index.
ISBN 978-3-8487-6208-8 (Print)
 978-3-7489-0324-6 (ePDF)
1st Edition 2019 
© Ingolf Pernice / Ana Maria Guerra Martins
Published by 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG 
Waldseestraße 3-5 | 76530 Baden-Baden 
www.nomos.de
Production of the printed version:  
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG
Waldseestraße 3-5 | 76530 Baden-Baden
Printed and bound in Germany. 
ISBN (Print): 978-3-8487-6208-8 
ISBN (ePDF): 978-3-7489-0324-6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748903246
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
BUT_Pernice_6208-8_OA.indd   4 26.09.19   15:25
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748903246, am 21.11.2019, 13:37:49
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Introduction
Precisely one year after the UK’ referendum on remaining or leaving the
EU, which is the basis of Brexit, the European Constitutional Law Net-
work (ECLN) met at the Faculty of Law of the University of Lisbon on 23
and 24 June 2017 to discuss ‘Brexit – Challenge or End of EU Constitu-
tional Law?’.
The formal inclusion of a withdrawal clause – Article 50 of the Treaty
on the European Union (TEU)1– into the TEU through the Treaty of Lis-
bon opened a Pandora’s box with consequences that no one could predict
either before the entry into force of that Treaty or after the referendum in
the UK; and even today it is difficult to fully assess the impact of the clause
and, in particular, of making use of it. As the negotiations of Brexit,2 the
draft Withdrawal Agreement that ensued,3 the successive rejections by the
House of Commons,4 and the successive decisions of the EU 27 leaders, in
agreement with the UK, on the extension of the negotiations’ period, first-
1 According to Article 50 TEU, any Member State may decide to withdraw from the
Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements. The Member State,
which decides to leave the Union, shall notify the intention of withdrawal to the
European Council. The Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with
that Member State, which shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Coun-
cil, by a qualified majority with the consent of the European Parliament.
The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into
force of the Withdrawal Agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification
above referred, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State
concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.
If a State, which has withdrawn from the Union, asks to rejoin, its request shall be
subject to the accession procedure.
2 The documents related to the negotiations of Brexit are available at the website
https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/brexit_en (accessed 26
June 2019).
3 Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy
Community, as agreed at negotiators' level on 14 November 2018, available at
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/files/draft-agreement-withdrawal-united-kingdom
-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-european-union-and-european-atomic-energy-co
mmunity-agreed-negotiators-level-14-november-2018_en (accessed 26 June 2019).
4 The Draft Withdrawal Agreement was rejected on 15 January, 12 March and 29
March 2019.
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ly, until 22 May 2019 and later on until 31 October 2019, under certain
conditions,5 have shown, the complexity of an exit process exceeds what
anyone could expect, and it seems to be a challenge to overcome the politi-
cal and practical obstacles that came out of that open box. Yet, in the per-
spective ex post, given the level and strength of the ties uniting the EU and
its Member States not only economically and legally, but also politically,
including social, financial and monetary matters, etc, no one should be
surprised that even after three years the process is far from coming to a sat-
isfying end.
This experience of applying Article 50 TEU in practice is perhaps the
main reason why we are, currently, in a deadlock. Nobody knows what
will happen in the near future. Can the UK expect a re-opening of the
negotiation on the Withdrawal Agreement? After the European elections,
will the UK decide for – or fall into – a “hard Brexit”; or will the govern-
ment call for new elections opening new perspectives, or call for a second
referendum? How many further months (or years?), if any, will the dead-
line of Article 50 TEU (have to) be extended? Will the EU and the UK con-
clude another type of agreement? If so, which one? Will the UK Parliament
accept this potential new agreement? Is it still possible and feasible for the
UK to remain in the EU, and if so, under what conditions? All these sce-
narios are for now conceivable, but, looking back to the Brexit process,
some of them are more realistic than others.
As to the EU, after a rather short period, still under the impact of the
referendum’s shock – in which even some institutions of the EU had sus-
tained that the Brexit should be rapid and under hard conditions in order
to give an example to other Member States – since the beginning of the ne-
gotiations with the UK, its position has been characterised by serenity, pre-
cision and clarity. First, the EU accepted the decision of the UK to with-
draw without making of it a drama. Second, under the political leadership
of President Donald Tusk, the EU-27 has rejected the negotiation strategy
by Theresa May, who demanded parallel discussions on the withdrawal
and on trade. The President of the European Council insisted that the ne-
gotiations should be informed by the following principles: minimization
of disruption caused by UK withdrawal; securing agreement on the rights
of EU citizens living in the UK; ensuring that the UK honors its financial
5 The UK is bound to hold European Parliament elections as it is still a member of
the EU, between 23 and 26 May 2019. If the UK fails to hold the elections, it will
leave the EU on 1 June 2019. See European Council Decision, 11 April 2019, XT
20013/19, available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39043/10-euco-art5
0-decision-en.pdf (accessed 26 June 2019).
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commitments; and avoiding a hard border between Northern Ireland and
Ireland. Donald Tusk stated firmly: ‘These four issues are all part of the
first phase of the negotiations. Once, and only once, we have achieved suf-
ficient progress on the withdrawal, can we discuss the framework for our
future relationship. Starting parallel talks on all issues at the same time, as
suggested by some in the UK, will not happen’.6 Third, contrary to one of
the major fears after the UK referendum, a potential domino effect leading
to the disintegration of the Union, the remaining Member States united
around the strategy of the EU. In fact, the EU’s 27 leaders unanimously
adopted the phased strategy at the European Council meeting on 29 April
2017. Fourth, even with many obstacles, the EU has achieved to conclude a
draft agreement with the UK on its withdrawal. Fifth, the EU has always
left an open door for the UK to revoke the withdrawal notification and to
remain in the EU. The Court of Justice of the European Union, in the case
Wightman and Others, has confirmed that a revocation of a notice under Ar-
ticle 50 TEU is lawful, since its ‘purpose (…) is to confirm the EU mem-
bership of the Member State concerned under terms that are unchanged as
regards its status as a Member State, and that revocation brings the with-
drawal procedure to an end’.7
Conversely, as to the UK, one has been witnessing a permanent lack of
coherence and a constant dance of advances and retreats, leaving the im-
pression that the UK was singing the music of Beatles Should I stay or
should I go?, culminating in a plurality of decisions of the UK Parliament
and in the Prime Minister Theresa May’s request to delay Brexit twice.
Even with the new Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, and his determination
to go for a hard Brexit in case the EU is unwilling to reopen the negotia-
tions on the Withdrawal Agreement – what it seems to be – it is question-
albe whether he will find support for this in Parliament. The membership
of the UK to the EU, and similarly, the Brexit process were rightly quali-
fied, by the UK Supreme Court in the Miller case,8 as having constitutional
implications for the UK (like for the EU), and this may explain why it at-
tracts more public attention and binds more workforce both sides for a
6 Remarks by President Donald Tusk of 32.3.2017 on the next steps following the
UK notification, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releas
es/2017/03/31/tusk-remarks-meeting-muscat-malta/ (accessed 26 June 2019).
7 CJEU, judgment of 10 December 2018, Wightman and Others, C-621/18,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:999, para. 75.
8 Judgment (2017) UKSC of 24 January 2017, Miller, paras 60, 62, 67, 68, 78, 80–82,
90, 92, 96, 100, at: https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2016-0196-judgm
ent.pdf (accessed 21 August 2017).
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longer time as ever expected. But the process with its adverse effects on the
capacities of all to tackle important other political issues cannot last with-
out limits.
Taking into account the uncertainties and implications caused by the
Brexit referendum, as well as the lasting openness of the outcome, one may
ask why publishing a book on Brexit right now. The main intend of the
present book is to reflect upon the Brexit process and analyse some particu-
lar issues from a constitutional perspective, with the aim to contribute to
the discussion and the finding of solutions to some of the many problems
raised.
From a European and constitutional law perspective, Brexit raises so
many issues, however, that the contributions to this volume cannot cover
all of them, and particularly cannot predict the future. Focussing on some
key general questions and particularly relevant policies, the eleven substan-
tive chapters of the book divided into three parts may give the reader a
hint of how the Brexit process and its implications are seen from European
constitutional law scholars outside the UK and stimulate the discussion
across the channel on the future relationship between the UK and the EU.
I. As the key narrative of the UK before and after the Brexit referendum
was based on the rhetoric of State sovereignty and democracy, Part I of the
book is devoted to Constitutional Issues – Basic Concepts Revisited.
The insistence of the UK in “taking back control” over laws, borders,
democracy, and money, means anything but “taking back control” over
the most significant issues of UK State sovereignty and its constitutional
system. Putting this decision in the hands of the people through the refer-
endum apparently legitimates Brexit within the purest standards of democ-
racy and protection of fundamental rights. Part I of this book will decon-
struct this rhetoric.
Tom Eijsbouts, following the discourse of President Macron of 26
September 2017 at Sorbonne, proposes the development of a new notion
of State sovereignty, which not only agrees with the facts of European inte-
gration instead of opposing them, but which also allows for an original
conceptual development of sovereignty in the EU, concerning both the
Member States and the Union itself. Analysing the way how the Euro sum-
mit came into being and got itself a permanent president, the Author con-
cludes that this institutional development shall be faced as an exercise of
European sovereignty. For Tom Eijsbouts, the European Union needs to
build up an open and dynamic concept of European sovereignty, which in-
stead of challenging national sovereignties builds upon, adds to and so
strengthens the Member States’ sovereignty, if it would like to prevent
events such as Brexit.
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Commenting Tom Eijsbouts’ contribution, Ana Maria Guerra Martins,
first, underlines how fascinating the said proposal is, but second, warns of
its dangers. Above all, the introduction of the idea of sovereignty in the EU
context may arise more fears and suspicion, which might well pave the
way to populism, nationalism and general pessimism. Secondly, the defini-
tion of such a sovereignty would be rather difficult. Thirdly, she argues
that the way how the Euro summit came into being and got itself a perma-
nent president must be integrated in the broader context of EMU gover-
nance and, fourthly, the recent case law of the CJEU on Article 50 TEU,
accepting the lawfulness of the revocation of the withdrawal notice is
much more an expression of a State’s sovereignty – the one of the UK –
than an expression of EU sovereignty. Finally, the author does not envisage
how helpful could be such an idea after the exit of the UK.
Giacinto della Cananea looks at this from another perspective: He distin-
guishes two main visions of the European Union, first, in order to explain
and critically assess, in a second step, the options for a future relationship
of the UK with the EU as a question of differentiated integration. One of
these visions is close to the traditional concept of State sovereignty, the EU
being ‘a broad community of nation-states’, the other that of an ‘ever clos-
er union’ of peoples as provided in the preamble of the Union Treaties. A
critical assessment of these two opposed positions leads to an analysis of
the existing mechanisms of flexibility in EU law, both within the EU (e.g.
the EMU, enhanced cooperation, the fiscal compact and two speed integra-
tion) and beyond the EU such as the European Economic Area, a set of bi-
lateral agreements like in the case of Switzerland and what is called the
“Schengen’s mixed membership”. Considering the implications for Brexit
the author finds that, given the need to take account of the twin criteria of
clarity and coherence a solution different from the one that exists in the
context of the EEA could not be meaningfully envisaged.
Jirí Zemánek analyses the future of the protection of fundamental rights
after Brexit, seeking to demonstrate that the withdrawal of the UK from a
“community of destiny”, which comprises three levels of protection of fun-
damental rights – national constitutions, European Convention on Hu-
man Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – where the UK
has, to some extent, a reserved position, would represent more than a mere
withdrawal from its rights and obligations. His focus is the question to
what extend the effective protection of fundamental rights of the individu-
al is affected. As the UK plays an important role in the EU-wide dialogue
on fundamental rights and their protection under the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights, he also points to the loss Brexit would cause in this regard.
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Ingolf Pernice is looking at the different stages of the Brexit process from
the perspective of democracy. Is it a challenge to, or an exercise of democ-
racy? While the strategy to put the future membership of the UK to an ad-
visory referendum is qualified as an exercise of democracy, and both, the
procedure of Article 50 TEU and the increase of democratic awareness
throughout the EU can in no way be understood as a challenge to democ-
racy, incidences related to the preparation of the referendum as well as the
interpretation of its result in the subsequent political action are found to
bring about serious challenges to democracy. The author discusses the im-
pact of open lies and targeted disinformation on democratic processes on
the one side, and the way the UK Parliament has renounced to the consti-
tutional principle of sovereignty of Parliament and brought itself into an
irresponsible situation of incapability to take a positive decision, on the
other side. Yet, the emergence of a new citizens’ engagement, triggered by
the Brexit process throughout the Member States, movements of citizens
taking ownership of the EU, acting for ‘remain’ and calling for further de-
veloping the EU, are taken as a positive outcome of the still open Brexit
process.
II. As Brexit will definitively impact on The Future of the Internal Market
and its Social Dimension, Part II of this book addresses the effects of Brexit
in the internal market, in the EU citizens’ social rights and in immigration
control and the future of the ‘Green Border’ in Ireland.
Paula Vaz Freire analyses the economic effects of Brexit in the UK and in
the EU, drawing attention to the fact that the UK specialization in services,
namely financial services, as well as the foreign direct investment in the
UK has evolved and turned into a successful model due the UK’s EU mem-
bership. The withdrawal from the EU would diminish the UK’s attractive-
ness insofar. For the EU, as a whole, the economic effects of Brexit may be
less significant, but taking into account the strategic and political impor-
tance of the UK and the contribution of the UK to the EU budget, the
Brexit will also have a considerable impact on the remaining EU-27. How-
ever, from the perspective of the EU, free trade and free movement must
be definitively linked, as the internal market is a global reality.
Rui Lanceiro develops a broad critical analysis of the recent CJEU case
law on EU citizen’s social rights, sustaining that, from Grzelczyk case to
Dano, Alimanovic and Garcia-Nieto judgments, the Court has initiated a sig-
nificant change in its earlier jurisprudence on non-national EU citizens’ ac-
cess to social benefits in host Member State, and did not change this in
more recent cases, such as Gusa, Prefeta and Tarola. This restrictive trend
has also extended to the social dimension of EU citizenship in the Commis-
sion v. United Kingdom (UK child benefit or child tax credit) case. It is sug-
Introduction
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gested that this judgment probably aimed at influencing the outcome of
UK Remain/Leave referendum, which failed. The consequence is under-
stood to be that the notion of EU citizenship as a fundamental and politi-
cal status with no link with the economic market is being dismantled and
the free movement of citizens and workers in the EU remains incomplete.
Daniel Thym and Mattias Wendel discuss one of the most topic issues
throughout the Brexit debate – immigration after Brexit. They are stressing
the uncertainty of the moment and conclude that, while Brexit may facili-
tate legal control over the entry and stay of EU citizens, from a legal per-
spective it might, ironically, render control of immigration of non-Euro-
peans, including asylum seekers, more difficult.
III. Apart from the internal market and its social dimension Brexit will
influence other EU Policies – Perspectives of Cooperation with the UK, as it is
discussed in Part III of the present book.
Jean-Victor Louis gives a legal standpoint of the presumed effects of Brex-
it on the Monetary Policy, as well as on financial regulation and supervi-
sion. After recalling some essential features of the Brexit negotiations up to
the present no deal and the new delay, the author draws attention to the
internal institutional consequences of Brexit in monetary and financial
matters, as well as to the situation of the UK, the EU and other national
authorities in the international financial institutions and the future coop-
eration. In spite of admitting negative consequences either for the UK or
for the EU, the author concludes with a word of hope, asserting that once
the UK becomes a third country after Brexit, this is perhaps an opportunity
for the EU progressing towards a sui generis federation.
In his comments on Jean-Victor Louis’s contribution, Stefan Griller
states that he agrees with the identification of the most salient issues as
well as the respective observation, therefore he opts to work on the hypo-
thesis of no deal and after 31 October 2019 the UK would find itself as a
third country. The author advocates that the dynamics of EMU-participa-
tion may change once the UK will have left, because the non-EMU Mem-
ber States will lose a powerful ally. Secondly, after Brexit, the EMU-deep-
ening and reform, including the building of a Banking Union, may be-
come easier, once the UK has always been a brake to this kind of initia-
tives. Thirdly, the impact of a no deal Brexit on the freedom of establish-
ment and, particularly, with regard to financial services located in the UK
is considered to be huge. In spite of a rather optimistic scenario for the EU
in this context, the author envisages also some negative effects.
Maria José Rangel de Mesquita, finally, analyses the possible modes of par-
ticipation and cooperation of the UK in the EU external action both, CFSP
and CSDP, with particular regard to the possible future status of the UK
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either as a mere third State or a special status as an ‘ex-EU third State’. The
analysis is based upon an assessment of the developments in the EU exter-
nal action, particularly the 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s
Foreign and Security Policy and the adoption of ‘three main categories of
initiatives – political, institutional and financial – in some of which the
UK may participate during and after the transition period’. In his very de-
tailed and deep description of the EU and the UK perspectives on the re-
cent developments as well as of the terms found in the Withdrawal Agree-
ment and the Political Declaration the author concludes in shaping a (pos-
sible) differentiated third State status of the UK in the field of European
Foreign and Security Policy, including Defence, based upon autonomy
both sides but also on common values and shared interests both, known
and to be identified though structured consultation and thematic dia-
logues. It could go as far as to agree on an observer status of the UK with
some rights of participation in EU institutions, bodies and structures ‘with
financial EU counterparty (“value for money”)’.
In the present introduction it is not possible to give a sufficiently precise
idea of the richness and of all the challenging thoughts expressed during
the conference, as updated and completed in the present volume by some
reflections regarding the evolution of Brexit process since June 2017.
Therefore, we invite the readers to go through the following chapters and
develop your own views on the EU constitutional impact of Brexit.
The Lisbon ECLN-conference 2017, which was organized by the Lisbon
Center for Research in Public Law in partnership with Walter Hallstein Insti-
tut für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht of Humboldt University of Berlin,
would not have been possible without the generous financial support of
Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (the Portuguese Agency for Science
and Technology), the Luso-American Development Foundation, and two law
firms – Quatre Casas and Linklaters. We very warmly thank all these donors
for their friendly support. We are also grateful to the Open Access Publica-
tion Fund of Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin for generous financial support
as well as to Dr. Johannes Rux and Stefan Grote of NOMOS publishing, who
made the publication of this book possible.
Ana Maria Guerra Martins/Ingolf Pernice
Lisbon / Berlin, July 2019
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Sovereignty In The European Way.
How the Euro Summit Came Into Being and Got Itself a
Permanent President
Tom Eijsbouts, University of Amsterdam
Abstract
The Brexit decision to leave the EU is a miscarriage of democracy. It is an expres-
sion of UK sovereignty, proving not, however, that the Kingdom is retrieving its
full sovereignty from the EU. Instead it proves that the UK's sovereignty has
failed to evolve along with its membership of the EU and take on a European
dimension.
This failure has seen UK sovereignty regress from a sophisticated parliamen-
tary sovereignty to a regressive outburst of popular sovereignty. In other Member
States, the same failure of evolution of sovereignty is latent and could lead to
similar outbursts.
The first lesson for us jurists to learn from Brexit is that keeping the articula-
tion of sovereignty to law and legal thinking, and to ourselves, is a mistake.
Worse: constitutional and legal doctrine are to blame, in part, for allowing
thought on sovereignty to be split up into incompatible positions and for leaving
the notion defenseless against its hijack by populists.
Emmanuel Macron, first in his Humboldt plea for 'European sovereignty',
provides a sound alternative. He denies the opposition between EU authority and
Member State sovereignty and wants Member States to draw sovereign strength
from their membership of the EU and from the latter's development. It is a new
version of the pooling of sovereignties. We should give this a constitutional elabo-
ration.1
1 Emmanuel Macron on Sovereignty: Berlin, 10 January 2017 (Humboldt-Universi-
tät)
www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/de/lf/oe/whi/FCE/2017/rede-macron; Financial Times 24
January 2017,
‘Europe holds its destiny in its own hands’ https://www.ft.com/content/3d0cc856-e
187–11e6–9645-c9357a75844a; Athens, 7 September 2017 https://en-marche.fr/artic
les/discours/
17
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Sovereignty must be seen not as an immutable idea or notion, but as a specific
form of authority, to wit that of a (or the) State. Apart from its axiomatic belong-
ing to the State, it is not static, but has evolved for hundreds of years and will
keep evolving over time, together with the State. Membership of the Union press-
es for further evolution of both the Member States and their sovereignties beyond
the current forms, and involving the structure of authority and representation of
the EU. This must be given a constitutional acknowledgment, in which constitu-
tional doctrine can help.
This piece is meant to open up our thinking in the matter. It centers on one
crucial event: the instant creation of a new institution at the heart of the Union,
the Euro summit and its permanent presidency, on 25 March 2010. In an emer-
gency situation, the EU created for itself a new authority and organized it in-
stantly. This happened outside the law but was a clear case, both of EU constitu-
tional evolution and of evolution in the sovereign authority of euro Member
States.
Introduction. Article 50 TEU
Article 50 TEU is, among other things, an enduring expression of individu-
al national sovereignty for the EU Member States. Article 50 TEU is also a
token of the EU as a Union born from an agreement, not from violence,
maintained under an enduring agreement and not by violence. This pre-
cludes an ultimate monopoly of violence as that of the US federation and
it is among the things precluding the EU from itself becoming a State.
What is more: the whole EU Treaty, in its evolution, is an enduring expres-
sion of the sovereignties of the Member States collectively. So, sovereignty
is at the heart of the EU constitution.
This allows to look at the EU constitutional situation under Brexit with
an eye to finding things to learn, first about what went wrong in the UK,
then about our understanding of sovereignty in general, and finally about
the evolution of State sovereignty in and through the EU.
discours-president-athenes; United Nations, 19 September 2017 https://en-marche.f
r/articles/discours/discours-president-nations-unies; La Sorbonne, 26 September
2017 (English version)
http://www.elysee.fr/assets/Initiative-for-Europe-a-sovereign-united-democratic-Eur
ope-Emmanuel-Macron.pdf; E. Macron, R.volution: R.concilier la France (French
and European Publications Inc 2017).
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Brexit: a miscarriage of democracy
The Brexit decision is an acute expression of British sovereignty singly. It
shows this up, however, not as a regain of ultimate control but as a whim-
sical and impulsive form of popular sovereignty, departing from the trust-
ed parliamentary sovereignty and resulting in what must be called a miscar-
riage of democracy. A less sturdy constitution than the British would have
been in acute difficulty of survival. It is an enlightening paradox how the
UK, an accomplished constitutional State, has been in political shambles
since its secession decision while EU, an incipient constitutional authority,
is keeping its act together and in control.2 This suggests that there is, at
least in these extremis, in the face of threats to the public realm from inside
and outside, a better claim of control, and of sovereignty, in the EU Mem-
ber States together than there is in the UK singly.
Brexit shows, among other things, what the consequences can be of our
not coming to grips with sovereignty in the European Union. For the EU
it is fundamental to have a sound notion of sovereignty, if only because
sovereignty is often invoked as an argument, or a solid fact, in the way of
any real (political) EU constitution. More assertively, national sovereignty
needs to be understood as an element of the EU constitution, even as a
principle of it, as AG Kokott has ventured to call it.3
Sovereignty in general and in the context of EU
Traditionally law scholars has been the first to define and tend to the no-
tion of State sovereignty. But this task has been relinquished at the cre-
ation of the European Union, and legal doctrine has split up into different
often irreconcilable positions, notably about the relationship of European
integration and national sovereignty. First, there is the doctrine holding
that sovereignty gradually loses relevance in the context of European inte-
gration. Another reading of the situation is that the EU is gradually taking
over sovereignty from the Member States in the form of competences and
with the legal precedence of EU law. Then there is constitutional plur-
2 See the European Council position http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press
-releases/2017/04/29-euco-brexit-guidelines/ the two years hence have only rein-
forced this evidence.
3 Opinion of 26 October 2012 in Case C‑370/12 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ire-
land, par. 136
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alism, in which sovereignty remains crucial, but is a mere 'claim to author-
ity' of a polity in general, with the State losing its special status. In each of
these readings, as in prevailing general views, there is at least a tense or
even contradictory relationship between the EU and the sovereignty of its
Member States.
In Emmanuel Macron's notion there is no such necessary contradiction;
quite the contrary: there is possible synergy. His views are not alien to the
ideas of multilevel or composite constitutions and to the old notion of
'shared sovereignty'. But while the latter primarily serves as doctrinal or
justificatory tools in the realm of constitutional law, Macron's European
sovereignty is militant, political, and defiant: 'we must reconquer our
sovereignty'. First of all, he wants to keep the idea of sovereignty from be-
ing hijacked by populists.
Following Macron, we lawyers may stop our doctrinal squabbles and
take the lead to find a notion of State sovereignty which not only agrees
with the facts of European integration instead of opposing them, but
which also allows for an original development of sovereignty in the EU,
concerning both the Member States and the Union itself.4
The idea of EU sovereignty is not altogether strange to our thinking as
EU lawyers, notably in the notion of 'pooled sovereignty'. Ingolf Pernice
and others have developed ideas on 'divided sovereignty' in the context of
multilevel constitutionalism. But it needs to be made concrete and related
to actual fact.
The first thing to do is to demystify sovereignty. Sovereignty is not an
idea, unfathomable or mysterious. It is, simply, a kind of authority, to wit
the special authority of the State. It is distinct from other authorities, and
stands above them. Sovereignty is, first, the ultimate authority of the State
over societal movements and authorities such as markets, militias, reli-
gions: internal sovereignty. Second, it is the full membership of the State in
the international community of States: external sovereignty. To further de-
mystify it, we need to break the State's authority down into different
spheres, or theatres where it is expressed and develops. Most difficult for us
lawyers is to see it as something else but a matter of law and a matter of
notion. Stefan Griller writes, typically: 'The concept of "sovereignty" is pri-
marily rooted in the field of the General Theory of Law and State (which is
in this part strongly linked to legal theory) and in Public International
4 See https://plone.rewi.hu-berlin.de/de/lf/oe/whi/FCE/2017/rede-macron/; Em-
manuel Macron: 'Europe holds its destiny in its own hands', Financial Times, 24
January 2017.
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Law'.5 Sovereignty is not rooted in theory; it is rooted in historic develop-
ment. All authority has solid foundations in crude, basic fact. So does
sovereignty. This face of sovereignty is often hard to understand for the
scholar, but its understanding is also most liberating and even illuminat-
ing.
The sovereignty of France, like that of Germany and of the US, is not
primarily a concept, but a fact. Anyone wanting to deal with the State, in-
ternally and externally, will profit from knowing that its sovereignty is a
fact and that it hurts to deny or ignore it. Forget about the notion. Of
course the notion of sovereignty is important to support and organize the
facts of sovereignty to greater coherence and function in their context. This
is in the same way that the notion of a car supports and organizes actual cars
to greater intelligibility and better function in traffic.
Likewise, sovereign authority is more than a matter of law or legal au-
thority only or mostly, but also a matter of political authority. When the
Federal Republic in the turmoil after the fall of Berlin's Wall in 1989
launched its plan to absorb the German Democratic Republic, it took the
initiative in a political act of sovereignty. Legal acts of sovereignty would
follow from this: first, treaties (Unification Treaty and 2+4 Treaty) then
legislation. Then, again, treaties, notably that of Maastricht.
Thus, sovereign authority is developed and expressed in several theatres:
in that of fact, in that of action, in that of structure and in that of doctrine.
All these theatres are different, each with its own casts of characters, even if
they communicate to keep coherence. In the form of doctrine, sovereignty
is expressed and elaborated internally in constitutional law and scholarship
and externally in diplomatic practice, by academics, courts and govern-
ment officials. In the form of structure, sovereignty is expressed in the con-
text of legal systems, in constitutions and legal instruments, by treaties and
legislation. In the form of action, sovereignty is acted by State authorities
nationally, and among States internationally. In the form of fact, sovereign-
ty arises from events at the origin of States, and subsists in the form of the
raw fact of the States' existence.
Having originated with the State, first as a fact, then as a notion sup-
porting the fact (Bodin, Hobbes), the authority of sovereignty has evolved
with the State over time, both in the abstract and in each State specifically.
5 Stefan Griller, 'The Impact of the Constitution for Europe on National Sovereign-
ty', in Jiri Zemanek/Ingolf Pernice (eds) A Constitution for Europe: the IGC, the Rati-
fication Process and Beyond, ECLN series vol. 5 (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2005), pp
151–182, at 151.
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It has evolved from god-given internal authority to legally established in-
ternal and external authority; from absolutist to parliamentary, to popular,
to national, to constitutional, to democratic. As all authority, even that of
law, sovereignty in its structure, in its means and instruments, and in its
appearance will vary over time and between States. The only thing im-
mutable is its appertaining to the State (in the abstract and in the con-
crete).
And with the inevitable evolution of every State, sovereignty's structure
of authority evolves; often towards greater democracy and rule of law.
With the evolution of the international community, international
sovereignty evolves toward including greater sophistication in internation-
al organization.
Does it also evolve towards greater authority or weight of international
organizations? That is uncertain generally, but unmistakably it does in the
EU. What is more, the evolution of the authority of the EU presses for a
constitutional restructuring of the Member States' sovereignties.
Such pressure can be creative, as is most obvious in the case of the Bun-
desrepublik. Created as a sovereign State only in name and form, in 1949,
the new German State has completed and boosted its sovereignty in the
seventy years hence. Today it is among the world's top in any ranking of
sovereign States, both as a vigorous democracy and as a member of the
world community, both internally and externally. And all this evolution it
has been both pressed and allowed to make by its membership of the EU.
Its sovereignty has a clear European condition and qualification. This is
what M. Macron understands by European sovereignty and what he vies to
obtain for France also, and for the other Member States. Anyone interested
can read it from the facts. Only the Bundesverfassungsgericht (and its
epigonist colleagues Courts) is blinded by its own legalistic doctrine from
seeing the facts. And it is cornering itself and legal doctrine in a false
dilemma. Fortunately, German politics is not fooled.
While Germany, having come last, has been the first to develop this ex-
tra layer to its sovereignty, it is the opposite with the first sovereign State
in Europe, the present United Kingdom. It has been the last and most reti-
cent to allow its sovereignty to develop under European integration. Brexit
is the result.6
6 The argument of Germany's strong evolution under EU membership I have put
forward in a keynote speech before the Dutch circle of constitutionalist on 15 De-
cember 2017, published as 'Germany's Grand and Growing European Sovereignty'
in Hardt, Sacha, Heringa, Aalt Willem, and Waltermann, Antonia: Bevrijdende &
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How does such evolution of a national sovereignty work? It works simi-
lar to natural evolution of a species. Each older version of sovereignty is
overlaid in further steps, but preserved in the full heritage. It is like we hu-
mans carry along our animal (and even bacterial) heritages. Our European
State sovereignties still carry the remains of godly authority, of kingdom,
of popular revolt. Even if they have now landed into constitutional and
democratic authority, these older forces and sources lurk below and can be
awakened, as shown in the US and the UK these days.
We are concerned not with the past, however, but with its future evolu-
tion. Sovereignty, carrying all the baggage from its past stages, will evolve
further inside the Member States due to their membership, and between
them. This is already going on. It is our business to stop quibbling and to-
gether turn our attention to how our States' structures of sovereignty have
in fact been evolving under pressure from EU membership. From there,
we may find doctrinal underpinning and coherence.
An unhistoric idea of sovereignty is false. This goes for the recurring
idea that sovereignty is always or essentially popular sovereignty as well as
for the idea that sovereignty lies with the power of exception and for any
other fixed idea.
Sovereignty as a notion: more than legal
Sovereignty is not merely a legal notion concerning legal power, but it es-
sentially, actually and notionally also involves political authority. The fact
that sovereignty is historic and evolving, in the way of a living species or
(better) of a form of culture or technology, means that there is no final
limit to its development or sophistication, or to its pooling in the context
of the EU, however frantically this limit is looked for by legal authority,
judicial or academic. The search and the evolution is a matter of history,
politics and law, not of legal definition. No idea of sovereignty should be
in the way of a development of the facts and the notion. Certainly not the
legalistic idea that sovereignty amounts to a State's legal powers and that it
inevitably is reduced by transfers. The evolution of the German State from
1949, involving power transfers while being strengthened, contradicts this
idea.
Begrenzende soevereiniteit. (Boom juridisch, Den Haag, 2018), pp 10–31. See also ed-
itorial European Constitutional Law Review 2018–1: 'European Sovereignty'.
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The challenge is to see what facts of sovereignty present themselves and
what notion of sovereignty fits the developing relationship between the
EU Member States and their Union. This is a challenge both in fact and in
understanding.  Let us pick one instance of such evolution, not a legal one,
in order to avoid the idea that sovereignty is all about notions and about
law. A single but brilliant little historic fact may help us to explore lines of
the possible evolution of Member State sovereignty in the EU.
Creation of the Euro-summit and its permanent chair, Brussels, 25 March 2010
In a meeting of the European Council on 25 March, 2010, at a first peak of
the financial crisis and euro-crisis, the members of the Eurozone were to
pledge their solidarity with Greece, in order to keep the Greeks and the eu-
ro from going under. This pledge was momentous as an act of authority in
the face of power of the money markets, not to forget its possible conflict
with Article 125 TFEU (no bail out). The nine non-members of the EU
were asked to leave the room! UK's Gordon Brown left last, protesting
loudly. Most of this is documented in the recent book by Luuk van Midde-
laar, who was chairman Van Rompuy's close assistant at the time.7
Under this immense pressure, what happened, constitutionally speak-
ing? Exceptional authority was exercised and new authority created. A new
institution was born, in the heart of the EU executive: the Euro-summit, as
it is now called. It was created not by way of legal decision, but by way of
convention. This happened in the heat of the moment and under protest
of some concerned. Both conditions helped towards the birth of this new
institution: the pressure of events created the necessity; British protest
marked the moment of the event and helped to articulate it.
When Brown had left, the question arose who was to chair this meeting?
The first and only meeting in this format, autumn 2008, was convened and
chaired by then rotating chair France's President Sarkozy. With Spain now
in the rotating presidency of the EU, no wonder José Zapatero walked to
take the chair. But in the meantime, on 1 December 2009, the office of per-
manent chair of the European Council had been created. Herman van
Rompuy was in the chair and did not budge.
7 Luuk van Middelaar, Alarums and Excursions. Improvising Politics on the European
Stage (Agenda Publishing, Newcastle Upon Tyne, 2019), p 200. This is the English
version of his book in Dutch of 2017. The event was reported in greater detail in
my own (TE) newspaper column in Het Financieele Dagblad of 7 May, 2010 on the
basis of my fact-finding then. The facts reported have never been disputed.
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Zapatero looked left and right for support, but did not find it in suffi-
cient measure. Then he turned and went back to his seat. The showdown
was over. Thus, Van Rompuy not only won the clash, but also his position
for the future, a new institution and a new office for the Union constitu-
tion. The whole thing would be legally codified in the Fiscal Treaty of 2
March 2012, Art. 12.
There is no doubt that what happened on 25 March 2010 changed the
EU constitution. A new institution was created in the heart of the EU ex-
ecutive, with a new office of permanent president. The change not only af-
fected Member States' core sovereignties but was an expression of new au-
thority created for the EU, an authority of sovereign substance and status,
however limited.
Conclusion: suggestions for reading sovereignty and the EU constitution
How sovereignty will implant itself constitutionally into the EU structure
is not clear. It will have to be read from the facts. A close reading of the
above case of constitutional innovation may help to summarize, to con-
clude and to make some suggestions:
1. Sovereignty is not a notion alone, nor legal. It is, first, a fact in the
form of an authority, to wit the essential authority of the State. This
goes for sovereignty both as fact and as notion, the two supporting
each other.
2. Sovereignty is inherent in States and in their constitution. As a matter
of fact and as one of notion, sovereignty has originated and evolved
with the State and will continue to do so.
3. Sovereignty is not a given, neither as fact nor as a notion. There is no
immutable idea behind neither the facts nor the notion of sovereignty.
Nothing prevents its evolution towards the EU wielding original polit-
ical authority in agreement with the sovereignties of its Member
States.
4. Neither the facts nor the notion of sovereignty is exclusively legal. To
consider sovereignty a matter of law and of legal doctrine alone leads
to deception. On the other hand, to consider sovereignty as essentially
non-legal, as Carl Schmitt held, is equally deceptive.
5. Sovereign authority in the context of the Union will come about and
be exercised respectful of Member State's sovereignties while pressing
these to evolve. It is not only a matter of dividing nor of sharing or
pooling sovereignty, but of finding a new constitutional structure. The
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UK Government and constitutional doctrine has failed to make clear
to the public that the evolution of the EU is no necessary threat to UK
sovereignty even if it provides evolutionary pressure to the structure of
executive authority and representation, and even judicial authority
which has to be acknowledged, expressed and given form, at the na-
tional level.
6. There is no identifiable limit in law to the evolution of the Member
States or to that of their sovereignties in the context of the Union,
their 'European sovereignty'.
7. We want to study the EU constitutional development to understand it
as an evolution of the facts and notion of sovereignty of the member in
conjunction with the constitution of the EU. The latter will concern:
a) EU original executive authority, as developing e.g. in the Euro-
context and exemplified by the case above-mentioned;
b) EU original legislative and representative authority, as developing
out of two sources. First, the Member States' treaty making power
evolving into EU primary legislation, in name and in fact of au-
thority. Second, in the original authority of EU secondary legisla-
tion. Most critically, this development will be led through the
original representative authority of EU citizens by the European
Parliament as provided in Arts. 10 and 14 of the EU Treaty since
Lisbon.
c) The Bundesverfassungsgericht's square denial, from the Maas-
tricht Urteil through the Lissabon Urteil and upheld to today, of
the European Parliament's representation of EU citizens is an un-
lawful denial of the possibility of German sovereignty to evolve
and include representation of Europeans.8
d) EU original judicial authority (autonomy, precedence), as claimed
by the ECJ and in most part agreed by most who are subject to it
(Member States, courts, private parties). The problem is that this
authority articulates itself clearly only in legal terms, ignoring
wider than legal claims and pretending these wider claims have
also been agreed. But supremacy of EU law and the autonomy of
the legal order are not expressions of full EU supremacy or of its
autonomy, let alone its sovereignty.
8 BVerfG 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08, para 284: Das Europäische Parlament bleibt vor
diesem Hintergrund in der Sache wegen der mitgliedstaatlichen Kontingentierung
der Sitze eine Vertretung der Völker der Mitgliedstaaten.
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8. If we constitutionalists don't come to terms with Member State
sovereignty as evolving in the context of EU, this will be a disservice to
the field of EU constitutional law.
9. Member States that don't come to terms with their sovereignty as an
essential remaining attribute yet necessarily evolving under Union
membership, will remain a liability in and to the Union.
10. As to Brexit. At finalizing this paper (Thursday 20 April, 2019), the
present author nor anyone else can know what the British miscarriage
of democracy on 23 June 2017 will ultimately bring forth. But some
decision is inevitable. As an optimist, whose understanding of develop-
ments is oriented by hope, I perceive a possibility for the crisis to lead
to a redeeming change in the structure of UK politics and even a
change in the constitution.
The saving change in UK politics needs to tackle, probably, as one never
can be sure of the way redemption takes, two elements. First, the polarity
between the two dominant parties; second, each of their crucial internal
divisions over the EU.
The change in the UK constitution would have to involve an acceptance
of the evolution of UK sovereignty in fact and its notion to include mem-
bership of the Union as one of its pillars. It would remain a parliamentary
constitution under the sovereignty of Parliament, but has to become, in
addition, the European sovereignty of the UK, accounting for the represen-
tative input of the European Parliament and for the executive input of EU
executive bodies, notably the European Council and its progeny, such as
the Euro-summit.
It is my hope as a scholar, that the present piece will be a help to under-
standing prospective events in the Brexit saga beyond the date of Easter
2019, when the piece was finalized. And that the events will have turned or
channeled the immense political pressures into development, British and
European. As is and will always remain in the powers and ingenuities of
politics9.
9 All this in the spirit of Bernard Crick's classic In Defence of Politics, London, Pen-
guin, 1992, fourth edition (my copy); first: 1962.
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Brexit from the Perspective of EU Sovereignty.
Some Comments on Tom Eijsbouts’ Contribution to this
Book
Ana Maria Guerra Martins
Abstract
The author argues that the application of the idea of sovereignty to the EU can
bring fears and suspicions that must be avoided in the current European context.
Otherwise, by definition, the idea of sovereignty comprises an element of exclusiv-
ity, which is almost impossible to spread over more than one entity. Sharing
sovereignty is to some extent a contradictory idea. The author also sustains that
the presidency of the euro summit must be assessed in the context of EMU gover-
nance, and within this broader context, this is anything but an exercise of EU’s
sovereignty. In addition, Article 50 TEU does not express some kind of EU
sovereignty, as the case Wightman of the Court of Justice recently confirmed.
Even if all these difficulties could be overcome, it remains the question whether
the idea of EU sovereignty can be helpful after the withdrawal of the United
Kingdom. In the view of the author, it cannot, and all in all, the EU does not
need to be compromised with sovereignty.
A Challenging and Inspiring Contribution but…
Commenting Tom Eijsbouts’ contribution in this book is a rather chal-
lenging task because he introduced in the discussion of Brexit one of the
most traditional notions that has ever been conceived in philosophy, polit-
ical science and legal theory – the idea of sovereignty. Fascinated by the
discourse of the President Macron of 26 September 2017 at Sorbonne,1
Tom Eijsbouts seeks to give new clothes to the concept of sovereignty, re-
jecting the perspective of those who consider that the idea of sovereignty is
nowadays outdated.
1
1 Available at http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/initiative-pour-l-europe-discou
rs-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique/.
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By contrast, he accepts that Brexit is an exercise of UK sovereignty, un-
derlining, at the same time, that ‘Brexit proves that the UK’s sovereignty
has failed to evolve with its membership to EU and take on a European di-
mension’.
For Tom Eijsbouts, at the end of the day, the Brexit decision may be ex-
plained by the failure of realizing the European dimension of sovereignty.
Apparently, for him, once sovereignty means authority, a multilevel
constitutionalism must be based on some kind of multilevel sovereignty in
progress that is located together in the individual Member State and in the
Member States altogether as well as in the European Union.
According to Tom Eijsbouts, in order to prevent events, such as Brexit,
Europe needs to build up its own sovereignty, which shall be added to the
States’ sovereignty. For him, the way how the Euro summit came into being
and got itself a permanent president shall be faced as an exercise of Euro-
pean sovereignty.
This is a rather inspiring and innovative perspective. However, as fasci-
nating as it may be, the transposition of the idea of sovereignty into the
European Union will, in my opinion, face some insurmountable obstacles.
Firstly, applying the idea of sovereignty to the EU is a risky adventure,
once it can bring more problems than contribute to solve whatever it is.
From the outset, it can arouse fears and suspicions that must be avoided in
the current European context at all costs. All in all, the EU does not need
to be compromised with sovereignty.
Secondly, the definition of EU sovereignty is anything but simple, once
it must integrate and respect the sovereignty of the Member States. Or, by
definition, the idea of sovereignty comprises an element of exclusivity,
which is almost impossible to spread over more than one entity. The idea
of shared sovereignty, which has already been rather popular among the le-
gal scholarship, is to some extent contradictory.
Thirdly, the presidency of the euro summit must be assessed in the con-
text of EMU governance. Within this broader context, one can hardly ac-
cept that it was an exercise of EU sovereignty.
Fourthly, Article 50 TEU might comprise some elements that go be-
yond the classical idea of sovereignty but that does not mean that they ex-
press some kind of EU sovereignty. The recent decision of the Court of Jus-
tice,2 accepting the reversibility of the notification of leaving the EU con-
firms that the UK sovereignty is much more powerful.
2 CJEU, C-621/18 Wightman and Others ECLI:EU:C:2018:999.
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Fifthly, even if all these difficulties could be overcome, it remains the
question whether the idea of EU sovereignty can be helpful after the with-
drawal of the United Kingdom.
In the following pages I will elaborate on these topics.
Sovereignty of the European Union – a Risky Adventure?
Inseparable link between sovereignty and State
Starting by clarifying why the application of the concept of sovereignty to
the European Union, is, in my point of view, a risky adventure, I would
say that the idea of sovereignty was not conceived for a multilevel constitu-
tional3 and political entity,4 such as the EU.
Conversely, it was conceived by Jean Bodin,5 in the sixteenth century,
intrinsically linked to the State as an institution that maintains a supreme
governing authority over a defined territory and which is to be differentiat-
ed both from its constituent people and its office holders. The sovereignty
was, in the internal perspective, the absolute and indivisible authority of
the ruling power.6 This theory was meant to serve a practical political pur-
pose.7 In order to survive the State needed to eliminate all other powers.
Secondly, the external dimension of the sovereignty, which implies the
capacity of acting within the international community on an equal footing
with other States, arose later (nineteenth century).
2
2.1
3 See: Ana Maria Guerra Martins, ‘Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice in the Con-
text of Multilevel Protection of Fundamental Rights and Multilevel Constitutional-
ism Revisited’, in L Papadopoulou / I Pernice / J. H. H. Weiler (eds.), Legitimacy
Issues of the European Union in the Face of Crisis – Dimitris Tsatsos memoriam (Baden-
Baden, Hart / Nomos, 2017) 233–270, as well as the bibliography therein quoted.
4 I have always argued that the EU is a new form of aggregation of political power.
See: Ana Maria Guerra Martins, Manual de Direito da União Europeia (Lisboa,
Almedina, 2017) 229 ff.
5 J. Bodin, De Republica (1576).
6 Martin Loughlin, ‘The erosion of sovereignty’ (2016) Netherlands Journal of Legal
Philosophy 58.
7 Tina Oršolič Dalessio, ‘The issue of sovereignty in an ever closer union’
(2014) Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 69.
Brexit From The Perspective Of Eu Sovereignty
31
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748903246, am 21.11.2019, 13:37:49
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
However, both dimensions were born and grew up with in the scope of
the State,8 whose affirmation as a political entity required a strong internal
and external authority. To put it in other words, the idea of sovereignty
arose in a very particular environment and enjoyed certain unrepeatable
circumstances. That means the idea of sovereignty was – as many other
ideas – a product of a certain time and a certain place.
As the circumstances have changed, so has the understanding of
sovereignty.9 In continental Europe it took the form of popular sovereign-
ty, while in Great Britain it was transformed into the principle of parlia-
mentary sovereignty.10
The EU’s challenges to the idea of sovereignty
The project of the European integration has also created great challenges
to the idea of sovereignty.11 However, in my opinion, any attempt to trans-
pose this idea into the European Union itself is at first starved for failure.
The European Union is a compound entity, created by the Member
States, and its authority derives, firstly, from them and, secondly, from the
citizens.
The European Union was made neither to – and it actually cannot –
eliminate the authority of the Member States nor to replace them. By con-
trast, it comprises the Member States and it is founded on cooperation,
mutual influence, reciprocal confidence and interdependence.
In my opinion, the inclusion of the idea of sovereignty in this context
may jeopardize the relationship between the Union and the Member
2.2
8 On the concept of sovereignty and its evolution see Daniel Philpott, “Ideas and
Evolution of Sovereignty”, Sohail H. Hashmi (ed.), State Sovereignty: Change and
Persistence in International Relations (Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1997) 15 ff;
Bruno De Witte, ‘Sovereignty and European Integration: the Weight of Legal Tra-
dition’ (1995), MJ 145 ff; Joseph A. Camilleri/Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The
Politics of a Schrinking and Fragmenting World (Edward Elgar Publishing,1992) 11–
68; R.P. Anand, ‘Sovereign Equality of States in International Law’, Recueil des
Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 197 (1986, II), 17–46.
9 Tina Oršolič Dalessio, (2014) ‘The issue of sovereignty’ 69.
10 This is not the adequate place to elaborate on these topics. In order to go further
see Neil Walker, ‘Sovereignty Frames and Sovereignty Claim’, Research Paper Se-
ries No 2013/14 of the School of Law of the University of Edinburgh, 4 ff; Pavlos
Eleftheriadis, “Law and Sovereignty” Legal Research Paper Series No 42/2009.
11 See, above all, Neil MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) Modern Law
Review, 1–18.
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States’ institutions, as even may break the mutual confidence and coopera-
tion between the Member States and the EU.
The assertion of sovereignty by the EU would certainly provoke an affir-
mation of sovereignty by the side of the Member States. Actually, through-
out the history of the European integration, there are many examples of
tension between the Member States and the European Union, due to dis-
putes on sovereignty, as the case law of some Supreme12 and Constitution-
al Courts13 has ever shown. In their Lisbon Treaty judgements some Con-
stitutional Courts14 seemed to be more flexible as regards the understand-
ing of sovereignty. However, all courts ‘have made it clear that the process
of European integration can only go on as far as it does not infringe upon
the core national sovereign powers’.15
If one introduces the sovereignty narrative in the European Union, one
can easily anticipate the raising of tensions between the Member States
and the EU institutions.
The idea of sovereignty of the Union would also comprise an internal
and an external authority, which could compete with the authority of the
Member States. This competition would certainly provoke a permanent
tension between the institutions of the European Union and the Member
States that would not be beneficial for the future developments of the rela-
tionship between the EU and the Member States.
Therefore, I do not believe that the notion of sovereignty would be very
helpful in the context of the European Union.
As regards the external dimension of the EU, it is even more question-
able to accommodate the idea of sovereignty. Although the Union has the
capacity to act at the international level, it is subjected to several restraints.
The conclusion of mixed agreements,16 the limited competence in the field
of foreign security and defense policies17are only two examples of these re-
strictions. However, they illustrate rather well that the lack of EU’s author-
12 See, for instance, the Irish Supreme Court in the judgement Crotty v An Taoiseach
or the Danish Supreme Court Decision in the Maastricht case.
13 See the French Constitutional Council in the Maastricht case I, the German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court in the Maastricht case, the Spanish Constitutional
Court in the Decision on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
14 See the decisions of Lisbon Treaty of the German Federal Constitutional Court,
the Czech Constitutional Court, the Hungarian Constitutional Court, the Latvian
Constitutional Court and the Polish Constitutional Court.
15 Tina Oršolič Dalessio, ‘The issue of sovereignty’, 77.
16 Ana Maria Guerra Martins, Os desafios contemporâneos à ação externa da União Eu-
ropeia – Lições de direito internacional público II (Coimbra, Almedina 2018) 211 ff.
17 Ana Maria Guerra Martins, Os desafios contemporâneos, 320 ff.
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ity within the scope of some external fields. Dealing with the concept of
sovereignty in this context is problematic.
Additionally, in several domains the core of international political au-
thority still belongs to the Member States.
Contrary to Tom Eijsbouts, I do think that the historical background of
the idea of sovereignty is so strong that it can hardly be freed from it.
The EU Sovereignty Idea May Cause More Damages than Gains
In my point of view the introduction of the idea of sovereignty in the
European Union discourse may cause more damages than gains, once it
may lead to some misunderstandings, turmoil and even may reactivate
nonsense fears, which is the most propitious terrain for evolving Euroscep-
tic, nationalist and populist movements.
In my opinion, as the European Union has become a different and
unique political entity in the world, the use of old notions, such as
sovereignty or federalism, in legal and political theories may well result in
more problems than solve whatever it is.
In its origins, the idea of sovereignty contains not only an element of au-
thority but also a component of exclusivity. It is rather difficult for the
Member States and, who knows, even for the citizens to accept some kind
of multilevel sovereignty in progress that is located either in the individual
Member State or in the Member States altogether or in the European
Union.
I do believe that it is better to replace or even to abandon the idea of
sovereignty,18 which is too connected to the State, than seeking to adapt it
to political entities that have nothing to do with the State and I am not
alone in this belief.19
In my view, the introduction of the idea of sovereignty into the narra-
tive of the European Union can only contribute to exacerbate the current
internal tension between the Member States and the EU institutions. And
Brexit is a good example of how the introduction of the idea of sovereignty
in the European Union discourse may well lead to negative Member
States’ reactions.
2.3
18 Against: Bruno De Witte, ‘Sovereignty and European Integration’ 172–173.
19 See: Pavlos Eleftheriadis, ‘Law and Sovereignty’, maxime 37–39. Michael New-
man, Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union (London, St. Martin’s Press,
1996), 12; Michel Leroy, ‘Requiem pour la souveraineté, anacronisme pernicieux’,
in Mélanges offerts à Jean Vélu, tome I, (Brussels, Bruylant, 1992), 91 f.
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It is never too much to remember that Brexit relied on the rhetoric of
State sovereignty before and after the referendum of 23 June 2016.
‘Taking back control’ over laws, borders, democracy, and money means
nothing but ‘taking back control’ over the most significant issues of the
State sovereignty and its constitutional system.
Notwithstanding, the rhetoric of sovereignty does not take many factors
into account. Firstly, the effects of the withdrawal of a Member State are
not restricted to the Member State that leaves the EU, but they are also felt
in the other Member States. That means the sovereignty of the remaining
Member States is also threatened. Secondly, it is true that the referendum
is one means to express the will of the people, but it is not the sole legiti-
mate tool in the context of the exercise of democracy. To put it bluntly,
sometimes it is not the most accurate one, especially when nobody serious-
ly considered the consequences of a negative result. Many scholars, includ-
ing in the UK, criticized the political decision of launching a referendum
on the exit of the EU. For instance, Jo Shaw drew attention to the particu-
larities of the UK as a Union State and to the fact that some voices were
not heard in the referendum vote and that those voices were also neglected
during the debate that preceded the referendum.20
In the perspective of the remaining Member States, the withdrawal may
be conceived as an “authoritarian” decision, since their citizens will lose
certain rights – for instance, the ones inherent to EU citizenship – without
having been consulted.
Accepting that Brexit is an expression of the UK sovereignty– which is
rather consensual and recently confirmed by the Court of Justice of the
EU21 – implies at the same time the rejection of EU sovereignty.
Therefore, if one does not want to introduce more sand into the gear, it
is better to leave some words, such as sovereignty or federalism, where they
are – within the State. That means aside the EU.
Other difficulties Raised by the Extension of the Concept of Sovereignty
Extending the concept of sovereignty beyond the State raises other ques-
tions, such as the one of its scope of application. Is it reduced to the EU or
2.4
20 V. Jo Shaw, “The quintessentially democratic act? Democracy, political communi-
ty and citizenship in and after the UK’s referendum of June 2016” (2017) Journal
of European Integration, 12.
21 CJEU, C-621/18 Wightman and Others ECLI:EU:C:2018:999.
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is the idea of sovereignty potentially applicable to every political entity? Is
it applicable to the international community in general, namely, to inter-
national organizations? Is it applicable to global governance, which com-
prises all sorts of actors (either public authorities or private)?
I am not saying that Tom Eijsbouts suggested going that far. Actually, I
do not think so. However, if one opens the Pandora’s box of the sovereign-
ty beyond the State, one must be ready to extend it, at least, to some inter-
national organizations, such as United Nations or the Council of Europe.
In my view, if the application of the idea of sovereignty to the EU raises
enormous problems, extending the said application to international orga-
nizations, which are dominated by the Member States, will face even
greater obstacles. And the sovereignty of the global governance is even
more unconceivable. This is true that global governance includes informal
entities that exercise authority without clear legal and political limits and
sometimes against the decisions of the States and of other legitimated in-
ternational actors, such as the international organizations. However, that
does not mean they are exercising sovereignty. By contrast, such situations
only highlight the difficulties of drawing a clear boundary between the ex-
ercise of sovereignty and a pure exercise of power (force). Not all acts origi-
nating from a political authority should be regarded as sovereign acts.
In the event that the idea of sovereignty only applies outside the State
within the European Union, as it seems to be the reasoning of Tom Eijs-
bouts, I do not see what is the difference of some well-known concepts,
such as ‘pooled sovereignty’, ‘shared sovereignty’,22 or ‘divided sovereign-
ty’, which have been theorized by the EU law scholarship since the very be-
ginning of the European integration.
22 Stefan Oeter, ‘Souveränität und Legitimation staatlicher Herrschaft im europä-
ischen Mehrebenesystem’, in Astrid Epiney et al, Direkte Demokratie und Europäis-
che Union. Démocratie directe et Union européenne (Freiburg 1998), 29 ff; idem,
‘Souveränität und Demokratie als Probleme in der “Verfassungsentwicklung” der
Europäischen Union’ (1995) ZaöRV, 666 ff.
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Denial of EU Sovereignty
The evolution of EMU Governance denies the EU Sovereignty
Contrary to Tom Eijsbouts, I do not assess the way how the Euro summit of
25 March 2010 in Brussels came into being and got a permanent president
as an exercise of European sovereignty.
In my viewpoint, this isolated act should be evaluated in the wider con-
text of the response of the EU and the Member States to the sovereign debt
and euro crises. When one puts this act in context, one can hardly accept
that the way how the EMU governance evolved during the crisis represents
any kind of exercise of EU sovereignty. By contrast, as it is well known, in
order to challenge the crisis not only a panoply of legislative measures
through the procedures established by the Lisbon Treaty were approved,
but also some inter-governmental treaties (the European Stability Mecha-
nism, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Econo-
mic and Monetary Union, the so-called Fiscal Compact, and the Single
Resolution Fund in the context of the banking union23) and the executive
agreements (EFSF2 and the Euro Plus Pact). These treaties were approved
by the EU Member States outside the Lisbon Treaty and bound only the
signatory Member States. As Bruno De Witte put it, ‘a group of EU Mem-
ber States ‘stepped outside’ the EU legal order and the Union’s institution-
al framework, and instead resorted to instruments of public international
law for organizing their cooperation’.24
The Euro summit and its presidency are currently enshrined in Article
12 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Econo-
mic and Monetary Union, the so-called Fiscal Compact, of 2 March 2012,
which entered into force on 1 January 2013. The president of the Euro
summit is not anymore the President of the European Council, but an
elected President. That means the so-called expression of EU sovereignty
has suddenly turned into the most evident expression of Member States’
sovereignty, since the Fiscal Compact is an international treaty approved
and signed by the Member States and not by the EU.
3
3.1
23 On the inter-governmental agreement on the Single Resolution Fund see Federi-
co Fabbrini, ‘On Banks, Courts and International Law – the Intergovernmental
Agreement on the Single Resolution Fund in Context’ (2014) 21 MJ 3, 444 ff.
24 Bruno De Witte, ‘Using International Law in the Euro Crisis – Causes and Conse-
quences’, Working Paper, ARENA Working Paper No. 4, June 2013.
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In the short term the TSCG may be fully integrated into the EU legal
framework, following the recommendation of the Five Presidents’ report25
and a proposal of the Commission of December 2017.26 However, up to
now the Fiscal Compact remains an exercise of Member States’ sovereign-
ty. The EU sovereignty has not been exercised yet.
We will probably need to revisit this topic, if the above mentioned rec-
ommendation and proposal become hard law in the future, but with the
currently available data, the way how the Euro summit got the permanent
presidency was the result of a constellation of factors that cannot be as-
sessed as an exercise of sovereignty.
Anyway, this was not the first time that law was overcome by facts in
European integration. The crisis of the chaise vide, the Schengen Agree-
ments, the Social Agreement, the successive opting outs of some Member
States are good examples that can be invoked in this context.
To sum up, the way how the Euro summit got the permanent presiden-
cy was only a drop in a bucket that does not allow any definitive conclu-
sion. After that episode there were so many manifestations in the opposite
direction, which do neither permit to consider that the EU sovereignty has
already emerged nor that it is in progress.
The reversibility of the UK decision of leaving the EU
Another example that denies the EU sovereignty concerns the reversibility
of the UK decision of leaving the EU. This question has been discussed in
the academy27 since the UK referendum of 23 June 2016.
3.2
25 Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/5-presidents-
report_en.pdf.
26 Proposal of the Commission of 6 December 2017 for a Council Directive laying
down provisions for strengthening fiscal responsibility and the medium-term
budgetary orientation in the Member States (COM(2017) 824 final 2017/0335
(CNS)). Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:52017PC0824&from=EN.
27 See ‘Editorial Comments’ (2016), Common Market Law Review, 1491 ff;
Christophe Hillion, ‘Le retrait de l’Union européenne – une analyse juridique’
(2016), Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 719 ff; Paul Craig, ‘The Process: Brexit
and the Anatomy of Article 50’, in Federico Fabbrini (ed.), The Law & Politics of
Brexit (Oxford Univ. Press, 2017) 49 ff; Catherine Barnard, ‘Law and Brexit’ (2017)
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 4 ff; Dora Kostakopoulou, ‘Brexit, Voice and
Loyalty: Reflections on Article 50 TEU’ (2016), European Law Review, 484 ff;
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Many scholars have suggested28 that the UK decision was not irre-
versible. According to them, the UK might well change its mind and noth-
ing in Article 50 prohibits the revocation of the notification, as long as it
respects the constitutional requirements of the State. As Piet Eeckhout and
Eleni Frantziou put it ‘if a Member State could not remove its notification
after changing its mind, and was thus forced to leave upon the conclusion
of a two-year period under Article 50(3), that would effectively amount to
an expulsion from the Union – a possibility that was considered and reject-
ed during the travaux. It would also be contrary to the principles of good
faith, loyal cooperation, the Union’s values, and its commitment to respect
the Member States’ constitutional identities’.29
On 10 December 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union puts
an end to any doubt on this issue. Within the scope of a preliminary ruling
request made by decision of the Court of Session, Inner House, First Div-
ision (Scotland, United Kingdom), the Court of Justice of the EU ruled
that ‘Article 50 TEU pursues two objectives, namely, first, enshrining the
sovereign right of a Member State to withdraw from the European Union
and, secondly, establishing a procedure to enable such a withdrawal to
take place in an orderly fashion.’30
Agreeing with its Advocate General, based on ‘the sovereign nature of
the right of withdrawal’, the Court admitted that ‘Article 50(1) TEU sup-
ports the conclusion that the Member State concerned has a right to re-
voke the notification of its intention to withdraw from the European
Union, for as long as a withdrawal agreement concluded between the
European Union and that Member State has not entered into force or, if
no such agreement has been concluded, for as long as the two-year period
laid down in Article 50(3) TEU, possibly extended in accordance with that
provision, has not expired’.31
According to the Court, the reversibility of the notification ‘reflects a
sovereign decision by that State to retain its status as a Member State of the
Tamara Capeta, ‘Brexit and the EU Constitutional Order: A three Act Tragedy’
(2016), Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy, 1 ff.
28 See Paul Craig, ‘Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts’ (2016), European Law Review, 464–
465; Piet Eeckhout / Eleni Frantziou, ‘Brexit and Article 50 TEU: A Constitution-
alist Reading’ (December 2016), UCL European Institute Working Paper’ 37 ff.
29 Piet Eeckhout / Eleni Frantziou, ‘Brexit and Article 50 TEU’ 41.
30 CJEU, judgment of 10 December 2018, Wightman and Others, C-621/18,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:999, para. 56 and 57.
31 Ibidem, para. 57.
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European Union, a status which is not suspended or altered by that notifi-
cation32 (…), subject only to the provisions of Article 50(4) TEU’.33
And the Court stressed that ‘given that a State cannot be forced to ac-
cede to the European Union against its will, neither can it be forced to
withdraw from the European Union against its will’.34
The emphasis put on the sovereignty of the Member State by the Court
contrasts with the lack of reference to the EU sovereignty. Actually, the EU
sovereignty is rather irrelevant in this context.
Having said that, one has to underline that the Court also set up limits
to State sovereignty. According to the Court, ‘the purpose of that revoca-
tion is to confirm the EU membership of the Member State concerned un-
der terms that are unchanged as regards its status as a Member State, and
that revocation brings the withdrawal procedure to an end.’35 That means
the revocation of the withdrawal’s decision shall not be transformed into a
renegotiation of the remaining terms of the Member State in the EU.36
In conclusion, the decision of not leaving should be taken, at first in-
stance, by the UK, in accordance with its sovereignty. The EU is, to a cer-
tain extent, subjected to that decision, unless it constitutes an abuse of
law.37
32 See judgment of 19 September 2018, RO, C-327/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:733, para-
graph 45.
33 CJEU, judgment of 10 December 2018, Wightman and Others, C-621/18,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:999. para. 59.
34 Ibidem, para. 65.
35 Ibidem, para. 75.
36 For a comment on this decision see Oliver Garner, ‘Case C-621/18, Wightman v
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union: the European Court of Justice
Confirms that Article 50 Notification can be Unilaterally Revoked’ (11 December
2018) European Law Blog available at https://europeanlawblog.eu/2018/12/11/case-
c-621-18-wightman-v-secretary-of-state-for-exiting-the-european-union-the-europea
n-court-of-justice-confirms-that-article-50-notification-can-be-unilaterally-revoke
d/; Dagmar Schiek, “The ECJ’s Wightman Ruling, the “Brexit” Process and the
EU as a Constitutional Entity” (7.1.2019) Frankfurter Newsletter zum Recht der
Europäischen Union, available at https://www.europa-uni.de/de/forschung/institut/
institut_fireu/newsletter/fireu-Newsletter-34.pdf.
37 Piet Eeckhout / Eleni Frantziou, ‘Brexit and Article 50 TEU’, 40.
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The Role of Sovereignty within the Negotiations of Brexit
In spite of the current uncertainty of the Brexit’s process, I would shortly
like to elaborate on the role played by the idea of sovereignty in the negoti-
ations of Brexit.
Regardless the final result of the Brexit process that nobody can predict
by now, the negotiations of Brexit also revealed to some extent a common
exercise of Member States’ sovereignties.
Firstly, at the very beginning, the rejection of the negotiation strategy of
Theresa May, who demanded parallel discussions regarding the withdraw-
al and trade, illustrates very well the leadership of the Union in the Brexit’s
process and the common exercise of Member States’ sovereignties. Accord-
ing to the President of the European Council, the negotiations should be
informed by the following principles: minimization of disruption caused
by UK withdrawal; securing agreement on the rights of EU citizens living
in the UK; ensuring that the UK honors its financial commitments; and
avoiding a hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland. “These four
issues are all part of the first phase of the negotiations. Once, and only
once, we have achieved sufficient progress on the withdrawal, can we dis-
cuss the framework for our future relationship. Starting parallel talks on
all issues at the same time, as suggested by some in the UK, will not hap-
pen.”38
The EU’s 27 leaders unanimously adopted the phased strategy at the
European Council meeting on 29 April 2017. Instead of contributing to di-
vide Member States, Brexit aggregated them around a negotiating strategy
that was proposed and supported by the European institutions.
From my point of view, although this decision has a constitutional com-
ponent and may well be regarded as a constitutional moment, it can hard-
ly be assessed as an exercise of EU sovereignty.
Secondly, the procedure of adoption of the future withdrawal agree-
ment shall also be assessed as a common exercise of the Member States’
sovereignties. This agreement shall be concluded on behalf of the Union
by the Council, acting by a qualified majority that represents at least 72 %
of the members of the Council representing the participating Member
States, comprising at least 65 % of the population of these States, after ob-
4
38 Remarks by President Donald Tusk on the next steps following the UK notifica-
tion, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03
/31/tusk-remarks-meeting-muscat-malta/.
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taining the consent of the European Parliament (Articles 50 (2) TEU, 218
(3) and 238 (3) (b) TFEU).
The adoption of the withdrawal agreement by the Council, acting by a
qualified majority, could even be seen as a first signal of the exercise of EU
external sovereignty. Actually, the withdrawal agreement is concluded be-
tween the EU (not by the Member States) and the exiting Member State.
However, in my opinion, this is not enough to characterize the treaty-mak-
ing power of the Union as a pure exercise of sovereignty, due to the com-
position of the Council. It never acts independently of the Member States
collectively. Furthermore, the future withdrawal agreement – if it exists –
must follow the constitutional requirements of the leaving Member State.
Therefore, the successive rejection of the draft agreement by the UK Parlia-
ment shows once again the Member State (rectius: the UK) sovereignty
prevails.
Thirdly, the recent extension of the 29 March deadline to 31 October
2019, according to Article 50 (3)TEU, may also be assessed as an expression
of the common exercise of the 27 Member States sovereignties and the UK
sovereignty, once it is taken by a unanimous decision of the European
Council and the agreement of the withdrawal Member State.
May EU Sovereignty emerge after Brexit?
Finally, although it is nowadays impossible to predict whether the exit of
the United Kingdom from the Union will contribute to deepen the Euro-
pean integration or will constitute a fertile ground for disintegration,
question whether the Brexit can have the effect of launching the EU
sovereignty is always possible.
Despite the circulation of some proposals before Brexit, such as the
Global Strategy for the European’s Union Foreign and Security Policy pre-
sented by the High Representative of June 2016,39 the Brexit led to the in-
creasing of the discussion of the future of Europe. In March 2017 the Com-
mission launched the White Paper on the Future of Europe,40 which did
not enclose any concrete proposal but scenarios for discussion. Since then,
5
39 Available at https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/regions/files/
eugs_review_web_0.pdf.
40 Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/white_paper
_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf.
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the debate of the future of Europe has intensively increased both at politi-
cal and at the academic level.
With or without an agreement concerning the future relationship be-
tween the United Kingdom and the EU, the Brexit will without doubt im-
pact in several fields of the Union. For instance, without the UK the insti-
tutional framework will not be the same, as it loses one of the biggest
Member States. Similar reasoning applies to the financial framework of the
Union, once the United Kingdom is a liquid contributor to the EU budget.
The impact of Brexit in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) will also be re-
markable, since the UK is not only the Member State that spends more on
security and defense but it is also a Permanent Member of the UN Security
Council.41 According to Whitman, ‘…for the EU the loss of UK’s diplo-
matic and military resources will diminish the collective capabilities at the
disposal of EU foreign and defence policies’.42
Depending on the future relationship between the UK and the EU
agreement, the impact of UK’s exit may still be minimized either for the
UK or for the EU.
Let me concentrate on the topic of the rights of EU citizenship and fun-
damental rights in general. The withdrawal of a Member State – whatever
it may be – from the Union will have an impact on EU citizens’ rights ei-
ther they are UK citizens or not. That means the impact of Brexit over-
comes the boundaries of the UK. Agreeing with Piet Eeckhout and Eleni
Frantziou, ‘the withdrawal of a Member State from the European Union
creates significant possibilities of regression in terms of fundamental
rights, and of panoply of other rights of persons and companies’.43
41 On the impact of Brexit into the CFSP see Ramses A. Wessel / Adam Łazowski,
‘Legal Consequences of ‘Brexit’ for the Role of the EU and the UK in Global Af-
fairs’, Paper presented at the EUSA Conference, Panel 7 A The Consequences of
Brexit on Europe's role: Reinvigoration or Atrophy, Miami, 4–6 May 2017, avail-
able at file:///C:/Users/Ana%20Martins/Downloads/Wessel%20and%20Lazowski
%20-%20Legal%20Consequences%20of%20Brexit%20-%20EUSA%20Miami
%202017%20-%20Panel%207A%20(1).pdf; James Black et al, Defence and Security
after Brexit – Understanding the possible implications of the UK’s decision to leave the
EU – Compendium Report (Cambridge, Rand Corporation, 2017), 25 ff.
42 Richard G. Whitman, “The UK and EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy Af-
ter Brexit: Integrated, Associated or Detached?” (2016) National Institute Economic
Review, 238–44.
43 Piet Eeckhout / Eleni Frantziou, ‘Brexit and Article 50 TEU’, 19.
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It is still possible to prevent some consequences of the losing of rights of
EU citizenship,44 through the conclusion of an international agreement be-
tween the UK and the EU, but it is impossible to prevent the losing of
rights. This loss does not depend on the exercise of EU sovereignty, rather
on the exercise of UK sovereignty, on the one hand, and on the common
exercise of Member States’ sovereignties within the Union, on the other
hand. That means the EU sovereignty does not play any significant role in
the future relationship between the UK and the EU.
In addition, there are some fundamental rights that are very difficult to
maintain, such as the right to access to the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union either directly or through national courts by means of a refer-
ence in the context of a preliminary ruling and the fundamental rights ac-
knowledged by the Charter, which are not part of the ECHR.
Another remark should be made about the EU competences after Brexit.
In my viewpoint, the EU competences will not change as a direct conse-
quence of Brexit. However, after the leave of the UK, it might be easier to
exercise some of them45 as well as to modify the Treaty, in conformity with
Article 48 EU Treaty.
Provided it actually happens, one has to underline that this will not be
an exercise of EU sovereignty but an exercise of sovereignty of the Member
States, acting collectively.
To conclude, constitutionally speaking, we firmly believe that the EU
sovereignty will be a so useless idea after Brexit, as it has been before.
44 See: Guayasén Marrero González, ‘‘BREXIT’ – Consequences for Citizenship of
the Union and Residence Rights’, (2016) 23 MJ 5, 796–811; Oliver Garner, ‘After
Brexit: Protecting European Citizens and Citizenship From ‘BREXIT’ – Conse-
quences for Citizenship of the Union and Residence Rights’, (2016) 23 MJ 5
(2016) 796–811; Oliver Garner, ‘After Brexit: Protecting European Citizens and
Citizenship From Fragmentation’, EUI Working Paper LAW 2016/22.
45 The authors of the Clingendael Report argue that EU defence might well be one
of the fields where the exit of the UK may be beneficial. See Anne Bakker / Mar-
griet Drent / Dick Zandee, ‘European Defence: how to engage the UK after Brex-
it?’ (The Hague 2017), 8.
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Differentiated Integration in Europe After Brexit:
An Institutional Analysis
Giacinto della Cananea
Abstract
It is self-evident that the European Union has evolved over time and so has the
relationship between unity and differentiation. Understanding the nature of this
evolution is more difficult. This essay seeks to explicate this development, not by
a temporal analysis, but by delineating two opposite political visions of the Euro-
pean construction. The first is the vision that is centred on the idea, or ideal, of
an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. The other vision of Europe
postulates a wide and loose union, a sort of ‘club’ where the members do not nec-
essarily wish to change the current state of things. The differing solutions provid-
ed by these visions are examined with regard, first, to some mechanisms of differ-
entiated integration, which are considered against the twin criteria of clarity and
coherence and, second, with regard to other legal mechanisms, which imply an
interaction between EU members and third countries. This can be useful for a
better understanding of the institutional and legal options that are available for
the relations between the UK and the EU in the post-Brexit period.
Introduction
The outcome of the referendum that has been held in the United King-
dom about leaving the European Union (Brexit) has fuelled the debate, in
political and academic circles, about the future of the EU, in particular
from the perspective of differentiated integration.1 This essay seeks to con-
tribute to the debate, by arguing that it should be made clear that the dif-
fering solutions that are proposed for the challenges with which the Union
I.
1 For a discussion of the theories of European integration, see FG Snyder, European
Integration, Encyclopedia of Law and Society (Sage, 2004); A. Stone Sweet, Integra-
tion and the Europeanization of the Law, in P Craig & R Rawlings (eds), Law and
Administration: Essays in Honour of Carol Harlow (Oxford University Press, 2003),
197.
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is confronted are based not only on different legal foundations, but also on
distinct visions of the European construction. For analytical purposes, two
opposite political visions can be delineated. At this stage, it suffices to char-
acterize each of them in the briefest terms. There is, first, the vision that is
centred on the idea, or ideal, of an ‘ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe’, as provided by the Treaty of Rome’s preamble. The other vision
of Europe postulates a wide and loose union, a sort of ‘club’ where the
members agree only on a few fundamental principles and do not necessar-
ily wish to change the current state of things.
It is precisely because these are political visions that they provoke pas-
sionate debates. But, for all their importance in social and political life,2
passions do not help analytical clarity and coherence.3 My intent is, first, to
show the distinctive traits of each vision and to argue that the differences
between them are so profound that the significance of some central ele-
ments of European integration will differ depending upon the framework
within which they are considered. This applies, in particular, to the various
mechanisms of differentiated integration. The ensuing analysis will make
this patently clear, but the idea can be briefly exemplified here. The vision
of unified Europe that is based on the idea of the ‘ever closer union’, whilst
recognizing the diversity of European peoples not only, descriptively, as an
element of the real, but also, prescriptively, as an element that must be pre-
served, aims at strengthening the ties between them. The other vision,
which aims at achieving a wider and looser union, pays less attention to
those ties and favours greater flexibility. Secondly, after showing the differ-
ent background of these political visions, we shall see that both pose par-
ticular problems, legally and institutionally.
The essay is divided into four parts. The first two parts will illustrate the
vision of the European construction that purports the achievement of the
‘ever closer union’ and that of a wide union, with less intense ties and obli-
gations for its members, respectively. Next, some mechanisms of differenti-
ated integration will be considered against the twin criteria of clarity and
coherence. Finally, there will be a discussion of other legal mechanisms,
which imply an interaction between EU members and third countries.
This might be helpful for a better understanding of how the issues arising
from Brexit can be dealt with.
2 See AO Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capi-
talism before Its Triumph (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977).
3 P Craig, Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the European Union, 7 Eur. L. J.
(2001) 125.
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Two Visions of Europe (I): An “Ever Closer Union”
With regard to the first political vision of Europe, three are the main
themes underlying it: first, the meaning and relevance of the “ever closer
union”; second, the emergence of a ‘community of destiny’; third, a set of
institutional and legal mechanisms, with specific regard to the principle of
loyal cooperation – governing the action (and inaction) of both common
institutions and national authorities. Adequate attention must be paid to
some elements of flexibility too.
A Union of Peoples
The first vision is well grounded in the genetic act of modern European in-
tegration, the Declaration of 9 May 1950 as well as by the founding
treaties. The Declaration was premised on the necessity to eliminate the
‘age-old opposition of France and Germany’. However, its drafters were
fully aware of the importance, for a polity, of the cultural and social con-
struction of the sense of belonging. They thus proposed the creation of a
community, viewed as a ‘first step in the federation of Europe’, through
the achievement of a ‘de facto solidarity’ between the Member States. The
Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community was
based on the same strategy, but with an important linguistic shift. It did no
longer refer only to the States, but aimed at laying the foundations of a
community of peoples (a ‘communauté plus large et plus profonde entre des
peuples longtemps opposés’). The Treaty of Rome sought to achieve the same
goal. According to its preamble, this Community was created ‘among peo-
ples long divided by bloody conflicts’. An adequate awareness of such con-
flicts was not, however, an obstacle to the choice of those peoples to give,
through the institutions thus created, ‘direction to their future common des-
tiny’. The Community was thus the first step towards ‘an ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe’. This formulation was explicitly teleological,
in the sense that it sets out the telos of European integration.4.
The thesis that not only the founding States, but also their peoples, are
constitutionally relevant is of remarkable importance in helping us to un-
derstand the nature of the legal order of the Community. The ECJ, for ex-
II.
A.
4 For this terminology, see JHH Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1999) and id, Europe in Crisis – On ‘PoliticalMessianism’, ‘Legitima-
cy’ and the ‘Rule of Law’, 53 Singapore J. Leg. St. 248 (2012).
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ample, referred to it in its famous ruling in Van Gend en Loos, when it ar-
gued that the EEC constituted a ‘new legal order of international law’ and
established the direct applicability of the Treaty of Rome.5 This is not to
say, however, that the Treaty was based on strong democratic mechanisms
in the sense that all public power was channelled through Parliaments.6
Quite the contrary, it simply set up a Common Assembly, certainly not an
all-powerful body, though its institutional connection with national Parlia-
ments could be viewed in a different light today, in a period in which new
attempts are being made to strengthen the ties between representative in-
stitutions.
That said, the shift from States to peoples has had a number of impor-
tant repercussions, the first of which is the pluralist conception of the so-
cial element. The Community was not simply premised on the recognition
of the existence of a plurality of peoples but, precisely because its telos was
to give rise to an ‘ever closer union’ between those peoples, on the com-
mon understanding that no step would be taken to forge a single people or
demos. Put differently, the ties existing between the peoples of Europe that
accepted to forge a ‘future common destiny’ were to be progressively in-
tensified and strengthened, but without eliminating their distinctiveness.7
Similarly, the preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which un-
der Article 6 TEU has the same legal value of the treaties, provides that
‘The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union among them, are
resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values’. The underly-
ing philosophy thus differs from that which underlies the US Constitu-
tion, which begins with the identification of its unitary author, ‘We the
People of the US’.8 This conclusion, which attenuates the possible tension
between the recognition of a pluralistic Europe and the aspiration to
5 ECJ, Case 26/62, Van Genden Loos v. NederlandeseAdministratie der Belastingen, hold-
ing that the ‘Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obli-
gations between the contracting states. This view is confirmed by the preamble to
the Treaty which refers not only to governments but to peoples’.
6 See P Craig, The Community Political Order, 10 Indiana J. Global L. Studies
(2003), 79, 84.
7 For further analysis, see R. Dehousse (ed), Europe after Maastricht: an Ever Closer
Union? (Springer, 1994); J.L. Quermonne, Trois lectures du Traité de Maastricht: es-
sai d’une analyse comparative, 42 Revue fr. sc. pol. (1992) 802, 813 (arguing that a
federal vision was not incompatible with the Treaty of Maastricht, though with im-
portant adjustments).
8 See B Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Harvard University Press, 1991), for
an analysis of the foundations of the US Constitution; C Nicolaidis, We, the Peo-
ples of Europe, 83 Foreign Affairs (2004) 97, and M Zuleeg, What Holds a Nation
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strengthen the ties between its various parts,9 is coherent with the empha-
sis that the TEU’s preamble has placed more recently on the ambition to
‘reinforce’ the ‘European identity’. From the wording of the Treaty this is
clearly something that pre-existed in the Union.
A Community of Destiny
There is another fundamental consequence of the shift from States to peo-
ples, which concerns the social element. The founding Treaties clearly re-
jected the idea of a community of origin and embraced that of a communi-
ty of destiny (‘a destin partagé’). There is a striking difference between this
conception of the social element and that of the German Volk, with its
strong sense of identity and belonging.10
Precisely because the goal to achieve an ‘ever closer union’ is connected
with the creation of a community of destiny, it implies a dynamic concep-
tion of integration, as opposed to a static conception.11 This means that the
Member States have not simply joined a club and agreed on a set of obliga-
tions. Rather, they have created a community aiming at strengthening the
ties among their peoples.12 More recent political and legal documents have
confirmed this, including the Solemn Declaration of 198313 and the TEU,
according to whose first provision ‘this Treaty marks a new stage in the pro-
cess of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which deci-
sions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen’. European integration is
B.
Together? Cohesion and Democracy in the United States and in the European
Union, 45 Am. J. Comp. L. (1997), 505, 506, pointing out the difference between
the philosophies underlying the US Constitution and the EC Treaty.
9 See, however, the report published by the LSE, Ever Closer Union. Report of the
Hearing of 15th April 2015 (2016), 6, holding that a tension does exist.
10 See JHH Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, cit., 295, tracing the roots of the
overemphasis on the organic understanding of peoplehood to Carl Schmitt.
11 See LJ Constantinesco, La nature juridique des Communautés européennes, in
Ann. Fac. dr. Liège (1979), 179-180, emphasizing the dynamic character of Euro-
pean integration.
12 See W Hallstein, The European Economic Community, 78 Pol. Sc. Quart. (1963)
161, holding that the Community was ‘not ‘static..., it is a process of continuous
creation’.
13 The Solemn Declaration on European Union of June 1983 reiterated the ‘aware-
ness of a common destiny’ and their ‘commitment to progress towards an ever
closer union among the peoples’ of the EC and their Member States, thus intro-
ducing a new element.
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thus viewed as a process. As a result of this, we may wonder whether the
refusal of either one partner or a group of partners to proceed in the path
of the ‘closer union’ is in irreducible contrast with this dynamic concep-
tion, with the further consequence that it could be regarded as an infringe-
ment of the foedus.
This is not without practical consequences. Consider, for example, the
deal that the UK and the other members of the EU concluded a few
months before the referendum of June 2016, a deal that would exempt the
UK from being involved in the achievement of the “ever closer union”.14
Politically, while David Cameron’s intent was not to have his “country
bound up in an ever closer political union in Europe”,15 his predecessor
John Major accepted to keep the reference to the ‘ever closer union’, in or-
der to avoid any reference to a federal Europe. Whatever the intrinsic
soundness of the deal for the rest of the EU, all its members accepted it.
On constitutional grounds, however, the remarks just made suggest that
the deal was in contrast with the Treaties.
The ideal of the ‘ever closer union’ is important also for understanding
the criteria for membership. Since its early decades, the Community has
been much more than a free market area. Without question, if we look
back to the Treaty of Paris, it provided no less than making the key indus-
tries (coal and steel), that are indispensable to make war, subject to a com-
mon supranational control, in the logic of a federation of States, which
would have been completed by a common defence.16 Without question,
too, the Treaty of Rome was regarded by its founders as being much more
than a common market. They saw it as a community of liberal democra-
cies. This was clear in the 1950’s and was equally clear in the following
decades. An illuminating example is the denial to include Spain in the
1960’s, when it broadly accepted market economy but was still governed
by Franco’s authoritarian regime. Such denial was based on a doctrine of
14 The deal provided that: ‘It is recognised that the United Kingdom, in the light of
the specific situation it has under the Treaties, is not committed to further politi-
cal integration into the European Union. The substance of this will be incorp-
orated into the Treaties at the time of their next revision in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the Treaties and the respective constitutional requirements
of the Member States, so as to make it clear that the references to ever closer
union do not apply to the United Kingdom’.
15 See David Cameron’s statement to the House of Commons on 3 February 2016.
16 A treaty establishing the EuropeanDefence Community was signed in 1952, but it
was not ratified by the French Parliament.
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membership that underlined the importance of the political values that are
common to liberal democracies.
More recently, the members of the EU have clarified the type of soci-
eties in which the peoples that wish to forge a ‘common destiny’ must live.
The European Council in Copenhagen, in 1993, took the first step, when it
sets out some criteria. Such criteria included: i) stable institutions guaran-
teeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and pro-
tection of minorities; ii) a functioning market economy and the capacity to
cope with competition and market forces in the EU; iii) the ability to take
on and implement effectively the obligations of membership, including
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. These
criteria have been enshrined into the treaties. Their repercussions can be
appreciated from a twofold point of view. On the one hand, only a State
that respects those principles and is committed to promoting them may
thus apply for membership. On the other hand, the States that have ob-
tained membership are no longer free. They have renounced to their free-
dom to adopt an authoritarian regime. In this sense, the reference to the
Rule of Law and to fundamental rights, as well as to liberty and democracy
has effects similar to those of national constitutions that prevent any depar-
ture from a set of principles concerning the form of government.17 Unless
a State chooses to leave the Union, it must respect those principles, even
though there is a variety of opinion about their meaning and significance.
A Unitary Institutional Framework
Under the present political vision of Europe, there is a necessity to ensure
that the action of the members is coherent with their determination to
achieve an ‘ever closer union’ and this has two principal implications for
the constitutional framework. First, it requires an institutional framework
that permits them to elaborate and manage common policies. Second, it
postulates the adoption of legal mechanisms that serve to ensure the unity
of the legal order and the equality of the Member States therein. These
mechanisms, including the infringement procedure and the preliminary
reference procedure, will be considered later. Meanwhile, it is helpful to
consider the implications of the model of the ‘ever closer union’ from the
C.
17 JL Quermonne, Trois lectures du Traité de Maastricht: essai d’une analyse com-
parative, cit., 814.
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first point of view, which concerns the organization and functioning of
common institutions.
As far as the institutional framework is concerned, despite the initial
distinction between the three communities created between 1952 and 1957
(the ECSC, the EEC, and the Euratom), the Brussels Treaty of 1965 en-
sured the unity of the institutional framework, by ‘fusing’ their executives.
There were thus a single Commission and a Council of Ministers, together
with the Court of Justice and the European Parliament. Almost thirty years
later, the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) distinguished between the EC and
the two areas of cooperation between the Member States (external security
and justice and home affairs). The risk of fragmentation thus emerged.18
Given that the Union’s actions and policies were increasingly differentiat-
ed, institutions were the unifying element. The Treaty thus stressed the ex-
istence of a ‘single institutional framework’, having the goal of enhancing
the ‘efficient functioning of the institutions’19 or, in a slightly different ter-
minology, of ensuring the ‘consistency, effectiveness and continuity’ of
such policies and actions.20 The Lisbon Treaty eventually abolished the dis-
tinction between those forms of integration and cooperation. It established
that ‘the Union shall replace and succeed to the’ EC,21 thus confirming the
continuity between the Community and the Union. All public power was
thus channelled through the EU.22
Another implication of the vision of the ‘ever closer union’ concerns de-
cision-making processes. The precise implications are, however, disputed,
because of a tension between the provisions of the Treaties and their im-
plementation. On the one hand, it has been pointed that, unlike most in-
ternational organizations, in many cases the EC was enabled to reach its
decisions by way of majority voting. This strengthened the Commission’s
agenda-setting power and, more importantly, the conception of the ‘com-
mon’ interest as something distinct from the interests of the members. On
the other hand, there is a more cautionary note in the literature that em-
18 D Curtin, The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and
Pieces, 30 Common Mkt L. Rev (1993), 19.
19 Preamble of the TEU, emphasis added.
20 Article 13 (1) TEU. For further analysis, see R. Dehousse, From Community to
Union, in R. Dehousse (ed.), Europe After Maastricht (Beck, 1994).
21 Article 1 (3) TEU.
22 A von Bogdandy & M Nettesheim, Ex Pluribus Unum: Fusion of the European
Communities into the European Union, 2 Eur. L. J. (1996), 267. See also HP
Ipsen, Europaisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (Mohr Siebeck, 1972), 1050, for the thesis
that the unity of the legal structure of the EC derived from the rationale of itscon-
struction and its tasks.
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phasizes the reluctance, if not the refusal, by national governments to use
majority voting. This becomes clear when considering not only the long
period during which the so-called ‘Luxembourg compromise’ produced its
effects, weakening ‘normative supranationalism’,23 but also the persistence
of the requirement of unanimity for decisions affecting certain areas, such
as taxation.
There is still another salient implication of the present model. It is the
principle of loyal cooperation between supranational and national institu-
tions. This principle has been laid down by Article 5 TEC with a broad
scope of application and the ECJ has clarified its contents.24 On the one
hand, the Court has applied it to the relationship between common insti-
tutions, and in this guise it has been used, in particular, to strengthen the
role of the European Parliament. On the other hand, it has been applied to
the relationship between EC and national institutions. The Court has used
it not only as a negative norm, that is to say a prohibition to perform pol-
icies and issue acts or measures in contrast with the obligation to cooper-
ate, but also as a positive norm, thus condemning the inaction of national
authorities. This is just an example of the power of judicial review that the
ECJ has exercised. In exercising this power, the Court has had to decide
what the language of the constitution means and it has decided that the
principle of loyal cooperation precludes States from operating against the
common interest of the Community and now of the Union.25
Once the action of common institutions is justified, the question that
arises is how its results can be achieved if a State is unwilling to respect it
or is unable to do so, for example due to its internal organization. In the
language used by the ECJ this necessity has been conceptualized in terms
of ‘coherence’ of the legal order. Practically, it has been ensured by several
mechanisms, including the higher legal status of the norms laid down by
the treaties, the system of centralized enforcement centred on the Commis-
23 JHH Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism,
1 Ybk Eur. L. (1981), 267.
24 See, for example, the ECJ’s ruling in Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden and,
for further analysis, J Temple Lang, Article 5 of the EEC Treaty: the Emergence of
Constitutional Principles in the Case Law of the Court of Justice, 10 Fordham
Int’l. L. J. (1986), 503, showing that, though this general principle had largely
been underestimated, it was very important.
25 What is considered in the text is the internal action of common institutions. As
far as their external action is concerned, loyal cooperation must be kept distinct
from pre-emption, as observed by M Cremona, Defending the Community Inter-
est: the Duties of Cooperation and Compliance, in M Cremona & B De Witte
(eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law. Constitutional Fundamentals (Hart 2008), 168.
Differentiated Integration in Europe After Brexit: An Institutional Analysis
53
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748903246, am 21.11.2019, 13:37:49
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
sion, and the jurisdiction of the ECJ. The first element was implicit in the
Court’s mandate to ensure that the law was observed in the interpretation
and application of the Treaty of Rome, and more particularly in the provi-
sion concerning the infringement of any provision of the Treaty itself.26
But it owed much to the jurisprudence of the Court on the primacy and
direct effect of the Treaty, which were eventually accepted by the higher
courts of the Member States. EC law was to be either valid or invalid for all
the Member States, as well as to business and citizens within their borders.
Another salient element is the system of centralized enforcement cen-
tered on the Commission, as provided by Article 169 TEC, according to
which the Commission could bring ‘disobedient’ States before the ECJ.27
This marked a profound difference with other mechanisms that are still
used today by international organizations such as the WTO. However,
since this mechanism places the entire burden of supervising national
compliance on the shoulders of the Commission, it does not only entail a
considerable administrative workload, but also a huge amount of discre-
tion. The Commission may not know that a breach of the Treaty or imple-
menting legislation has occurred or it may prefer to postpone its interven-
tion. This could give rise to a prejudice for citizens and business whose
rights are affected by delayed or partial compliance.
For this reason, the Court’s doctrine of direct effect has had fundamen-
tal importance. It was by giving weight to their rights that the ECJ estab-
lished the fundamental principle of direct effect, thus empowering individ-
uals to enforce EC norms before national courts.28 This was a salient step
not only in the transformation of the Community from a compact be-
tween States to a legal order of a new kind, but also in the achievement of
the ‘closer union among the peoples of Europe’.29 At the same time, this
doctrine had a practical advantage, because EC norms could be enforced
without any need for the Commission to sue the States by way of the in-
fringement procedure. Action brought by interested individuals before na-
tional courts would suffice, if necessary by giving the Court of Justice the
possibility to interpret EC law in the context of the preliminary reference
26 See Articles 164 and 173 EC Treaty.
27 This is the ‘standard’ procedure: A Gil Ibanez, The ‘Standard’ Administrative Proce-
dure for Supervising and Enforcing EC Law: EC Treaty Article 226 and 228, 68, Law
& Cont. Probl. 135 (2004). Other mechanisms concern, for example, the surveil-
lance on excessive government deficits, under Article 126 TFEU.
28 ECJ, Case 26/62, Van Genden Loos v. NederlandeseAdministratie der Belastin-
gen.
29 P Craig, Administrative Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), 311.
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procedure. The margin of discretion left to national authorities was even
more limited by the Court’s rulings that awarded damages in case of non-
compliance with directives.30
Flexibility Within Unity
For all its concern for ensuring coherence, this vision of Europe does not
neglect the necessity of flexibility and of the differentiation that it can al-
low. Since the beginning, the legal order of the EC has been characterized
by the existence of legal mechanisms allowing some form of flexibility.
They can be justified in a simple manner: without some degree of flexibili-
ty the execution of legislation in very different areas of the same legal sys-
tem can be very hard, if not impossible.
The Treaty of Rome provided for both, a transitional period and for spe-
cial arrangements. The transitional period was provided in order to give all
the Member States enough time to adjust their internal institutional and
legal arrangements to cope with the obligations stemming from their
membership. Special legal arrangements were laid down either for some
policies, by way of specific derogations, or for some parts of the territory of
the Member States that were outside Europe. Interestingly, the Treaty of
Rome expressed the partners’ will to ‘to associate with the Community,
the non-European countries and territories which have special relations
with Belgium, France, Italy, and the Netherlands’.31 It also specified that
nothing precluded the existence of a regional union between Belgium,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, which stipulated an agreement in 1958.
After the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the UK, other norms gave the
latter some opt-out clauses and specified that the EC Treaty applied only
partially to the Isle of Man and did not apply as such to the Faroe Islands,
though it could have been extended to them subsequently. However, these
were very limited and specific areas, which could justify limited exceptions
without undermining the postulates of the other conception of the consti-
tutional framework of the Community.
An important element of differentiation also emerged from the famous
ruling of the ECJ in Cassis de Dijon. Confronted with a measure having
D.
30 ECJ, Joined Cases 6 & 9/90, Francovich, Bonifaci et al. v. Italy.
31 Article 131 (1), TEC. For further analysis, see D Hanf, Flexibility Clauses in the
Founding Treaties: From Rome to Nice, in B De Witte, D Hanf & E Vos (eds.), The
Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law (Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2001), 4.
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equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction, the Court found that a prod-
uct lawfully marketable in a Member State could be freely marketable in
another.32 It established, therefore, a sort of functional equivalence of na-
tional standards. The Commission endorsed this functional equivalence, or
mutual recognition as many began to call it and it became part of the ac-
quis. It provided EC institutions with a viable alternative to the harmoniza-
tion of national legislative, regulatory and administrative rules. It should
not be forgotten, however, that the Court recognized several exceptions, in
the guise of ‘overriding reasons of public interest’, including public health
and the protection of consumers, thus legitimizing national political pref-
erences.
The Difficulties of this Vision of Europe
As observed earlier, this vision of Europe shaped the pace and form of inte-
gration for decades. However, it was not unchallenged. First of all, it was
based upon a mistrust of the Nation-State, which was not unjustified after
World War II (WW2). However, retrospectively, some observers argued
that, far from ceding the centre stage to the institutions, the Member
States were rescued by European integration.33
Secondly, some lawyers criticized the exercise of the Union’s power to
harmonize national legislative and administrative rules, on grounds that it
would unnecessarily reduce the autonomy of national legal orders.34 Simi-
larly, some commentators observed that the Court did not show its will-
ingness to defer to such national preferences.35 There are certainly some el-
ements of truth in these remarks. The overall force of this critique is, how-
ever, attenuated by a fact that is not disputed and which has an undeniable
importance, politically and legally; that is, not only national governments
accepted harmonization within the Union’s decision-making processes,
E.
32 ECJ, Joined Cases 6 & 9/90, Francovich, Bonifaci et al. v. Italy.
33 A. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (Routledge 1992).
34 On such autonomy, there is a wide literature: see, in particular, DU Galetta, Pro-
cedural Autonomy of EU MemberStates: Paradise Lost? A Study on the "Func-
tionalized Procedural Competence" of EU Member States (Springer, 2010).
35 See AW Green, Political Integration by Jurisprudence (Sijthoff, 1969) and H Ras-
mussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice. A Comparative
Study in Judicial Policy-making (Nijhoff, 1986). But see also the opposite views of
M Cappelletti, Is the European Court of Justice ‘Running Wild’?,12 Eur. L. Rev.
(1987), 3, and JHH Weiler, The Court of Justice on Trial, 24 Common Mkt. L.
Rev. (1987), 555.
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but also their Parliaments constantly ratified all treaties providing it, in-
cluding the Lisbon Treaty. Moreover, every enlargement was decided un-
der the condition that the union between European peoples should be
deepened. The initial constitutional clause was confirmed by all the
treaties that amended the Treaty of Rome, as well as by all accession
treaties, including that concerning the UK.36
Thirdly, since the end of the 1980’s there was a growing awareness that,
though the Member States could and did keep a key role, European inte-
gration did not leave their structures and processes unchanged, in terms of
both centralization and perceived disempowerment of citizens. This pro-
voked a cultural and political reaction. It was no longer taken for granted
that European integration was a good thing in itself, because it under-
mined the sense of belonging and identity, which was allegedly rooted in
national constituencies. This explains, in part, the emergence of a different
vision of Europe, which is based on the idea of a wider and less demanding
or looser union which will be examined in the next section.
There is a final element of the picture, which should not be neglected;
that is, the perceived failure of the neo-functional approach that was associ-
ated with the idea of an ever closer union. Some of those who advocate
greater flexibility do so because they think that European integration has
simply gone too far and must, therefore, be reconsidered.37 Others point
out that what is increasingly controversial is precisely the dream of a better
future, based on peace and prosperity.38
Two Visions of Europe (II): A Wider and Looser Union
A Broad Community of Nation-States
It is important to say at the outset that the other vision of Europe, going
ideally from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals is not new, though it has
gained consent in the last two decades.
Some elements of this vision can be traced in the Treaty of Paris. Its
Preamble emphasized the intent to create a ‘broad’ community. Accord-
III.
A.
36 I am grateful to Ingolf Pernice for drawing my attention of this important issue.
37 See, for example, G Majone, Rethinking the Union of Europe Post-Crisis: Has In-
tegration Gone Too Far? (Cambridge University Press, 2014).
38 JHH Weiler, Europe in Crisis – On ‘Political Messianism’, ‘Legitimacy’ and the
‘Rule of Law’, cit, 258.
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ingly, the Treaty established that ‘[a]ny European State may request to ac-
cede to the present Treaty’.39 However, as observed earlier, it should not be
forgotten that membership would inevitably be common supranational
control of the key industries for both peace and war, coherently with a fed-
eralist approach.
The Treaty of Rome used slightly different words. It established that
‘any European State may apply to become a member of the Community’.40
It added a new element; that is, the Community’s capacity not only to con-
clude treaties with third countries and international organizations, but
also to ‘establish an association’ involving reciprocal rights and obliga-
tions.41 It was precisely when dealing with the failure of the first series of
negotiations for the UK entry into the Common Market (as it was then
called) and with the Uruguay round of GATT that Walter Hallstein reiter-
ated that the Community was, and had to be, an ‘open Community’.42
This political vision of the Community was converted into reality dur-
ing the following decades. While membership has remained unchanged
until 1973 and has changed by way of limited accessions during the follow-
ing three decades,43 it has changed more radically after 2000, when ten
new members have acceded the EU, followed by another three in the fol-
lowing years. An important step has thus been made towards the ‘broad’
union envisaged fifty years earlier and a new policy has replaced that of
gradual and limited extension of membership, with the consequence that
the number of Member States was almost doubled44.
This was not without institutional consequences. If the 1990’s had seen
the rise of subsidiarity, which appeared both as a rationale and an operat-
ing tool for resolving the practical problems raised by the widening scope
of Community policies, the following decade has been characterized by
discourses about flexibility and differentiation. Many have argued that new
and more flexible policy methods were necessary,45 including various
forms of differentiated integration. Others have underlined the necessity to
39 Article 98 (1), Treaty of Paris.
40 Article 237 (1), TEC.
41 Article 238 (1), TEC.
42 W Hallstein, The European Economic Community, cit, 174.
43 Denmark, Ireland and the UK in 1973; Greece in 1980; Portugal and Spain in
1985; Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995.
44 See C Lequesne, Les perspectives institutionnellesd’une union élargie, 69 Pou-
voirs (2004), 129.
45 See H Wallace, Flexibility: A Tool of Integration or a Restraint on Disintegration? (Ox-
ford, Oxford University Press, 2000).
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respect of national constitutional identities. Both arguments can be better
understood in the context of an analysis of the values upon which the
Union is founded.
A ‘Community of Interests’
Like other legal orders that of the EC/EU has laid down certain gateways,
methods for allowing interests to be recognized and weighed within the
system. Initially, these gateways were centred on individual interests, as op-
posed from collective interests, which are promoted by social groups, such
as trade unions and environmental associations.
Only at a later stage, have such collective interests gained recognition
and protection, for example, through the ‘dialogue with civil society’.46
There is another sense in which interests are of central importance for
understanding the role of the EU; that is, the problematic relationship be-
tween the ‘common’ interest and national interests. This relationship can
be considered both conceptually and institutionally. Conceptually, as ob-
served earlier, at the heart of the first vision of unified Europe there is a
conception of the ‘common’ interest, which is truly distinct from the inter-
ests of the individual States and which, within certain limits, must prevail
on them. Within the other vision of unified Europe, that of a broad and
loose union, there is a very different conception of the common interest. If
the EC/EU is a community of Nation-States, so the reasoning goes, it is
also a community of interests, where the common interest is nothing more
than the aggregation of national interests.47 It is perhaps no exaggeration
to say that, if the main function of the EU is to ensure that the market is
not distorted, the political arena functions similarly to the market.
This conception of the common interest has three principal implica-
tions. First, the role of the Union within this vision of a broad community
is not regarded as a challenge to the Nation-State, but as a mechanism for
B.
46 See Articles 10 (1) and 11 (2), TEU.
47 See C Harlow, A Community of Interests? Making the Most of European Law, 55
Modern L. Rev. (1992), 331. But see also D Mueller, Federalism and the European
Union: A Constitutional Perspective, 90 Public Choice (1997), 255, 267 (qualify-
ing the UK Government’s threat to veto the accession of new members in 1994 as
an “illustration … of an essentially constitutional choice only in terms of its im-
pact on the narrow geographic interests … represented”).
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preserving it.48 EU institutions are considered instrumentally, as means for
achieving policy goals, what no Member State could obtain alone. Second,
EU legislation must be narrowly confined for two related reasons. On the
one hand, there is the objective of limiting the Union’s legislative action.49
There has been concern for ‘creeping competence’,50 as it was often said
before the Treaty of Lisbon confirmed that the Union is founded on the
principle of conferred powers. On the other hand, even when common ac-
tion is in principle legitimate, it is argued that in many instances the States
are in a much better position for understanding and maximizing their in-
terests than is the EU. The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality
impose a rigorous scrutiny of any intervention by the EU.
Third, because every government operates so as to maximize its own in-
dividual interest within the decision-making processes of the EU, the cen-
tral institutions are those that are composed by national representatives.
Legislation is seen as a product that will be ‘produced’ by the legislature, in
particular by the Council of Ministers, in response to the demand from the
members of the club, that is to say the States. Accordingly, the role of the
Commission is that of implementing the balance of interests determined
by the Council. Even within the European Parliament, which is no longer
an assembly composed of delegates of national Parliaments, the choices to
be made are sometimes regarded in a national perspective.51 However, on
one hand, the internal organization of the EP does not reflect national
boundaries. On the other hand, there are several examples of parliamen-
tary debates that do not reflect national boundaries, for example, when
MPs discuss about the rules concerning the reduction of the tariffs paid by
consumers for roaming services. Nor is it the case when parliamentary
groups are called to discuss about agreements with third countries. The
preceding description is even less suitable to explain the choices that are
made by other institutions, in particular by the European Central Bank.
48 For a historic approach, see A. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State
(University of California Press, 1992).
49 J. Temple Lang, EC Constitutional Law: the Division of Powers between the
Community and the Member States, 39 N. Ireland Legal Q (1988), 209.
50 This expression became popular after the 1980s: see M. Pollack, Creeping Compe-
tence and the Agenda of the European Community, 14 J. Public Policy, (1994), 95.
51 S. Mazey & J. Richardson, Interest Groups and EU Policy Making: Organizational
Logic and Venue Shopping, in J. Richardson (ed.), European Union: Power and
Policy Making (Routledge, 2001), 217.
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The Shift from Principles to ‘Values’
For an adequate understanding of the importance of national constituen-
cies within this vision of unified Europe, it would be wrong to consider
only the ‘prosaic’ interplay of interests. At least two other elements ought
to be taken into account: the weight accorded to national constitutional
identity and the shift from common principles to ‘values’.
The term ‘national constitutional identity’ has been introduced by the
Maastricht treaty. This is not at all a very clear legal concept. Perhaps the
underlying idea can be understood as a temperament of the emphasis that
the other vision of Europe has placed initially on the general principles of
law common to the legal systems of the Member States and subsequently
on ‘common constitutional traditions’. At the heart of this idea there is a
concern for the preservation of the sense of identity and belonging that in
the last centuries has been forged within the Nation-States. Coherently
with this concern, whilst confirming the importance of ‘common constitu-
tional traditions’ under Article 6 TEU, the drafters of the recent Treaties,
from Maastricht to Lisbon, have referred to national traditions. National
traditions, in a generic sense, are mentioned by the TEU’s preamble, to-
gether with history and culture, though in an indent which begins with
the desire to deepen the solidarity between European peoples. Interesting-
ly, the TFEU recognizes national ‘legal traditions’ in a particular, but fun-
damental area, that of freedom, security and justice. It does so with the in-
tent of balancing the ‘respect for fundamental rights’ with the guarantee of
the ‘different legal systems and traditions of the Member States’.52
This shows a difficulty concerning fundamental rights, which becomes
more evident when considering an ambiguity of the Lisbon Treaty that has
been seldom noticed and that is under-theorized. Since the early 1950’s it
has been settled case-law of the ECJ that not only the institutions and bod-
ies created by the treaties, but also national authorities must respect the
general principles of law common to the legal orders of the Member
States, including legal certainty, proportionality and due process of law53.
Since the late 1960’s the Court has also ensured the respect of fundamental
rights, as they are listed by the European Convention of Human Rights.
The Preamble of the Maastricht Treaty confirmed the Member States ‘at-
C.
52 Article 67 (1), TFEU.
53 See JA Usher, General Principles of EC Law (Longman, 1998) and T Tridimas, The
General Principles of EU Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, 2nd ed.), both
highlighting the role of the ECJ.
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tachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for the funda-
mental freedoms and the rule of law’. This choice was confirmed by Arti-
cle F TEU, according to which the Union had to respect the national iden-
tities of the Member States ‘whose systems of government are founded on
the principles of democracy”’, as well as fundamental rights. The language
used by the Treaty thus was the same of the Court and was the language of
‘principles’. There was only one provision which used a different concept,
that of ‘values’, but it was a sector-specific provision, that did so with re-
gard to the common foreign and security policy and significantly, referred
to the necessity to safeguard “the common values” and fundamental inter-
ests of the EU.
The Lisbon Treaty has reiterated the ‘attachment to the principles of lib-
erty, democracy and respect for the fundamental freedoms and the rule of
law’. But, after so doing, it has shifted from the concept of ‘principles’ to
the concept of ‘values’. According to Article 3 TUE, the Union’s aim is ‘to
promote peace, its values and the wellbeing of its peoples’. The question
that thus arises is which are the Union’s values. The answer is provided by
Article 2, which lists such ‘values’, including ‘respect for human dignity,
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human
rights’. There is not only, therefore, a longer list, but also a shift of
concepts, although there is a certain overlapping between them, for exam-
ple, with regard to fundamental rights and the rule of law, even though
Article 7 TEU sets out a political mechanism for their enforcement. More
recently, the Rome Declaration of 25 March 2017 has reiterated the em-
phasis on ‘common’ and strong values.54
Three comments can be made on the preceding textual analysis. The
first is conceptual. Some legal theorists have stressed the distinction be-
tween general principles and values,55 in the sense that the latter is suscep-
tible of emphasizing divisions within the social body.56 The second is insti-
tutional and concerns judicial bodies. Viewed in conjunction with the em-
phasis placed on national identities, the reference to values may lead na-
tional constitutional courts or other judicial institutions to affirm their
54 See infra, Part 5.
55 For further discussion, see G dellaCananea, Due Process of Law Beyond the State.
Requirements of Administrative Procedure (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016),
arguing that general principles have a foundational value.
56 See C Schmitt, Die Tyrannie der Werte (1964)..
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role as defenders of such identities.57 The third concerns the role of the
Union’s political institutions. Under Article 7 TUE, there are two mechan-
isms: there is the action by the Council, acting by a qualified majority,
when it is requested to determine whether there is a serious breach of
those values by a Member State; there is the action by the European Coun-
cil, acting by unanimity when it is called to determine the existence of a
serious and persistent breach by a Member State. Clearly, the objective is
to protect common values and there is an obligation, for common institu-
tions, to attempt to reach this goal. However, there may be no certainty
that this objective will always be attained in fact, because the various peo-
ples may well disagree as to the content of those values, as well as to the
best way to reach the goal of protecting them. National rulers may not on-
ly disagree on both aspects, but also use their voting powers instrumentally
or tactically, in order to prevent a negative assessment of their conduct.
From Transitional to Permanent Differences
As observed earlier, some elements of flexibility have been laid down since
the early period of European integration and are perfectly compatible with
the first vision of Europe, that centred on the idea of an ‘ever closer union’.
What characterizes the other vision of Europe, therefore, is not the recog-
nition that some form of flexibility and differentiation is simply necessary.
It is rather the use of normative and functional arguments in favour of in-
stitutional mechanisms that allow the Member States to follow different
rules and paths, not just for a limited period of time, but for a longer peri-
od or forever.
Normatively, two main arguments might be used to support an in-
creased differentiation of EU institutional and legal mechanisms. Firstly, it
is coherent with the increasing internal differentiation of the EU. Sec-
ondly, it accords a prominent role to pluralism.58The consequences of this
change in attitude are important. There is the provision according to
D.
57 See E Cloots, National Identity, Constitutional Identity, and Sovereignty in the
EU, 45 Netherlands J. Leg. Phil. 82 (2016) and B Guastaferro, Beyond the Excep-
tionalism of Constitutional Conflicts: The Ordinary Functions of the Iden-
tity Clause, 32 Ybk. Eur. L. (2012), 263.
58 For this perspective, see C Harlow, Voices of Difference in a Plural Community,
50 Am. J. Int’l. L. (2002), 339. See also P Manin – JV Louis (eds.) Vers une Europe
différenciée? Possibilité et limites (Paris, A Pedone, 1996).
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which the Union ‘respects the national identities’ of its Member States.59
Other provisions aim at protecting cultural diversity. Interestingly, there is
a shift between the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Lisbon Treaty.
While the former imposed on the Union the obligation to respect ‘cultur-
al, religious, and linguistic diversity’,60 the latter provides that the EU shall
respect its ‘rich cultural and linguistic diversity’.61
Functionally, it might be argued that a Union of almost thirty mem-
bers, with very different political cultures and policy processes, requires a
much greater degree of flexibility and differentiation. This is not necessar-
ily an obstacle to the traditional functional or neo‑functional strategy of
creating de facto solidarity between the peoples of Europe on concrete is-
sues. Rather, an approach that leaves much room for different national
choices may preserve the dynamic of integration. In this sense, some ob-
servers have pointed out that without the distinction between the various
phases of the Economic and Monetary Union and the opt-out clauses for
Denmark and the UK, it would not have been possible for the other Mem-
ber States to proceed in this path. This is an important point to which we
shall return in the next section. Meanwhile, it is important to observe that,
for all its appeal, the increasing recourse to differentiation is not without
difficulties. In particular, it raises serious issues from the point of view of
accountability, which is always more difficult in non-unitary frameworks
than in unitary ones.62
The Difficulties of this Vision of Europe
Certain of the problems raised by the second political vision of Europe
have been touched on in the preceding discussion. A more structured sur-
vey of these and other difficulties is however warranted.
First and foremost, for all the appeal of a broad and loose union, every
enlargement of the Community was decided under the condition that the
union between European peoples should be deepened. The initial constitu-
E.
59 Article 4 (2) TEU, according to which national identities are ‘inherent in the fun-
damental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local
self-government’ of each country.
60 Article 22, Charter of Fundamental Rights.
61 Article 2 TEU (emphasis added).
62 For this remark, see P Craig, European Governance: Executive and administrative
powers under the new constitutional settlement, 3 J. Int’l. Const. L. (2005), 407,
436.
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tional clause was confirmed by all the treaties that amended the Treaty of
Rome, as well as by all accession treaties, including those concerning the
UK and more recently various countries from Central and Eastern Euro-
pe.63 It can be understood that politicians and electors in some of these
countries are reluctant to accept what has been described as ‘integration by
stealth’.64 However, constitutionally, their accession has been premised,
among other things, on the acceptance of the initial clause, even though
there was not full awareness of the ramifications of this.
Secondly, functionally, there are clearly more problems in managing a
Union with 28 or 27 Member States than there would be if membership
were still limited to six or twelve countries.65 This puts a burden of proof
on the shoulders of those who argue for a more flexible and differentiated
Europe.
For all its importance, decision making is not the only element that real-
ly matters. A constitutional framework that recognizes and protects rights
provides expectations and determines constraints that it is unwise for polit-
icians to ignore. Within liberal democracies an assertion that a certain
course of action is contrary to constitutional requirements or to some goals
set out by the constitution or to a procedure that it sets, is a potent argu-
ment for invoking some kind of correction either by the courts66 or by oth-
er public agencies. We may surely ask ourselves whether the mechanism
set out by Article 7 TEU is the right solution for the problem of noncom-
pliance with the values upon which the EU is founded. However, one
thing should be clear; that is, treating such values as generic ideas, from
which no meaningful answer can be deduced for the problems that
emerge and, a fortiori, an instrumental use of voting mechanisms under Ar-
ticle 7 would seriously undermine mutual trust between partners and, in
the end, the Union itself.
This debate about fundamental rights is very significant also historically
and comparatively. In the US, in the ratification debate the Anti-Federal-
ists opposed to the Constitution on grounds that the new system would
lead to excessive centralization and would thus fail to protect individual
63 I am grateful to Ingolf Pernice for drawing my attention of this important issue.
64 G Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration. The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of
Integration by Stealth (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009).
65 As observed almost thirty years ago by L Dubouis, Peut-on gouverner à Douze?, 48
Pouvoirs 105 (1989).
66 For a pioneer comparison between judicial institutions, see H Kelsen, Judicial re-
view of Legislation. A Comparative Study of the Austrian and the American Constitu-
tion, 4 Journ. of Politics (1942), 183.
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rights, while Madison and others argued that only a wide republic could
limit factions, though Madison himself later presented the Bill of Rights to
Congress. In today’s Europe, instead, those who oppose to a new central-
ized government that would allegedly have the characteristics of despotism
do not use the argument of rights. Quite the contrary, they do not seem to
be concerned with the dangers or unrestrained national government. The
arguments of rights is, instead, used by those who fear that, if the EU is
weakened and the ties between European peoples are loosened it is only a
matter of time before several fundamental rights are jeopardised and this
explains why the debate about judicial independence is so important.
The Institutional Mechanisms of Differentiated Integration within the EU
Clarity and Coherence
Thus far, we have seen that there is a tension inherent between two visions
of Europe, with important consequences about the goals of the Union, the
conception of its peoplehood and the legal tools for ensuring coherence
and unity. We cannot, however, content ourselves with delineating this
distinction. We must subject existing or proposed institutional mechan-
isms to careful scrutiny under the twin criteria of clarity and coherence. In-
tellectual clarity is traditionally regarded as a requisite for academic works,
in the sense that any thought or statement must be sufficiently clear and
must avoid contradictions. There can perhaps be a policy without intellec-
tual clarity, but not a scientific argumentation. Even for a policy, however,
coherence matters, at least in the sense of coherence between ends and
means. From this point of view, if we value something intrinsically, in our
case either an ever closer union between the peoples of Europe or a union
with less intense ties between them, an increase of it, all else being equal
(there might be side effects), can be assessed favourably, while what re-
duces it or is incompatible with it should be considered unfavourably. An
attempt will thus be made to understand whether a certain existing or pro-
posed institutional mechanism that can be said to be coherent with one vi-
sion of Europe is hardly compatible with the other, or not at all.
It can be helpful to begin by observing that the idea of differentiated in-
tegration is expressed by way of several terms, including enhanced cooper-
ation, two-speed Europe, variable geometry, Europe à la carte and concen-
tric circles. Even a quick look at official discourses and academic works
show that these terms are increasingly important, both descriptively and
prescriptively. Descriptively, the various terms just mentioned are used to
IV.
A.
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designate situations in which the members of the EU make policy choices
with different effects for the different partners. The prescriptive side seeks
to build an increasing legitimacy for these types of decision making pro-
cesses.
As observed earlier, there is nothing wrong in this. However, legally,
some distinctions are necessary, because there are various forms of differ-
entiation.67 Only some of those terms designate mechanisms that are pro-
vided by the treaties, such as enhanced cooperation. Moreover, and more
importantly from the institutional perspective that is followed in this es-
say, the mechanisms that involve, at least potentially, only the Member
States of the EU must be kept distinct from those that are susceptible of
involving third countries. Last but not least, the terms just mentioned are
not simply different, but mean different things, in the sense that a closer
look reveals that they support contrasting strategies of integration.68 There
is thus the need to ensure coherence between ends and means. Keeping
this in mind, our discussion will continue with an analysis of what has
been probably the single most important achievement after Maastricht;
that is, EMU. As a second step, enhanced cooperation procedures will be
considered. Next, we will look at a recent and controversial treaty between
most EU members, but not all; that is, the Fiscal Compact.
No ‘Ever Closer’ Monetary Integration within the EMU
Given the object and purposes of this essay, no attempt will be made here
to synthetize the complex legal and institutional arrangements on which
the EMU is based.69 Suffice it to mention few legal norms and facts that
B.
67 See B De Witte, D Hanf & E Vos (eds.), The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU
Law (Intersentia, 2001).
68 See, however, JA Usher, Variable Geometry of Concentric Circles: Patterns for the
European Union, 46, 243 at 253 (1997), putting on an equal basis ‘variable geome-
try’ and ‘two speeds’.
69 On the road to the EMU, see N Thygesen, The Delors Report and European Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union, in 65 International Affairs 637 (1989). For an out-
line of the main issues, see JV Louis, The Economic and Monetary Union: Law
and Institutions, 41 Common Mkt. L. Rev. (2004), 575, and FG Snyder, EMU –
integration and differentiation: metaphor for European Union, in P Craig & G de
Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), 687.
But see also G Majone, Rethinking the Union of Europe Post-Crisis: Has Integration
Gone Too Far? (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014), 20, referring to
the EMU as an example of the more general crisis of the EU.
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are substantially undisputed. First of all, the EMU is the main innovation
from the viewpoint of the transfer of sovereign powers from the Member
States to the EU, which is particularly visible in the adoption of a single
currency. Secondly, and as a specification of this, institutionally the EMU
consists of three distinct though related parts. There is the economic part,
which rests in the hands of national government, though under a set of
common rules, while national budgetary policies are constrained by com-
mon targets, standards and checks, within the procedure of multilateral
surveillance. There is, finally, monetary policy making, which is conferred
to the ECB. Thirdly, institutional differentiation has been increased by the
different choices made by the Member States. Three phases or stages were
envisaged and while all the States that were members of the EU were in-
cluded in the first one and could move to the next, the norms governing
the EMU did not impose on them to ask to be included in the third stage,
as it will soon be explained. A differentiated membership has thus
emerged. Last but not least, unlike traditional common policies, EMU is
characterized by a complex variety of rules, including guidelines and tech-
nical opinions, and by the exemption from the ordinary mechanisms for
ensuring compliance. All the rest is controversial, to say the least. In partic-
ular, it is disputed whether the policies followed by the ECB have saved
the euro, and with it the EU itself, or has just dissipated resources that
should have been used otherwise.
The main question that arises is, however, another; that is, how the first
and the third aspects mentioned earlier – that is, the fundamental impor-
tance of the EMU and its differentiated membership – can be reconciled.
Jean-Victor Louis has suggested a twofold explanation, pragmatic and nor-
mative. Pragmatically, granting to Denmark and the UK an ‘opt-out’
clause was the only way to obtain their consent to the revision of the
treaties, in view of the unanimity that was required. Normatively, he ac-
knowledged that the special status granted to these members was ‘singu-
lar’. But he argued that, although such status appeared to be of indefinite
duration, it was ‘de facto only temporarily if the objective of an ever closer
union is to be safeguarded’. He added that it was with this idea in mind
that such status was conceded.70 This is a very helpful contribution to the
understanding of the complex decisions taken by the European Council.
The normative argument that he has advanced is however problematic in
some respects, in particular with regard to the potential dismissal of the
70 J.V. Louis, Differentiation and the EMU, cit. at 45, 43-44.
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goal of the ‘ever closer union’. A distinct but related question is whether
the course of events made such goal unattainable.
Let us begin by clarifying a preliminary issue. It is often asserted that
Denmark and the UK were granted an opt-out clause from EMU, but this
is not wholly correct. In fact, they were included in EMU, but were not re-
quired to participate in its third stage, with the further caveat that Den-
mark obtained the acknowledgement of its right to take part in the third
phase, after a positive assessment by the Council.71 As regards to the UK,
all EU countries ‘recognized’ that it ‘shall not be obliged or committed to
move to the third stage’ of EMU without a decision of its representative in-
stitutions,72 which according to the standard account means that it was
granted an opt-in clause.
That said, normatively, the fact that the concession of a specific status to
the UK and Denmark was ‘de facto only temporary’ because of the necessity
to safeguard the goal of the ‘ever closer union’ is a weak counter to the lit-
eral argument that such status was conceded without any explicit deadline.
There is a strong argument that runs in the contrary direction. As the Pro-
tocol on EMU specified unequivocally, the UK ‘shall retain its powers in
the field of monetary policy according to national law’.73 As a consequence
of this, a different law was to be, and was, applied.
Moreover, and as a variant of the preceding argument, the Maastricht
Treaty was an agreement between sovereign States and conventional inter-
national law is based, though not exclusively, on their explicit consent. As
a result, it is hard to see how the fact that the specific status was conceded
to the UK with the idea in mind that this situation would not last for a
long time could influence the exercise of rights and duties under the
Treaty. Even if it could be said that all partners agreed on this, this would
not be conclusive against the ordinary criteria of interpretation.
Finally, the argument advanced by Louis with regard to the necessity to
safeguard the goal of the ‘ever closer union’ is ambiguous, in the sense that
it can be read in two distinct ways. It is one thing to say that the treaties
and the other parts of the constitutional framework of the EU must be in-
terpreted systematically, with the consequence that the specific status con-
ceded to Denmark and the UK had to be used in the light of their commit-
ment to contribute to the achievement of the ‘ever closer union’. It is an-
71 Protocol on certain provisions relating to Denmark, Article 1 (1).
72 Protocol on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom, Articles 1 and 9,
last indent.
73 Protocol on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom, Article 4.
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other thing to say that, in the light of this commitment, their specific sta-
tus de facto has a limited duration. We must be very careful when deducing
particular consequences from a very general clause of the Treaty’s pream-
ble. It is hard to see how it would be possible to convert a permanent
clause into a temporary one.
These findings support the conclusion that the solution envisaged by
the drafters of the provisions governing the EMU, whilst allowing Den-
mark and the UK to join the Euro when they meet the requisite prescribed
by the Treaties, at least potentially, deviated from the goal of the ‘ever clos-
er union’. It remains to be seen how this potentiality was converted into
reality and in this respect that the explanation provided by Louis is particu-
larly helpful. Even a quick look at the course of the events shows, on the
one hand, that both British and Danish officers participated in a variety of
decision-making processes concerning the EMU and on the other hand
soon after 1992 several measures were taken by national policy makers in
particular within the UK in order to make full membership possible.74 For
example, between 1993 and 1999, the Bank of England constantly moni-
tored the preparation for the adoption of the single currency. Some years
later, Gordon Brown, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, set out the econo-
mic conditions that had to be fulfilled so that this could occur.75 This was
not the case, however, though the adoption of the single currency was still
supported by some economists when the crisis begun.76 A different choice
has been made and its consequences are so well known that few hints will
suffice for our purposes here. The UK has kept its money and has re-
mained relatively insulated from the effects of the policies carried out by
the European Central Bank. Institutionally, this implies that the Governor
of the Bank of England takes part only in the meeting of the General
Council, a body with limited powers, but is not involved in decisions con-
cerning the fixing of rates or to refer to the most salient decision taken by
the ECB in the last year, in the purchase of national bonds. More concrete-
ly, the consequence of all this for citizens is that, unlike in other EU coun-
74 See, however, T Prosser, The Economic Constitution (OUP, 2014), 142, noting the
‘partial acceptance by the UK’ of the objectives set out by the ECB.
75 See the statement by Gordon Brown on UK Membership of the Single Currency,
HM Treasury (2003).
76 See W Buiter, Why the United Kingdom Should Join the Eurozone, 11 Interna-
tional Finance 269 (2008). For a survey of the literature, see T Sadeh & A Verdun,
Explaining Europe’s Monetary Union, 11 International Studies Rev. 277 (2009).
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tries, in the UK a visitor needs to change currency.77 In sum, the provisions
of the Treaty determined a potential breach with the ideal of the ‘ever clos-
er union’, though they left the door open.
Looking at the course of the events has a further advantage. It reveals
that there is not simply a two-tier legal regime, whereby all EU countries
are within the third stage except those who either cannot join it or do not
wish to do so. Indeed, there is a more complex situation, with: a) nineteen
countries within the Eurozone; b) other EU countries that are obliged to
meet convergence criteria and do so with some difficulties (with the excep-
tion of Sweden); c) Denmark and the UK (until the end of negotiations for
its exit from the EU) that have a specific status; d) some smaller European
States (Andorra, Monaco, San Marino and Vatican City) that are using the
euro on the basis of a specific agreement; e) two Balkan countries that are
unilaterally using the Euro (Kosovo and Montenegro). This last element
shows the existence of asymmetric relationships between legal orders,
which is not unknown to legal theorists78 and that raises interesting issues
from the viewpoint of both effectiveness and accountability.
Enhanced Cooperation: Nature, Rationale and Impact
As a second step, it is interesting to examine enhanced cooperation. There
is a brief overview of the provisions on enhanced cooperation that have
been laid down since the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). On this basis, the
rational for enhanced cooperation is examined. Finally, we must consider
some difficulties that have emerged in institutional practice.
Although some consider the provisions enacted by the Treaty of Amster-
dam as a generalization of previous experiments in flexibility that had been
agreed within the Treaty of Maastricht, institutional mechanisms differed,
particularly with regard to the role of EU institutions.79 Moreover, those
provisions initially excluded common foreign and security policies. A
C.
77 G Dinan, Ever Closer Union. An Introduction to European Integration (Palgrave
McMillan, 2005, 3rd ed.), 1.
78 From the viewpoint of general theory of law, see S Romano, L’ordinamento
giuridico (Sansoni, 1946, 2nd ed.), Engl. transl. The Legal Order (Routledge, 2017).
79 See JHH Weiler, Editorial: Amsterdam, Amsterdam, 3 Eur. L. J. (1997), 309, for
the claim that the Treaty was important not only for its existence, but also for its
institutional contents; for further details on enhanced cooperation, H Korten-
berg, Closer Cooperation in the Treaty of Amsterdam, 35 Common Mkt. L. rev.
(1998), 833.
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change occurred with the Treaty of Nice, though it still excluded all ‘mat-
ters having military or defence implications’. It has been the Treaty of Lis-
bon, therefore, that has generalized enhanced cooperation, though within
the substantive limits and procedural constraints that will now be clarified.
The essence of enhanced cooperation is that some Member States, not
all, ‘may make use’ of the Union’s institutions. It is, therefore, a mecha-
nism that is ‘constituted’ and regulated by the Treaty and which takes
place within the institutional framework of the EU, unlike those of purely
intergovernmental nature that will be examined earlier. The justification
for the use of EU institutions is that the goal of enhanced cooperation is to
‘further the objectives of the Union, protect its interests and reinforce its
integration process’.80 However, its scope is limited to the areas for which
the Union has non-exclusive legislative competence. Moreover, it is only if
the Council has ‘established that the objectives of such cooperation cannot
be attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole’ that an
enhanced cooperation may take place. The Treaty also sets out a requisite
concerning the minimum number of EU members (nine) that must be in-
volved81 and specifies that the procedure laid down in Article 329 TFEU
shall be used. This requires the authorization issued by the Council, acting
on a proposal made by the Commission and with the assent of the Euro-
pean Parliament. Participation in an enhanced cooperation has relevant le-
gal consequences, in the sense that, though all members of the Council are
enabled to participate in its deliberations, only those that represent the
Member States participating in it ‘shall take part in the vote’.82 On the oth-
er hand, their decisions will neither be binding on the other members of
the EU nor will be regarded as part of the acquis communautaire.
Three comments can be made on the preceding textual analysis. They
concern the nature, the rationale and the impact of enhanced cooperation.
Functionally, there is an analogy between enhanced cooperation and treaty
revisions, because they both seek to adjust the process of European integra-
tion to the varying necessities and to the difficulties that inevitably arise in
a Union of twenty-seven (or twenty-eight) Member States.83 However,
there is also a fundamental difference. Unlike treaty revision, enhanced co-
operation leaves the existing constitutional framework unaltered and is,
80 Article 20 (1) TEU.
81 Article 20 (2) TEU.
82 Article 20 (1) TEU.
83 On this linkage, see P Craig, The Lisbon Treaty (Oxford, OUP, 2013, 3rd ed.).
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therefore, not subject to ratification processes within national legal sys-
tems.
The rationale of enhanced cooperation becomes clear when considering
that, according to the Treaty, enhanced cooperation is viewed as a ‘last re-
sort’, when it has become undisputed that the members of the EU either
cannot or do not wish to proceed in the same direction and with the same
pace, though all members can join at a later stage, if they wish to do so. It
is, therefore, an institutionalized differentiated integration, in the sense
that it differs from the closer integration that can be achieved by the mem-
bers that choose to sign an agreement outside EU treaties, as it happened
with the Schengen Agreement (1985) and more recently with the Prüm
Convention (2005). To the extent to which enhanced cooperation can
work as an instrument of the ‘ever closer union’, without obliging all the
Member States to accept the same ties simultaneously, it can be said to be a
flexible tool, which is compatible with both visions of the Union. Precisely
for this reason, however, it has a certain ambiguity.84
Moreover, despite its flexibility, enhanced cooperation has been less rel-
evant and significant than expected by its proponents. Soon after the entry
into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, EU institutions expressed concern
about the development of enhanced cooperation outside the treaties, as a
consequence of enlargement85. After the big enlargement, few steps have
been taken by national governments to use enhanced cooperation, even
when they intended to ‘reinforce the process of integration’ in the area of
the EMU. They have preferred to stipulate international treaties, as they
did in 2012 for the ‘Fiscal Compact’. It is interesting, therefore, to take it
into consideration.
84 For this remark, see H Bribosia, Les coopérationsrenforcées, in G Amato, H Bri-
bosia & B De Witte (eds), Commentaire du traité établissant une Constitution
pour l’Europe à la lumière des travaux préparatoires et perspectives d’avenir
(Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2007). See also D Thym, The Political Character of Suprana-
tional Differentiation, 31 Eur. L. Rev. (2006), 781, seeing in this the emergence of
an ‘asymmetric constitutionalism’.
85 See B De Witte, Chameleonic Member States: Differentiation by Means of Partial
and Parallel Agreements, in D Hanf & E Vos (eds), The Many Faces of Differenti-
ation in EU Law (Intersentia, 2001), 236, 239, noting that the Amsterdam rules
were too rigid.
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‘Internal’ International Agreements: the Fiscal Compact
In addition to enhanced cooperation, there is another instrument that can
be regarded as an alternative to the revision of the treaties; that is, the con-
clusion of international agreements between either all Member States or
only some of them. These are international treaties. They are, therefore,
subject to the principles and rules of public international law, including
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in addition to the limits
stemming from EU law,86 for example with regard to the relations with
third countries, under the doctrine of pre-emption. However, this ‘parallel
track’ has always existed, as was observed earlier with regard to the Treaty
establishing the Benelux. It had become increasingly important during the
economic and financial crisis. An interesting example is the Treaty on Sta-
bility, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary
Union (TSCG), which is better known as the ‘Fiscal Compact’. An analysis
of its process, rationale and relationship with EU law can help us to under-
stand the distinctive features of this form of differentiated integration.
When the crisis burst out, most political leaders affirmed that the exist-
ing legal framework needed to be adjusted. On the one hand, it was adjust-
ed for all the Member States, through a further change of the Stability and
Growth Pact, enacted in 1996 and already modified in 2005. On the other
hand, it was adjusted by way of an international agreement negotiated by
most members, but not by all. Initially, there was a Franco-German pro-
posal to amend the treaties in order to tighten the framework of budgetary
rules for the Member States. That proposal was vetoed by the UK, on the
grounds that its representatives had not managed to obtain adequate safe-
guard against the undesired impact of those tightened rules on the UK’s
financial services industry, an aspect that certainly has not lost its relevance
in the context of Brexit. The negotiation process that followed was not easy
for some members, who were afraid of meeting strong opposition during
their ratification processes. In particular, the Czech Republic, decided that
it was not in a position to sign the treaty. Quite the contrary, Italy used
that process instrumentally, in order to secure an amendment of the na-
tional constitution. Eventually, on 30 January 2012, twenty-five Member
States agreed to the TSCG or ‘Fiscal Compact’.
D.
86 See B De Witte, Chameleonic Member States: Differentiation by Means of Partial and
Parallel Agreements, cit., 232, distinguishing partial agreements, concluded be-
tween some Member States within the institutional framework of the EU, from
parallel agreements, involving all of them, and placing less emphasis on the in-
volvement of third countries.
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At its roots there is not only the fact that, even when action by a group
of Member States is regarded as justified from the viewpoint of the
Union’s goals and processes, national politicians often show a strong pref-
erence for cooperating outside the treaties. There are also two important
factors, greater flexibility and time. If the decisions to be taken are left to
be determined through unconstrained political processes, then an even
greater flexibility can be attained. Accordingly, decisions will be reached
on shorter time horizons than for comparable behavior regulated by EU
rules. But there can be another justification for doing so: the opposition by
one or more members to the proposed innovation, as it happened with the
Fiscal Compact.
It is precisely because the TSCG is not an EU treaty that it has a complex
relationship with EU law. The preamble clearly reveals that the intent of
the contracting parties is to proceed on the path of integration. They re-
gard their economic policies ‘as a matter of common concern’ and express
their desire to ‘develop ever closer coordination of economic policies with-
in the euro area’.87 This intent is confirmed by Article 2, which refers to
the parties’ will to ‘foster budgetary discipline through a fiscal compact’.
However, the Fiscal Compact has but a limited impact on existing EU
rules for two reasons that are related but distinct. Firstly, the general basis
of the rules set out by EU treaties is the prior consent of the States. It is this
consensus that performs the basic legitimizing function. Without their
consent, the two EU members that have not signed the TSCG, are not
bound to respect the canons of conduct that it lays down, in particular the
‘rule’ that ‘the budgetary position of the general government … shall be
balanced on in surplus’.88 Secondly, and consequently, several provisions
of the Fiscal Compact clarify that the new treaty entails no change of the
obligations stemming from existing EU treaties. While Article 2 does so in
a general way, by ensuring that the Fiscal Compact will be interpreted and
applied consistently (‘in conformity’) with EU treaties,89 Article 3 does so
with regard to the more innovative and controversial rule about budget
87 See the first two indents of the TSCG’s Preamble.
88 TSCG, Article 3 (1) b).
89 TSCG, Article 2 (1), which refers to both ‘the Treaties on which the European
Union is founded’ and to ‘European Union law, including procedural law’. The
following indent puts even more emphasis on the necessity of consistency, by af-
firming that compatibility is requisite for applying the TSCG. See, however, P
Craig, The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and
Pragmatism, 37 Eur. L. Rev. 231 (2012), arguing that the TSCG raises the
question concerning the extent to which a treaty outside the confines of the Lis-
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deficits, which will be applied by the contracting parties ‘in addition and
without prejudice to their obligations under’ EU law. In addition to these
limits, the new rules have a differentiated application. While they ‘apply in
full’ to the Member States whose currency is the euro,90 they apply to the
other parties under the conditions set out in Article 14. Leaving aside the
conditions that referred to the entry into force of the TSCG, it can be ob-
served that it will apply to the States with a derogation or with an exemp-
tion, as in the case of Denmark, as from the date when the decision abro-
gating that derogation or exemption takes effect.91 This, incidentally, con-
firms that the position of Denmark (and the UK) differs from that of the
other members of the EU. There is, finally, a provision that is increasingly
important in the political debates about the EMU; that is, Article 16 of the
TSCG, which regulates the process of ‘incorporation’. It establishes that
‘within five years …, the necessary steps will be taken … with the aim of
incorporating the substance of this Treaty’ into the legal framework of the
Union. But precisely with regard to the substantial part of the Fiscal Com-
pact in some Member States there is much less consensus than there was
five years ago concerning the soundness of the tighter rules on public debt
and deficit. Tighter budgetary standards have been criticized on grounds
that they codify debt-reduction policies with a huge and negative impact
on social programs. What is controversial is moreover their imposition by
a treaty, as opposed to a national constitution.92
In the light of these findings, the distinctive features of this form of dif-
ferentiated integration, from an institutional point of view, can be viewed
more clearly than hitherto. First, State consensus performs the usual basic
normative function, in the sense that it is of central importance in shaping
the interaction between the Member States. However, while in the case of
bon framework can confer new powers on EU institutions; for further remarks, K
Tuori, The European Financial Crisis –Constitutional Aspects and Implications, EUI
Working Paper LAW 2012/28.
90 TSCG, Article 1 (2).
91 TSCG, Article 14 (5).
92 For critical remarks, see M Everson & C Joerges, Between Constitutiona lCom-
mand and Technocratic Rule: Post Crisis Governance and the Treaty on Stability,
Coordination and Governance (‘The Fiscal Compact’), in C Harlow, P Leino & G
della Cananea (eds), Research Handbook on EU Administrative Law (Elgar, 2017),
351, but see also P Craig, The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Princi-
ple, Politics and Pragmatism, cit. at 87, 235, arguing that the TSCG ‘does not ad-
vance matters much’ with respect to existing EU rules. New changes have been
envisaged by the ‘five presidents’ report’: Towards a Genuine Economic and Mone-
tary Union (Brussels, 2012).
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the Maastricht clauses their consensus was expressed by all members and
within the provisions of the treaties, in this case it concerns most mem-
bers, but not all. As a further consequence, while the Maastricht Treaty dis-
tinguished between members with or without specific clauses, the TSCG
makes EU membership more differentiated than before, with two cat-
egories of contracting parties, those within and outside the Eurozone, and
the remaining two members of the EU that did not sign the new treaty.
The question that thus arises is whether this type of agreement reinforces
the perspective of a sort of Europe ‘à la carte’. This question will now be
addressed.
Two-speed Europe: Concept and Issues
As observed initially, few topics have aroused as much controversy in the
literature about the EU as differentiated integration. Opinions differ
markedly both as to the justification for the existence of such form of inte-
gration and as to the shape that it should assume. It is, therefore, not sur-
prising that different concepts are used in differing ways. However, if we
move beyond nominalism, in an attempt to understand the nature of the
interactions between the Union’s partners, it becomes evident that a juxta-
position of some forms of differentiated integration is unjustified. This is
the case of two-speed Europe and Europe à la carte. While some observers,
including Usher, put them on an equal basis,93 they differ. The term ‘two-
speed Europe’ designates processes that are used to reach more expedite de-
cisions for some members of the EU, who sooner or later are joined by the
others.94 Quite the contrary, the term ‘Europe à la carte’95 designates a sce-
nario in which certain countries would join some policies while others
would join other policies, with the consequence that there can only be a
very low common denominator. For this reason, unlike the idea of two-
speed, the idea of a Europe à la carte is hardly coherent with the first vision
of a unified Europe, that which seeks to achieve an ‘ever closer union’ be-
tween the peoples of Europe.
This does not mean, however, that the other idea, that of a two-speed
Europe, is without difficulties. These become evident when considering
E.
93 JA Usher, Variable Geometry of Concentric Circles: Patterns for the European
Union (1997) 46, 243 at 253.
94 For further analysis, see JC Piris, The Future of Europe: Towards a Two-Speed EU?
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997).
95 See R Dahrendorf, A Third Europe (Florence, EUI, 1979).
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the joint Declaration of 25 March 2017, in the sixtieth anniversary of the
Treaty of Rome.96 The Declaration has both a retrospective and a prospec-
tive, which deserve a detailed analysis.
The retrospective is a bit rhetoric, as it often happens in these types of
documents. There is a strong emphasis on the decision ‘to bond together
and rebuild our continent from its ashes’ and on the construction of a
‘community of peace, … with unparalleled levels of social protection and
welfare’. For sure, that of the EC/EU can rightfully be seen as a success sto-
ry from the point of view of the achievement of the initial goals of peace
and prosperity. The Declaration proudly states ‘we have built a unique
Union with common institutions and strong values, a community of
peace, freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law’. This state-
ment is not unreasonable if we compare Europe and more particularly the
EU with other regions of the world. However, as we shall argue later, there
are some difficulties with it.
The prospective part of the Declaration seeks to combine unity and di-
versity. Its incipit underlines the importance of the ‘construction of Euro-
pean unity’. The importance of unity is reiterated by the second paragraph,
according to which ‘today we are united and stronger’. There is still anoth-
er paragraph (the fourth) that begins by affirming the ambitious goal of
‘even greater unity’ and continues with this challenging statement:
‘we will act together, at different paces and intensity where necessary,
while moving in the same direction, as we have done in the past, in
line with the Treaties and keeping the door open to those who want to
join later’.
There is, again, a similarity with enhanced cooperation; that is, flexible in-
tegration. But there is also a distinctive trait, in the sense that a two-speed
Europe can be achieved in more than one way. Its essence is that integra-
tion requires some ‘pioneers’; that is, some members of the club choose to
be more closely integrated in a new policy field, on the assumption that, if
it works, the others will join them. This idea can be appealing for several
reasons. It appears to be susceptible to revitalize the functional method, by
encouraging sector or issue-specific coalitions of partners willing to pro-
ceed with the same pace. From the viewpoint of economic theory, it can
96 Declaration of the leaders of 27 Member States and of the European Council, the
European Parliament and the European Commission, available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/25-rome-declarati
on/.
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make sense to say that, unlike other ‘clubs’ or organizations, the EU pro-
vides several ‘goods’, which may have different relevance or significance
for its members.97 This may foster competition between different policy
approaches.98
There are, however, some difficulties with the strategy delineated by the
Declaration. First, it rests on an unclear assumption. It is questionable
whether in the past what was really allowed was the acceptance of ‘differ-
ent paces and intensity where necessary’. Arguably, the mechanisms con-
cerning EMU did much more than allowing different paces. They allowed
some members of the club not to proceed on the path of monetary integra-
tion. This is of significance when thinking about a strategy aiming at
achieving unity, whatever the veracity of the intent of the Declaration’s au-
thors.
Secondly, the idea to ‘act together, at different paces and intensity
where necessary’ may take different forms. Some are based on the treaties,
such as enhanced cooperation. Other forms of cooperation between the
Member States lie outside the treaties, as the ‘Fiscal Compact’, because not
all EU countries agreed about it and its inclusion within the architecture of
the EU requires a series of steps and of course the consensus of all partners.
Those who think that it suffices to say that the EU will proceed ‘at differ-
ent paces and intensity where necessary’ are therefore mistaken. To borrow
a term used in one of the first studies on differentiated integration, this
was but a ‘misleading simple idea’.99
Thirdly, it is not clear how the partners would move in the same direc-
tion. There is an inner tension between the desire to get all members of the
EU involved and the role of the promoters or pioneers. For example, some
political leaders who did not wish to join the Eurozone feared to be left
behind. Their fear becomes more evident when, instead of multi-speed Eu-
rope, other terms are used, such multi-tier Europe, which has a hierarch-
ical and pejorative connotation.
97 See J Pisani-Ferry, Intégration monétaire et géométrie variable, 48 Revue
économique 495 (1996), for the thesis, that preserving the single market and en-
hancing convergence are distinct objectives.
98 G Majone, Europe as the Would-Be World Power: the EU at Fifty (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2009). On ‘pioneer groups’, see B de Witte, Future Paths of Flexibility:
Enhanced Cooperation, Partial Agreements and Pioneer Groups, in in JW de
Zwaan et al., The European Union: An Ongoing Process of Integration – Liber Amico-
rum Alfred E Kellermann (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, 2004), 140.
99 F De La Serre & H. Wallace, Flexibility and Enhanced Cooperation in the European
Union: Placebo rather than Panacea, Notre Europe, research and policy paper n. 2,
(1997), 5.
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A Synthesis
An analysis of differentiated integration within the EU confirms the claim
made initially about the implications of the two contrasting visions of the
European construction. Differentiated integration is often considered in a
functional fashion; that is, with a focus on the opportunity to allow some
members to proceed faster on the path of integration, without precluding
the other members from joining them at a later stage. This type of explana-
tion is helpful but incomplete.
There are four reasons why an exclusive concern with functional aspects
fails to provide an adequate understanding of differentiated integration.
First, even supposing that the arguments supporting differentiated integra-
tion are of functional nature, the question that arises is why there is a vari-
ety of forms, some within and some outside the provisions of the treaties.
This explanation is therefore not sufficient.
More importantly, there is another side of the coin. The various forms
of differentiated integration are susceptible of promoting different visions
of the European construction. For example, whatever the original intent of
the drafters of the EMU, it has allowed some members not to proceed to-
wards the goal of the ‘ever closer union between the peoples of Europe’,
though the rules they agreed are very different from those that would gov-
ern a more or less free trade area, that some British (but also Polish) politi-
cians seem to wish.
Thirdly, an explanation that focuses only on functional or pragmatic
considerations fails to devote adequate attention to the dynamics of power.
It is not fortuitous, for example, that the UK has contrasted the idea that
an enhanced cooperation could be launched without a unanimous deci-
sion. Nor is it fortuitous that some of the new members that are reluctant
to engage in enhanced cooperation are afraid that, if they remain outside
of it, they will be indirectly subject to the new rules without being able to
influence their content, an aspect to which we shall return when consider-
ing the post-Brexit scenario.
Finally, paying attention to the functional features of differentiated inte-
gration can be helpful to understand whether integration may proceed, in
a perspective that focuses on the conduct of the States. It will in no sense
be sufficient from a perspective that instead focuses on individual and col-
lective (as distinct from national) interests. Although the shift from gener-
al principles to values does not necessarily undermine the importance of
the respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights, it can be observed
that, by placing the focus on national traditions, some institutional safe-
F.
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guards have been weakened. This is the case, for example, of the indepen-
dence of the judiciary in Poland.
Legal Mechanisms of Integration Beyond the EU
With these caveats in mind, let us consider the forms of differentiated inte-
gration that involve other European countries. They include the treaties
that are agreed by all the members of the EU with other groups of coun-
tries, such as the Treaty of Oporto establishing the EEA, or by some mem-
bers with third countries, as it happens with the rules established under
the Schengen Agreement. Space limits preclude an examination of other
legal mechanisms, including those with the European countries that wish
to become members of the EU, such as Serbia and Montenegro, and those
with non-European countries that wish to establish a closer partnership
with the EU, particularly in the Mediterranean area.100
A Single Market Beyond the Union: the European Economic Area
What has been said earlier with regard to monetary policy raises the fur-
ther question whether a similar asymmetry occurs with regard to the other
main instrument of the EU, the single market. This question is interesting
in itself, for an understanding of the legal mechanisms of integration be-
yond the EU and for its practical implications, because some observers sug-
gest that the UK might be a member of the European Economic Area
(EEA).
The standard account about the EEA highlights three main features:
first, that the EEA is an area where persons, goods, services and capitals can
circulate freely, which exists since 1 January 1994, upon entry into force of
the Treaty of Oporto; second, that membership of EEA is open to EU
countries as well as to the members of European Free Trade Area Associa-
tion (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway); third, that EFTA members must
adopt most EU legislation concerning the single market and, correspond-
V.
A.
100 See, for further analysis, R Wessel, Fragmentation in the Governance of EU Ex-
ternal Relations: Legal Institutional Dilemmas and the New Constitution for Eu-
rope, in J.W. de Zwaanet al, The European Union: An Ongoing Process of Integra-
tion – Liber Amicorum Alfred E Kellermann (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Instituut,
2004), 123.
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ingly, are able to influence the content of such legislation by way of ‘deci-
sion-shaping’ processes at an early stage of EU legislation.
There is nothing basically wrong with this standard account. However,
for an adequate understanding of the available options, at least two other
aspects must be taken into consideration. On the one hand, while the
forms of differentiation that were examined previously imply an institu-
tional differentiation within the Union, the EEA is a regulatory regime for
applying the rules governing the single market beyond its borders. Conse-
quently, some non-EU countries have simply accepted large amounts of
substantive EC/EU law. There is, therefore, an asymmetric relationship be-
tween their legal orders and that of the EU. On the other hand, within the
other members of EEA, there is a difference between the paths followed by
Norway and Switzerland. While Norway has negotiated through the EEA,
Switzerland has not joined the EEA, but has entered into a series of bilater-
al agreements with the EU.
These findings support the following four conclusions: First, the EEA
does not constitute a form of differentiated integration between the Mem-
ber States of the EU. It is, rather, a form of cooperation between the EU
and other European countries. Secondly and consequently, although it
could be said that such cooperation might be beneficial to a further inte-
gration of non-EU members, this is just a potentiality. Meanwhile, it is a
cooperation that is limited to the rules governing the Single Market and is,
therefore, coherent also with the vision of a wide and loose union. Thirdly,
such cooperation is based on a variety of legal sources, as it can be estab-
lished either by accessing EFTA or by negotiating several bilateral agree-
ments. Accordingly, referring to the EEA only provides a generic solution;
that is, the devil is in the details. Finally, the asymmetry that has been no-
ticed is relevant from a twofold viewpoint: theoretically, it confirms that
relations between legal orders can be either symmetric or asymmetric; in-
stitutionally, it is problematic with regard to democratic standards.
Schengen’s Mixed Membership
As observed initially, there are two distinct frames in the present analysis:
one concerns the institutional mechanisms of differentiated integration
within the EU and the other the legal mechanism of integration outside
the Union. It might, therefore, come as a surprise that the rules of the
Schenghen agreement are examined here, but this is not unjustified.
It can be helpful to begin by saying that, while the Maastricht Treaty al-
lowed differentiated integration within a partially new area, that of mone-
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tary policy, the Schengen Agreement of 1985 was more problematic, be-
cause its object was the regulation of free movement of persons, as distinct
from citizens or workers. This was one of the pillars of the European Com-
munity, as it was envisaged by the Treaty of Rome in 1957; that is, a Com-
munity where the citizens of the Member States could freely travel. How-
ever, almost thirty years later, systematic controls of identity documents
were still in place at the borders between most Member States, with the
notable exception of the Benelux countries. It was precisely these coun-
tries, together with France and (West) Germany, which in 1985 signed the
agreement aiming at progressively dismantling common border controls.
The contracting parties agreed on the harmonization of their visa and asy-
lum policies, allowing their nationals and other residents to cross borders
without police controls.
This legal framework has been subsequently modified in three ways.
First, in 1990 the Agreement was supplemented by the Schengen Conven-
tion, which established an area without border controls.
Secondly and more importantly, during the Intergovernmental Confer-
ence that drafted the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) all the Member States, ex-
cept the UK and Ireland, agreed to incorporate the Schengen rules within
the Union’s legal framework. The Protocol annexed to the Treaty clarified
that such incorporation was achieved with a view to developing more
rapidly ‘an area of freedom, security and justice’. It also noticed that Ire-
land and the UK had not signed the Schengen Agreement, though they
could accept some of its provisions and could at any time request to take
part in the entirety of the acquis.101 Conversely, the Protocol mentioned
the intent of Iceland and Norway to become bound by the Schengen rules.
The form of ‘cooperation’102 that thus emerged was based on a ‘mixed’
membership. This feature has been confirmed by later agreements, for ex-
ample with Switzerland. In brief, the enhanced cooperation that initially
was promoted only by some members of the EU has been opened to other
European countries.
Thirdly, the incorporation of the Schengen acquis allowed EU institu-
tions to step in. In particular, the Council replaced the Executive Commit-
tee and the Court of Justice was enabled to exercise judicial review within
101 Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European
Union, Article 4.
102 Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European
Union, Article 1.
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certain limits,103 which have mainly been eliminated by the Lisbon Treaty,
together with the ‘three-pillars’ structure of the EU.104 For example, the
ECJ has found that the application of a rule set out by the Schengen Con-
vention is incompatible with the right of free movement that stem from
Community law for third country nationals who are family members of
EU citizens.105
Once again, when considering differentiated integration, it is clear that
the voluntary consensus of the State, of each State, is of central impor-
tance. Two elements are crucial in determining the nature of the voluntary
consensus. First, the voluntary nature of the agreement is not vitiated by
inequality in the bargaining power of the parties, because the rules that are
incorporated have been set out only by some of them. On the one hand, as
noticed by the Protocol’s Preamble, those rules ‘aimed at enhancing Euro-
pean integration’. Their goal was thus a deeper integration. On the other
hand, though the acquis must be preserved, EU institutions can develop it.
For example, they have established a European Border Surveillance Sys-
tem.106 Second, with the Treaty of Amsterdam it has become clear that
even with regard to one of the central elements of the EC, the free move-
ment of persons, where Union’s action would have been justified, a deep-
ened integration remains subject to the voluntary consensus of each State.
It is in this sense and within these limits that the Schengen agreement has
been considered as a sort of interim arrangement, in view of a communau-
tarization of its rules.107
103 Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European
Union, Article 2. For further analysis, see H Wallace, Flexibility: A Tool for Inte-
gration or a Restraint on Disintegration?, in K Neunreither & A Wiener (eds),
European Integration after Amsterdam: Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for
Democracy (Oxford, OUP, 2000) 175.
104 Article 276 TFEU keeps some limits, on which see P Craig, The Treaty of Lis-
bon: Process, architecture and substance, 33 Eur. L. Rev. (2008), 137, at 144.
105 ECJ, Case C-503/03, Commission v Spain, §§ 33-35. On the issues concerning non-
EU nationals, see C Harlow & E Guild (eds), Implementing Amsterdam: Immigra-
tion and Asylum (Oxford, Hart, 2001) and GI Wolf, Efforts toward ‘An Ever Clos-
er’ European Union Confront Immigration Barriers, 4 Indiana J. Global Leg.
Stud. 223, 228 (1996), noting the increased perception of a ‘fortress Europe’.
106 See Regulation No 1052/2013 and the ruling of the ECJ in Case C-44/14, Spain v.
European Parliament and Council (rejecting the action brought by Spain against
the possibility that the UK is involved in the new regime).
107 See B De Witte, Chameleonic Member States: Differentiation by Means of Par-
tial and Parallel Agreements, cit., 241.
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A Europe of Concentric Circles: a ‘Misleading Simple Idea’
In the light of the remarks that have made thus far, another interesting and
important question arises; that is, whether the various forms of interaction
within and beyond the EU can be summarized by the referring to the idea
of a ‘Europe of concentric circles’.
As it has been observed for other terms, this metaphor has both a de-
scriptive and a prescriptive side. Descriptively, it is noticed that some non-
EU countries have accepted to apply the principles and rules of the single
market, an aspect to which we will return later. Likewise, Turkey has ac-
cepted certain parts of EU law in the framework of the custom union that
it agreed with the EU. Other Balkan countries have accepted part of the
acquis communautaire and in particular the general principles of law de-
veloped by the ECJ, as is normally requested to the States that wish to be-
come members of the EU. Conversely, the UK is not involved in the bor-
der-free Schengen area, which is so strategic for the freedoms of EU citi-
zens to travel without visas or passports, and other five members of the EU
followed it, including Ireland, which does not wish to take part in com-
mon actions in the field of defence. The general conclusion that is drawn
from all this is that there is a greater differentiation of EU law than there
was in the past. The description turns into a prescription, when it is ob-
served that this is the inevitable price to pay for the construction of a larger
area of peaceful cooperation in Europe.
There are, however, some difficulties with this irenic view of a Europe
of concentric circles. First of all, the outer circle, that of non-EU countries,
is far from being homogeneous, because some of them joined the EEA,
while another have only agreed on a custom union.
Secondly, the inner circle – the EU – is itself differentiated not only
with regard to monetary and fiscal issues. On the one hand, within the EU
there are different views about the construction of the area of freedom, se-
curity and justice, as we have seen with regard to the Schengen acquis.
Moreover, only fourteen Members have ratified the Convention of Prüm,
which aims at strengthening police cooperation through exchange of in-
formation and, thus, security. On the other hand, there are very different
views with regard to one of the main values upon which the EU is found-
ed; that is, the respect for fundamental rights. When the last IGC discussed
about the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, some
Member States dissented. A protocol added to the Lisbon Treaty now af-
firms that the Charter does not extend to Poland and the UK the ‘ability’
of the ECJ to ‘find’ that their ‘laws, regulations or administrative provi-
C.
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sions, practice or actions’ are inconsistent with the Charter.108 Legal schol-
arship has expressed strong reservations concerning the legal value and ef-
fects of this Protocol, which on other hand reaffirms the obligations stem-
ming from EU law, including its general principles and thus fundamental
rights as they stem from the ECHR and common constitutional tradi-
tions.109 A more critical remark might be that any attempt to limit the
scope and effectiveness of individual rights, even indirectly, for example
through a limitation of judicial independence,might lead to the destruc-
tion of the moral foundations on which the ‘legal order of a new kind’ has
been built. Interestingly, this was precisely the point of attack of the Com-
mission in respect of Polish legislation and the Court of Justice endorsed
its argument. The Venice Commission, too, criticized certain measures tak-
en by Polish policy-makers from the viewpoint of the Council of Europe’s
standards concerning the Rule of Law.110
For the sake of clarity, I am at present making no claim about the na-
ture of this controversy and the measures that could be adopted in order to
solve it. This is a complex question that must be considered on its own,
not tangentially. The present aim is more limited. It is to enquire whether
one can coherently construct a theory of differentiated integration that
rests on the assumption that there is an inner and more integrated circle –
the EU – and a an outer and less integrated circle. The conclusion that sug-
gested here is that this is not plausible. Whatever its apparent appeal, the
idea of a Europe of concentric circles is but another ‘misleading simple
idea’.111
108 Protocol n. 30, Article 1 (1). See also Polish Declaration n. 61 on the Charter,
affirming that the Charter does not affect in any way the Member States’ capaci-
ty to legislate in the sphere of family law and public morality.
109 See J Ziller, Les nouveaux traités européens: Lisbon et après (La Découverte, 2005),
105; I Pernice, The Treaty of Lisbon and Fundamental Rights, in S Griller & J
Ziller (eds), The Lisbon Treaty. EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional
Treaty? (Springer, 2008). See also P Craig, The Treaty of Lisbon: Process, architecture
and substance, cit, 163 (observing the UK’s insistence on the Protocol is ‘prob-
lematic’).
110 The Opinion was adopted by the Commission at its 113th session, on 8-9 Decem-
ber 2017.
111 F. De La Serre & H. Wallace, Flexibility and Enhanced Cooperation in the Euro-
pean Union: Placebo rather than Panacea, cit., 5.
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Implications for the post-Brexit Scenario
It is in the light of the various legal mechanisms just examined that the
post-Brexit scenario will be considered. The Bill approved by the English
Parliament to authorize the referendum (the European Union Referen-
dum Act 2015), the referendum’s outcome and the decision to trigger Arti-
cle 50 TEU brought about major changes for the UK, ‘a fundamental reori-
entation in … law and policy’,112 as well as for the EU as a whole. Taken
together with the magnitude of such changes, the evident lack of adequate
awareness of the available institutional and legal options before the refer-
endum took place, explain the difficulties with which policy makers are
confronted.
Limits of space preclude treatment of several important issues concern-
ing public policies in range of sectors including work and environment, se-
curity and trade with the rest of the world. The following discussion will
focus on some issues concerning institutions and rights and will rest on an
assumption, that is, it can rightfully be said that is ‘axiomatic’ that the fu-
ture relations between the UK and the EU will be deeply affected by the
content of the withdrawal agreement,113 but at the same time the content
of the agreement will be influenced by the nature of the relationship that
can be envisaged. This applies even to the scenario characterized by the ab-
sence of an agreement (the ‘no-deal’). That being the case, the UK would
not leave just a wide range of policies, but also the Single Market, under
which most of its trade in goods and services has taken place for almost
fifty years. Absence of an agreement, at least about a transitional period,
this would happen very quickly and would force the UK to use World
Trade Organization rules. Whether such rules are more or less favourable
to the UK is a question that requires specific treatment,114 which is pre-
cluded by space limits. Suffice it to mention that WTO rules are by all
means a vehicle of legal globalization, more than those of the EU.
The question that is more related with our previous analysis is another;
that is, whether the UK may remain aligned with the EU, either within the
Single Market or within the Custom Union (this scenario is often called
E.
112 M Dougan, Introduction, in Id (ed), The UK after Brexit. Legal and Policy Chal-
lenges (Intersentia, 2017), 1. For an account of the institutional consequences of
Brexit, see P Craig, Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts, 41 Eur. Law Rev (2016), 447.
113 P Craig, Brexit and Relations Between the EU and the UK, in M. Dougan (ed.),
The UK after Brexit. Legal and Policy Challenges, cit, 302.
114 See M Cremona, UK Trade Policy, in M Dougan (ed.), The UK after Brexit. Legal
and Policy Challenges, cit, 247.
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‘soft Brexit’, whatever the adequacy of this term). Some observers suggest-
ed that the UK might be involved in the single market as a member of the
EEA.115 There is no doubt that such a scenario could be economically ben-
eficial for all, though in a different degree. It would also be beneficial to all
individuals who have benefited of free movement and right of establish-
ment.
However, it is not immune from difficulties. There is, first, the difficulty
concerning the choice of legal instruments. As observed earlier, while Nor-
way signed a single treaty with the EU, Switzerland chose to sign a set of
agreements. Whatever the choice, the process of negotiation will tend to
be long and cumbersome, as the experience of the last two years shows.
There is a further difficulty with this solution; that is, the close connec-
tion between the four freedoms of circulation of persons, goods, services
and capitals. Of course, the UK may ask, as it did, to exclude the former,
but the common position of the EU has been that those freedoms cannot
be separated. For this reason, a scenario of a Europe ‘à la carte’ in this re-
spect seems very unlikely. This might induce negotiators to consider a cus-
tom union. But this would severely limit the capacity of the UK to enter
into relations with other countries. In other words, if this was the model to
be followed, instead of bringing sovereignty home, as many supporters or
the ‘Leave’ front argued during the political campaign, Britons would be
subject to the rules established elsewhere, with a very limited influence on
their contents.116
A further difficulty concerns enforcement mechanisms. Those who gov-
ern the UK constantly expressed their intent to be no longer subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. While this may be a politically legiti-
mate purpose, institutionally it is not easy to understand how it could be
achieved in the short run, because the EU Council’s negotiating policy is
that the Court must have jurisdiction concerning the term of the agree-
ment. Nor, in the medium term, is it easy to understand how a solution
different from the one that exists in the context of the EEA could be mean-
ingfully envisaged. It is true that the Council has not excluded an alterna-
tive mechanism of adjudication, provided that it offers equivalent guaran-
tees of independence and impartiality. However, an elementary necessity
of coherence within the EEA would run against anything – for example,
115 This is a contentious political issue, as it is demonstrated by the fact that some
shadow ministers of the Labour Party resigned after they joined the MPs who
supported a rebel amendment to the Queen’s Speech calling for Britain to stay
in the single market and customs union (The Independent, June 30, 2017).
116 P Craig, Brexit and Relations Between the EU and the UK, cit, 320-1.
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arbitral procedures – that differs from the existing judicial mechanism, in
its essence the Court of Justice integrated by judges coming from the other
partners. Similarly, the interpretation given by the Court to the acquis com-
munautaire would continue to have weight as a persuasive authority for na-
tional courts, when they elaborate their own interpretation of the national-
ized acquis, in terms indicated by the Repeal Bill.
Conclusion
This essay has two major themes. The first is that there is a tension inher-
ent between two political visions of Europe, one centred on the ‘ever clos-
er union’ and the other on the achievement of a wide and loose union.
Precisely because these are not simply different, but conflicting political vi-
sions of what the EU is and should be, it is necessary to be fully aware of
their consequences, which is not always the case. A clear example is provid-
ed by the illusion, which emerges from the recent Declaration of Rome,
that it is possible to live together harmoniously for a prolonged amount of
time despite conflicting ideas about the ultimate ends of the European
construction and, to some extent, about what its common values concrete-
ly mean. The second theme concerns differentiated integration. Although
there is a variety of opinion about the desirability of those political visions
of Europe, the institutional and legal mechanisms of integration that exist
within and outside the EU must be considered in the light of the twin cri-
teria of clarity and coherence. Such criteria are necessary requisites for a
rigorous scientific analysis. They are also helpful for a better understanding
of the institutional and legal options that are available for the relations be-
tween the UK and the EU in the post-Brexit period. Clarity and coherence,
of course, do not replace passions and interests, which shape political pref-
erences. They are nonetheless important.
VI.
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The Future of the Protection of Fundamental Rights after
Brexit
Jiří Zemánek
Abstract
The Union fundamental rights can become a medium of a real – two direction –
dialog between European and national judicial authorities. The judicial reason-
ing by the British courts, reflecting the long tradition of the British system of con-
versations between the courts, will be missing after Brexit.
To meet the legitimate aspirations of the Union citizens means to leave the
strict application of the CFR by the CJEU that should have to be more open to a
discourse with national courts, which might be as well positioned to assess con-
flicts of constitutional values even beyond the standard instrumentalities of pre-
liminary ruling. A more courageous use of the CFR means for judicial authorities
at both levels to take their commitments in this area more seriously. The British
judiciaries had been responsive in this respect. Their leaving the Union means
slowing down the process of assertion of the CFR as the authoritative document
on human rights protection in Europe.
Introduction
A process of rapprochement of three autonomous, but functionally interre-
lated, levels of protection of fundamental rights – national constitutions,
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the
ECHR) and, for the Member States of the European Union, the Charter of
Fundamental Rights (the CFR) – is running in Europe, initiated by the
free movement of EU citizens within the internal market and the shared
space of security and justice. The Britain´s departure from this ´communi-
ty of destiny´, where the United Kingdom holds in certain respects a re-
served position, will entail more than a mere withdrawal from its rights
and obligations.
The enforcement of Union law at national level, whether it is applied
directly or through implementation acts of Member States, relies on the ef-
fectiveness of national sanctions and other coercive measures for keeping
I.
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under control the margin of appreciation or limits of exception conferred
on national authorities by Union law. The judicial review of their acts by
ordinary and constitutional courts refers – besides the principle of rule of
law – to the principle of protection of fundamental rights. The direct nor-
mative reception of the CFR is taking place on an alternative basis, where
the higher level of protection is replacing the lower ones (Article 53), not –
as in cases without the Union law dimension – on a cumulative basis,
where the national constitution is in a subsidiarity position towards the
ECHR or other human rights treaties. ‘A total convergence’1 of all stan-
dards of protection has been made difficult due to warries of some consti-
tutional courts about the extensive interpretation of the CFR by the Court
of Justice of the European Union (the CJEU), which could allegedly over-
ride the identity-building core elements of their national constitutions.
The British reservation followed by a Polish one against the CFR at the in-
tergovernmental conference in Lisbon 2007 has evidenced this approach.2
A convergence-supporting potential of references to the CJEU as well as
by national judicial authorities to general principles of law with binding
force, stemming both from the ECHR and from common constitutional
traditions of the Member States, is evident and functionally complement-
ing the CFR. This process results in merger of concepts originating in dif-
ferent legal orders by mutual communication of their interpreters, form-
ing an autonomous frame of protection, which is not identical with the
original sources. The real permeability of shared national and supranation-
al values, which are nominally listed in Article 2 TEU, can be verified in
the judicial dialog.3
Distinct positions towards direct application of the CFR appeared in the
case-law of the constitutional courts in some Central and East European
countries. The Czech Constitutional Court (the Court) admitted earlier an
indirect influence of the CFR through its ‘irradiation’ in the national cata-
logue.4 By this reserved position to the CFR the Court displayed an asym-
1 R Arnold, ´Introduction´ in R Arnold (ed), The Convergence of Fundamental Rights
Protection in Europe (Springer, 2016), 2.
2 Protocol no. 30 on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union.
3 M Wendel, Permeabilität im europäischen Verfassungsrecht. Verfassungsrechtliche
Integrationsnormen auf Staats – und Unionsebene im Vergleich (Mohr Siebeck,
2011), Teil 3 (Einheitsbildende/Vielfaltswahrende Formen primärrechtlicher Per-
meabilität).
4 Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court in the case Sugar quotas III, Pl. ÚS
3/14 (N 50/40 SbNU 443 = no. 154/2006 Coll.).
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metric approach, since – after the adoption of the monistic concept in the
Constitution5– international treaties on human rights and fundamental
freedoms have been expressly declared as having the same legal status as
the norms of the constitutional order6, forming a reference point for the
constitutional review of domestic law,7 whereas – after the accession of the
Czech Republic to the European Union – the same status has not been ex-
pressly granted to the CFR (yet). However, an equivalent standing is recog-
nized to the CFR de facto by the case law of the Court on constitutional
complaints.
The CFR has been referred to with certain reservation in Slovakia, what
was a matter of a sharp criticism. The absence of reasoning with reference
to the CFR at the level of ordinary courts ‘deprives the Constitutional
Court of the opportunity to establish the basics of its doctrine in relation
to the Charter’.8 Otherwise it ‘infringes the principle of the prohibition of
denegatio iustitiae’, its approach to the Charter was found to be ‘unreason-
ably dismissive, particularly in comparison with its attitude to other inter-
national documents on human rights and fundamental freedoms’.9 A
deeper analysis of the relevant case law to date leads to the conclusion that
this gap has been progressively narrowed.
After 2015 a disobedience – ‘a clear risk of a serious breach of the values
referred to in Article 2 TEU’– in Poland has been determined by the Euro-
pean Commission.10 It could result in violation of principles of rule of law
as well as protection of fundamental rights.11
If Brexit would mean also cutting the communication between the
British courts and the jurisprudence of the CJEU, it could amount to nar-
rowing the plurality of national experiences of protection, impeding the
Europe-wide convergence in the field of fundamental rights. A couple of
5 International treaties binding the Czech Republic form a part of the legal order
with priority over status in case of a conflict, Article 10 Const. as amended by Act
no. 395/2001 Coll.
6 It is determined by Article 112 Const.
7 The case Bancrupcy Trustee,Pl. ÚS 36/01 (N 80/26 SbNU 317; no. 403/2002 Coll.).
8 J Mazák and M Jánošíková (eds), The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union in proceedings before courts of the Slovak Republic (Košice, 2016),
179.
9 Ibid, 180.
10 See meanwhile the judgment of the ECJ, Case 619/18, Commission v. Republic of
Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531.
11 Opening remarks of the First Vice-President Frans Timmermans, Readout of the
European Commission discussion on the rule of law in Poland, Brussels, 20 December
2017.
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law students from the Central and Eastern Europe, forming the new gener-
ation of judges and practicing lawyers now, made use after 1990 of the
unique opportunity to study at universities in the United Kingdom under
the EU programs Socrates/Erasmus and learned the fundamental rights-
based approach to law there. The treaty arrangement of the leaving of the
United Kingdom the European Union should have to take the need for
preservation of the link between judges at ´both sides´ into account. The
access of UK´s persons to the EU internal market as well as the access of
Member States´ persons to the UK´s market should have to remain sup-
ported by the shared constitutional values and fundamental rights, the exe-
cution of which, indispensable for the effective functioning of the whole
system of the post-Brexit cooperation between the EU and the UK, is to be
guaranteed by judicial authorities at the both sides. The mutual communi-
cation and exchange of opinions between them, enjoying also future devel-
opments of the jurisprudential standards of protection, needs an anticipat-
ing open-ended treaty frame without any isolated self-assertion in this
field.
The position of the EU charter in United Kingdom
There has been a dispute about the application of the CFR in the United
Kingdom. The Protocol no. 30 to the Treaty of Lisbon states that the abili-
ty of the Union or British courts will not be extended to ‘find that the
laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action of the
United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms
and principles’ of the CFR. As the CFR reaffirms the general principles of
Union law having been developed by jurisprudence, they have binding ef-
fect on British courts, when they interpret the CFR and form part of crite-
ria of review of British laws on their compliance with them [Article 52(4)
CFR]. For instance, under Article 4 CFR the British courts ‘may not trans-
fer an asylum seeker to the “Member State responsible” …where they can-
not be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in
the reception conditions of asylum seekers … amount to substantial
grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being
subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment’ [the judgment of the
CJEU in the joint cases N. S. (C-411/10) and M. E. (C-493/10)]. Whether
Article 1(2) of the Protocol no. 30 exempts the United Kingdom from ap-
plying social rights as justiciable under Title IV has not been cleared yet.
The CFR has been given normative effect within the United Kingdom
by Section 2 of the ‘European Communities Act 1972’. This basic concept
II.
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differs from continental systems of Union law reception and is in contrast
with the principle of its direct validity and enforceability as developed by
the CJEU case law and has not been modified by ‘European Union Acts
2008 and 2011’.
The United Kingdom´s ‘Human Rights Act 1998’ has established a sys-
tem, which combines judicial and political intervention, guaranteeing
compliance of national laws with the ECHR. The declaration of incompat-
ibility by higher courts challenges the legislative bodies to make laws com-
patible. The most fundamental principle of the British constitutional order
– sovereignty of the Parliament – seems to remain only formally respected
by this system. It is the Government (the Minister responsible for the legis-
lation in question), which takes a measure reflecting the respective deci-
sion of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR), whereas the
Parliament is expected to give its consent, in urgent cases ex post.
According to the Conservatives´ proposals for changing Britain´s hu-
man rights laws of May 2015, both the recent practice of the ECtHR, using
the ECHR under a ‘living instrument doctrine’ leading to a ‘mission
creep’, and the domestic legislation passed in this respect and overruling
decisions of the democratically elected Parliament, ‘damaged the credibili-
ty of human rights at home’. They undermined the role of British courts,
that ´have to take into account´ ECtHR rulings, when they are interpret-
ing ECHR´s rights, as well as the sovereignty of the Parliament, when the
‘Human Rights Act 1998’goes far beyond the United Kingdom´s obliga-
tions under the ECHR.
The Conservatives, therefore, earlier proposed fundamental changes by
repealing (Labour´s) ‘Human Rights Act 1998’ and restoring common
sense (‘put Britain first’) through a new ‘Bill of Rights and Responsibili-
ties’, which should have to ‘prevent British laws from being effectively re-
written through interpretation’. As even after Brexit the experience of the
British judicial authorities in human rights protection would continue (at
least for some time), their performance would have to be counted for by
the Union and Member States´ judiciaries and political bodies, even when
looking for a new arrangement of the Union´s accession to the ECHR.
However, the British Government has given priority to negotiating and
concluding a post-Brexit treaty. The long anticipated British Bill has been
further delayed because of the Brexit judgment of the Supreme Court R
(on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for exiting the
European Union given on 24 January 2017 as well as by the outcome of par-
liamentary election in June 2017 and later, due to turbulences in decision
making process of Brexit policy, left open for post-Brexit times.
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The relevance of the CFR for the areas of EU policies
The intensity of application of the CFR relies on the area of Union law con-
sidered. Where a stronger Union interest exists (e.g. internal market, com-
petition), the CFR is more likely to be a frame of references for constitu-
tional review of national measures. When the application of the CFR
could lower the effective enforcement of Union law (like in asylum or
European Arrest Warrant matters), the uniform compliance with a mini-
mum standard of protection by Member States is presumed and precedes
over the potential breach of fundamental rights in a given case.12 When,
on the other hand, the objectives of European integration can be realized
only by coordinating the exercise of Member States competencies (e.g.
family law, social policy), the obligation of national authorities to refer to
the CFR by taking it into consideration is limited solely for the specific
purposes of interpreting a piece of Union law without an assessment of na-
tional law as such.13 In all other cases the CFR will most likely not be ap-
plied. Substantive (higher level of protection) as well as procedural
(supremacy) advantages for individuals could have been always favoring
the Union rather than national fundamental rights.
The relevance of the CFR in areas reserved to Member States, where the
Union has not been authorized to full harmonization, is constitutionally
questionable as it might result in a latent extension of competences, even
when the CJEU constructed – through an extensive interpretation of the
scope of application of Union law – a remote link to it, sufficient enough
to refer to the CFR.14 However, the CJEU rather attempts to ensure that
the CFR should not become a vehicle for broadening the impact of Union
law on national law through further limitation of the field, in which na-
tional courts must apply the CFR directly. When assessing the scope of dis-
cretion in the execution of an asylum claim, the Member State is imple-
menting Union law; however, to ensure the full effectiveness of the Dublin
II Regulation, the CFR would be as relevant as in an ‘exceptional’ situa-
tion.15 The CJEU is somehow reducing the impact of the CFR even when
national courts are enforcing Union law. The CJEU renounced to a broad
application of fundamental rights also to avoid an intervention in the
sovereignty of the Member States, in particular, in cases of migration of
III.
12 Judgment of the CJEU in the case no. C-399/11 Melloni.
13 Judgment of the CJEU in the case no. C-400/10 PPU McB.
14 Judgment of the CJEU in the case no. C-617/10 Akerberg Fransson.
15 Judgment of the CJEU in the case no. C-411/10 and C-483/10 N. S. and others.
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third country nationals within the Union. However, the CJEU did not
identify such an intervention in national sovereignty in pleas of Hungary
and Republic of Poland Decision (EU) 2015/1601 on provisional measures
in the area of international protection in an emergency situation character-
ized by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries into certain Mem-
ber States.16
The above-mentioned findings have been in the United Kingdom, the
most exposed Member State to (im)migration with its social impacts, a
stock of displeasure leading to Brexit.
Recent developments
The integration in sensitive matters is imaginable, when mutual trust be-
tween the Member States in adequate fundamental rights protection across
the Union is underlying the legal instruments of cooperation. National au-
thorities should not be exposed to the need to scrutinize the ‘adequacy’ of
fundamental rights compliance in cooperating States, otherwise the effec-
tiveness of the pieces of Union law in question would be impaired. How-
ever, national constitutional courts could be unwilling to rely only on
Union guarantees, as the German Federal Constitutional Court recently
demonstrated in a ruling which claimed its jurisdiction on the review
whether the principle of mutual trust does not violate the constitutional
guarantees of fair trial as a part of national identity.17
The quick answer from Luxembourg was unusual – in contrast to its
earlier decisions,18 the CJEU adjudicated, that the full effect of Union law
is not the only objective to be aimed at. It is rather the elimination of any
inhuman treatment in the country the court of which has been asking the
extradition. The obligation of mutual recognition of standards of protec-
tion of an individual in criminal proceedings under the framework deci-
sion on the European Arrest Warrant must be supported by an impartial
information about non-existence of degrading treatment of prisoners,
based on a direct communication between the respective national criminal
IV.
16 Judgment of the CJEU of 6 September 2017 in joint cases no. C-643/15 and
C-647/15.
17 Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court 2 BvR in the case no.
2535, 14 concerning European Arrest Warrant (called Solange III, too).
18 Case Melloni (supra n 11).
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courts. Otherwise the process of surrender can be – rather is to be –
brought to an end.19
This indicates that the Union fundamental rights can become a medium
of a real – two direction – dialog between European and national judicial
authorities. The judicial reasoning by the British courts, reflecting the long
tradition of the British system of conversations between the courts, will be
missing after Brexit.
Conclusions
It is open to debate, whether the approach of the CJEU to the application
of the CFR in the Member States is not arbitrarily restrained, weakening
the protection and frustrating the expectations of Union citizens. As an ef-
fective Union procedural mechanism for the enforcement of fundamental
rights obligations in the Member States (regardless of the infringement
procedure under Article 258 TFEU and the ‘nuclear bomb’ of Article 7
TEU) has been still under construction, the space for presumption of a
minimum compliance within the Union would be narrowed. It can be
considered whether or in which way the next draft Treaty on the accession
of the Union to the European Convention of Human Rights, the first draft
having been rejected by the CJEU,20 could be supportive in this respect.
The hypothetical question about the prospects of supporting the accession
by United Kingdom need not to be raised now any more.
Both the CJEU case law on coordinating legislation and on Article 51
CFR seem to suggest an inferiority of Union fundamental rights in the
interest of European integration (a. o., rejection to reflect the constitution-
al reservations of Spanish courts against the execution of European Arrest
Warrant in Melloni case,21 calling into doubt Article 53 CFR). National
guarantees are the main source of protection for Union citizens against
acts of the Member States when exercising discretion in a field occupied by
Union law, whereas the CFR is a medium guaranteeing the conformity of
national authorities´ obligations in the area of fundamental rights and
freedoms. A generous application of the CFR might limit national autono-
my and entail the loss of constitutional diversity, forming part of national
V.
19 Judgment of the CJEU in the joint cases no. C-404/15 and C-659/15 Aranyosi and
Caldararu, initiated by preliminary questions of German courts.
20 Opinion of the CJEU no. 2/13.
21 Supra, n 12.
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identity, which is to be observed by the Union (Article 4 para 2 TEU) in a
way that could be difficult to justify with regard to the principle of confer-
ral of powers.
To meet the legitimate aspirations of the Union citizens means to leave
the strict application of the CFR by the CJEU that should have to be more
open to a discourse with national courts, which might be as well posi-
tioned to assess conflicts of constitutional values even beyond the standard
instrumentalities of the preliminary ruling. A more courageous use of the
CFR means for judicial authorities at both levels to take their commit-
ments in this area more seriously. The British judiciaries had been respon-
sive in this respect. Their leaving the Union means slowing down the pro-
cess of assertion of the CFR as the authoritative document on human
rights protection in Europe.
The question, whether the European Union does possess remedies ad-
equate to the task of protecting its values, has been recently a matter of as-
sessment of the CJEU, initiated by the reference for preliminary ruling
concerning conditions for execution of the European arrest warrant. On
the basis of the European Commission´s reasoned opinion of 20 Decem-
ber 201722 submitted in accordance with Article 7 (1) TEU and the find-
ings of the Venice Commission for Democracy through law of the Council
of Europe regarding the rule of law in Poland the CJEU has deepened its
conclusions in the judgment of 5 April 2016 Aranyiosi and Caldararu23 by
the ruling that ‘where the executing judicial authority … has material …
indicating that there is a real risk of breach of the fundamental right to a
fair trial … on account of systemic or generalized deficiencies so far as con-
cerns of the independence of the issuing Member State´s judiciary, that au-
thority must determine, specifically and precisely, whether … there are
substantial grounds for believing that that person will run such a risk if he
is surrendered to that State’.24
The further course of human rights in the Union thus faces an uneasy
dilemma: is it better for the Member States, who control the Treaties and
therefore the rules of the game, to give up the national autonomy they
have anxiously guarded, so that the Union may react decisively to restric-
tions on fundamental rights? Or should they rather accept the Union,
22 Supra, n 11.
23 Supra n 19.
24 Judgment of 25 July 2018 in the case C-216/18 PPU, para 80.
The Future of the Protection of Fundamental Rights after Brexit
99
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748903246, am 21.11.2019, 13:37:49
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
which does not intervene in fundamental rights’ issues at the expense of
tolerating new authoritarians emerging in some other Member States?25
25 ´The interpretation of Article 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: the
dilemma of stricter or broader application of the Charter to national measures.
Study for the PetiCommitee of the European Parliament, 2016´.
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Brexit – Exercise of Democracy or a Challenge to Democracy?
Ingolf Pernice, Berlin
Abstract
The Brexit process is no doubt a challenge to the EU. Is it also a challenge to
democracy? Or is it just an exercise of democracy? Looking closer at both, the pro-
visions for the withdrawal from the EU and their application by the UK and the
EU no serious violation of democratic principles can be determined. Some
doubts, however, arise with regard to certain aspects of the process in practice,
starting from the conditions and preparation of the referendum up to the effect
given by a broad majority to its result, notwithstanding the advisory nature only.
The present contribution discusses questions of appropriate democratic participa-
tion to a referendum of the given kind, of dealing with systemic lying and ma-
nipulation in political processes, binding effects of a referendum in a parliamen-
tary democracy and the role of courts in relation to the parliament and the gov-
ernment when it comes to decide upon far-reaching constitutional issues. Some
lessons are drawn from the experience of Brexit so far, not least for the rising
awareness of citizens of the Union for political developments across borders and
of challenges to democracy the abuse of new information technologies can bring
about at all political levels. Whatever the outcome of the process with all its
threats to democracy it brings about, it will trigger a transformation both of the
UK and the EU. Should Brexit really happen, the door so remains open for an
enlightened return as an expression of democracy.
Introduction
The Brexit story so far is full of surprises, unexpected turns and disappoint-
ments. Nobody really expected that the referendum of 23 June 2016 would
result in a success for the Brexiteers, and that the government would strive
to execute it with such decisiveness and rigor. Many argued that the gov-
ernment simply had to follow what ‘the people’ had decided and forgot
about the consultative nature of the referendum as well as the constitution-
al principle of the supremacy of Parliament. Surprisingly for them, the
High Court and the Supreme Court has very clearly confirmed the consti-
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tutional need for the government to obtain parliamentary authorisation in
order to trigger Article 50 TEU and also surprisingly clear was the Parlia-
ment’s final vote on this authorisation, in spite of the fact that before the
referendum a majority of the Parliament had defended exactly the oppo-
site point of view: Remain.
That Theresa May, having an absolute majority in Parliament for her
party, would decide to call new elections in order to gain support for her
strategy of a hard Brexit, was unexpected as well, and so was the clear re-
fusal of the British people to follow her. Nothing suggests that Theresa
May will politically survive the process or even remain in office for the full
period of the process. Given her failure in the 2017 general elections, it
came as a surprise that the negotiations on a withdrawal agreement started
at all: 19 June 2017.
The only obvious certainty was at this time that the remaining part of
the two years period provided under the Treaty for coming to an arrange-
ment on the conditions of Britain’s withdrawal would be over by 29
March 2019. Given the complexity of the subject there was little hope that
this deadline would be met. Surprisingly, the negotiators did emerge with
an agreement in time. And this “Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the Euro-
pean Union and the European Atomic Energy Community”, as agreed at
negotiators' level on 14 November 2018,1 was even accepted by the Coun-
cil of 27, as required by Article 50 TEU. It was also expected to receive the
consent of the European Parliament. As it was rejected by the UK Parlia-
ment, however, it was difficult to see how a timely ratification could be
reached to avoid a hard Brexit, as it was the wish of the majority voting in
the UK Parliament on 14 March 2019. Would a second referendum be
needed, or new elections, before such a step is taken? An extension of the
Article 50 TEU deadline with the agreement of the 27 was necessary in any
event. This agreement even seemed to be questioned for a while, since Italy
was thought possibly to veto the extension.2 The only way to avoid a hard
1 Draft Agreement, TF50 (2018) 55–Commission to EU27, full text available at:
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/draft_withdrawal_agreem
ent_0.pdf (accessed 19 March 2019).
2 For an attempt of blocking: see Georgi Gotev, ‘Farage to lobby EU countries in
search of Brexit extension veto’, at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-elections-2
019/news/farage-to-lobby-eu-countries-in-search-of-brexit-extension-veto/ (accessed
19 March 2019); see also: Focus online of March 19, 2019: ‘Geheim-PaktmitSalvini?
Wie Brexit-Vater Farage die EU austricksen will’, at https://eulawanalysis.blogspot.
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Brexit in this case would have been the revocation of the Article 50 notice.3
Yet, at the EU summit of 22 March 2019, an extension was granted until
31 October 2019, though nothing indicates that an agreement will be
found and finally be ratified by all parties until then. – Following the 2019
European elections and after Theresa May stepping down, the new Prime
Minister Boris Johnson even more strongly envisages a no-deal Brexit. This
is as suprising as audacious, given the clear majority in the Parliament is
against this solution. Probably the Parliament will not allow it to happen,
though time is too short for new elections or for organising the second ref-
erendum. The next surprise, thus, is to come. The second extension of the
Article 50 deadline may be unavoidable.
The 2019 local elections in the UK had shown a manifest move away
from the Tories and the Labour Party, and commentators saw this as an ex-
pression of disappointment of people with the way the Brexit process was
handled by the Government and in the Parliament so far. Since no solu-
tion could be found, the UK had decided to participate in the European
elections of 26 May 2019. This was a new challenge since the question may
be asked: What was the point of participating in the elections for a Mem-
ber State that is about to leave the Union. Or is it not?
A second referendum or new elections in the UK may lead to no-Brexit
at all. Millions of petitioners asked for revoking the Article 50 notice,4 and
again, hundreds of thousands anti-Brexit campaigners were marching in
London demanding a second referendum at the ‘Put it to the People
march’ of 23 March 2019. Given the increasing weight of young British
voters compared to that of the elderly, whose votes were decisive in the
June 2016 referendum, and with a view to the fact that Brexit is decisive
for the young generations’ future above all, the last word is not spoken
yet.5
com/2019/03/extension-and-elections-we-need-to-talk.html?fbclid=IwAR3sRomrzR
bRRAVnh7ProT9M7VPdrRO2TXxTayljNu1h3pbQM8AMku88BfA&m=1 (ac-
cessed 19 March 2019).
3 For the possibilities of this option from a legal point of view see the judgment of
10 December 2018 of the ECJ in case C-621/18 – Wightman, ECLI:EU:C:2018:999.
4 See Petition: Revoke Article 50 and remain in the EU, with 4,366,791 signatures by
March 23, 2019, 16:32, at: https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/241584 (accessed
23 March 2019).
5 For the legal aspects of the remaining outcomes a fortnight before the 29 th of
March 2019 see the blog of Catherine Barnard & Steve Wheatherill, ‘Extension and
elections: We need to talk about Article 50’, at: https://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/
2019/03/extension-and-elections-we-need-to-talk.html?fbclid=IwAR3sRomrzRbRR
AVnh7ProT9M7VPdrRO2TXxTayljNu1h3pbQM8AMku88BfA&m=1.
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What we are experiencing these days in the UK and the EU with regard
to the Brexit process is closely related to the meaning of democracy. If my
task at this Lisbon conference, as the title of the present paper suggests,
was to develop some thoughts about the choice between characterising
Brexit as an exercise of, or a challenge to democracy, perhaps the only cer-
tainty is, wherever the process may finally lead the Union to, that the out-
come must be democratic. Let me develop my thoughts on the basis of
these three:
1. The Brexit process is no doubt an exercise of democracy in some re-
spect;
2. It must be understood as a challenge to democracy in some other re-
spect;
3. And it is a process from which some lessons can be drawn for the fu-
ture.
Some questions cannot be examined in depth at this place: ‘What actually
is democracy?’, or whether ‘democracy’ is a term that can be easily applied
in EU contexts at all. Reference may be made insofar to the proceedings of
the last ECLN Conference in Thessaloniki in May 2015, published under
the title ‘Legitimacy Issues of the European Union in the Face of Crisis’.6
The present paper rather focuses, first, on the provisions of the EU-
Treaty regarding the withdrawal of a Member State: They seem, indeed, to
provide for an exercise of democracy (infra I.). Second, the process leading
to the UK Government’s notice of withdrawal under Article 50 TEU: With
a view, in particular, to the democratic rights of the citizens directly affect-
ed by a Brexit and how EU citizens are represented, it rather looks like a
challenge to democracy (infra II.).This leads to the question what lessons
can be learned from this process: What does it tell us about democracy in
the EU (infra III.)?
The Brexit Process as an Exercise of Democracy
Paul Craig has described the first phases of the process in a brilliant essay
titled: ‘Brexit: a drama in six acts’.7 After a long public debate, David
I.
6 Lina Papadopoulou/Ingolf Pernice/Joseph H.H. Weiler (eds), Legitimacy Issues of
the European Union in the Face of Crisis. Dimitris Tsatsos in Memoriam (Nomos,
Baden-Baden 2017).
7 Paul Craig, ‘Brexit: a drama in six acts’, European Law Review (2016), 447.
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Cameron was given a clear mandate in the parliamentary elections of 2014
to carry out his strategy in the form he had proposed in the famous
Bloomberg Speech of 23 January 2013.8 As promised, he led negotiations
with the EU on an arrangement satisfying the demands of the UK and af-
ter these negotiations had been concluded, he submitted the question to
the British people so that they could decide whether to remain in the EU
under these new conditions or to withdraw from it. The answer was Brexit.
But even more than 3 years after the referendum of June 2016 the UK is
still a Member State of the EU, it participated in the European elections of
May 2019, and its future role in – or relation to – the EU remains unde-
fined.
The conclusion that this process was an exercise of democracy can, at
least, be based on four aspects of it: David Cameron’s strategy was demo-
cratic (infra A.); putting the question of Brexit to an advisory referendum
is an exercise of democracy (infra B.); the conditions and the procedure
that Article 50 TEU provides for a withdrawal from the EU are democratic
(infra C.), and the result of the Brexit process so far has been a surprising
increase in democratic awareness among people throughout the EU (infra
D.).
The Cameron Strategy was democratic
David Cameron understood that strong feelings existed in Britain against
the EU and that people had problems with (a) the increasing flow of immi-
grants into the country, with (b) the financial burden of EU membership
and with (c) the constraints that EU legislation and policies seemed to
place on sovereign UK policies, primarily in the social sector and health
care. The EU seemed to have competences that were too far-reaching. Con-
trary to his expectations, however, the ‘balance of competences review’
David Cameron had initiated in 2012 revealed that there was no unjusti-
fied EU competence.9 With a view to finding an appropriate arrangement
with the EU, Cameron puts emphasis rather on a stronger subsidiarity con-
trol over the exercise of EU competences, an enhanced role of the national
A.
8 David Cameron, ‘EU speech at Bloomberg’, 23 January 2013, at: https://www.gov.u
k/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg (accessed 18 August 2017).
9 See GOV.UK, ‘Guidance. Review of the balance of competences’, at: https://www.g
ov.uk/guidance/review-of-the-balance-of-competences (accessed 19 March 2019).
An official conclusion upon all the documents and work published has not been
published yet.
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Parliaments over EU policies and the deletion of the ‘ever closer Union’-
clause in the Treaties. If his strategy was to negotiate these issues with his
colleagues in the EU and to submit the resulting arrangement to the scruti-
ny of the British people as a basis for the ‘remain’ option, it is difficult to
contest the democratic character of this process.
The problem was that the outcome of these negotiations was neither
strong nor convincing in substance, nor clear regarding the legal implica-
tions.10 It was not the ‘far-reaching fundamental change’, nor the ‘updated
European Union‘ he had called for in the Bloomberg speech, nor the re-
turn to the ‘common market’.11 Nonetheless, to put the question of ‘Brexit
or remain’ to the British people was a great risk, to say the least, and his
campaign for ‘remain’ on this basis was more than difficult. This does not
mean, however, that the strategy was undemocratic. On the contrary, in
the 2014 elections it received full backing, and the Brexit referendum was
expressly authorised by the Parliament in 2016.
Advisory Referendum and Democracy
Is an advisory referendum, as it was authorised by the Parliament, demo-
cratic? Difficult to deny! A referendum is an expression of direct democra-
cy. Even in a representative democracy that is based upon the principle of
parliamentary sovereignty, like Britain, there cannot be doubts about this,
at least in a case where the Parliament in the exercise of its prerogatives ex-
pressly authorises a referendum that is not legally binding. In the present
case the referendum was advisory, so the Parliament allowed the govern-
ment to ask for the opinion of the people without implying that the out-
come would determine the policies of the government or the Parliament.
While the principle of parliamentary sovereignty may well exclude an act
of Parliament – or a popular vote, authorised by the Parliament – from be-
ing binding for the Parliament in future and so restricting the Parliaments’
own freedom to decide at any time whatever it considers necessary, no
such restriction follows from an advisory referendum.
B.
10 See the critique by Sylvie Goulard, ‘Goodby Europe’ (Flammarion, Roubaix 2016).
11 David Cameron, Bloomberg speech (n 8), summarising his view of what the
British peoples’ ‘disillusionment with the EU is’: ‘People feel that the EU is head-
ing in a direction that they never signed up to. They resent the interference in our
national life by what they see as unnecessary rules and regulation. And they won-
der what the point of it all is. Put simply, many ask “why can’t we just have what
we voted to join – a common market?”’.
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Meanwhile, the Divisional Court of England and Wales and, on appeal,
the UK Supreme Court were asked to decide upon the question ‘whether a
formal notice of withdrawal can lawfully be given by ministers without
prior legislation passed in both Houses of Parliament and assented to by
HM The Queen’.12 With Judgment of 20 January 2017 the UK Supreme
Court has confirmed the view taken by the High Court13 that an express
authorisation by the Parliament is required for the government to file the
notice under Article 50 TEU. The Supreme Court stressed, in particular,
that ‘Parliamentary sovereignty is a fundamental principle of the UK con-
stitution’. Quoting from Dicey’s Introduction to the Study of the Law of the
Constitution the Court emphasises that the ‘Parliament, or more precisely
the Crown in Parliament, lays down the law through statutes – or primary
legislation as it is also known – and not in any other way’. And as the with-
drawal from the EU would necessarily change the law applicable within
the UK and the rights of her citizens, Brexit would not be possible without
an act of Parliament.14 In rejecting the government’s argument that filing
the notice under Article 50 TEU would not be an exercise of the Royal pre-
rogative the Supreme Court so protected the constitutional rights of the
Parliament and democracy in Britain.
It was for the Parliament, thus, to give or not to give the green light for
the notice. And voting upon the authorisation of the government to give
notice of withdrawal to the President of the Council as specified by Article
50 TEU, each individual Member of Parliament was called to make his or
her own personal judgment of conscience whether or not to follow the
people’s vote. If they felt bound, politically, to follow it, this was no doubt
an expression of democracy.
The Terms of Article 50 TEU as an Expression of Democracy
Democracy means free self-determination of people, citizens of a political
community. According to the concepts of post-national democracy and
C.
12 See (2017) UKSC 5 Judgment of 24 January 2017 – Miller, para. 2, at: https://www
.google.com/search?q=uk+supreme+court+brexit+judgment&oq=uk+supreme+co
urt+brexit&aqs=chrome.2.69i57j0l3.20422j1j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#
(accessed 21 March 2019).
13 Divisional Court of England and Wales, Judgment given on 3 November 2016 –
R (Miller) v The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC
2768.
14 UKSC (n 12), paras 43, 100, 101.
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multilevel constitutionalism, democracy is not limited to States only.15
People can organise self-determination at diverse levels, and this is what
the citizens of the Member States did when they accepted, according to
their respective constitutional requirements, the European Treaties and
their amendments as negotiated, on their behalf, by their governments.
With the constitution of the EU people, citizens of the Member States,
have not only created this particular supranational setting for pursuing
their common political objectives, and defined themselves as citizens of
the Union; they have also set up the procedure allowing EU membership
to remain voluntary. Thus, like the Constitution of the EU as a whole, the
right of withdrawal reflecting the ‘principle of voluntariness’ laid down in
Article 50 TEU,16 is also an expression of the citizens’ democratic self-deter-
mination in the profoundest sense of the term. The citizens of the Member
States exercised their sovereign right to establish the EU, the membership
to which similarly remains the sovereign choice of each of the participat-
ing peoples.
There is an important difference to the constitution of a State, even of a
federal State: Article 50 confirms the voluntary character of the member-
ship to this particular joint venture, with all the consequences it may im-
ply. Though originally not thought to be of practical relevance, the exit op-
tion is part of the deal and an expression of a constitutional principle,
which is formative of the EU. It underlines the openness, which the princi-
ple of democracy requires as a matter of self-determination, for peoples at
any time to revise previous decisions whenever deemed necessary.
But democratic self-determination is not without limits. It is based upon
the recognition and respect of human dignity and the fundamental rights
of others. This is the reason why the withdrawal from the EU is subject to
a specific procedure. The terms of Article 50 TEU can, thus, be understood
as an expression of these limits. They reflect the fundamental requirements
of solidarity, the principle of loyal and sincere cooperation and respect for
the rights of EU citizens under the Treaties, in particular the rights of free
15 Ingolf Pernice, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Crisis of Democracy in Eu-
rope’, 11 EuConst (2015), pp 541–62, available also as: WHI-Paper 02/2015.
16 On this principle as a particular characteristic of the EU see Ingolf Pernice, ‘The
EU – A Citizens’ Joint Venture. Multilevel Constitutionalism and Open Democ-
racy in Europe’, in: José M Magone (ed), Routledge Handbook of European Politics
(Routledge, Abingdon, 2015), pp 184–201. See also: Kalypso Nicolaidis, Exodus
Reconing Sacrifice. Three Meanings of Brexit (Unbound, London 2019), p 188:
Brexit as a demonstration of “how the freedom to leave defines the very essence of
the EU”.
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movement and non-discrimination or, technically speaking ‘national treat-
ment’ of foreign EU citizens. Therefore, though established by a democrat-
ic process, the question of whether or not the procedure and conditions set
out in this provision are sufficient to ensure the effective protection of
these rights and principles needs further consideration.17
Stimulating democratic Processes in the EU
As part of the Brexit story, not only the developments in the UK, but also
the reactions they provoked in other Member States are of interest. It was a
shock for many people, an alarm bell warning of the decline not only of
the EU but also of national democracies. People feared that the British ref-
erendum would have a negative impact on national political developments
in Austria, the Netherlands, France and others, including Germany, due to
populist, xenophobic and nationalist movements gaining ground at the
same time as the European idea was coming under increasing pressure. As
a result, new citizens’ initiatives and movements arose spontaneously in re-
action to these threats to integration and peace in Europe.
One of them, Pulse of Europe, begun in January 2017 and has since
brought tens of thousands of Europeans onto the streets in up to 130 Euro-
pean cities, to demonstrate each Sunday at 2 p.m. for a United Europe of
the citizens.18 The general fear that the Brexit process could stimulate dis-
integration and push Europe back into a situation that we thought we had
overcome over the past 70 years thus had the positive effect of mobilising
citizens who had hitherto been silent to engage and take ownership of the
EU. After some silence in 2018 this movement has taken up speed in the
run-up to the European elections in May 2019 and must continue to
counter those who see their future in political structures devised in the
19th century with consequences nobody would wish to see again.
It may be going too far to construct some kind of causality, but the vic-
tory of Van der Bellen in Austria, the defeat of Wilders in the Dutch elec-
tions, and the victory of Macron 2017 with his clear commitment to the
European Union in France seemed to signal an awakening of people all
over Europe, people who have realised that the current period of crisis and
D.
17 See infra II.1.
18 See: https://pulseofeurope.eu (accessed 21 May 2019) – After the French elections
of 2017 the activities of Pulse of Europes lowed down for a while, but new mo-
mentum was found in 2019 with a view to the European elections.
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depression must have an end and that our common future is a future with-
in and not without the European Union. Polls showed that approval of the
EU were rapidly increasing since June 2016, with increases of 18% in Ger-
many, 15% in the Netherlands and 12% in Spain.19 In this sense, the out-
come of the elections in Austria, the Netherlands and France, and perhaps
even that of the 2017 elections in the UK indicate that neither the disinte-
gration of Europe nor a hard Brexit or, perhaps, any Brexit at all, is what
people in Europe ultimately want to see. If this is true, the Brexit process
has so far proved to not only be an exercise of democracy, but even stimu-
lated democracy far beyond the UK.
The Brexit Process as a Challenge to Democracy
At the same time, however, certain aspects and effects of the Brexit process
raise critical questions and must be understood as a challenge to democra-
cy. Four issues that seem to require special reflection will be discussed be-
low in order to stimulate further thought: the role of the citizens (infra A.);
the role of lying and voters’ manipulation (infra B.); the effects of a consul-
tative referendum (infra C.); and the specific role of the judiciary (infra
D.).
Union Citizens who have made use of their fundamental Freedoms
If democracy is a mode of citizen’s self-determination and means that citi-
zens of a polity shall participate in the process of decision making on mat-
ters that directly or indirectly affect them, then the question already men-
tioned of participation of Union citizens who have established their resi-
dence in a Member State that decides to leave the Union, or the role of the
II.
A.
19 See Hans-Jürgen Schlamp, 'Zustimmung zur EU wächst. Danke Frau May, danke
Herr Trump. Keine Lust mehr auf EU? Das war einmal – zumindest laut einer
neuen Studie: Demnach steigt die Zustimmung der Europäer zur Union. Mit ein-
er Ausnahme’, in: Spiegel Online 20 June 2017, at: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/
ausland/europaeische-union-zustimmung-steigt-dank-brexit-studie-a-1152927.html
(accessed 22 August 2017). Similarly: European Parliament, ‘Aktuelles’, of 28
April 2017: ‘Meinungsumfrage Eurobarometer special des Europäischen Parla-
ments: Zustimmung zur Europäischen Union steigt wieder’, at: http://www.euro
parl.europa.eu/news/de/press-room/20170427AVI72828/zustimmung-zur-europais
chen-union-steigt-wieder-laut-eurobarometer (accessed 22 August 2017).
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citizens of this State who have made use of the freedoms offered by the
Treaties with regard to such decisions, is a question of democracy.
Decisions with no Voice for those affected
In the case of the UK, the problem was clear: When the British people vot-
ed for Brexit, and when the British Parliament decided that the UK would
leave, Union citizens from other Member States had no voice, nor repre-
sentation; they were just ignored in what is for them a very existential mat-
ter. Similarly, and perhaps even more strikingly, even British citizens who
have chosen to make use of their freedom to move to another Member
State and who have been established there for a certain number of years
already, as well as UK nationals who have been working in the European
institutions and therefore live in Belgium or another Member State for
more than fifteen years, are excluded from participating both in the refer-
endum and in the UK elections.20
In an early reaction to the referendum, Francesca Strumia not only
stresses the damage of these consequences for the very concept of EU citi-
zenship, but also very clearly describes the effects if this popular vote from
the ‘democratic perspective’:
‘The problem is that, for the significant minority that opposed Brexit
with their vote, it is the voice of others that forces exit. This is, of
course, the regular course of democracy: winner takes all. In this case,
however, the winner takes away from all, winners and losers, part of
the political self that supranational citizenship entails: voice in the
European Parliament, and for migrant British citizens, voice in local
elections in other Member States. Any supranational loyalties that
some British citizens may have developed together with such political
self are going to be automatically disabled.’21
1.
20 After fifteen years of residing outside Britain it seems that British citizens no
longer have the right to vote: see Gov.UK, ‘Voting when you’re abroad’, at: https:/
/www.gov.uk/voting-when-abroad (accessed 22 August 2017); see also Section 2
(1) of the European Union Referendum Act 2015, together with Section 1 (2–4)
of the Representation of the People Act 1985.
21 Francesca Strumia, ‘Brexiting European Citizenship through Voice of Others, in:
17 German Law Journal (2016), Brexit Special Supplement, p 109, 111, at: https://
www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/9E93BD73EF
9A007BFD13C1BEC1E77119/S2071832200021805a.pdf/brexiting_european_citiz
enship_through_the_voice_of_others.pdf (accessed 22 May 2019).
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These consequences seem to be at odds with the principle of democracy if
it means self-determination. The problem is all the more serious as these
citizens risk losing their rights automatically as soon as the withdrawal
takes effect, unless an agreement is reached under Article 50 TEU to pro-
tect these rights and to ensure the continuing role of the ECJ giving effect
to this protection.
The Principle of loyal Cooperation as a negotiation Guideline
Yet, for both, EU citizens in the UK, and UK citizens in other Member
States, the loss of all their rights of European citizenship can be under-
stood as a simple consequence of the constitutional principle of voluntari-
ness. Thus, a democratic justification can be found in the fundamental de-
cision to accept the Union Treaties including Article 50 TEU. But this pro-
vision cannot be read in isolation, it must be applied in accordance with
other general principles of the EU and, in particular, with the principle of
loyal cooperation (Article 4 (3) TEU). Triggering the Article 50 TEU-pro-
cess would, thus, not be a simple reset – in a situation as it was prior to the
accession to the EU, but rather an engagement of finding a just and sus-
tainable solution through a (re-)negotiation of the respective rights of the
citizens. Voluntariness, or the freedom to be or not to be a Member State,
is coupled with a constitutional duty of cooperation and respect. In cases
where people of a Member State do not feel comfortable any more with
their membership in the EU, thus, the Treaty provides for a meaningful
procedure, including the two-year period as a deadline for the negotiation
of a suitable arrangement.
This constitutional duty of cooperation is, in some way, a compensation
and guaranty for the citizens having made use of their rights under the
Treaties. During the period of negotiation, which may even be extended if
necessary, the principle of loyal cooperation under Article 4 (3) TEU fully
applies and compels all sides to make every possible effort to find appropri-
ate arrangements regarding all interests involved including, as a priority, to
fully protect the droits acquis of the citizens. It is a constitutional duty of
both sides at the negotiation table, the EU and the UK during the period
of Article 50 TEU. The agreement to be reached has to respect the funda-
mental rights and freedoms of the citizens who have trusted in these guar-
anties; the full respect and protection of these rights must also play a key
role when the Council, the European Parliament and the UK are taking
their respective decisions in the ratification process.
2.
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Democratic self-determination, thus, goes hand in hand with the respect
of the other and, in the case of withdrawal of a Member State from the EU,
of the other’s rights and interests. The EU institutions have a specific re-
sponsibility for making sure that these rights are protected.
Exclusion of Nationals in other Member States from the Vote
The case of UK citizens who have established themselves in other Member
States raises specific questions. These people find themselves in a trap.
First, they have been invited to make use of their rights offered by the
Treaties, particularly since the internal market would not have become a
reality without people moving from one country to another; and second,
they are likely to suffer most from a decision taken by people (at home)
who have not even had any experience of residing in another EU country.
British citizens, therefore, having made use of their right to free movement
within the EU for more than 15 years, or having served as a European civil
servant in one of the EU institutions, are deprived of their democratic
rights in Britain and had no voice in matters directly concerning them.22
Democracy goes along with rights. If there is a general practice among
States to exclude their nationals from participating in a vote after they have
lived abroad for a longer period and are far away from the daily political
developments at home, a sufficient explanation may be that these citizens
would be no longer affected by the internal politics of their country.
This reasoning, however, does not satisfy the case in point. The Brexit
referendum deeply affects the rights of these citizens abroad, much more
than it affects the general public in Britain. Not to include them in the
vote, therefore, is not only a serious challenge to the principle of democra-
cy but also serves as a punishment for having exercised the rights given by
the Treaties to the Union’s citizens and thus, would emerge as an indirect
barrier to the freedom of movement contrary to Articles 21 and 45 TFEU.
It is, primarily, a matter for each Member State to devise specific provi-
sions including these citizens in decision-making processes. If Union citi-
zenship is the fundamental status of the citizens of the Member States of
the Union, as the ECJ confirms in its established case law,23 to exclude
3.
22 Ibid.
23 ECJ Case C-184/99 – Grzelczyk (2001) ECR I-6193 ECLI:EU:C:2001:458, para 31,
and Case C-34/09 – Ruiz Zambrano (2011) ECR I-01177 ECLI:EU:C:2011:124,
para 41. See also Christian Calliess, ‘The Dynamics of European Citizenship:
From Bourgeois to Citoyen’, in: Allan Rosas, Egils Levits and Yves Bot (eds.), The
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those who have made use of their rights under the Treaties from participat-
ing in the making of national decisions withdrawing these rights in accor-
dance with Article 50 TEU would compromise this very constitutional sta-
tus.24
The European Parliament and the Union Citizens’ Rights
The protection of the rights of Union citizens on both sides, in the event of
a withdrawal of a Member State from the Union, thus, is one of the major
tasks particularly of the Commission to implement when negotiating an
arrangement with the UK under Article 50 TEU; not only the – transition-
al – Withdrawal Agreement, but also an agreement on the future relation-
ship between the UK and the EU must provide for the safeguard of these
rights. In performing this task, the Commission is under the control of the
European Parliament, which directly represents the citizens of the Union –
those of the UK as well as those of the other Member States. As long as the
UK is a Member State, this representation therefore extends to all Union
citizens, including the British. Hence, also the European Parliament plays
a particularly important democratic role in the negotiation process with
the UK. If no satisfactory solution is found to protect the rights of all the
citizens – who have exercised their fundamental freedoms under the
Treaties – the European Parliament has a responsibility to refuse ratifica-
tion of any arrangement under Article 50 (2) TEU.
If it is true that without an agreement the situation of the citizens affect-
ed by the withdrawal might be worse than what they would have with the
agreement, adequate remedies would have to be found by the EU and the
UK outside the Article 50 process.
4.
Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe. Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty
Years of Case-law (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2013), pp 425, 429–32.
24 For the short description of the general rule see Koen Lenaerts/Piet Van Nuffel,
European Union Law (3rd ed Sweet & Maxwell, London 2011), 8–008: ‘Art. 21
TFEU opposes national legislation which places at a disadvantage certain of the
nationals of the Member States concerned simply because they have exercised
their freedom to move and to reside in another Member State’.
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Protection of acquired Rights by the Countries of Residence?
Is it for each of the other Member States individually, in the event that the
negotiations do not result in a satisfactory solution and, in particular, in
case of a ‘hard Brexit’, to protect the ‘rights’ of these (ex-)EU citizens ‘as if”
the UK was still a member of the EU – and for the UK to protect the rights
of the EU citizens in the UK? While, formally, there is no reason for them
to do so, it is difficult to imagine that the 27 could seriously stop treating
UK citizens as Union citizens, and of the UK to act accordingly. Solutions
have to be found under national law, at least to maintain the status quo for
those who have established residence in these countries before the with-
drawal of the UK takes place. They may be based upon principles like the
principle of legitimate expectation or the protection of acquired rights.
Yet, there is no secure guarantee for what had been achieved under the
rule of ‘national treatment’. For there is no such legal duty under EU law,
and the ECJ would have no competence to judge upon preliminary ques-
tions of national courts on this issue.
Similarly, should no suitable arrangement be reached with the UK on
the issue of EU civil servants and employees coming from the UK, the
Council of the 27 would have to find an appropriate solution protecting
their acquired rights according to the general principles of Union law.
Lies and Democracy
There was a lot of lying during the Brexit campaign. Apparently, lies were
told at all sides in the campaign: Claims that could not stand. A fact check
by The Telegraph led to the conclusion:
‘This is now particularly important: some of these claims have helped
swing the UK to Brexit, and now the country must face the conse-
quences’.25
Is lying undemocratic; is it a challenge to democracy? And is it perhaps
particularly undemocratic when lies and fake news are distributed and ad-
vertised through social media and other IT-based mechanisms? What if
5.
B.
25 See Ashley Kirk, ‘EU referendum: The claims that won it for Brexit, fact checked’,
in: The Telegraph 13 March 2017, at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/eu-refer
endum-claims-won-brexit-fact-checked/ (accessed 14 June 2017). With an impres-
sive list of lies see also Brexit Lies at: http://brexitlies.com/.
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such news and disinformation are distributed on a massive scale through
botnets in social networks? Is there a specific challenge in the case of tar-
geted propaganda based upon big data analysis, such as that offered by un-
dertakings like Cambridge Analytica?26 If lies alone are not a challenge to
democracy, any attempt to use information technology and services to in-
dividualise people’s personal data and, on this basis, manipulate voters
with wrong information in elections or a referendum certainly can be.
This seems to have been the case both in the Trump and in the Brexit cam-
paigns 2016.27 And Steve Bennon, one of the key election campaign aids of
Donald Trump, supported by secretive hedge fund billionaire Robert Mer-
cer, is reported actually to continue his activities in Europe aiming to build
up a right-wing eurosceptic front for the EU elections.28
26 See the alarming confession of Michal Kosinski, reported by Hannes Grassegger
and Mikael Krogerus, ‘Ich habe nur gezeigt, dass es die Bombe gibt’, in: Das Mag-
azin no 48 of 3 December 2016, available at: https://www.dasmagazin.ch/2016/12/
03/ich-habe-nur-gezeigt-dass-es-die-bombe-gibt/ (accessed 16 June 2017). See also
Jamie Doward and Alice Gibbs, ‘Did Cambridge Analytica influence the Brexit
vote and the US election?’, in: The Guardian 4 March 2017, available at: https://w
ww.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/04/nigel-oakes-cambridge-analytica-what-
role-brexit-trump (accessed 16 June 2017). After heavy critiques Cambridge Ana-
lytica does not seem to have maintained its claim, see: Patrick Beuth, ‘Die Luft-
pumpen von Cambridge Analytica’, in: Zeit Online of 7 March 2017, available at:
http://www.zeit.de/digital/internet/2017-03/us-wahl-cambridge-analytica-donald-tr
ump-widerspruch (accessed 16 June 2017).
27 See Carole Cadwlladr, ‘The great British Brexit robbery: how our democracy was
hijacked’, The Guardian 7 May 2017, at: https://www.theguardian.com/technolog
y/2017/may/07/the-great-british-brexit-robbery-hijacked-democracy (accessed 24
March 2019).
28 See Markus Becker, ‘Rechte Front in Europa. Wer hat Angst vor Steve Bennon’,
Spiegel online, 25.7.2018, at: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/stephen-bann
on-will-die-rechtspopulisten-in-der-eu-einen-a-1220011.html; Jamie Doward,
‘Steve Bannon plans foundation to fuel far right in Europe’, in: The Guardian
21. Juli 2018, at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/21/steve-bannon
-plans-foundation-to-fuel-far-right-in-europe; more on this: Jan Sternberg, ‘Steve
Bannons Netzwerk gegen Europa’, in: Hannoversche Allgemeine v. 13.
Nov. 2018, at: http://www.haz.de/Nachrichten/Politik/Deutschland-Welt/Steve-Ba
nnons-Netzwerk-gegen-Europa (all accessed 28 December 2018). For the situation
one week before the European elections see: Holly Ellyatt, ‘Steve Bannon is in Eu-
rope ahead of elections. And he’s upsetting the locals’, CNBC of 21 May 2019, at:
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/21/steve-bannon-is-in-france-ahead-of-european-pa
rliament-elections.html (accessed 21 May 2019). But: Henry Samuel, ‘Marine Le
Pen denies Steve Bannon has role in her EU election campaign as he sets up camp
in Paris’, in: The Telegraph, 20 May 2019, at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2
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With regard to lies, disinformation and manipulation and their effects
on democratic decision making a distinction should be drawn between the
functioning of representative democracy with parliamentary elections (in-
fra 1.) and direct democracy with referendum on specific political ques-
tions with irreversible effects, such as in the case of Brexit (infra 2.).
Parliamentary Democracy and Systemic Lying: Trust and Distrust
Representative democracy, where people vote for a party or for someone to
be a member of Parliament, is based upon trust. The elected representa-
tives are given a mandate to determine the future policies of the country.
Yet, their promises in election campaigns will be measured against their
action taken in reality. Such accountability and the risk of not being re-
elected if people understand that they were misled in the election cam-
paign serve as a remedy against lies. Trust is lost when lies are discovered,
and another candidate or party may be elected. In this regard, democracy
can also be described as the institution of distrust. It inherently provides a
remedy or sanction in the case of failure of a party or policy-maker to hon-
our a pledge. Lies, therefore, do not seem to be undemocratic per se.
However, the red line is crossed when lies become systemic, and when
they turn into a subtle manipulation of the electorate as in the case of psy-
chographic targeting on a mass scale, with the effect that trust is lost not
only in individual candidates or parties but in the entire system. This
might be the reason why following the 2016 presidential elections in the
United States of America, the threats of foreign hacking (Hillary Clinton’s
e-mails) disinformation campaigns, as well as psychographic targeting be-
came, and continues to be, one of the major political topics in the country,
in the EU and beyond.29 And rightly so: Systemic lying entails an erosion
of the democratic system and is a major challenge to democracy.
The threat to democracy is becoming even more serious when the ma-
nipulation is coupled with illegal and in-transparent funding from (for-
eign) governments or organisations as it was reported being the case in the
1.
019/05/20/marine-le-pen-insists-steve-bannon-has-no-part-eu-election-campaign/
(accessed 21 May 2019).
29 See Ingolf Pernice, ‘Protecting the global digital information ecosystem: a practi-
cal initiative’, Internet Policy Review 5 March 2019, at: https://policyreview.info/art
icles/news/protecting-global-digital-information-ecosystem-practical-initiative/138
6 (accessed 25 March 2019).
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Brexit campaign.30 Targeted subversive advertising with fake news through
social media of this kind is about to undermine the openness and fairness
of the public discourse as a fundamental condition of the democratic pro-
cess, and such experience call not only for a special responsibility of the
online platforms operating such social media, but also for regulation and
law enforcement. The President of Germany, Frank Walter Steinmeier,
rightly warned at re;publica 2019: ‘those who create an online forum for
political discourse also carry responsibility for democracy – whether they
like it or not!’;31 while France has already taken legislative action to turn
this responsibility into concrete duties.32
Direct Democracy: the Risks of irreversible Decisions
Trust seems to play a different role in the case of direct democracy with
popular voting. Direct democracy suggests that mature and informed peo-
ple are taking their future into their own hands. A mechanism of account-
ability and ‘repair’, as in the system of ‘time-limited entrustment of pow-
er’, does not exist. Once the vote is given in a referendum, there is no need
2.
30 Carole Cadwalladr, Facebooks role in Brexit – and the threat to democracy, TED
talk of 16 April 2019, at:
https://www.ted.com/talks/carole_cadwalladr_facebook_s_role_in_brexit_and_th
e_threat_to_democracy (accessed 8 May 2019).
31 Frank Walter Steinmeier, Introductory Speech at Re;publica, 6 May 2019, p 5,
also calling for transparency: ‘as long as casual lies and reputable news reports, as
long as checked facts and mere opinion, as long as reason and hate speech appear
one after another in people’s newsfeeds, with nothing to distinguish between
them, demagogues will have it far too easy. We need the sources of our informa-
tion to be crystal clear, particularly when political ads are concerned. Those who
target tailored political messages at specific audiences must be forced by the site
operators – and where necessary by law – to show their face, to reveal who exactly
sent the ad, who financed it, and what other ads this person or organisation is
sending. In other words, they must make transparent whose game are they play-
ing – and how we can opt out of the game’, at: https://www.bundespraesident.de/
SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Reden/2019/05/190506-Republica-Englisch.pd
f ;jsessionid=729867EFFF010CC0C0CFF783B1A0E7A8.1_cid378?__blob=publica-
tionFile (accessed 8 May 2019).
32 See the French law on the combat of manipulation of information: LOI n 2018–
1202 du 22 décembre 2018 relative à la luttecontre la manipulation de l'informa-
tion, JORF n 0297 du 23 décembre 2018, at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affich
Texte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000037847559&categorieLien=id (accessed 8 May
2019).
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for accountability. Nobody voting ‘yes’ or ‘no’ can be checked and nobody
– except campaigners – has to fear a sanction for misbehaviour or a wrong
decision. All the citizens, whether they have participated in the vote or
not, equally bear the consequences of the ‘decision of the people’. Yet, cor-
rect information regarding the background and the implications of the
vote, a serious public debate and a keen sense of responsibility on the part
of the people voting are conditions for the functioning of direct democra-
cy.
In the case of a binding referendum, the outcome is not subject to any
other political check. People who find themselves misled upfront of the
vote would not accept the result as legitimate and binding, however, if the
campaigns for or against the issue at stake were poisoned by lies and ma-
nipulation. The loss of trust affects the legitimacy of the system as such,
and is particularly serious in cases of irreversibility. The decision to trigger
the process of Article 50 TEU is a case in point.
An advisory referendum, in contrast, leaves full responsibility for the fi-
nal decision to the Parliament. It remains for each MP individually to
make her independent and responsible judgement upon what the outcome
of the referendum would mean to her, and what decision to take. This
choice has to be made by each party and each individual MP, well con-
scious of the implications for the policies they may adopt subsequently;
the MP’s remain fully accountable to the scrutiny of the voters of their
constituency at the next election. Thus, as long as a referendum is not
binding – and MP’s are taking their responsibilities seriously – the demo-
cratic system as such is not more challenged by lying and manipulation
than in the case of any other parliamentary vote in a representative democ-
racy.
‘Advisory’ Referendum?
Was the British referendum on Brexit binding or advisory only? The Euro-
pean Union Referendum Act 2015 does not specify that it should bind ei-
ther the Government or the Parliament.33 Given the sovereignty of Parlia-
ment, a referendum in Britain is not binding, as a rule, except if expressly
C.
33 Section 1 of the European Union Referendum Act 2015 reads: ‘A referendum is to
be held on whether the United Kingdom should remain a member of the Euro-
pean Union’, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/36/contents/
enacted/data.htm (accessed 15 March 2019).
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specified in the parliamentary Act.34 The UK Supreme Court has con-
firmed this view.35 Nonetheless, the distinction becomes doubtful in this
specific case. Neither the new British Government, nor the great majority
of the Members of the UK Parliament seem to have taken the Brexit refer-
endum as a simple expression of the opinion of the voters just to guide
their independent consideration of all relevant factors for their own pos-
ition. Rather, it was suggested that there was a democratic imperative to
follow the outcome of the referendum without further ado.
Be it as it may, there was a little critical analysis of the circumstances
leading to the referendum’s surprising result. Did the MPs who simply fol-
lowed it as ‘the command of the people’ take their personal responsibility
seriously, being elected representatives of their respective constituency, to
follow their own conscience in taking a responsible decision? Though –
prior to the referendum – the majority of the Parliament had been in
favour of ‘remain’, what were the reasons for the change of mind after the
referendum? It was as if the fact that the people had been misled by lies
and fake information was ignored. Even the opposition, the Labour Party,
ordered their MPs to vote in favour of Brexit when the Parliament had to
decide upon authorising the government to trigger the procedure of Arti-
cle 50 TEU.36 The only explanation is that the referendum, which was not
meant to be legally binding, was nevertheless understood, politically, to
have a binding effect. For Vernon Bogdanor it was
‘... the first time in British history Parliament is enacting a policy in
which it does not believe. The majority of MPs and peers are Remain-
ers. So also are the majority of members of the Cabinet. They believe
that they have been instructed by the British people. The sovereignty
34 See explanations by Haroon Siddique, ‘Is the EU referendum legally binding? Par-
liament is sovereign and, if Brexit wins, Cameron will not be legally obliged to
invoke the Lisbon treaty to start an EU exit’, in: The Guardian 23 June 2016, at:
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/23/eu-referendum-legally-binding
-brexit-lisbon-cameron-sovereign-parliament (accessed 25 March 2019).
35 See the convincing argument in the Judgment (2017) UKSC of 24 January 2017,
Miller, paras 116–125, at: https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2016-019
6-judgment.pdf (accessed 21 August 2017).
36 The decision was taken by a majority of 498 against 114 votes. Nonetheless, 20%
of the Labour Party MPs, including 13 serving front benchers, were ‘defying the
whip’, see: ‘MPs vote to give May power to trigger Article 50 – as it happened’, in:
The Guardian of 1 February 2017, at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/
live/2017/feb/01/article-50-debate-vote-bill-pmqs-theresa-may-jeremy-corbyn-ivan-r
ogers-to-give-evidence-to-mps-about-why-he-quit-as-uks-ambassador-to-eu-politics-l
ive (accessed 25 March 2019).
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of the people, therefore, has overcome the sovereignty of Parliament –
a very significant constitutional event!’37
In such circumstances lies and manipulative practices are a challenge to
democracy even if the referendum is formally consultative. At least, it is
difficult to understand why the MPs did not use the opportunity created
for them by the Supreme Court to take an independent decision. Was it
the fear that their constituencies would rebuke them if they deviated from
the decision taken by ‘the people’?
Least to say, the history of the referendum and the irritations it caused
for many of the MPs may be an explanation for the almost chaotic dealing
of the Parliament with the Withdrawal Agreement and its incapability to
take any positive decision on the conclusion of the Brexit process at all.
With the second extension of the Article 50 deadline until 31 October
2019, there is time for finding a solution. In a desperate attempt to find
agreement in the House of Commons on the Withdrawal Agreement
-fourth time after three failures – Theresa May has announced the 21st of
May 2019 to include in the bill on the Withdrawal Agreement a referen-
dum to be held on yes or no to ratify it after the Parliament has voted for
it.38 Not much, however, seems to justify the expectation that this initiative
will allow the Parliament to accept the proposed ‘new deal’.39 It is difficult
to see that the Parliament will come to any common position at all and,
thus, deliver on its democratic responsibilities.40 These difficulties may
have led to the major shifts away from the two leading parties in the local
37 Vernon Bogdanor quoted in a comment of Antony G Gordon (12th December
2018) at Research Gate: ‘Is the EU referendum vote legally binding?’, at: https://w
ww.researchgate.net/post/Is_the_EU_referendum_vote_legally_binding (accessed
25 March 2019).
38 ‘Theresa May makes statement on “new Brexit deal”’, speech of 21 May 2019 at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6Il96yzu2I (accessed 21 May 2019), with a 10
points offer to the MPs regarding changes to the Political Declaration, to reflect
her ‘new deal’. The speech, however, is broadly understood as containing little
new ideas, except for the second referendum, and would not bring about a posi-
tive decision of the House of Commons, see Chris Morris, ‘Brexit: Is there any-
thing new in Theresa May’s “new deal”’?, at: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-48359
350 (accessed 21 May 2019).
39 See Chris Morris (n 38).
40 More optimistic still the analysis of Christos Katsioulis, ‘The House of the Rising
Sun’, IPG 28.3.2019, at: https://www.ipg-journal.de/regionen/europa/artikel/detail
/the-house-of-the-rising-sun-3358/ (accessed 21 May 2019).
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elections of 2 May 2019,41 and they could well end in a serious crisis of the
British democracy.
The referendum, as it is envisaged here, might even not offer people to
rethink Brexit as such, but only give the choice between Brexit with the
Agreement or without it. Would such a referendum really allow the Parlia-
ment to take up its constitutional responsibilities – or, contrarily, be an ex-
pression of a definitive abandon of democratic control?
Courts and Democracy
Following the referendum, it was only through the intervention of the
High Court and the Supreme Court that the authorisation to trigger Arti-
cle 50 TEU was put to the Parliament at all. Without going into details of
the intense debate on the respective prerogatives of the executive and the
Parliament in this case, it was the judiciary who insofar had saved the spe-
cific form of democracy existing in Britain: A representative democracy
based upon the sovereignty of parliament as a fundamental principle. As a
result of an impressive constitutional analysis, the Supreme Court made it
clear that the Prime Minister could not trigger Article 50, as she had in-
tended to do, without an act of Parliament authorising this step.42 If the
intention was to challenge the existing British democratic system, it was
commendable of the Courts to stop Theresa May.
But what does this mean for the concept of democracy? If the parlia-
ment is supreme or sovereign, why is it necessary for courts to intervene? Is
it a challenge to democracy if courts take on this role?
The answer is no, at least from a German constitutional law perspective.
Democracy is a basic constitutional principle, but it is a constitutional
principle and neither the only one nor absolute. Without the rule of law,
without respect for the fundamental rights of the individual, without the
division of powers laid down in the Constitution – written or not –
democracy could not function. Courts, acting as the guardians of the Con-
stitution, are therefore not a challenge but a constituent part of the system
and a safeguard of democracy.
D.
41 See BBC News on ‚England localelections 2019‘, at: https://www.bbc.com/news/t
opics/ceeqy0e9894t/england-local-elections-2019 (accessed 21 May 2019): ‚the two
main parties have suffered significant losses… The Lib Dems were the biggest
winners on the night….‘
42 UKSC (n 35), in particular paras. 43–83.
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In some way, the Supreme Court confirms this specific task of the judi-
ciary in the constitutional system of the UK:
‘By the end of the 20th century, the great majority of what had previ-
ously been prerogative powers, at least in relation to domestic matters,
had become vested in the three principal organs of the State: the legis-
lature (the two Houses of Parliament), the executive (ministers and the
government more generally) and the judiciary (the judges)’.43
With a clear reference to the rule of law, it emphasises that
‘the role of the judiciary is to uphold and further the rule of law; more
particularly, judges impartially identify and apply the law in every case
brought before the courts. That is why and how these proceedings are
being decided’.44
This important constitutional role is not necessarily contrary to the princi-
ple of sovereignty of the UK Parliament, for the UK Parliament preserves
the right at any time to set aside judgments of the judiciary by an express
act of abrogation.
Lessons learned: Democracy in the EU
Given the subsequent developments in European politics after Brexit, at
least four lessons can be learned from the Brexit process as it stands today.
They are about lies, democratic dynamics, transborder effects of national
policies and the important role of the citizens.
Lies have short Legs.
‘Lügen haben kurze Beine’: This is a German saying meaning that lies have
short legs. They cannot go very far. Shortly before the election day – June 8
2017 – a song entitled ‘She’s a liar, liar’ came out. As the Guardian report-
ed: ‘Remix by anti-austerity band Captain Ska mocking May’s claims of
‘strong and stable leadership’ tops Amazon UK downloads’. The title of
the article was: ‘ “She’s a liar, liar”: anti-Theresa May song heads to top of
III.
A.
43 Ibid., para. 41.
44 Ibid., para 42.
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charts’.45 More than a million downloads had been counted a few days lat-
er. The song seems to reflect feelings shared by more and more people in
the UK and beyond.
British people were waking up and walking away from Brexit. Already
the negotiation guidelines adopted by the European Council on 29 April
201746 showed that the EU had certain top priorities difficult to reconcile
with the promises made by the Brexit campaigners and, in particular, by
Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson. The first and most important of these pri-
orities was the determination to ‘safeguard the status and rights derived
from EU law at the date of withdrawal of EU and UK citizens, and their
families, affected by the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the Union’.
Another is that the financial settlement should ‘cover all commitments as
well as liabilities, including contingent liabilities’, which means that Brex-
it, at least for a while, would fall far short of allowing Britain substantial
financial relief.47 Apart from all the other difficulties and burdens that will
gradually emerge, could the result of the June 2017 elections be under-
stood as a reaction of people who feel that they have been fooled? If so, this
disaster for the Tories may be the first bill Theresa May had to pay. What
other claims might be made?
What seems to be more important is how people will react given the in-
sight that expectations about positive effects of Brexit on their lives were
based upon misleading or false information.
Dynamics of Democracy: What if Brexit loses Support?
The outcome of the June elections was unexpected and a clear ‘no’ to the
declared strategy of the Prime Minister. Yet immediately after the elections
Theresa May confirmed that she would ensure stability in the country.
This is perhaps what the country needs most in a situation that looks any-
B.
45 See: The Guardian of 31 May 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/m
ay/31/liar-liar-anti-theresa-may-song-heads-to-top-of-charts; for the song: https://w
ww.youtube.com/watch?v=danwAOT_WDU (accessed 16 June 2017).
46 Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/29-e
uco-brexit-guidelines/ (accessed 16 June 2017).
47 According to some estimates, Britain will have to pay as much as 100 billion eu-
ros, while Boris Johnson seems to expect that the EU will pay large sums to
Britain. For a legal assessment of the financial modalities of Brexit see: Steffen
Hindelang, ‘The Brexit Bill – Großbritanniens Welt der alternativen Fakten’, in:
70 ifoSchnelldienst 11/2017 of 8 June 2017, p 12–5.
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thing but stable. It includes a lack of clarity about the objectives Britain
would want to achieve in the Brexit negotiations that had started on Friday
19 June 2017. Given the failure of the Prime Minister’s attempt to get
stronger backing in the elections for her ‘hard Brexit’, a clear parliamen-
tary vote against it and the repeated rejection in March 2019 of the With-
drawal Agreement signed in November 2018 by the Parliament, it remains
an open question what Britain will finally strive to achieve and what deal,
if any, people will accept.
The Brexit process so far has shown that a ‘democratic’ decision made
yesterday does not necessarily mean a lot for today and the future. A more
flexible position, particularly with regard to the rigidities a hard Brexit
would bring about for Northern Ireland, seems to be the order of the day.
If the May government did not end in June 2017, it was thanks to a conser-
vative group of MPs from Northern Ireland that after the promise of new
financial support for their region, allowed the government not to lose its
majority.48
The next test was the vote in the UK Parliament on the ‘European
Union (Withdrawal) Bill’ providing for the repeal the European Commu-
nities Act 1972 ‘on exit day’ (section 1), while retaining substantive EU law
applicable in the UK until it is amended through executive regulations
concerning ‘deficiencies arising from withdrawal’, international obliga-
tions or the implementation of the withdrawal agreement.49 It was aiming
at ‘constitutional change and legal continuity’.50 But without the European
Commission watching the full application of EU law and without the
European Court of Justice judging upon questions of interpretation and
validity Union-wide, there is no ‘legal continuity’ after Brexit. And ‘imple-
menting the withdrawal agreement’ (section 9) presupposes that, in fact,
there is such an agreement – which is still not the case three years after the
referendum.
48 See Jack Maidment, ‘DUP agrees £1bn deal with Conservatives to prop up There-
sa May's minority Government’, in: The Telegraph, 26 June 2017, at: http://www.t
elegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/26/arlene-foster-meet-theresa-may-finalise-dup-deal-
prop-tory-minority/ (accessed 22 August 2017).
49 Official Publication at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2017-2019
/0005/18005.pdf (accessed 23 August 2017).
50 See Jack Simson Caird, ‘The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: constitutional
change and legal continuity’, in: The Constitutional Unit, 18 July 2017, at: https://
constitution-unit.com/2017/07/18/the-european-union-withdrawal-bill-constitutio
nal-change-and-legal-continuity/ (accessed 22 August 2017).
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There are reasons to believe that if, after the extension of the Article 50
deadline and, probably further 2 or more years of negotiations, there is any
agreement at all, or the agreement will be rather close to what the law is
today. People asked to ratify such an agreement on the future relations of
the UK with the EU may then rightly ask the question of whether or not it
is worth approving Brexit; they might refuse the ratification of the agree-
ment because Britain’s situation would be much worse than it is today.
While the estimated aggregated cost of ‘hard Brexit’ for Britain are up to
€ 57 bn yearly, with welfare going down by 2.39%, the costs of ‘soft Brexit’
would be lower, but still around € 32 bn, with a welfare decrease of
1.34%.51 More importantly, given the fact that the EU has been created for
achieving goals that States alone would be unable to achieve on their own,
British people may understand that Brexit would mean a real loss of
sovereignty instead of the promised gain.52
In such conditions – and given the clear interest of the ever-growing
body of young voters striving to remain – there is a good chance, finally, of
there being a majority for remaining in the EU. As a result, even after a
ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement and years of further negotiations
on the future relationship between the EU and the UK, Brexit may not be
the choice of the then majority of the British people.
Yet, as no valid agreement was reached until 29 March 2019, and if even
after the end of the extended deadline – the 31 October 2019 – the With-
drawal Agreement is not ratified, a hard Brexit will be the automatic con-
sequence of the notice given under Article 50 TEU. This would be the
worst scenario for all sides. Paul Craig has argued that the notice can be
51 See: Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed), ‘Estimating the impact of Brexit on European
countries and regions. Policy Paper, 2019, introduction and the comparative ta-
bles showing losses per country, at: https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmi
n/files/user_upload/EZ_Estimating_the_Impact_of_Brexit_2019_ENG.pdf;
outside the UK the losses are estimated considerably lower, with the highest rates
for Ireland and some limited gains for the U.S., China, and India (p 11 and 18).
52 For more details: Ingolf Pernice, ‘European Constitutionalism and the Constitu-
tions of the Member States. Implications for Brexit’, in: 2017 Boletin da Facul-
dade de Direito XCIII Tomo I, p 211, 239–241. On the terms of ‘European
Sovereignty’ coined by the French President Emmanuel Macron, in this sense see
also Tom Eijsbouts, 'European Sovereignty', editorial European Constitutional
Law Review2018, p 4–6, furthermore id, 'Germany's Grand and Growing Euro-
pean Sovereignty' in Hardt, Sacha, Heringa, Aalt Willem, and Waltermann, Anto-
nia: Bevrijdende&Begrenzendesoevereiniteit (Den Haag, Boom juridisch, 2018),
pp 10, 28–31, and id., ‘Sovereignty the European Way’, in this volume.
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withdrawn.53 Doubts on this view54 have been rejected by the ECJ in
2018,55 and so the door still remains open for a quick end of the Brexit pro-
cess until the definitive closure of the Article 50 deadline.
More than a million people participated at the ‘put it to the people
march’ of 23 March 2019 in London, with the aim to stop Brexit through a
second referendum. It was perhaps one of the greatest demonstrations in
British history.56 And more than 5, 6 Million people have signed the peti-
tion ‘Revoke Article 50 and remain in the EU’ to the UK Parliament by 25
March 2019.57 The Parliament said that it would consider the petition, and
people would no doubt appreciate if upcoming votes on the steps to be
taken until October 31 did not ignore what could develop to an even
broader public support for reconsidering the former policies.
One test was the European elections on 23–26 May 2019. With the polls
giving the new Brexit Party of Nigel Farage around 34% of the votes and
with its clear choice for a hard Brexit, the political divide of the country
may be growing stronger, and so is the challenge to the UK Parliament in
the days to come in its task to keep the country together. Its way to deal
with the Brexit process so far may feed concerns about the functioning of
the democratic system in Britain; preference given by MPs to their position
in an internal political power game around the Brexit instead of a concern
for the future of their country, as can be observed, seems to result in a real
challenge to democracy.
Growing Awareness of the Externalities of national Politics
The developments in the UK received an unknown public attention in the
other Member States. Media keep busy in reporting and discussing day by
day the news from the UK, and rightly so since what is decided that will
deeply affect people in and of all the other Member States. Organisations
like Pulse of Europe are demonstrating their sympathy for and support of
C.
53 Craig, Brexit (n 7) pp 464–65.
54 Pernice, ‘European Constitutionalism’ (n 52), p 235–6.
55 ECJ case C-621/18 – Wightman (n. 3).
56 See: Tim Adams, ‘Put it to the People march: a formidable sea of humanity and
powerful strength of feeling. They came to London from across Britain and Euro-
pe, filled with enthusiasm for the new three Rs: revoke, remain, reform’, The
Guardian 23 March 2019, at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/mar/23/
put-it-to-the-people-march-against-brexit-london-revoke-remain-reform.
57 See the Website at: https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/241584.
Brexit – Exercise of Democracy or a Challenge to Democracy?
127
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748903246, am 21.11.2019, 13:37:49
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
the UK movements fighting against populist-nationalists who strive at the
destruction of the European venture. They do so as well, actually, in other
Member States with a view to the European elections of May 2019. This
grassroot movement is an excellent example of exercise of democracy relat-
ed to, or even triggered by the Brexit process.
What we learn from the Brexit-process, more generally, is that within
the EU political developments in one country are of highest relevance to
people in other Member States as well. Brexit isn’t but one striking exam-
ple. The great success of Macron in the French elections 2017 was another.
Both have the potential to change the EU considerably – in different direc-
tions – and so to change the life of millions of Union citizens in all the
Member States.
What does this mean for democracy? If politics in one Member State,
and even the vote of individuals in national elections, have an impact on
people and politics in other Member States, such possible implications on
others must seriously be taken into account in each Member State. This
connectivity of what I call the European ‘Verfassungsverbund’58 entails ex-
ternalities and horizontal effects and explains why the media and citizens
in one Member State have a legitimate cross-border interest in political
processes in other Member States. Accordingly, the shock of the Brexit ref-
erendum was felt to be a disaster in all other Member States. Similarly, re-
cent political developments in Hungary and Poland are felt as a threat to
democracy in Europe at large. The citizens of the Union do not feel neu-
tral on such developments. They have a stake, even if they have no voice.
Yet, things have begun to change in the wake of these shocks. People
from all Member States are taking part in a European-wide public dis-
course on the shaping of our common future, and this includes national
election campaigns and referenda. Thanks to the internet, rapid informa-
tion can easily be gathered from all Member States, and arguments can be
exchanged within social networks, through blogs and at discussion plat-
forms, thus allowing discourses beyond borders and languages.59 While
58 For the concept: Ingolf Pernice, Bestandssicherung der Verfassungen: Verfas-
sungsrechtliche Mechanismen zur Wahrung der Verfassungsordnung, in: Roland
Bieber / Pierre Widmer (Hrsg.), L'espace constitutionnel européen. Der Europäische
Verfassungsraum. The European Constitutional Area (Zürich, Schulthess 1995), p
225–264, more recently id, ‘European Constitutionalism’ (n 52).
59 See also Ingolf Pernice, ‘E-Government and E-Democracy: Overcoming Legitima-
cy Deficits in a Digital Europe?’, in: Lina Papadopoulou/Ingolf Pernice/Joseph
H.H. Weiler (eds), Legitimacy Issues of the European Union in the Face of Crisis. Dim-
itrios Tsatsos in memoriam (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2017) p 287, 305–7.
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participation in national elections or referendums remain reserved for na-
tionals of each country, views and experience from foreign stakeholders
can have a considerable impact and increasingly do so.
People and Citizens of Member States acting as Citizens of the EU
After all, the Brexit process is perhaps not only a challenge to, and an exer-
cise of democracy; but more than this: it also triggers a new step in devel-
oping democracy in the EU. It has led to a growing awareness of the values
and benefits of the EU; people are becoming more responsible for their
common European future and they are increasingly viewing the EU as
their vehicle to secure peace, freedom and prosperity in Europe, and as a
common instrument for securing the effective participation of our coun-
tries and, thus, of the EU citizens, in the shaping of globalisation.
Conclusion
The Brexit process was first considered to be a serious threat to the idea of
European integration. Whether or not it will, ultimately, bring the EU
back to 27 Member States, it seems to have a positive side too. Little more
than from one year after the referendum up to now, reasons are given to
assume that it has a potential to give a beneficial impulse to the European
project. Together with the surprising outcome of the American election in
2016 it has raised awareness throughout Europe of the fundamental values
the EU represents and has mobilised new citizens’ movements determined
to make the European Union more democratic and effective. This unex-
pected positive effect may be understood as one that is impelling people to
take ownership of the Union and push it towards a democratic reform that
brings it in conformity with their hopes and expectations.
Whatever the outcome of the Brexit process might be, the withdrawal of
the UK on the basis of a fair agreement on the future relationship with the
EU, hopefully a „do-not-harm Brexit“, as Kalypso Nicolaidis thoughtfully
calls for,60 or the revocation of the Article 50 notice as a consequence of a
second referendum, the experiences and lessons learned from the process –
in spite of the costs it has caused – are important for the upcoming discus-
sions on the reform of the EU. With the completion of the internal mar-
D.
60 Nicolaidis, Exodus (n 16), p 2, 188.
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ket, including tax harmonisation, with a stronger role of the national Par-
liaments in the control of subsidiarity regarding the exercise of EU compe-
tencies and better parliamentary oversight of the European policies and, in
particular, with new provisions for the enhanced involvement and partici-
pation of both, the European and national Parliaments, in the shaping and
control of the common economic and fiscal policies of a reformed EMU,
the EU could become closer to what David Cameron may have had in mind
when in his Bloomberg speech of 23 January 2013 he called for an “updat-
ed European Union”.61 And a future can be envisaged „where a trans-
formed UK rejoins a transformed EU“,62 ultimately, as an expression of
democracy both sides.
61 David Cameron, EU speech at Bloomberg, 23 January 2013, at: https://www.gov.u
k/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg (accessed 25 March 2019).
62 Nicolaidis, Exodus (n 16), p. 189.
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Internal Market and Brexit
Paula Vaz Freire
Abstract
The economic effects of Brexit in the UK and in the EU are still uncertain. Al-
though immediately after the referendum British GDP growth had not declined
dramatically, neither did firms and consumers drastically changed their be-
haviour in advance of future scenarios. In the long run it’s safe to say there will
be reductions in trade and foreign direct investment, which will low UK living
standards. In fact, living standards were already affected by Brexit, as it caused
the value of the pound to decline and that in turn led to the depreciation of the
terms of trade to higher inflation and to a lower real wage growth.
For the EU, as a whole, the economic effects of UK’s exit may not be very sig-
nificant, but they surely are very relevant to some European economies. That as-
pect, as well as the strategic and political importance of the UK, recommends the
definition of a close economic cooperation that, nevertheless, cannot be conceived
as a ‘soft version’ of EU’s internal market.
Internal Market and the UK
As it is well known, since the mid 90’s, the UK’s development model
evolved towards specialization in services, in particular, financial services.
A prosperous financial hub was formed as “the financial sector has a natu-
ral tendency to form clusters and London – where English is spoken, the
legal system is efficient, labour markets are flexible, and the regulatory
regime is relatively streamlined – offered substantial advantages’.1
The financial market’s success is inextricably linked to the UK’s EU
membership. Actually, the concentration of many types of wholesale fi-
nancial services in the City of London began with the capital movements
liberalization (under the internal market program, in the 1990s), and was
I.
1 Daniel Gros, ‘The Economics of Brexit: It’s not about the Internal Market’, CEPS
Commentary (2016), at https://www.ceps.eu/publications/economics-brexit-it’s-not-a
bout-internal-market.
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fostered by the common currency, combined with the elimination of ob-
stacles to cross-border capital flows and a global credit boom. Additionally,
the European ‘passporting’ system – further assessed below – enabled Lon-
don-based banks to sell their services directly throughout the EU.
The expansion of the financial services industry was one of the major
economic benefits of the UK’s EU membership but at the same time led
the British to reject the European project. In fact, the financial industry
created few very highly paid jobs, contributing to raise income inequality,
in a much more pronounced way than elsewhere in the EU; and inequality
helped to fuel Brexit, by creating a widespread frustration towards global-
ization and the so-called ‘establishment elites’.
Economic Impacts of Brexit
Official institutions and independent economists have produced a consid-
erable amount of economic studies on the consequences of Brexit.2
These studies cover a wide range of legal scenarios in the optimistic-pes-
simistic spectrum, but from them it can be concluded that for the EU 27
the losses are virtually insignificant (averaging between 0.11% and 0.52%
of GDP for the optimistic versus pessimistic scenarios respectively); on the
other hand, for the UK the losses average between 1.31% and 4.21 % of
GDP for the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios respectively, or 0.13% to
II.
2 Ian Begg & Fabian Mushövel, ‘The economic impact of Brexit: jobs, growth and
the public finances’, The London School of Economics and Political Science, Euro-
pean Institute, London, UK (2016), at
https://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LSE-Commission/Hearing-11---The-impac
t-of-Brexit-on-jobs-and-economic-growth-sumary.pdf; Ian Begg, ‘Making sense of
the costs and benefits of Brexit: challenges for economista’, Atlantic Economic Jour-
nal (2017), at https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/84310352.pdf; R. Kierzenkowski et
al., ‘The Economic Consequences of Brexit: A Taxing Decision’, OECD Economic
Policy Papers, No. 16, (OECD Publishing, Paris 2016), at https://doi.org/10.1787/5j
m0lsvdkf6k-en; Guntram B. Wolff, ‘The implications of a no-deal Brexit: is the
European Union prepared?’, Policy Contribution Issue n ̊2 (2019), at http://bruegel
.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/PC-2019-02-140119.pdf.
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0.41% of GDP annually.3 As an example, one of those analysis estimates
that as a result of Brexit the UK may end up losing 2–3% of its GDP.4
The mentioned economic effects upon British economy result, mainly,
from the fact that Brexit will strongly affect foreign direct investment (FDI)
in the UK.5 Nevertheless, some factors will cushion the negative effects of
Brexit, such as a probable depreciation of the national currency that will
likely increase export competitiveness, and the strong commercial relation
with non-EU markets.
As it is well known, UK’s features have long made it a very important
destination for FDI. The UK is a big and rich market, characterized by a
strong rule of law, flexible labour markets and a highly educated work-
force and all these aspects make it an attractive FDI location. Additionally,
for non-EU firms the fact that the UK was fully in the internal market
made it a very interesting export platform for the rest of the European
countries.
After Brexit trade costs, coordination costs and compliance costs with
different regulations will certainly increase, diminishing UK’s attractive-
ness. Accordingly, some studies estimate that Brexit is likely to reduce FDI
inflows to the UK by about 22%; as a consequence, it can also be expected
a decrease in productivity and a fall in real income.
Two of the most important sectors in British economy will be affected:
car industry and financial services industry.
The UK is now the world’s fourth largest car producer but without the
internal market the worst-case scenario predictions estimate a production
fall of 12% (almost 180,000 cars per year) and prices faced by UK con-
sumers raised by 2.55%, as the cost of imported cars and their components
increase. This is mainly because European car manufacturers such as BMW
will most probably move some production away from the UK, as it is ex-
3 Michael Emerson, Matthias Busse, Mattia Di Salvo, Daniel Gros & Jacques Pelk-
mans, ‘An Assessment of the Economic Impact of Brexit on the EU27’, European Parlia-
ment, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic
and Scientific Policy (2017), p. 8.
4 The estimated losses are a consequence of the exit from the single market; if the
exit turns out to be a ten-year process, the losses would be borne gradually over
that period, costing the UK about 0.2 – 0.3% of GDP per year, on average, see
Daniel Gros, ‘The Economics of Brexit: It’s not about the Internal Market’, CEPS
Commentary (2016), https://www.ceps.eu/publications/economics-brexit-it’s-not-ab
out-internal-market.
5 Swati Dhingra, Gianmarco Ottaviano, Thomas Sampson & John Van Reenen, ‘The
impact of Brexit on foreign investment in the UK’, Centre for Economic Perfor-
mance, London School of Economics and Political Science (2016).
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pected an increase in trade costs and coordination costs between headquar-
ters and British located production plants (transfers of key staff within the
firm may be harder because of migration controls; different regulatory
standards can make engineering, R&D and consultancy services more diffi-
cult and expensive).6
Financial services have the largest stock of inward FDI in the UK (45%),
constitute 8% of its GDP and generates 12% of tax receipts. In this domain,
the effects of Brexit are difficult to predict, and they can’t hardly be offset
by expanding to other markets since there is no evidence that European
regulations were a burden that hindered the UK’s ability to trade with
countries outside the EU. On the contrary, the negative effects of becom-
ing a non-EU Member State seem to be significant as there is a consensus
that the City became a financial hub while being in the EU. Europe is actu-
ally the world’s largest exporter of financial services (making up for a quar-
ter of world financial services exports) and half of the cross-border lending
in the world is originated within the EU.7
A part of the financial flows – once in London – will shift to other fi-
nancial centres such as Paris or Frankfurt, but it is safe to say that – proba-
bly with less vigour – London’s financial services industry will survive
Brexit.8 Many of the advantages that have made London a financial ser-
vices hub will remain after Brexit, and the loss of passporting might be par-
tially offset by the creation of subsidiaries or bridgeheads within the EU or
by the principle of equivalence.9
The internal market for financial services is based on the EU ‘passport-
ing’ system for banks and financial services companies which allows a
6 Aimin Zhang & Ran An, ‘The Impact of Brexit on Motor Industry in UK’, Ad-
vances in Economics, Business and Management Research (AEBMR), Vol. 37 (2017),
643–653. David Bailey & Lisa De Propris, ‘Brexit and the UK Automotive Indus-
try’, NIER (2017), at
https://research.aston.ac.uk/portal/files/23922060/Bailey_De_Propris_final_author_
copy_NIER_Nov_2017.pdf.
7 On the impact of Brexit on UK financial markets: Welfens, Paul J. J. & Fabian J.
Baier (2018), ‘Brexit and FDI: Key Issues and New Empirical Findings’, Discussion
Paper No. 241, Wuppertal: Universitätsbibliothek Wuppertal; Sapir, André; Dirk
Schoenmaker & Nicolas Véron (2017), ‘Making the Best of Brexit for the EU-27 Fi-
nancial System’, Peterson Institute for International Economics No. 17–8. Bruegel:
Bruegel.
8 That will probably determine some changes in UK’s growth model, perhaps
through a revival of manufacturing, which has experienced decades of decline.
9 A Duvillet-Margerit, M. Magnus, B Mesnard & A Xirou, Third-country equivalence
in EU banking legislation, European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal
Policies (2017).
Paula Vaz Freire
136
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748903246, am 21.11.2019, 13:37:49
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
bank based in one member of the EU to set up a branch or provide cross-
border financial services in another (or in the European Economic Area
(EEA)), while being regulated by authorities in the home country (home
state authorization). ‘Passporting’ means that a UK bank can provide ser-
vices across the EU from its UK home. It also means that a Swiss or an
American bank can do the same from a branch or subsidiary established in
the UK.
Loosing access to the passporting system is a huge change for Great
Britain’s financial firms. As it was explained, EU internal market offers the
possibility to provide regulated financial services across borders under sim-
plified conditions: companies can apply only once for a license within the
EU and then offer their services in the entire Union without additional na-
tional permits (‘EU passport’).10 Passporting is a tool for a more efficient
functioning and integration of financial markets, since it reduces supervi-
sory and compliance burdens, as well as ensure that investors—especially
retail investors— all over the EU are protected in the same way.
However, without a special agreement, EU passports like all European
legislation cease to apply for business activities between UK and EU juris-
dictions after Brexit. In a scenario of no-deal Brexit, the UK becomes a
‘third-country’, regarding its relationship with the EU, and could eventual-
ly benefit from a specific regime. These so called third-country regimes
give companies from countries that are not Members of the European Eco-
nomic Area (EEA) uniformly regulated access to EU markets, so that cross-
border transactions can be concluded more securely and efficiently. The
most common third-country solution are so-called ‘equivalence regimes’.11
10 EU passports can be granted for market participants (e.g., banking permit), prod-
ucts (e.g., securities prospectus) or services (e.g., marketing a fund).
11 ‘Equivalence’ refers to a process whereby the European Commission assesses and
determines that a third country’s regulatory, supervisory and enforcement regime
is equivalent to the corresponding EU framework. That recognition makes it pos-
sible for the competent authorities in the EU to rely on third country entities’
compliance with the third country framework which has been deemed ‘equiva-
lent’ by the Commission. Equivalence decisions can include conditions or limita-
tions, to better cater for the objectives of granting equivalence (...). Equivalence is
primarily used to reduce overlaps in terms of regulatory and supervisory compli-
ance in the interest of EU financial institution or market participants”: J Deslan-
des, C Dias & M Magnus, ‘Third Country Equivalence in EU Banking and Finan-
cial Regulation’, European Parliament (2019), p. 1.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2018/614495/IPOL_IDA(2
018)614495_EN.pdf.
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Equivalence is a condition that allows third-country firms to access the
EU markets, if the third-country regulation meets the essential require-
ments of the EU regime:
‘equivalence is not a vehicle for liberalizing international trade in fi-
nancial services, but a key instrument to effectively manage cross-bor-
der activity of market players in a sound and secure prudential envi-
ronment with third-country jurisdictions that adhere to, implement,
and enforce rigorously the same high standards of prudential rules as
the EU’.12
Equivalence aims at reducing the risks of contagion from non-EU jurisdic-
tions or protecting the domestic market against financial crises outside the
EU. But this system involves a process of recognizing ‘equivalence’ by the
European Commission and such decisions on equivalence may be revoked
at short notice, that is to say, ‘equivalence’ regimes for third countries may
be discretionarily activated or revoked by the Commission. This, indeed,
does not offer a good amount of certainty and legal continuity for market
participants.
Due to the political uncertainty concerning the Brexit process, some
temporary measures have been taken in order to minimize the chaotic out-
comes from a no-deal exit. In this context, the UK Government announced
a temporary permissions regime (TPR) for inbound passporting EEA firms
and funds that will come into effect in the event of a hard Brexit.13 The
TPR is only relevant for firms that passport into the UK and the European
Commission has so far not reciprocated with a similar regime.14
Additionally, some EU countries have taken their own measures in this
area. One of the most relevant transitory regimes was created by Germany.
German Parliament has adopted a bill which, inter alia, sets out a national
12 Commission Staff Working Document, ‘EU equivalence decisions in financial ser-
vices policy: an assessment’ SWD (2017) 102 final, 5.
13 In order to take advantage of the TPR firms and funds need to make a notifica-
tion to the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) or UK Prudential Regulation
Authority (PRA).
14 Instead the EU continues to push for UK firms to submit an application for au-
thorisation in the relevant Member State where they wish to conduct business. In
particular, the “no-deal” Contingency Action Plan of the European Commission
deliberately provides for a limited number of contingency measures only (includ-
ing temporary and conditional equivalence regimes for UK central counterparties
and UK central depositaries): Bank of England, “Temporary permissions regime”,
at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/eu-withdrawal/temporary-permissions-regim
e.
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transition regime for regulated market participants from the UK in case of
a hard Brexit.15 The German regulator (Federal Financial Supervisory Au-
thority, ‘BaFin’) is empowered to allow the UK entities16 covered by the
transitional regime, that have operated in Germany under the European
passport regime so far, to continue providing certain services without a
German license, for a period up to 21 months following a hard Brexit. In
synthesis, the bill empowers ‘BaFin’ to treat UK banks and investment
firms currently providing banking and investment services under the Euro-
pean passport regime as if they continued to hold an EU passport post-
Brexit.
Legal Framework for UK’S ‘Access to the EU Single Market’
Brexit also means uncertainty, which has always a negative impact. The
British Government is planning to conclude a free trade agreement with
the EU, but such an agreement can take several years and as a result, com-
panies in the UK and Europe will lack certainty about the conditions un-
der which they will be able to trade with and invest in the future.
The degree of co-operation with the EU27 can range from two extreme
scenarios: (i) the UK would accede to the European Economic Area (EEA),
or (ii) the UK would have no preferential trade relationship with the EU,
with only their common membership of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). In the middle ground, that relation can be similar to other bilater-
al agreements that exist between the EU and third countries: customs
unions, free trade agreements, association agreements, stabilization and as-
sociation agreements, partnership and cooperation agreements, etc.17
III.
15 It seeks to avoid market distortions and risks to financial stability and will enter
into force only in the event that the EU and the UK do not enter into a With-
drawal Agreement. Given the tax-related provisions also included, the bill is enti-
tled “Tax Act relating to Brexit” (Brexit-Steuerbegleitgesetz – Brexit-StBG) http://dip
21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/073/1907377.pdf.
16 The Brexit-StBG introduces transitional rules for regulated market participants
and trading venues that target the German market from the UK, namely, credit
institutions, investment firms, insurance undertakings, payment institutions and
electronic money institutions, regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities
(MTFs) and organised trading facilities (OTFs).
17 Michael Emerson, Matthias Busse; Mattia Di Salvo, Daniel Gros & Jacques Pelk-
mans, An Assessment of the Economic Impact of Brexit on the EU27, European Parlia-
ment, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic
and Scientific Policy (2017).
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The shape of the agreement between the EU and the UK is still to be
defined but the 12-point plan for the UK's exit, presented by British Prime
Minister,18 has established some boundaries and features for future rela-
tions. Theresa May established as an objective for Brexit: ‘8. Free trade with
the EU: The United Kingdom is seeking the greatest possible access to the EU sin-
gle market for goods and services. It is willing to make financial contributions to
the EU.’ But according to the same speech, the relation with the EU is also
determined by other objectives: ‘2. Control over legislation: The laws applica-
ble in the United Kingdom will be made in the UK and interpreted only by UK
courts, no longer by the European Court of Justice’ and ‘5. Control of immigra-
tion: The United Kingdom intends to control the number of immigrants from the
EU.’
As the internal market represents a 50 per cent share of British trade
(the other 50 per cent is divided up between various trading partners such
as China, India, Japan, Canada and USA), it’s in the UK best interest to es-
tablish a free trade agreement guaranteeing the ‘greatest possible access’ to
the European markets.
The internal market for goods is far less significant for the UK today than
it was in the mid 1990s, not only because since then British economic de-
velopment model shifted towards a specialization in services, but also be-
cause of a rise in Britain’s non-EU exports (especially to Asia). Regarding
goods, the fact that UK relies more heavily on access to world markets than
on access to the EU’s internal market it’s accompanied by the conviction
that the country can secure privileged access to those markets on its own
rather than as part of the EU, because trade deals will be much easier to
negotiate19. However, the UK will have less leverage in negotiations than
the EU does, especially in dealing with large emerging economies.
As for the internal market for services things can be different, because
services exported to the EU account for about 40% of the UK total20. If the
UK adopted a relation as the one covered by the Treaty on the European Eco-
18 Theresa May's speech delivered on 17 January 2017 at https://www.gov.uk/govern
ment/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-spee
ch.
19 Nevertheless, some political declarations state that Brexit is the opportunity for
the UK to be the global leader in free trade, to build a new Prosperity Zone (with
countries such as New Zealand, Singapore and Australia, who are all committed
to free trade), to engage in a US-UK trade deal or in a Continental partnership.
20 Regarding financial services, the effects of Brexit can be significant, as they ac-
count for about one-third of Britain’s total services exports and two-thirds of the
overall services surplus that the UK needs to pay for its deficit on goods. David
Blake, Brexit and the City, Cass Business School (2017) at
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nomic Area (EEA)21 it would have an extensive access to the EU internal
market. Companies based in the EEA can export goods to the EU, duty
free or at reduced rates of duty, and offer services, including financial ser-
vices, throughout the EU without having to set up an EU subsidiary (‘EU
passporting’). As there is no obligation of complying with a common eco-
nomic policy, British Government could conclude its own free trade agree-
ments. But this model of economic relation is incompatible with the UK’s
claims for full control over legislation and over immigration. Actually,
EEA countries are obliged to accept all EU rules relating to the internal
market (without any involvement in drafting them) and are subject to the
jurisdiction of the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) Court that in
turn has to base its decisions on the case law of the European Court of Jus-
tice (ECJ) (Article 3 of the Treaty establishing an EEA Court). Conversely,
by accepting all the acquis related to the internal market EEA countries
have to respect all four freedoms of the EU, including the freedom of
movement.
Another way of designing the economic relationship between Europe
and the UK could be based in the ‘Swiss model’ or EFTA model, in which
the access to the EU internal market only applies to certain sectors. Con-
sidering that financial services have been almost completed excluded from
market opening,22 this will not be a good solution for the UK.
A Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), such the one
EU has concluded with Canada, would provide free trade without free
movement, but it doesn’t provide the necessary framework for a close co-
operation with the EU on foreign and defence policy as well as on combat-
ing crime and terrorism.
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58a0b77fe58c624794f29287/t/58ca91f8e58c6
2741806e682/1489670684557/Brexit-and-the-City.pdf.
21 Since 1992, with Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.
22 “The main argument against the ‘Swiss Model’ though is the fact that the United
Kingdom wants to restrict free movement. Since 2002, an agreement on free
movement has been in place between the EU and Switzerland. This states that
free movement can only be restricted in exceptional cases by mutual agreement. If
Switzerland were to terminate the agreement on free movement in order to im-
plement the popular initiative ‘against mass immigration’, this would result in
the automatic termination of all bilateral agreements between Switzerland and
the EU (“Guillotine Clause")’: Urs Pötzsch & Bert Van Roosebeke, ‘”Ukraine
Plus” as a model for Brexit’, cep Adhoc, (2017) p 4, at
http://www.cep.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/cep.eu/Studien/cepAdhoc_Brexit/cepA
dhoc_Ukraine_Plus_as_a_model_for_Brexit.pdf.
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The Association and Free Trade Agreement that the EU concluded with
the Ukraine (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)) seems to
correspond to the British objectives: it guarantees a substantial market ac-
cess without requiring the application of EU law or the compliance with
the ECJ case law; it doesn’t provide for free movement and allows free
trade agreements with third countries. It also provides for collaboration on
foreign and defence policy, as well as in combating crime and terrorism.
Nevertheless, the ‘Ukraine Model’ contains numerous restrictions on mar-
ket access particularly for cross-border services, incompatible with interests
of the British finance industry.
Financial Contribution
The United Kingdom has been the third largest net payer into the EU, be-
hind Germany but almost equal to France, and it is pointed by some
British politicians that one of the “advantages” of Brexit is that, being no
longer a member of the single market, the UK will not be required to con-
tribute with huge sums to the EU.
With the UK’s withdrawal, the EU is likely to face a € 9 billion ‘hole’ in
its annual budget, but at the same time, the UK declared that in exchange
for the access to the EU single market it is willing to make financial contri-
butions.
All Member States are interested in keeping the gap, caused by Brexit in
the EU-finances, as small as possible because otherwise national contribu-
tions would have to increase or European expenditures be reduced. Receiv-
ing a financial contribution in connection with a trade agreement is partic-
ularly relevant for Germany and France, the two biggest net payers into
the EU budget but also the countries that have a significant trade surplus
visà vis the UK. Therefore, British willingness to pay is an additional very
interesting incentive especially for those countries as they “have an inter-
est, both fiscal and trade related in a comprehensive free trade agreement
paid for with a substantial financial contribution from the United King-
dom”23.
The amount of that contribution as a condition for a comprehensive
free trade agreement can also be estimated: taking as reference amount the
IV.
23 Urs Pötzsch & Bert Van Roosebeke, ‘”Ukraine Plus” as a model for Brexit’, cep
Adhoc (2017), p 7, at http://www.cep.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/cep.eu/Studien/ce
pAdhoc_Brexit/cepAdhoc_Ukraine_Plus_as_a_model_for_Brexit.pdf.
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contribution that Norway makes, scaled up for the size of the UK econo-
my, this gives about € 3.5 billion. On the other hand, if the UK has simply
a WTO-based relationship with the EU, then the European budget would
receive additional tariff revenues, estimated at € 4.5 billion. Either way the
EU will recuperate around a third to half of its loss of UK contributions.24
Conclusive Remarks
Any agreement must reasonably balance the interests of all sides, and the
scenario of a close economic cooperation is of course the one with larger
mutual benefits.
The UK needs to preserve its relationship with the EU; but it is also very
important for companies in the EU to retain the greatest possible access to
the British market, as in 2015, the EU’s trade surplus with the UK amount-
ed to almost 80 billion euros.
Although the advantages of economic cooperation are huge, it cannot
be ignored the UK’s will to terminate being a participant in the most de-
veloped economic integration project in the world. A project of free trade
and free movement, based on non-discrimination, characterized by its co-
herence, which justifies the EU Heads of State and Government, repeated
emphasis that ‘access to the single market’ after Brexit will be linked to the
continuation of ‘free movement’.
In our view, this is the correct perspective as internal market is a ‘global
reality’ that cannot be fragmented, and the European project is not com-
patible with a kind of ‘differentiated integration’ outside the EU legal and
institutional framework.
24 Additionally, there also the issue of ‘legacy costs’ of the divorce with figures in the
range of € 20–40 billion; there has been so far no listing of the EU’s assets and
liabilities, including contingent liabilities such as loan guarantees, nor explana-
tion of the legal basis for this claim.
Michael Emerson, Matthias Busse, Mattia Di Salvo, Daniel Gros & Jacques Pelk-
mans, An Assessment of the Economic Impact of Brexit on the EU27, European Parlia-
ment, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic
and Scientific Policy (2017).
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Brexit and EU Citizen’s Social Rights – the Commission v.
United Kingdom [UK child benefit or child tax credit] and the
CJEU case law on social rights
Rui Lanceiro
Abstract
Since its creation, the concept of EU citizenship, as well as the rights and duties it
entails, have evolved greatly, notably in the area of social rights. The CJEU case-
law broadened non-national EU citizens’ rights to claim social benefits while
narrowing Member States’ scope to restrict their access to national welfare sys-
tems. However, the recent Dano, Alimanovic, and García-Nieto judgments
present a striking shift in relation to the previous case-law, establishing limits on
the right of EU citizens to social assistance in host Member States. The UK child
benefit or child tax credit case provides proof that this evolution of the CJEU case-
law is emerging as a general trend leading to possible changes in EU law but,
especially, to the emergence of a restrictive view of the social dimension of EU cit-
izenship. The right to reside in another Member State appears to be made depen-
dent on the worker status of the citizen, in order to avoid becoming ‘an unreason-
able burden on the social system of the host Member State’. Several questions re-
main. Were these decisions an attempt to address the debate on ‘welfare tourism’
namely during the Brexit referendum? What will be left of the previous jurispru-
dence?
Introduction: the current debate on non-national EU citizens social rights in a
host State
In the European Union (EU) a growing tension between a strong central-
ized enforcement of EU citizen’s rights, enshrined both in the Treaties and
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and a more decentralized approach,
concerned with Member States autonomy can be observed and is central to
Jirí Zemánek’s text «The Future of the Protection of Fundamental Rights after
Brexit».
One of the most important areas in that debate, which was also of great
importance in the Brexit debate, is the freedom of movement and of resi-
I.
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dence within the Member States of the EU by Union citizens. In fact, EU
citizenship, which is additional to national citizenship of a Member State
and affords a set of rights, is at a crossroads. This is especially felt in terms
of its implementation by the Member States and its relation to fundamen-
tal rights, namely social rights, and the principle of non-discrimination.
The concept of citizenship of the EU, which is a novel experiment1 es-
tablished by the Maastricht Treaty, and recognised in the Treaty of the EU
(TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), as well as the
rights and duties it entails, have evolved greatly, much due to the case-law
of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU). The rights of free-
dom of movement and of residence of EU citizens, as developed by the
CJEU case law, are closely connected with the development of EU integra-
tion.
The development of Union citizenship by the CJEU case-law was espe-
cially notable in the area of the free movement and residence of EU citi-
zens and their access to social benefits. The Court’s case-law has been cen-
tral for the guarantee of an effective freedom of movement of citizens
within the territory of the Member States, recognised in the TEU as one of
the fundamental freedoms on which the Union is based, especially when
interpreted together with the principle of prohibition of discrimination on
grounds of nationality (Article 18 TFEU).2 According to Article 3(2) TEU,
‘The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without
internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured’. The right
of every citizen of the Union ‘to move and reside freely within the territory of
the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the
Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect’ is also recognised (Ar-
1 E Gild / C Gortázar Rotaeche / D Kostakopoulou, The reconceptualization of Euro-
pean Union citizenship (Leiden, M. Nijhoff, 2014).
2 On the expansive interpretation by the Court of the EU citizenship in relation to
the principle of equality, v., v.g., C Barnard, ‘EU citizenship and the principle of
solidarity’ in M Dougan / E Spaventa (eds.), Social welfare and EU law (Oxford,
Hart Publishing, 2005) 157–180; G Davies, ‘The humiliation of the state as a consti-
tutional tactic’ in F. Amtenbrink / P.A.J. van den Berg (eds.), The Constitutional In-
tegrity of the European Union (The Hague, Asser Press, 2010) 147; M Dougan / E
Spaventa, ‘Wish you weren’t here...: new models of social solidarity in the Euro-
pean Union’, in M Dougan / E Spaventa (eds.), Social welfare and EU law (Oxford,
Hart Publishing, 2005) 181–218; S Giubonni, ‘Free movement of Persons and
European solidarity’ (2007) 13 3 European Law Journal 360–379; C O’Brien, ‘Real
links, abstract rights and false alarms: the relationship between ECJ’s ‘real link’
case law and national solidarity’, (2008) 33 5 European Law Review 643–665.
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ticle 21 TFEU).3 The relation between freedom of movement, freedom of
residence, and the prohibition of discrimination is implemented by the
Citizens’ Directive.45
In the Grzelczyk case, the Court established one of the cornerstones of
the EU citizenship case-law: that ‘Union citizenship is destined to be the fun-
damental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those who find
themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law irrespective
of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for’.6
The CJEU recognised the direct effect of the right of residence of Union
citizens7 and has consistently extended the prohibition of discrimination
and the principle of equality, while interpreting Articles 18, 20 and 21
TFUE, namely to EU citizens who reside lawfully in a Member State but
are economically inactive.8 The Court was especially important in the
building of a notion of EU citizenship which was not connected with the
need to have an economic link to a certain Member State and which grant-
ed access to a wider range of rights.9 It developed its case-law according to
3 J Cunha Rodrigues, ‘Liberdade de Circulação e Permanência’ in A. Silveira / M.
Canotilho (eds) Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da União Europeia Comentada
(Coimbra, Almedina, 2013) 522–523; Idem, ‘A proposEuropeancitizenship:
theright to move and reside freely’ in P Cordonnel/ A Rosas / N Wahl (eds) Consti-
tutionalisingthe EU judicial system: essays in honourofPernillaLindh (Oxford, HartPub-
lishing, 2012) 206.
4 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and
reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC)
No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC,
73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC
[2004] OJ L 158.
5 For a comprehensible analysis, v. E Guild / S Peers / J Tomkin, The EU citizenship
directive: a commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014).
6 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk ECLI:EU:C:2001:458, para. 31.
7 V., v.g., Case C-413/99 Baumbast ECLI:EU:C:2002:493, para. 84, and Case C-456/02
Trojani ECLI:EU:C:2004:488, para. 32.
8 V., v.g., Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala ECLI:EU:C:1998:217, paras. 61–62.
9 V., v.g., Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala ECLI:EU:C:1998:217, paras. 61–62, Case
C-184/99 Grzelczyk
ECLI:EU:C:2001:458, para. 44, Case C-60/00 Carpenter ECLI:EU:C:2002:434, para
38, Case C-413/99 Baumbast ECLI:EU:C:2002:493, para. 84, Case C-109/01 Akrich
ECLI:EU:C:2003:491, paras 57–58, Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello
ECLI:EU:C:2003:539, para 24, Case C-456/02 Trojani ECLI:EU:C:2004:488, para.
32, Case C-209/03 Bidar ECLI:EU:C:2005:169, para 31, Case C-22/08 and C-23/08
Vatsouras ECLI:EU:C:2009:344, paras 38–39, and Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano
ECLI:EU:C:2011:124, paras 42–44.
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which Article 20 TFEU, ‘precludes national measures that have effect of de-
priving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of
the rights conferred by the virtue of their status as citizens of the union’.10
The EU citizenship should make a difference and involves a break from
merely economic categories, such as ‘worker’, which were predominant in
the EEC.11
However, this case-law was sometimes criticised, namely by some of the
Member States, including the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland (UK), for being too broad in recognising the access to
benefits while interpreting the Citizens’ Directive too extensively.12 In this
debate, at least some of the Member States reject intrusions in their auton-
omy while the European Commission defends the freedom of movement
of persons.13 The broad interpretation of these rights could interfere with
10 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano ECLI:EU:C:2011:124, para 42, quoting Case
C‑135/08 Rottmann ECLI:EU:C:2010:104, para 42.
11 V., v.g., E Spaventa, ‘From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a (non-)economic
European constitution’ (2004) 41 (3) Common Market Law Review 743–773; N
NShuibhne, ‘The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship’ (2010) 47 (6) Common
Market Law Review 1597–1628, pp 1605–1609; S Kadelbach, ‘Union citizenship’ in
A von Bogdandy / Bast (ed.) Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. (Ox-
ford, Hart, 2009) 443–478, pp 445–448; C. O’Brien, ‘I trade, therefore I am: legal
personhood in the European Union’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 1643–
1684.
12 V., v.g., N Caicedo Camacho, ‘La Directiva 2004/38/CE y la jurisprudenciadel
TJCE sobre el disfrute de las prestaciones sociales: ¿freno al avance en materia so-
cial o adecuación a los intereses de los estados?’ (2014) 19 Revistad’estudis au-
tonòmicsi federals 96–143; Davies, ‘The humiliation of the state as a constitutional
tactic’, 147–174; Giubonni, ‘Free movement of persons and European solidarity’,
360–379; Idem, ‘A Certain Degree of Solidarity? Free Movement of Persons and
Access to Social Protection in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice’, in
M Ross / Y Borgmann-Prebil (eds) Promoting Solidarity in the European Union (Ox-
ford, Oxford University Press, 2010) 191–193; I. Lirola Delgado, ‘Derecho de resi-
dencia de los ciudadanos de la Unión y prestaciones sociales en tiempos de crisis’
(2014) 18 (49) Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo 761–762; F Wollenschläger,
‘A New Fundamental Freedom beyond Market Integration: Union Citizenship
and its Dynamics for Shifting the Economic Paradigm of European Integration’
(2011) 17 European Law Journal 1–34.
13 For an overview, v. M Morsa, ‘Les migrations internes à l’Unioneuropéennesont-
ellesmotivées par un accès à des prestationssociales? Citoyenneté européenne, lib-
erté de circulation et de séjour des inactifs et droits sociaux. La relation entre la
coordination européenne et la directive 2004/38’ (2014) 1190 Journal des tribunaux
du travail 245–246; H Verschueren, ‘Free Movement or Benefit Tourism: The Un-
reasonable Burden of Brey’ (2014) 16 European Journal of Migration and Law 147–
179.
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the Member States’ political choices or the national solidarity on the basis
of their welfare systems.14
There is a direct relation of this matter with the current debates on ac-
cess by non-national EU citizens to social security in host Member States,
characterised sometimes as ‘welfare migration’15, ‘benefit tourism’16 or ‘social
tourism’.17 These are terms used in the context of the perceived threat that a
number of economically inactive EU citizens move to a given Member
State to benefit from its social welfare system rather than to work. The de-
bate has grown in intensity because of the perceived need to implement
budget-cuts on national benefits during the global economic crisis.18
The access by non-national EU citizens to social security in host Mem-
ber States was one of the central questions in the debate of the prospective
withdrawal of the UK from the EU. In fact, when then Prime-Minister
Cameron called for ‘a new settlement for the United Kingdom in a reformed
European Union’ in his letter of 10 November 2015 one of the main areas of
concern pointed out was immigration and specifically that the UK was not
able to ‘cope with all the pressures that free movement can bring – on our
schools, our hospitals and our public services’ and that it was necessary ‘to crack
14 V., v.g., M Dougan, ‘The constitutional dimension to the case law on Union citi-
zenship’ (2006) 31 European Law Review, 613–641, 623; AJ Menéndez, ‘European
Citizenship after Martínez Sala and Baumbast: Has European Law Become More
Human but Less Social?’ in M Poiares Maduro / L Azoulai (eds) The Past and Fu-
ture of EU Law. The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome
Treaty (Oxford, Hart, 2010), 391–392.
15 V., v.g., P Larkin, ‘The Limits to European Social Citizenship in the United King-
dom’ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review, 435–447, pp. 440–442; S Mantu / P Minder-
houd, ‘Exploring the limits of social solidarity: welfare tourism and EU citizen-
ship’ (2016) 2(2) UNIO – EU Law Jounal, 4–19.
16 H Verschueren, ‘Preventing “benefit tourism” in the EU: A narrow or broad inter-
pretation of the possibilities offered by the ECJ in Dano?’ (2015) 52(2) Common
Market Law Review 363–390
17 Term used by Advocate General Geelhoed, and described as “moving to a Member
State with a more congenial social security environment” (Case C-456/02 Trojani
ECLI:EU:C:2004:112, Opinion of AG Geelhoed, para 18).
18 V. Editorial Comments, ‘The free movement of persons in the European Union:
Salvaging the dream while explaining the nightmare’ (2014) 51 Common Market
Law Review, 729–740; J. Shaw, ‘Between law and political truth? Member States
preferences, EU free movement rules and national immigration law’, Conference
paper, UACES 44th Annual Conference, Cork, 1–3 September 2014, at http://www.u
aces.org; I. Lirola Delgado, ‘Derecho de residencia de los ciudadanos de la Unión
y prestaciones sociales en tiempos de crisis. ¿Hacia un planteamiento casuístico y
ambiguo de la solidaridad entre los Estados miembros?’ (2015) 49 Revista de Dere-
choComunitarioEuropeo, 733–766, 734–742.
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down on the abuse of free movement’.19 The letter, thus, asked for a limitation
of the rights of European citizens who were migrants to receive social
benefits in host Member States. This was one of the issues discussed in the
negotiation of the package of changes to the UK’s terms of membership to
the EU and changes to EU rules that came to a conclusion during the
European Council meeting on 18 and 19 February 2016.20 The set of ar-
rangements agreed by the President of the European Council Donald
Tusk, and approved by EU leaders of all 27 other Member States in the
European Council meeting on 18th and 19th February were spelled out in
its Conclusions.21
The agreement included as response to the concerns of the UK in these
matters is in three declarations of the European Commission as annexes V,
VI and VII. In these annexes the Commission agreed to i) ‘make a proposal
to amend Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the coordination of social security systems in order to give Member
States, with regard to the exportation of child benefits to a Member State other
than that where the worker resides, an option to index such benefits to the condi-
tions of the Member State where the child resides’ (annex V); ii) ‘table a propos-
al to amend Regulation 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within
the Union to provide for a safeguard mechanism with the understanding that it
can and will be used and therefore will act as a solution to the United Kingdom's
concerns about the exceptional inflow of workers from elsewhere in the European
Union’ (annex VI); and iii) ‘adopt a proposal to complement Directive 2004/38
on free movement of Union citizens’ in matters of persons who marry a
19 David Cameron, ‘A new settlement for the United Kingdom in a reformed Euro-
pean Union’, 10th November 2015, at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/s
ystem/uploads/attachment_data/file/475679/Donald_Tusk_letter.pdf
20 The negotiations only began following the outcome of the UK General Election
in the summer of 2015.
21 V. General Secretariat of the Council (2016–02–19). ‘European Council meeting
(18 and 19 February 2016) – Conclusions’, EUCO 1/16.
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Union citizen,22 abuse of free movement rights23 and other clarifications24
(annex VII). The changes were intended to become effective on the date
the Government of the UK informed the Secretary-General of the Council
that the UK has decided to remain a member of the EU, following a vote
in the UK’s referendum. Due to the result of the referendum, the changes
were never implemented.
The subject of immigration and of access of non-national EU citizens to
welfare benefits was also one of the most discussed subjects in the UK ‘Re-
main/Leave’ referendum campaign. It was during this campaign that the
CJEU issued its decision on the UK child benefit or child tax credit case.25
This decision must be read in the context of a recent change in the CJEU
case-law on this subject, that could have profound consequences in the
way EU citizen’s rights and the freedom of movement are interpreted and
implemented.
22 The change would be ‘in order to exclude, from the scope of free movement
rights, third country nationals who had no prior lawful residence in a Member
State before marrying a Union citizen or who marry a Union citizen only after
the Union citizen has established residence in the host Member State” and clarify-
ing that “the concept of marriage of convenience – which is not protected under
Union law – also covers a marriage which is maintained for the purpose of enjoy-
ing a right of residence by a family member who is not a national of a Member
State’.
23 The change would be to clarify that ‘Member States can address specific cases of
abuse of free movement rights by Union citizens returning to their Member State
of nationality with a non-EU family member where residence in the host Member
State has not been sufficiently genuine to create or strengthen family life and had
the purpose of evading the application of national immigration rules’.
24 ‘The Commission will also clarify that Member States may take into account past
conduct of an individual in the determination of whether a Union citizen's con-
duct poses a ‘present’ threat to public policy or security. They may act on grounds
of public policy or public security even in the absence of a previous criminal con-
viction on preventative grounds but specific to the individual concerned. The
Commission will also clarify the notions of "serious grounds of public policy or
public security" and “imperative grounds of public security”. Moreover, on the
occasion of a future revision of Directive 2004/38 on free movement of Union
citizens, the Commission will examine the thresholds to which these notions are
connected’.
25 Case C-308/14 Commission v United Kingdom [UK child benefit or child tax credit
case] ECLI:EU:C:2016:436. See also D. Berlin, ‘La Cour invite dans le débat sur le
Brexit?’ (2016) 26 La Semaine Juridique – édition générale, 1310.
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The Recent Evolution in CJEU Case-law on Access to Social Assistance
Granted to Non-national EU Citizens
Against this background, a number of recent CJEU judgments present a
striking shift in relation to the previous case-law, clarifying the limits of
the right to access to social assistance granted to non-national Union citi-
zens in host Member States under EU Law.
In fact, it has been up to the CJEU to largely develop the legal frame-
work and the principles applicable to the connection between the freedom
of movement and the non-national EU citizens’ access to social rights, and
specifically to social benefits, in the host State. The Court developed an ap-
proach which was centred on the individual at issue and its subjective case
and established that the right of residence and of establishment and the
equal treatment principle should not be precluded by lack of resources.
For instance, the principle of equality was declared applicable to the rights
to maintenance aid for students who are exercising their right of residence,
despite the exception established in Article 24 (2) of the Citizens’ Direc-
tive.26
The prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality and the
establishment of the EU citizenship were seen by the CJEU as precluding
the entitlement to a non-contributory social benefit from being made con-
ditional to non-national legally residing EU citizens being considered as
workers when no such conditions would apply to nationals of the Member
State. In Judgments such as Martínez Sala, Grzelczyk, Trojani, or Bidar, for
instance, the CJEU developed a case-law which incrementally broadened
non-national EU citizens’ rights to claim social benefits while narrowing
Member States’ scope to regulate or restrict their access to national welfare
systems, notably in the case of non-contributory benefits. The Court recog-
nised and accepted that this involved the need for a certain degree of finan-
cial solidarity between Member States.27 However, the Court accepted that
in certain cases it was legitimate for a Member State to grant such a benefit
only after it has been possible to establish a ‘real link’ between the jobseek-
er and the labour market of that State28, or a ‘certain degree of integration
II.
26 V., v.g., Case C-224/98 D'Hoop ECLI:EU:C:2002:432, paras 30–32; Case C-209/03
Bidar ECLI:EU:C:2005:169, para 31.
27 V., v.g., Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk ECLI:EU:C:2001:458, para. 44, Case C-209/03
Bidar ECLI:EU:C:2005:169, para 56.
28 V., v.g., Case C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras ECLI:EU:C:2009:344, paras 38–39,
and Case C-138/02 Collins ECLI:EU:C:2004:172, paras 67–69.
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into the society of the host State’ was demonstrated. 29 Finally, in any case,
the Court recognised that the applicant should not become ‘an unreason-
able burden’ on the public finances of the Member State.30
In the Brey judgment of September 201331 the CJEU stated that the Citi-
zen’s Directive ‘allows the host Member State to impose legitimate restrictions
in connection with the grant of [social security] benefits to Union citizens who
do not or no longer have worker status, so that those citizens do not become an
unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of that Member State’.32
This objective to avoid that a citizen becomes an ‘unreasonable burden’ was
already stated in recital 10 in the preamble to the Directive.33
However, the Court interpreted the Directive in light of the Treaty and
of general principles of EU law. The result was that ‘since the right to free-
dom of movement is – as a fundamental principle of EU law – the general rule,
the conditions laid down in Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38 must be con-
strued narrowly (see, by analogy, Kamberaj, paragraph 86, and Chakroun, para-
graph 43) and in compliance with the limits imposed by EU law and the princi-
ple of proportionality (see Baumbast and R, paragraph 91; Zhu and Chen, para-
graph 32; and Commission v Belgium, paragraph 39)’. This meant that EU
29 V., v.g., Case C-209/03 Bidar ECLI:EU:C:2005:169, para 57; Case C-258/04 Ioanni-
dis ECLI:EU:C:2005:559, paras 30 etseq.; Case C-158/07 Förster
ECLI:EU:C:2008:63, para 54; Case C-103/08 Gottwald ECLI:EU:C:2009:597, paras
32 etseq.
30 V., v.g., Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk ECLI:EU:C:2001:458, para. 44; and Case C‑75/11
Commission v Austria [reduced fares on public transport granted to students]
ECLI:EU:C:2012:605, para 60.
31 Case C-140/12 Brey ECLI:EU:C:2013:565. Mr Brey and his wife were both Ger-
man nationals with no other income or assets other than a low sum of pension
and benefit payments received in Germany. After moving to Austria in 2011, Mr
Brey applied for a compensatory supplement. However, the Austrian authorities
refused this because the aforementioned low amounts of pension payments from
Germany supposedly did not constitute sufficient resources to establish his lawful
residence in Austria.
32 Case C-140/12 Brey ECLI:EU:C:2013:565, para 57. For an analysis of the Brey case,
v., v.g., B Spiegel, ‘Anspruch auf Leistungen der sozialen Sicherheit von nichtak-
tiven Personen – wer fürchtet sich vor ‘Sozialtourismus’? Neue EuGH Fälle:
C-140/12, Brey, und C-333/13, Dano’, (2014) 15 ERA Forum, 339–340; D Thym,
‘Sozialleistungen für und Aufenthalt von nichterwerbstätigen Unionbürgern’
(2014) 23 Neue Zeitschrift für Sozialrecht, 81–120; H Verschueren, ‘Free Movement
or Benefit Tourism’ 147–179; A.P. van der Mei, ‘Overview of Recent Cases before
the Court of Justice of the European Union (October-December 2014)’ (2014)
17(1) European Journal of Social Security, 102–122.
33 Case C-140/12 Brey ECLI:EU:C:2013:565, para 54. It was already stated in the Case
C-424/10 and C-425/10 Ziolkowski and Szeja ECLI:EU:C:2011:866, para 40.
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law precluded the automatic exclusion of an economically inactive citizen
of another Member State from receiving a particular social benefit because
that exclusion does not enable the competent authorities of the host Mem-
ber State to ‘carry out – in accordance with the requirements under, inter alia,
Articles 7(1)(b) and 8(4) of that directive and the principle of proportionality –
an overall assessment of the specific burden which granting that benefit would
place on the social assistance system as a whole by reference to the personal cir-
cumstances characterising the individual situation of the person concerned’.34
The Brey test was construed in such a way that the Member State’s au-
thorities can only claim that a citizen is an unreasonable burden to their
social security system after considering his/her individual personal situa-
tion.
Only a year later, in November 2014, the Dano case35 represents the be-
ginning of a different methodology of analysis of the relation between the
right to reside and the access to social benefits.36 In the Dano decision, the
CJEU made clear that Member States may reject claims to social assistance
by EU citizens who have no intention to work and cannot support them-
selves. It was followed by the Alimanovic case37, which confirmed the new
trend and gave the Court the opportunity to clarify the application of this
principle.
34 Case C-140/12 Brey ECLI:EU:C:2013:565, para 77.
35 Case C‑333/13 Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358. Ms Dano and her son, Romanian na-
tionals, claimed an entitlement to unemployment benefits at the Leipzig Social
Court, after being denied by the Jobcenter Leipzig. Ms Dano is currently staying
with her son in Germany. She was not seeking employment, nor has she been
trained in a profession and, to date, she has never worked in Germany or Roma-
nia. They lived with Ms Dano’s sister, who provided for them.
36 For an analysis of the Dano case, v., v.g., D Guimarães, ‘The Right of Free Move-
ment and the Access To Social Protection in the EU: The Economical Dimension.
Notes on the Case Elisabeta Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, C-333/13’ (2015) 1(1)
UNIO – EU Law Jounal 110–120; D Thym, ‘The Elusive limits of solidarity: Resi-
dence rights of and social benefits for economically inactive Union citizens’
(2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 17–20; Id, ‘When Union Citizens turn into
illegal migrants: the Dano case’ (2015) 40 European Law Review 249 ff, 260; AP
van der Mei, ‘Overview of Recent Cases before the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union (January-June 2015)’, 481–496; H Verschueren, ‘Preventing ‘Benefit
Tourism’ in the EU’ 363–364; F Wollenschläger, ‘Keine Sozialleistungen für
nichterwerbstätige Unionsbürger?’ (2014) 24 NVwZ 1628–1632; and, very critical-
ly of the CJEU’s new approach: N N Shuibne, ‘Limits Rising, Duties Ascending:
The Changing Legal Shape of Union Citizenship’ (2015) 52 Common Market Law
Review 889–937.
37 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic ECLI:EU:C:2015:597.
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At the beginning of the reasoning of the Dano decision, the Court re-
peats the Grzelczyk statement that ‘the status of citizen of the Union is destined
to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’.38 However,
the CJEU subsequently answered the questions by reference to the Citi-
zens’ Directive and Regulation No 883/200439, as ‘more specific expressions’
of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality of Article
18 TFEU, and said that ‘so far as concerns access to social benefits, such as those
at issue in the main proceedings, a Union citizen can claim equal treatment with
nationals of the host Member State only if his residence in the territory of the
host Member State complies with the conditions of Directive 2004/38’.40 In do-
ing so, the Court does a literal interpretation of the text of the Directive
without reference to the Treaties – especially to the provisions on EU citi-
zenship and the freedom of movement and of residence.
Adopting this methodology allows the CJEU to state that ‘any unequal
treatment between Union citizens who have made use of their freedom of move-
ment and residence and nationals of the host Member State with regard to the
grant of social benefits is an inevitable consequence of Directive 2004/38’41 with-
out having to equate this statement with the general principles of EU law
and with the Treaties’ rules.
According to the Citizens’ Directive, the right of residence for periods
longer than three months is subject to the conditions set out in Article 7(1)
which distinguishes between (i) persons who are working and (ii) those
who are not. The first group of citizens have the right of residence in the
host Member State without having to fulfil any other condition (Article
7(1)(a) of Directive). Persons who are economically inactive are required
by Article 7(1)(b) of the Directive to meet the condition that they have suf-
ficient resources of their own. From these provisions, the Court concludes
that each ‘Member State must therefore have the possibility, pursuant to Article
7 of Directive 2004/38, of refusing to grant social benefits to economically inac-
38 Case C‑333/13 Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358, para 58.
39 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, OJ L 166.
40 Case C‑333/13 Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358, para 69. The Advocate General
Wathelet also concluded that EU law did not preclude the national legislature
from choosing to exclude nationals of other Member States from entitlement to a
special non-contributory cash benefit on the basis of a general criterion, such as
the reason for entering the territory of the host Member State, but used the capa-
bility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine link with that State, in order to
prevent an unreasonable burden on its social assistance system (v. Case C‑333/13
Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:341, Opinion AG Wathelet, para 139).
41 Case C‑333/13 Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358, para 77.
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tive Union citizens who exercise their right to freedom of movement solely in or-
der to obtain another Member State’s social assistance although they do not have
sufficient resources to claim a right of residence’.42
No reference to the individual situation of Ms. Dano was made other
than that ‘in the main proceedings, according to the findings of the referring
court the applicants do not have sufficient resources and thus cannot claim a
right of residence in the host Member State’.43 This, in itself, signified a depar-
ture from the Brey test described supra.
One of the questions referred to the Court were on the application of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights to the case. The CJEU, however, stated
that it did not have jurisdiction. Its reasoning was that, since the condi-
tions creating the right to the benefits did result neither from Regulation
No 883/2004 nor from Directive 2004/38 or other secondary EU legisla-
tion, it was thus for the legislature of each Member State to lay down those
conditions. According to the Court, while doing so, the Member States are
not implementing EU law for the effect of triggering the application of the
Charter under its Article 51 (1).44 In the Alimanovic case,45 one year later,
the Court used the Dano line of reasoning, confirming that a new
paradigm of access of non-national EU citizens to the host State’s social
benefits had emerged.46
42 Case C‑333/13 Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358, para 78.
43 Case C‑333/13 Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358, para 81.
44 Case C‑333/13 Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358, paras 87–92.
45 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic ECLI:EU:C:2015:597. The case concerns the access of
Nazifa Alimanovic and her three German-born children, all possessing the
Swedish nationality, to German social welfare benefits. These welfare benefits in-
clude Arbeitslosengeld II, Germany’s subsistence allowance for the long-termed un-
employed, and social allowances for beneficiaries unfit to work. In contrast with
the Dano case, in which the EU citizen in question had never worked and was not
seeking work, mother Alimanovic and her oldest daughter did have temporary
jobs between June 2010 and May 2011 in Germany. As a result, they received so-
cial benefits from 1 December 2011 to 31 May 2012, after which the ‘Job Center’,
the responsible German authority, withdrew their grant. For an analysis of the
Alimanovic case, v., v.g., A Iliopoulou-Penot, ‘Deconstructing the former edifice of
Union citizenship? The Alimanovic judgment’ (2016) 53 Common Market Law Re-
view 1007–1035; AP van der Mei, ‘Overview of Recent Cases before the Court of
Justice of the European Union (July-December 2015)’, 74–84.
46 This meant not following the Advocate General’s opinion. Advocate General
Wathelet considered that it was “contrary to EU law, and more precisely, to the prin-
ciple of equal treatment affirmed in Article 18 TFEU and clarified in Article 4 of Regu-
lation No 883/2004 and Article 24 of Directive 2004/38, for the legislation of a Member
State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, automatically to exclude a citizen of
the Union from entitlement to a special non-contributory cash benefit within the mean-
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The question before the CJEU was if Member States could exclude na-
tionals of other Member States who are jobseekers in the host Member
State from entitlement to certain ‘special non-contributory cash benefits’ with-
in the meaning of Article 70(2) of Regulation No 883/2004, which also
constitute ‘social assistance’ within the meaning of Article 24(2) of the
Citizens’ Directive, although those benefits were granted to nationals of
the Member State concerned who are in the same situation.47 The Court
reiterated the Dano assessment that ‘a Union citizen can claim equal treat-
ment with nationals of the host Member State under Article 24(1) of Directive
2004/38 only if his residence in the territory of the host Member State complies
with the conditions of Directive 2004/38’.48 Only Article 7(3)(c) and Article
14(4)(b) of the Citizens’ Directive were considered as able to confer a right
of residence on jobseekers in the situation of Ms Alimanovic and her
ing of Regulation No 883/2004 (a benefit which, moreover, constitutes social assistance
within the meaning of Directive 2004/38) beyond a period of involuntary unemploy-
ment of six months after working for less than a year, without allowing that citizen to
demonstrate the existence of a genuine link with the host Member State” (v. Case
C-67/14 Alimanovic ECLI:EU:C:2015:210, Opinion of AG Wathelet, para 110).
The Advocate General also stated that in circumstances such as those of the main
proceedings, the children of a national of a Member State who works or has
worked in the host Member State and the parent who is their primary carer may
claim a right of residence there on the sole basis of Article 10 of Regulation (EU)
No 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union, without
such a right being conditional on their having sufficient resources and compre-
hensive sickness insurance cover in that State (v. Case C-67/14 Alimanovic
ECLI:EU:C:2015:210, Opinion of AG Wathelet, paras 117–122).
47 In this decision, as in the Dano case, the benefits at issue were characterised as
‘special non-contributory cash benefits’ within the meaning of Article 70(2) of
Regulation No 883/2004, i.e. benefits which were intended to cover subsistence
costs for persons who cannot cover them themselves and that are not financed
through contributions, but through tax revenue. The Court considered that, from
its case-law, those benefits were also covered by the concept of ‘social assistance’
within the meaning of Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38, which refers to all assis-
tance schemes established by the public authorities to which recourse may be had
by an individual who does not have resources sufficient to meet his own basic
needs and those of his family and who by reason of that fact may, during his peri-
od of residence, become a burden on the public finances of the host Member
State which could have consequences for the overall level of assistance which may
be granted by that State. V. Case C‑333/13 Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358, para 63,
and Case C-67/14 Alimanovic ECLI:EU:C:2015:597, paras 43–44.
48 Case C‑333/13 Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358, para 69, and Case C-67/14 Alimanovic
ECLI:EU:C:2015:597, para 49.
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daughter. The first provision (Article 7(3)(c))49 only conferred worker sta-
tus during 6 months after their last employment had ended, a period
which had already expired when they were refused entitlement to the
benefits at issue. Article 14(4)(b) can be relied upon to establish a right of
residence even after the expiry of the period referred to in Article 7(3)(c) of
the Citizens’ Directive, entitling Ms. Alimanovic and her daughter to equal
treatment with the nationals of the host Member State so far as access to
social assistance is concerned.50 However, in that case, the host Member
State may rely on the derogation in Article 24(2) of that Directive in order
not to grant that citizen the social assistance sought.
The Court addressed the Brey case, stating that ‘although the Court has
held that Directive 2004/38 requires a Member State to take account of the indi-
vidual situation of the person concerned before it adopts an expulsion measure or
finds that the residence of that person is placing an unreasonable burden on its
social assistance system (judgment in Brey, C‑140/12, EU:C:2013:565, para-
graphs 64, 69 and 78)’, no such individual assessment is necessary ‘in circum-
stances such as those at issue in the main proceedings’.51 The reason for this
conclusion begins with stating that the Citizens’ Directive ‘itself takes into
consideration various factors characterising the individual situation of each ap-
plicant for social assistance and, in particular, the duration of the exercise of any
economic activity’. Besides, the Directive does ‘guarantee a significant level of
legal certainty and transparency in the context of the award of social assistance
by way of basic provision, while complying with the principle of proportionality’.
Finally, ‘while an individual claim might not place the Member State concerned
49 This provision establishes that if the worker is in duly recorded involuntary un-
employment after completing a fixed-term employment contract of less than a
year or after having become involuntarily unemployed during the first 12 months
and has registered as a jobseeker with the relevant employment office, he retains
the status of worker for no less than six months. During that period, the Union
citizen concerned retains his right of residence in the host Member State under
Article 7 of the Citizens’ Directive. Article 7(3)(b) provides in principle for the
unlimited retention of the worker status after employment for more than a year,
but in that case the worker would have to have completed an employment con-
tract longer than a year.
50 Article 14(4)(b) stipulates that Union citizens who have entered the territory of
the host Member State in order to seek employment may not be expelled for as
long as they can provide evidence that they are continuing to seek employment
and that they have a genuine chance of being engaged.
51 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic ECLI:EU:C:2015:597, para 59.
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under an unreasonable burden, the accumulation of all the individual claims
which would be submitted to it would be bound to do so’. 52
Any prospect that these cases did not represent the adoption of a broad
new approach of the CJEU to the question of access to social benefits by
non-national EU citizens was proven unfounded by the subsequent case
that adopts the same methodology.
In the García-Nieto case53 the Court once again addressed the access to
‘special non-contributory cash benefits’ within the meaning of Article 70(2) of
Regulation No 883/2004, which also constitute ‘social assistance’ within the
meaning of Article 24(2) of the Citizens’ Directive, by quoting the Dano
and Alimanovic cases – ‘a Union citizen can claim equal treatment with nation-
als of the host Member State (…) only if his residence in the territory of the host
Member State complies with the conditions’ of the Citizens’ Directive.54 The
Court followed the same kind of reasoning, limiting itself to the interpre-
tation of the provisions of the Citizens’ Directive. Article 6(1) of the Direc-
tive provides that EU citizens have the right of residence on the territory of
another Member State for a period of up to three months without any con-
ditions or any formalities other than the requirement to hold a valid iden-
tity card or passport. However, in such a case, the host Member State may
rely on the derogation in Article 24(2) in order to refuse to grant that citi-
zen the social assistance sought.55 Hence, the host Member States can ex-
clude economically inactive non-national EU citizens from access to ‘social
assistance’ as long as they are residing for a period shorter than three
52 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic ECLI:EU:C:2015:597, paras 60–62.
53 Case C-299/14 García-Nieto ECLI:EU:C:2016:114. The unmarried Spanish couple
García-Nieto and Peña Cuevas, had lived together in Spain for several years and
had a common child. The father also had a son from an earlier relationship.
Mother García-Nieto and their common child moved to Germany in April 2012,
where she moved in with her mother, registered as a jobseeker and started work-
ing in June 2012. The father and his other son joined the family in Germany in
June 2012. Until November 2012, the family’s living expenses were met from the
mother García-Nieto’s income. From that moment onwards, the father also start-
ed to work in short-term jobs. The case concerned the request for social assistance
benefits that the father made for himself and his son in July 2012. The German
authorities denied them these benefits for August and September as they had
resided for a period shorter than three months in Germany and, during that time,
were neither working nor self-employed.
54 Case C-299/14 García-Nieto ECLI:EU:C:2016:114, para38, quoting Case C‑333/13
Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358, para 69, and Case C-67/14 Alimanovic
ECLI:EU:C:2015:597, para 49.
55 Case C-299/14 García-Nieto ECLI:EU:C:2016:114, paras 42–43, quoting Case
C‑333/13 Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358, para 70.
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months. No reference to the special status of EU citizen or to the Treaties
is made. No consideration is given to the family status of those involved.
The individual personal situation test put forward in Brey was replaced
by the objective test used in the Alimanovic case. In Alimanovic, the Court
stated that the Citizens’ Directive, ‘establishing a gradual system as regards the
retention of the status of ‘worker’ which seeks to safeguard the right of residence
and access to social assistance, itself takes into consideration various factors char-
acterising the individual situation of each applicant for social assistance and, in
particular, the duration of the exercise of any economic activity’.56 This reason-
ing is taken a step further by the Court in the García-Nieto case, stating that
‘if such an assessment is not necessary in the case of a citizen seeking employment
who no longer has the status of ‘worker’, the same applies a fortiori to persons
who are in a situation such as that (…) in the main proceedings’.57
This delivers the coup de grace on the Brey doctrine – no individual per-
sonal situation test is needed; the Court merely applies the Citizens’ Direc-
tive to the case. However, the Court does so without the admission of
abandoning that doctrine, and without a specific reasoning on that sub-
ject: it is as if the Court is presenting a mere exception to previous case-
law.
The evolution of the case-law: the UK child benefit or child tax credit case
This evolution of the CJEU case-law emerged in cases dealing with ‘special
non-contributory cash benefits’58, which were the benefits at issue in the
Dano, Alimanovic and García-Nieto cases. However, it appears to be emerg-
ing as a general change in the Courts doctrine in the matter of access to
III.
56 Case C-299/14 García-Nieto ECLI:EU:C:2016:114, para47, quoting Case C-67/14
Alimanovic ECLI:EU:C:2015:597, para 60.
57 Case C-299/14 García-Nieto ECLI:EU:C:2016:114, para 48.
58 On this subject, v. T. Guerrero Padrón, ‘The scope and instrumentation of the
principle of equal treatment regarding social assistance benefits’ (2016) I (1) e-Re-
vista Internacional de la Protección Social 87, 89–90.
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social benefits, with consequences outside of that field59 – the UK child ben-
efit or child tax credit case provides proof of this change.60
In this case the question brought before the CJEU was the implementa-
tion of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security sys-
tems, and not the Citizens’ Directive. This Regulation lays down a series of
common principles to be observed by the legislation of the Member States
in that sphere so that the various national systems do not place at a disad-
vantage person who exercise their right of freedom of movement and of
residence within the EU. One of the common principles that the Member
States must observe is the principle of equality which, in the field of social
security, takes the form of prohibiting any discrimination on grounds of
nationality.
The UK was requiring a person claiming some social benefits (child
benefit and child tax credit) to satisfy the right to reside test in order to be
treated as habitually resident in that Member State. Since the Commission
took the view that the UK legislation does not comply with the Regu-
lation, because it has added a condition that does not appear in Regulation
No 883/2004, it brought an action for failure to fulfil obligations against
the UK. According to the Commission, that condition deprives persons
59 E.g., Case C-233/14 Commission v the Netherlands [financial support for travel costs
awarded to national students] ECLI:EU:C:2016:396. This case is about the restrict-
ing of access to fares at preferential rates on public transport for students who
pursue their studies in the Netherlands to Netherlands students who are regis-
tered with a private or public educational establishment in the Netherlands and
to students from other Member States who, in the Netherlands, are economically
active or have obtained the right of permanent residence.
60 For an analysis of the UK child benefit or child tax credit case, v., v.g., C O’Brien,
‘The ECJ sacrifices EU citizenship in vain: Commission v. United Kingdom’
(2016) 54 Common Market Law Review 209–243; Idem, ‘A failed Faustian pact:
Case C-308/14 Commission v UK and the sacrifice of EU citizenship’ (2016) 4
Quaderni costituzionali 824–827; M D Bollo Arocena, ‘Salvaguarda de las finanza-
spúblicas, derecho de residencia y obtención de prestaciones de seguridad social
en el Estado miembro de acogida. Comentario a la Sentenciadel TJUE (Sala
Primera), de 14 de junio de 2016. Asunto C-308/14’ (2016) 8–9 Revista Aranzadi
Unión Europea, 95–102; NN Shuibhne, ‘“WHAT I TELL YOU THREE TIMES IS
TRUE” Lawful Residence and Equal Treatment after Dano’, (2016) Maastricht
Journal of European and Comparative Law 908–936. See also C O’Brien, ‘Don't
think of the children! CJEU approves automatic exclusions from family benefits
in Case C-308/14 Commission v UK’ in EU Law Analysis Blog, 16 June 2016, avail-
able at http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/06/dont-think-of-children-cjeu-app
roves.html.
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who do not meet it of cover under the social security legislation of one of
the Member States, cover which that regulation is intended to ensure. The
condition was, thusly, considered discriminatory and contrary to the spirit
of the Regulation since it had regard only to the claimant’s habitual resi-
dence.61
In response to those arguments, the UK, which relied on the Brey deci-
sion, maintained that the host State may lawfully require that social bene-
fits be granted only to Union citizens who fulfil the conditions for possess-
ing a right to reside in its territory, conditions which are, essentially, laid
down in the Citizens’ Directive. Furthermore, while acknowledging that
the conditions conferring entitlement to the social benefits at issue are
more easily satisfied by its own nationals (as they have, by definition, a
right of residence), the UK maintains that in each case the condition re-
quiring a right of residence is a proportionate measure for ensuring that
the benefits are paid to persons sufficiently integrated in the UK.62
In its decision, the Court found, first of all, that the benefits at issue
were social security benefits and therefore fell within the Regulation’s
scope.63 However, the CJEU, following the Opinion of the AG Cruz Vil-
lalón,64 rejected the Commission’s arguments, and concluded that the ac-
tion was to be dismissed in its entirety.
Firstly, the CJEU addressed the Commission’s main argument that the
UK legislation imposes a condition supplementing that of habitual resi-
dence contained in the Regulation. The Court pointed out that the criteri-
on of habitual residence, within the meaning of the Regulation, was not a
condition that must be met to qualify for benefits, but a ‘conflict rule’
which was intended to prevent the concurrent application of a number of
national legislative systems and to ensure that persons who have exercised
their right of freedom of movement were not left without cover. Accord-
ing to the Court, the Regulation does not set up a common scheme of so-
cial security, but allows different national social security schemes to exist.
It thus does not lay down the conditions creating the right to benefits, be-
cause it is in principle for the legislation of each Member State to lay down
those conditions.65
61 Case C-308/14 Commission v United Kingdom ECLI:EU:C:2016:436, para 28.
62 Case C-308/14 Commission v United Kingdom ECLI:EU:C:2016:436, paras 38–39.
63 Case C-308/14 Commission v United Kingdom ECLI:EU:C:2016:436, para 61.
64 V. Case C-308/14 Commission v United Kingdom [UK child benefit or child tax credit
case] ECLI:EU:C:2015:666, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón.
65 Case C-308/14 Commission v United Kingdom ECLI:EU:C:2016:436, paras 62–67.
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This approach to Regulation No 883/2004 seems to ignore that it also
establishes some aspects of eligibility, and the principle of equal treatment
between persons subject to the Regulation (Article 4). This means that the
Regulation does establish some substantive general rules applicable to the
different national social security schemes – which could be of importance
in this case.66
The Court also quotes as the basis for this assessment the Brey and the
Dano cases, stating that ‘it is clear from the Court’s case-law that there is noth-
ing to prevent, in principle, the grant of social benefits to Union citizens who are
not economically active being made subject to the requirement that those citizens
fulfil the conditions for possessing a right to reside lawfully in the host Member
State’.67 However, those cases address special non-contributory benefits,
whereas the social benefits at issue in this case are ‘social security benefits’,
as referred to in Article 3(1)(j) of Regulation No 883/2004, read in con-
junction with Article 1(z) thereof.68 Hence, despite the fact that the
Court’s analysis is consistent with the recent trend in case-law (i.e. Dano)
which has found that Member States retain the competence to refuse to
grant social assistance benefits to EU migrants who are not exercising
Treaty rights within a host Member State, it extends this approach to fami-
ly benefits.
In both the Brey and the Dano cases, the classification of the benefits at
issue in the proceedings as ‘special non-contributory cash benefits’ is analysed
and bears consequences for the regime applicable69. In Brey, the Court said
that ‘the nature of that benefit, which is the subject of the referring court’s
question, must be examined in the context of analysing this issue’ – which was
the ‘right to reside’.70 However, in the UK child benefit or child tax credit case,
the Court does not concern itself with this classification – despite the fact
that family benefits, as the ones at issue in the case, are social security bene-
66 O’Brien, ‘The ECJ sacrifices EU citizenship in vain’, 209–243; Idem, ‘A failed Faus-
tian pact’ 824–827.
67 Case C-308/14 Commission v United Kingdom ECLI:EU:C:2016:436, para 68.
68 Case C-308/14 Commission v United Kingdom ECLI:EU:C:2016:436, para 61.
69 Case C-140/12 Brey ECLI:EU:C:2013:565, paras 33–45, and Case C‑333/13 Dano
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358, paras 46–55.
70 Case C-140/12 Brey ECLI:EU:C:2013:565, para 30. V. ‘whether a Member State
may refuse to grant the compensatory supplement to nationals of other Member
States on the grounds that (…) they do not, despite having been issued with a cer-
tificate of residence, meet the necessary requirements for obtaining the legal right
to reside on the territory of that Member State for a period of longer than three
months, since, in order to obtain that right, the person concerned must have suf-
ficient resources not to apply for, inter alia, the compensatory supplement.’
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fits and do not fall within the ‘social assistance’ exclusions of Citizens’ Di-
rective, as is the case of ‘special non-contributory cash benefits’. One can also
see that there is some incongruity in applying a limitation to the equal
treatment provision in Regulation No 883/2004 which was developed
within the context of the Citizens’ Directive, which has a specific scope
(the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and
reside freely within the territory of the Member States), to a different legal
act, the Regulation No 883/2004, which has a different scope. In fact, the
personal scope of the Regulation is broader, including anyone who are or
have been subject to the legislation of one or more Member States on mat-
ters of social security, independently of the exercise of the right to move,
and including non-economically active persons71. The scope of the benefits
included in both the Citizens’ Directive and Regulation No 883/2004 is
also different.72
The Brey test is apparently extended to all benefits, irrespective of their
classification allowing for the application of the discriminatory ‘right to re-
side’ condition without any specific provision in the Treaty or secondary
law excluding Union citizens from equal treatment in this case.
Alternatively, the Commission contended that the introduction of the
right to reside test in the national legislation inevitably results in direct, or
at least indirect, discrimination, prohibited by Article 4 of Regulation No
883/2004. The CJEU admitted that the condition requiring a right to reside
in the UK gave rise to unequal treatment because UK nationals could satis-
fy it more easily than nationals of the other Member States, which consti-
tuted indirect discrimination.73 In order for this discrimination to be justi-
fied, according to the Court’s case law, it must be appropriate for securing
the attainment of a legitimate objective and cannot go beyond what is nec-
essary to attain that objective. The Court states that the ‘need to protect the
finances of the host Member State justifies in principle the possibility of checking
whether residence is lawful when a social benefit is granted in particular to per-
sons from other Member States who are not economically active, as such grant
could have consequences for the overall level of assistance which may be accorded
by that State’.74 In this regard, the Court found that the UK authorities veri-
fied whether residence is lawful in accordance with the conditions laid
down in the Citizens’ Directive. Thus, this verification was considered to
71 V. Recital 42 of the Regulation No 883/2004.
72 O’Brien, ‘The ECJ sacrifices EU citizenship in vain’ 209–243; Id, ‘A failed Faustian
pact’ 824–827.
73 Case C-308/14 Commission v United Kingdom ECLI:EU:C:2016:436, paras 76–78.
74 Case C-308/14 Commission v United Kingdom ECLI:EU:C:2016:436, para 80.
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not be carried out systematically by the UK authorities for each claim, but
only in the event of doubt. It followed that the condition does not go be-
yond what is necessary to attain the legitimate objective pursued by the
UK, namely the need to protect its finances.
Furthermore, the Court considered that the Commission did not pro-
vide evidence or arguments showing that the measure does not satisfy the
conditions of proportionality, that it is not appropriate for securing the at-
tainment of the objective of protecting public finances or that it goes be-
yond what is necessary to attain that objective,75 and concluded that the
UK can require recipients of child benefit and child tax credit to have a
right to reside in the UK.
One can say, however, that this reasoning is moot, because the condi-
tion is directly discriminatory. According to the Grzelczyk decision, the ap-
plication of a condition to legally resident non-nationals when no such
condition applies to nationals of the host Member State was recognized as
being directly discriminatory and violating the provisions of EU citizen-
ship. In the UK child benefit or child tax credit case the legislation at hand
whilst the right to reside in the UK – which was conditional to be entitled
to certain social benefits – is conferred on all UK nationals, in the circum-
stances prescribed in the Citizens’ Directive, nationals of other Member
States are not considered to have a right to reside. This means, to all effect,
that only non-national EU citizens residing in the UK must provide evi-
dence of a right to reside.76
Besides that, the Court accepted as legitimate the UK’s Government jus-
tification of the ‘need to protect the finances of the host Member State’ without
requiring evidence of a threat to public finances posed by the granting of
social benefits to persons from other Member States who are not economi-
cally active. The Court did not question if the condition imposed was in
itself appropriate or proportional, only the verification procedures.
Finally, in cases where discrimination was found to result from a legal
regime, the burden to demonstrate that their actions were justified lied
usually with the potential infringer. It was up to the Member State, not the
Commission, to prove that they are pursuing a legitimate aim, that the
means are proportionate and appropriate, and do not go beyond what is
necessary.77
75 Case C-308/14 Commission v United Kingdom ECLI:EU:C:2016:436, para 85.
76 O’Brien, ‘The ECJ sacrifices EU citizenship in vain’ 209–243; Id, ‘A failed Faustian
pact’ 824–827.
77 V., v.g., Case C-237/94 O'FlynnECLI:EU:C:1996:206, paras 15 and 26, and Case
C-379/87 Groener ECLI:EU:C:1989:599, paras 15–18.
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The UK child benefit or child tax credit case will probably never be consid-
ered one of the greatest decisions of the CJEU.78 The Court does not give
full weight, in its reasoning, to Article 18 TFEU or Article 4 of Regulation
883/2004, the appropriateness and proportionality of the right to reside
test (even in the context of Brey), or the consequences to EU citizenship. It
was broadly criticised by legal experts79 and, despite its timing, appears to
have failed to convince a substantial number of UK voters to vote to re-
main in the EU. It can be seen as deeply connected with the Brexit proce-
dure and with the discussion on the ‘financial effects’ of ‘benefit tourism’ –
representing a further step in the road started with the Dano/Alimanovic
case law which can have widespread ramifications on the social rights of
EU citizens and the freedom to move.
The evolution of the case-law after the UK child benefit or child tax credit
case
In the Gusa case80 the Court decided on the status of self-employed non-
national EU citizens who became involuntary unemployed, namely if they
maintain their status if they have worked for more than a year in their host
IV.
78 J Paju, ‘On the Lack of Legal Reasoning in Case C-308/14, European Commission
v United Kingdom’ (2019) 48(1) Industrial LawJournal, 117–136.
79 O’Brien, ‘The ECJ sacrifices EU citizenship in vain’ 209–243; Id, ‘A failed Faustian
pact’ 824–827.
80 Case C‑442/16 Gusa ECLI:EU:C:2017:1004. The case concerned Mr Gusa, a Ro-
manian national who moved to Ireland in October 2007. From October 2008 un-
til October 2012, he worked as a self-employed plasterer and, on that basis, paid
taxes in Ireland, as well as pay-related social insurance. In October 2012, due to an
absence of work caused by the economic downturn in Ireland, he had to cease
work and register as a jobseeker and applied for a jobseeker’s allowance in
November 2014. His application for jobseeker’s allowance was refused on the ba-
sis that the provision for retaining worker status under Article 7(3)(b) of Directive
2004/38 only applied to employed persons and excludes those who have worked
as self-employed persons. According to the Irish authorities, Mr Gusa no longer
had a right to reside in Ireland because he had ceased his activities as a ‘self-em-
ployed’ person and could therefore not rely on the same protection awarded to
regularly ‘employed’ persons on the basis of Article 7(3)(b) of the Citizens’ Direc-
tive. The right to retain worker status after having worked for more than one year
– granting the right to reside and equal treatment –, as interpreted by the Irish
authorities was reserved exclusively for EU citizens working under an employ-
ment contract.
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Member State, thereby retaining a right to reside and access to social bene-
fits.
Article 7(3) of the Citizens Directive addresses both workers and self-
employed persons when granting the right to retain their status in various
circumstances. This includes the situation ‘when he/she is in duly recorded
involuntary unemployment after having been employed for more than one
year and has registered as a job seeker with the relevant employment of-
fice’ (Article 7(3)(b) of the Citizens’ Directive). The question was, there-
fore, whether the phrase ‘after having been employed’ only applied to em-
ployed persons and excludes those who have worked as self-employed per-
sons.81
The Court provides a broad interpretation of ‘involuntary unemploy-
ment’, stating that this should not be limited to a dismissal of an employee,
but also refers to a situation in which the occupational activity – whether
employed or self-employed – has ceased ‘due to an absence of work for rea-
sons beyond the control of the person concerned, such as an economic re-
cession’.82 The CJEU continues, stating that, although the phrase ‘after
having been employed’ was used in the English language version of Article
7(3)(b), other language versions were formulated in more neutral terms,
relating to a person who had been in an ‘occupational activity’; and that
the Directive drew a distinction between economically active citizens and
inactive citizens and students (Article 7(1) but it did not draw a distinction
between ‘workers and self-employed persons’. The structure of Article 7(3) is
meant to grant both categories of persons the right to retain their status in
the four listed situations.83A different interpretation would run counter to
the Directive’s objective to remedy the ‘piecemeal approach’ that character-
ized the earlier legislation and would introduce an unjustified difference
in the treatment between employed and self-employed persons.84
In this case, then, the Court did decide in favour of a broader interpreta-
tion of the Citizens’ Directive than the Member States’ in question pro-
posed, which can be seen as opposed to the Dano, Alimanovic, and Garcia-
Nieto cases. However, the judgment is still in line with this previous case
law.85 The Court once again emphasises the importance of economic activ-
ity, stating that the ‘difference in treatment’ in this case ‘would be particularly
81 Case C‑442/16 Gusa ECLI:EU:C:2017:1004, paras 26–29.
82 Case C‑442/16 Gusa ECLI:EU:C:2017:1004, para 31.
83 Case C‑442/16 Gusa ECLI:EU:C:2017:1004, paras. 32–38.
84 Case C‑442/16 GusaECLI:EU:C:2017:1004, paras. 41–44.
85 AG Wathelet expressly rejected a connection between the cases stating that where-
as the Dano, Alimanovic, and Garcia-Nieto cases “wereprimarilyconcernednotwith-
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unjustified in so far as it would lead to a person who has been self-employed for
more than one year in the host Member State, and who has contributed to that
Member State’s social security and tax system by paying taxes, rates and other
charges on his income, being treated in the same way as a first time jobseeker in
that Member State who has never carried on an economic activity in that State
and has never contributed to that system’. 86 The question here is, once again,
the economic status of the citizens and, specially, if they ‘earned’ their so-
cial rights by paying their way into their host welfare system.87 No refer-
ence to Union citizenship as a ‘fundamental status’ is made.
In the following year the Court decided a case on the ability of accession
State nationals to access social welfare rights during the accession period
established in the 2003 Act of Accession88 – it was the Prefeta case.89 The
Court held that Chapter 2 of Annex XII to the referred Act had to be inter-
preted as permitting, during the transitional period, the United Kingdom
to exclude a Polish national such as Mr Prefeta from the benefits of Article
theissueoftherightofresidencebutwiththespecificquestionoftheright to receive so-
cial benefits in the host State”, in the Gusacase “the question referred to the Court
relates first and foremost to the legality of residence”. Case C‑442/16 Gusa
ECLI:EU:C:2017:607, Opinion of AG Wathelet, paras. 54–56.
86 Case C‑442/16 Gusa ECLI:EU:C:2017:1004, para 44.
87 D Kramer, ‘A Right to Reside for the Unemployed Self-Employed: The Case Gusa
(C-442/16)’ in europeanlawblog.eu/2018/01/10/a-right-to-reside-for-the-unem-
ployed-self-employed-the-case-gusa-c-444216/. V. also J-Y Carlier / G Renaudière,
‘Libre circulation des personnes dans l'Union européenne’ (2018) Journal de droit
européen141–151.
88 The Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Re-
public of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of
Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of
Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to
the Treaties on which the European Union is founded (OJ 2003 L 236).
89 Case C-618/16 Prefeta ECLI:EU:C:2018:719. Rafal Prefeta is a Polish national who
was resident and employed in the United Kingdom during the transitional peri-
od, and the extension to that period, following the accession of Poland to the EU.
He was legally required under domestic transitional provisions made under the
Accession Treaty to register his employment. Under the 2003 Act of Accession,
Member States were entitled to restrict access to rights under Articles 1–6 of
Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union (OJ 2011
L 141, p. 1) to Polish workers who had not been admitted to the labour market
for 12 months. Mr Prefeta completed more than 12 months’ employment, but on-
ly approximately two months of it were registered. After he was injured at work
and became involuntarily unemployed, the question arose whether he could rely
on retained rights under Article 7(3) of the Citizens Directive to access social ad-
vantages under Article 7(2) of the Regulation.
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7(3) of the Citizens Directive when that person did not satisfy the require-
ment imposed by national law of having completed an uninterrupted 12-
month period of registered work in the UK. The UK’s exclusion of such
individuals from the benefits of Article 7(3) of the Citizens Directive was,
thus, considered lawful.90 The Court, in this case, affirmed that the reten-
tion of the right of residence ‘covers situations in which the EU citizen’s re-
entry on the labour market of the host Member State is foreseeable within a rea-
sonable period’.91 The connexion between the right of residence and econo-
mic status of the person is once again central to the case.
Finally, the CJEU ruling in Tarola,92 responding to a preliminary refer-
ence from the Irish Court of Appeal, interprets Article 7(3)(c) of the Citi-
zens Directive. The question was, in the words of the AG Szpunar: ‘Where
a citizen of the Union exercises his right of free movement and residence in accor-
dance with [the Citizens Directive] and works in a Member State other than his
own for a period of two weeks, and becomes involuntarily unemployed, does that
citizen retain the status of worker and, therefore, the corresponding right of resi-
dence?’.93
Article 7(3)(c) of the Citizens Directive provides for the status of work-
er, whether employed or self-employed, to be retained, for no less than six
months, in two situations: i) ‘the worker was employed under a fixed-term em-
ployment contract of less than a year and became involuntarily unemployed at
the end of that contract’; or ii) ‘after having become involuntarily unemployed
during the first twelve months and has registered as a job seeker with the relevant
employment office’. The Court considered that this
90 S Cazet, ‘Le retour du ‚plombier polonais‘: l'acte d'adhésion de 2003 permet bien
au Royaume-Uni d'imposer des restrictions aux travailleurs polonais’, (2018) 11
Europe 17–18.
91 Case C-618/16 Prefeta ECLI:EU:C:2018:719, para 39.
92 Case C‑483/17Tarola ECLI:EU:C:2019:309. Mr. Tarola is a Romanian national
who first arrived in Ireland in May 2007 where he was employed for periods of
time in 2007, 2013 and 2014. He also worked as a self-employed subcontractor
during a period of time in 2014. In 2013 and 2014 he applied to the Irish Minister
for Social Protection for jobseeker’s and supplementary welfare allowances. Both
applications were refused on the ground that he had failed to produce evidence of
his habitual residence in Ireland or means of support. On 6 November 2014, Mr.
Tarola submitted a second application for jobseeker’s allowance, which was again
refused on the grounds that, since coming to Ireland, he had not worked for
more than a year and the evidence produced was insufficient to establish Ireland
as his habitual residence. Mr. Tarola argued that he had the right to reside in Ire-
land for the six months following a two-week period of employment in July 2014
under Article 7(3)(c) of the Citizens Directive.
93 Case C‑483/17Tarola ECLI:EU:C:2018:919, Opinionof AG Szpunar, para 1.
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‘provision does not specify whether it applies to employed or self-em-
ployed persons or to both categories of worker or whether it concerns
fixed-term contracts of more than a year, contracts of indefinite dura-
tion or any type of contract or activity, or, lastly, whether the 12
months to which it refers relate to the period of residence or the peri-
od of employment of the worker concerned in the host Member
State’.94
Hence, in interpreting that provision, the CJEU resorted ‘not only its
wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pur-
sued by the rules of which it is part’, as well as its ‘origins’.95
With regard to context, the Court analysed Article 7 and concluded that
while the Citizens Directive ‘establishes a gradation with regard to the dura-
tion of the right of all Union citizens to reside in the host Member State, by pro-
viding, between the right of residence for up to three months referred to in Article
6 thereof and the right of permanent residence referred to in Article 16 thereof,
for a right of residence for more than three months, which is governed by the pro-
visions of Article 7’ (3) of this provision also establishes a gradation with re-
gard to the conditions for retaining their status of worker and, consequent-
ly, their right to reside in the host Member State. That gradation is made
by reference to,
‘first, the reason for the citizen’s inability to work, in the case in point
depending on whether he is unable to work because of illness or acci-
dent, involuntary unemployment or vocational training, and, second,
the initial duration of his period of activity in the host Member State,
that is, depending on whether that is longer or shorter than one year’.
An EU citizen ‘who has pursued an activity in an employed or self-employed
capacity in the host Member State for a period of less than one year retains his
status of worker only for a period of time which that Member State may deter-
mine, provided it is no less than six months’.96
The Court’s conclusion was that the provision allows retention of the
status for workers ‘in all situations in which a worker has been obliged, for
reasons beyond his control, to stop working in the host Member State be-
94 Case C‑483/17Tarola ECLI:EU:C:2019:309, para 35.
95 Case C‑483/17Tarola ECLI:EU:C:2019:309, para 37.
96 Case C‑483/17Tarola ECLI:EU:C:2019:309, paras 41–43, 45, quotingCase
C‑483/17Tarola ECLI:EU:C:2018:919, Opinion of AG Szpunar, para 33.
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fore one year has elapsed, regardless of the nature of the activity or the type
of employment contract entered into for that purpose’.97
This interpretation was considered consistent with ‘the principal objective
pursued by’ the Citizens Directive: ‘to strengthen the right of free movement
and residence of all Union citizens, and with the objective specifically pursued by
Article 7(3) thereof, which is to safeguard, by the retention of the status of work-
er, the right of residence of persons who have ceased their occupational activity
because of an absence of work due to circumstances beyond their control’,98
while, at the same time, not undermining ‘the achievement of one of the oth-
er objectives pursued (…) striking a fair balance between safeguarding the free
movement of workers, on the one hand, and ensuring that the social security sys-
tems of the host Member State are not placed under an unreasonable burden, on
the other’.99
In terms of origins, the Court examined the travaux préparatoires of the
Citizens Directive, concluding that the ‘intention of the EU legislature to ex-
tend the benefit of retention of the status of worker, limited, as the case may be,
to six months, to persons in involuntary unemployment after having worked for
less than a year otherwise than under a fixed-term employment contract’.100
In the final part of the decision, the CJEU states that ‘all Union citizens
residing on the basis of that directive in the territory of the host Member State,
including those retaining their status of worker or self-employed person under Ar-
ticle 7(3)(c) of that directive, enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that
Member State within the scope of the FEU Treaty, subject to such specific provi-
sions as are expressly provided for in the Treaty and secondary law’. However,
following the Opinion of the AG, the Court also states that ‘where national
law excludes persons who have worked in an employed or self-employed capacity
only for a short period of time from the entitlement to social benefits, that exclu-
sion applies in the same way to workers from other Member States who have ex-
ercised their right of free movement’.101
The Court, in its last dictum, draws a boundary between right to equal
treatment, which is derived from the right to residence, and entitlement to
social assistance. The fact that a non-national EU citizen retains the status
97 Case C‑483/17Tarola ECLI:EU:C:2019:309, para 48.
98 Case C‑483/17Tarola ECLI:EU:C:2019:309, para 49, quoting Case C‑67/14 Ali-
manovic EU:C:2015:597, para 60; Case C‑299/14 García-Nieto EU:C:2016:114,
para 47; Case C‑442/16 Gusa EU:C:2017:1004, para 42.
99 Case C‑483/17Tarola ECLI:EU:C:2019:309, para 50.
100 Case C‑483/17Tarola ECLI:EU:C:2019:309, para 53.
101 Case C‑483/17Tarola ECLI:EU:C:2019:309, paras 55–56, quoting Case C‑483/17
Tarola ECLI:EU:C:2018:919, Opinion of AG Szpunar, para 55.
Brexit and EU citizen’s social rights
171
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748903246, am 21.11.2019, 13:37:49
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
of worker, and the corresponding right to reside, means that he/she should
be treated by the host State as a national. Member States remain free to ex-
clude from benefits, the workers that have worked for less time, as long as
the scope of the exclusion encompasses national as well as non-national
EU citizens. As in the Gusa case, despite the fact that the outcome appears
to be favourable to the worker’s access to benefits, there is an underlying
concern with the objective to ensure that the Member States’ social securi-
ty and social assistance systems are not placed under an undue burden.102
Once again, no reference to Union citizenship as a ‘fundamental status’ is
made.
Critical Analysis
The Dano, Alimanovic, García-Nieto, and UK child benefit or child tax credit
string of decisions seems to represent a significant change in the CJEU ear-
lier jurisprudence on non-national EU citizens’ access to social benefits in
host Member States. This seems not to have changed in more recent cases
Gusa, Prefeta, and Tarola.
In the pre-Dano case-law, the reasoning of judgments on Union citizen-
ship had their starting point in the Treaty, bore in mind the proportionali-
ty principle and imposed an individual assessment of the person at issue.
The Citizens’ Directive (and other secondary legislation) was interpreted in
that light. This changed with the Dano-Alimanovic methodology, which is
based on the assertion that ‘a Union citizen may claim equal treatment with
nationals of the host Member State under Article 24(1) of Directive 2004/38 on-
ly if his residence in the territory of that State complies with the conditions of
that directive’.103 Hence, in the post-Dano case-law, the CJEU appears to
have replaced its previous focus on the interpretation of the Treaties, with
a literal (even an ad pedem litterae) interpretation of the Citizens’ Directive.
V.
102 F Strumia, ‘Unemployment, residence rights, social benefits at three crossroads
in the Tarola ruling’, in EU Law Analysis Blog, 13 April 2019, available at eulaw-
analysis.blogspot.com/2019/04/unemployment-residence-rights-social.html.
103 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic ECLI:EU:C:2015:597, para 49. See A. Farahat, ‘Solidari-
tät und Inklusion. Umstrittene Dimensionen der Unionsbürgerschaft’ (2016) 45
Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 45–55; C. O’Brien, ‘Civis capitalist sum: Class as the
new guiding principle of EU free movement rights’ (2016) 53 Common Market
Law Review 937, 943 ff, 961 ff., 973 ff.; E Spaventa, ‘Earned Citizenship: Under-
standing Union Citizenship Through Its Scope’, in D Kochenov (ed.), EU Citi-
zenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2017); D
Thym, ‘The Elusive limits of solidarity’ 25.
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The previous focus on strengthening the right of free movement and resi-
dence of all EU citizens as the main objective of the Citizen Directive has
been replaced by the Court with the need to strike ‘a fair balance between
safeguarding the free movement of workers, on the one hand, and ensuring that
the social security systems of the host Member State are not placed under an un-
reasonable burden on the other’.104
The change seems to have its roots in the discussions on the power of
Member States to limit the possibility of non-national EU citizens to claim
benefits in a host Member State, especially in the case of the non-economi-
cally active citizens, which has also framed the Brexit debate.105 The discus-
sion is posed in terms of ‘benefit tourism’ and presented as a phenomenon
linked to east-west migration within the EU, which is also read as the
movement of poor EU citizens to the more affluent Member States.106 It
can also be seen as the vindication of the push back of Member States
against the CJEU’s initially generous interpretation of EU citizenship
rights in the field of social benefits. The CJEU has entered was has been
interpreted as a ‘reactionary’ phase in its citizenship case law in the context
of the European economic crisis in the late 2000s.107 The explanation for
that can be found on the responsiveness of the Judges to the political pref-
erences of Member State governments but also on the broader EU political
context, with this issue having become increasingly politicized, public
opinion and political concerns are reflected in the Court’s case law.108
104 Case C‑483/17 Tarola ECLI:EU:C:2019:309, para 50.
105 V., v.g., G Davies, ‘Migrant Union Citizens and Social Assistance: Trying to Be
Reasonable About Self-Sufficiency’ (2016) 2 Research Paper in Law, European Le-
gal Studies, College of Europe; A Hofmann, ‘Resistance against the Court of Jus-
tice of theEuropean Union’ (2018) 14 International Journal of Law in Context,
258–274. On the responsiveness of the CJEU to criticism of its case-law by aca-
demics and also of media and governments as a part of a dialogic character of
jurisprudence, v. I Pernice, ‘CJEU Jurisprudence and the Audience: Making Law
in a Public Discourse – Ten Years after CJEU Case C-144/04 Mangold v Helm’,
in J Czuczai and F Naert (eds) The EU as a Global Actor – Bridging Legal Theo-
ry and Practice, Liber Amicorum in honour of Ricardo Gosalbo Bono (Leiden,
Brill | Nijhoff,2017), 111–144.
106 S Mantu/P Minderhoud, ‘EU citizenship and social solidarity’ (2017) 24(5) Maas-
tricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 703–720, 719.
107 A Hofmann, ‘Resistance against the Court of Justice of the European Union’
269; E. Spaventa, ‘Earned Citizenship’.
108 M Blauberger/A Heindlmaier/D Kramer/ DS Martinsen/JMS Thierry/S
Angelika/B Werner, ‘ECJ judges read the morning papers. Explaining the turn
around of European citizenship jurisprudence’, (2018) 25 (10) Journal of Euro-
pean Public Policy,1422–1441.
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However, the change – and, especially, the UK child benefit or child tax cred-
it case – seems to have been in vain in terms of influencing the Brexit refer-
endum outcome.109
Despite the apparent change in the approach of the Court to such cases,
some deny its existence. In his Opinion in the Gusa case, AG Wathelet
states that there was no ‘about-turn in the approach to understanding Directive
2004/38’ in the Dano case. According to him, the importance that is at-
tached in that case ‘to the secondary objective pursued by Directive 2004/38’, is
due to ‘the subject matter of the request for a preliminary ruling which had been
submitted to it’. After all, the cases which gave rise to the three judgments
cited in the previous point in this Opinion [Dano, Alimanovic, García-Ni-
eto] were primarily concerned not with the issue of the right of residence
but with the specific question of the right to receive social benefits in the
host State. This was therefore a question which had arisen at a point in
time subsequent to the exercise of freedom of movement but was nonethe-
less indissociable from the legality of residence.110 However, this approach
by the AG seems somewhat contradictory because if the cases are different,
there would be no need to sustain that there was any change in the case-
law. At the same time, if one admits that the question of the right to re-
ceive social benefits in the host State was, in those cases, ‘indissociable from
the legality of residence’, one must see that there is a connection with the
previous line of judicial reasoning and a new importance that is being giv-
en to ‘preventing Union citizens who are nationals of other Member States from
becoming an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host
Member State’.111
Others sustain that the explanation for the change in case-law lies in the
changing characteristics of the litigants themselves, that recent claims for
social assistance are based on less meritorious facts.112 However, that con-
clusion does not seem to hold if the same methodology is applied in simi-
lar cases before and after the perceived change in the jurisprudence of the
CJEU – as is the case with the Commission v Austria113 and Commission v the
109 O’Brien, ‘The ECJ sacrifices EU citizenship in vain’, 209–243.
110 Case C‑442/16 Gusa ECLI:EU:C:2017:607, Opinion of AG Wathelet, paras. 54–
56.
111 Case C‑333/13 Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358, para 74.
112 G Davies, ‘Has the Court changed, or have the cases? The deservingness of liti-
gants as an element in Court of Justice citizenship adjudication’ (2018) 25 (10)
Journal of European Public Policy, 1442–1460.
113 Case C‑75/11 Commission v Austria [reduced fares on public transport granted to stu-
dents] ECLI:EU:C:2012:605.
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Netherlands114 cases. Both these judgements deal with financial support for
travel costs awarded to students and had different results, which means
that the same benefit with a similar hypothetical user base was awarded a
different legal treatment in the space of a few years. To claim that the
Court has been consistent and there has been merely a change in the char-
acteristics of the claimants does not seem to be supported by sufficient evi-
dence.115
Finally, it has also been sustained that Dano and Alimanovic are not rev-
olutionary cases but, instead, the result of a natural evolution of the case
law following the introduction of the Citizens Directive and that the rea-
soning and outcomes of the decisions, despite some minor details are on
the whole convincing.116 This is more a criticism of the presentation of the
cases as entirely surprising, than of the fact that such evolution occurred.
By presenting the CJEU as merely accepting the political choices made by
the EU legislature, and applying such rules as laid down in secondary legis-
lation, it forgets the place of the Court as the ‘Constitutional Court’ of the
EU, in charge of checking the legality of such choices.
Despite this position, there is empirical evidence that the recent case law
of the CJEU in Brey, Dano, Alimanovic, Garcia-Nieto and UK child benefit or
child tax credit cases has drastically changed the landscape concerning ac-
cess to social assistance benefits for inactive EU citizens.117
There is also an abandonment of the Brey decision in the Dano case law.
In this decision the Court found that EU law precluded the automatic bar-
ring of economically inactive persons from entitlement to benefits without
assessment of their individual circumstances, including the duration of res-
idence, amount of income, amount and duration of benefit claimed and
other relevant circumstances. A proportionality approach was adopted,
which allowed for some differentiation between the possible wide range of
claims of varying degrees of reasonableness. In the mentioned recent cases
no proportionality test, case-by-case assessment, or individual assessment of
114 Case C-233/14 Commission v the Netherlands [financial support for travel costs
awarded to national students] ECLI:EU:C:2016:396.
115 A Hoogenboom, ‘CJEU case law on EU citizenship: normatively consistent? Un-
likely! – A response to Davies’ ‘Has the Court changed, or have the cases?’, in EU
Law Analysis Blog, 13 November 2018, at eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/11/
cjeu-case-law-on-eu-citizenship.html.
116 D Carter / M Jesse, ‘The “Dano Evolution”: Assessing Legal Integration and Ac-
cess to Social Benefits for EU Citizens’ (2018) 3(3) European Papers, 1179–1208.
117 P Minderhoud, ‘Social Assistance for Economically Inactive EU Citizens in the
Member States’ (2018) 3 Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers Series, 28.
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personal circumstances was made. This is especially notable in the Ali-
manovic case, where a bold contradiction of the Brey test can be found. The
Court did not use the Grzelczyk characterisation of the European citizen-
ship as ‘the fundamental status of nationals’; did not engage with the doc-
trine of EU citizenship; and made no reference to Article 20 TEU. The Citi-
zens’ Directive seems to be viewed by the CJEU as already creating a sys-
tem of individual assessment taking into consideration various factors
characterising the individual situation. The Court also made no mention
to the fact that Ms. Alimanovic is the primary carer of minor children, in
contradiction with previous case law.118
The UK child benefit or child tax credit case provides proof that this evolu-
tion of the CJEU case law is emerging as a general trend.119 In this deci-
sion, the CJEU did not engage with the Brey test, seemingly accepting that
automatic exclusion was lawful: ‘As the United Kingdom submitted at the
hearing, legality of the claimant’s residence in its territory is a substantive condi-
tion which economically inactive persons must meet in order to be eligible for the
social benefits at issue’.120 This is especially striking because it seems to rep-
resent a departure from the proportionality test usually associated with the
‘real link’ case law. Martinez Sala, Grzelczyk, Trojani, Bidar and Förster, all
cited in the Brey case,121 precluded the use of automatic exclusion rules, re-
quiring some assessment of circumstances of the case.122 It is impressive
that the UK child benefit or child tax credit decision at the same time is based
on and directly contradicts the Brey decision.
There are positive aspects to this new line of reasoning by the Court.
The Dano/Alimanovic case law represents a noteworthy shift of emphasis,
accentuating the protection of Member States’ interests and a new-found
respect to national legislatures.123 Member States should be free to deter-
mine the material conditions and levels of benefit of their social security
systems as part of the non-harmonisation principle124. It also bears in mind
118 Case C-310/08 Ibrahim ECLI:EU:C:2010:80, and Case C-480/08 Teixeira
ECLI:EU:C:2010:83.
119 Paju, ‘On the Lack of Legal Reasoning in Case C-308/14, European Commission
v United Kingdom’, 117–136; Carter / Jesse, ‘The “Dano Evolution”‘, 1205.
120 Case C-308/14 Commission v United Kingdom ECLI:EU:C:2016:436, para 72.
121 Case C-140/12 Brey ECLI:EU:C:2013:565, para 44.
122 O’Brien, ‘The ECJ sacrifices EU citizenship in vain’ 209–243; Idem, ‘A failed
Faustian pact’ 824–827.
123 D Thym, ‘The Elusive limits of solidarity’ 25.
124 F Pennings, EU citizenship: access to social benefits in other EU member states,
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 28
(2012), 307–334.
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the financial soundness and sustainability of the Member State’s social se-
curity systems, which are commonly based on principles of solidarity with-
in national borders. The previous case-law was criticised for undermining
the national social policy compromises and imposing unsustainable bur-
dens on the welfare systems of Member States.125
Moreover, the Court refuses to read the Citizens’ Directive extensively
or creatively, respecting the will of the EU legislature. This is extremely im-
portant: it should be the democratically legitimised EU legislator rather
than the CJEU to take the main responsibility in balancing the individual
rights of EU citizens against the financial-political interests of the Member
States to maintain social assistance systems.126 The new line of case law
also establishes clear criteria to access to benefits, providing legal certainty.
The Member States and the EU citizens can now trust that the Court will
follow a literal interpretation of the Directive instead of performing an in-
dividual assessment test of the case, which lead to results considered unpre-
dictable and uncertain.127
Despite these positive aspects, formal and substantive criticisms can be
made of this new trend in the CJEU case-law. As for the formal criticism,
one can challenge the method used by the Court in overruling its previous
judgments. Usually, this is done by means of evolutive interpretation. Ar-
guably, in this case we have an instance of evolution of interpretation
which lowers rather than heightens human rights protection. Although
this is not unprecedented in the Court’s history, one can argue that the
Court needs serious reasons to depart from its own case-law not only in
cases of ‘progressive’ evolution but especially in opposite cases. On more
than one occasion the Court itself has pointed out that evolutive interpre-
tation should be justified by particularly strong reasons. However, the
Court changed its methodology without admitting the reversal of the earli-
125 V., v.g. K Hailbronner, ‘Union citizens and access to social benefits’ (2005) 42
Common Market Law Review, p. 1245; AJ Menéndez, ‘European Citizenship after
Martinez Sala and Baumbast: Has European Law Become More Human but Less
Social?’ in M Poiares Maduro / L Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law.
The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Ox-
ford, Hart, 2010) p 391; M Blauberger/ SK Schmidt, ‘Welfare migration? Free
movement of EU citizens and access to social benefits’ (2014) 1 Research and Po-
litics, 1–7.
126 AP van der Mei, ‘Overview of Recent Cases before the Court of Justice of the
European Union (July-December 2015)’ 77.
127 S.O’leary, ‘Developing an Ever Closer Union Between the Peoples of Europe? A
reappraisal of the case-law of the Court of Justice on the free movement of per-
sons and EU citizenship’ (2008) Yearbook of European Law 182.
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er doctrine and once again without a specific reasoning justifying the
change.
Besides, the new case law states that, in terms of access to social assis-
tance, EU citizens can only claim equal treatment if their residence in the
territory of the host State complies with the conditions to lawfully reside
there, established in the Citizens Directive. This focus on the provisions of
the Citizens’ Directive means that the claim of equal treatment, which is
established in the Treaties, is dependent on conditions set in secondary
law. Restrictions to the right to reside established in Article 21 TFEU can
also result from secondary legislation. In these cases, fundamental free-
doms, recognised in the Treaties, are restricted by secondary legislation
without the Court’s reviewing the conformity of these restrictions with the
Treaties – which are the parameters of the EU’s rule of law – for instance,
through a proportionality test. The right to equal treatment between Euro-
pean citizens (Article 18 TFEU) can be questioned on the basis of sec-
ondary legislation without any control.
The positive aspect of the shift of emphasis of the Court with the Dano/
Alimanovic case law, accentuating Member State interests, could represent
also the abandonment of countervailing constitutional arguments that
could have justified a different outcome128. The idea of solidarity between
Member States and an emphatic defence of the right to move and to reside
could be examples of arguments sacrificed.
Nobody denies that the Treaties and the Citizens’ Directive trust the
CJUE to define and control the limits of free movement. But the Court
should be careful not to ignore implications for social cohesion in the in-
ternal market and the constitutional and sociological foundations of social
policy and the importance of the freedom of movement of citizens (inde-
pendently of being economically active or not) to the notion of EU citizen-
ship. The Court’s approach runs the risk of downplaying the risks of this
reduction, in effect, of the scope of the freedom of movement to encom-
pass merely economically active citizens.
The assessment of individual cases, burdensome as it was, served the
wider objective ‘to ensure that the grant of assistance (…) [did] not become an
unreasonable burden which could have consequences for the overall level of assis-
tance’.129 The ‘exclusive focus on the Directive’ is problematic ‘due to the lack
128 D.Thym, ‘The Elusive limits of solidarity’ 25.
129 D Thym, ‘The Elusive limits of solidarity’ 32.
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of individualised proportionality assessments, as well as an increasing range of
social benefits that can be subjected to residence tests’.130
The change in the CJEU case-law can be especially criticised because it
appears to have not been needed. The Court could have used criteria estab-
lished in earlier judgments to exclude access to benefits in these cases.131
For example, in the Dano case, Advocate General Wathelet defended
that the questions raised should be answered ‘in the light of the principle of
proportionality’ and of the case-law of the CJEU on the existence of a ‘gen-
uine link’ between Union citizens and the host Member State.132 The Advo-
cate General refers, more specifically, to the case law on the grant of assis-
tance to students and social benefits for job seekers, from which he infers
that the entitlement of economically inactive Union citizens to social assis-
tance benefits ‘is, in general, dependent on a certain degree of integration into
the host Member State’.133 Also in the Dano case, the Court could have re-
sorted to ‘the excessive burden to the social security system of the host State’ cri-
teria but, instead, chose as the reason to refuse access to benefits the non-
fulfilment of residence requisites established in the Citizens’ Directive.134
So, the CJEU could have made an evaluation of the national legislation
in the light of the established jurisprudence, while arriving at the same
conclusion (that the national legislation was compatible with the Treaties),
but following a path which was coherent with its previous case law and
with less erosion of the rights to move and to reside.
Additionally, the recent case law can also be criticised because of the ab-
sence of analysis of the cases in light of the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights. As was referred supra, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was
deemed non-applicable in the Dano case. In fact, despite the clear state-
ment, in the Åkerberg Fransson case, that the Charter was applicable in all
130 D Carter / M Jesse, ‘The “Dano Evolution”, 1182.
131 H Verschueren, ‘Preventing “Benefit Tourism” in the EU’ 363–390, p. 374.
132 Case C‑333/13 Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:341, Opinion AG Wathelet, para 126.
133 Case C‑333/13 Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:341, Opinion AG Wathelet, para 127–129.
The Advocate General refers to this effect to the Case C-209/03 Bidar
ECLI:EU:C:2005:169, para 56 and 57; Case C-158/07 Förster ECLI:EU:C:2008:63,
paras 48 and 49; Case C-138/02 Collins ECLI:EU:C:2004:172, para 67; Case
C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras ECLI:EU:C:2009:344, para 38; Case C‑523/11 e
C‑585/11 Prinz and Seeberger ECLI:EU:C:2013:524, para 36; and Case C‑220/12
Thiele Meneses, ECLI:EU:C:2013:683, para 35.
134 P Jiménez Blanco, ‘Derecho de residência en la UniónEuropea y turismo social’
(2015) 22 La Ley Unión Europea 11.
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situations governed by European Union law135, in the social rights area
this clarity of purpose has eluded the Court.136
Also, the connection between fundamental rights and EU citizenship,
established in decisions such as the Rottmann137 or the Ruiz Zambrano138
cases, has been read in a much more restrictive manner in the Cholakova139
or Ymeraga140 cases.141 The convergence of these tendencies with the Dano
case-law results in a deficit of protection of non-economically active Union
citizens who seek access to social benefits.
The CJEU’s judgments in Dano, Alimanovic, García-Nieto and UK child
benefit or child tax credit introduced a level of ambiguity at the EU citizens’
right to free movement and freedom to reside.
The right of an EU citizen to reside in a Member State other than its na-
tional State is made dependent on his/her ability to support themselves
and their family in order to avoid becoming an unreasonable burden on
the social security system of the host State. There is an implied duty to
have sufficient resources and the economically inactive citizens can appar-
ently see their right of movement restricted. In fact, the only relevant cir-
cumstance after Alimanovic is the duration of economic activity – not the
existence of genuine link to the Member State or the family status. The UK
child benefit or child tax credit decision extended this reasoning to all welfare
benefits. EU citizenship is, therefore, once again related with worker sta-
tus. That approach is maintained in the Gusa and Tarola cases. The result is
135 Case C-617/10 ÅkerbergFransson ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, para 19.
136 V., v.g., Case C‑265/13 Torralbo Marcos ECLI:EU:C:2014:187, paras 29–30, and
43; Case C‑198/13 Julian Hernández ECLI:EU:C:2014:2055, paras 32–34, 37, and
48; Case C-117/14 Ariza Toledano ECLI:EU:C:2015:60, paras 28–29, and 42. In all
these cases the Charter was considered not applicable. – For an analysis of the
more recent decisions F Fontanelli, ‘The implementation of European Union
law by Member States under Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights’
(2014) 20 (3) The Columbia Journal of European Law, 193–247; J Genberg, ‘The
scope of application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union: quo vadimus?’ (2014) 8 (1) Helsinki Law Review 31–60; F Wollenschläger,
‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Applicability to the Member
States: A Step towards Unitarisation or Federalisation?’ (2015) 13 Ritsumeikan In-
ternational Affairs 1–12, 9–10.
137 Case C-135/08 Rottman, ECLI:EU:C:2010:104.
138 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano ECLI:EU:C:2011:124.
139 Case C-14/13 Cholakova ECLI:EU:C:2013:374, paras 28–29, 31.
140 Case C-87/12 Ymeraga ECLI:EU:C:2013:291, paras 40 and 43.
141 S Iglesias Sánchez, ‘Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of the Union at a
Crossroads. A Promising Alliance or a Dangerous Liaison’ (2014) 20 (4) Euro-
pean Law Journal, 466–467.
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that the notion of the EU citizenship as a fundamental and political status
with no link with market economy is being dismantled. It also leads to the
idea that EU citizenship ‘virtually never protects the weak and the needy’
based on their human needs alone, merely informs the ‘dogmatic ideal of a
good market citizen’.142
The Dano and UK child benefit or child tax credit line of cases can be seen
as confirming that the CJEU now takes a back seat when it comes to pro-
tecting the legal status of economically inactive EU citizens.143 The Court’s
analysis of the meaning of the Citizens Directive could be interpreted to
the effect that Member States are allowed to refuse to pay any social bene-
fits, including social security benefits, to economically inactive Union citi-
zens who do not have the right to reside under that Directive, namely be-
cause they do not possess sufficient resources of their own.144 It is solely up
to the EU legislator, through the Citizens Directive to define the legal sta-
tus of EU citizens. The CJEU no longer refers to EU citizenship as the ‘fun-
damental status’ of citizens and seems no longer willing to use the TFEU’s
provisions on EU citizenship and the rights attached to it to interpret the
Directive.
One may agree with the need to respect the will of the democratically
legitimised legislator (national and European). However, if the EU is gov-
erned by the rule of law, it should be up to its highest Court to control the
decisions of the legislatures, especially in times of socio-economic crisis.
The Citizens’ Directive cannot be seen as giving the Member States carte
blanche to discriminate between EU citizens.
In this area, in fact, the EU legislator may be on the verge of interven-
ing.
The Commission has adopted on 14 December 2016 a proposal for a
Regulation amending Regulation No 883/2004145, which is currently still
under ordinary legislative procedure146 and some of the changes proposed
142 D Kochenov, ‘The Citizenship of Personal Circumstances in Europe’, in D Thym
(ed), Questioning EU Citizenship (Oxford,Hart, 2017), 37–56, 51.
143 AP van der Mei, ‘Overview of Recent Cases before the Court of Justice of the
European Union (July-December 2015)’ 77.
144 H Verschueren, ‘Preventing ‘Benefit Tourism’ in the EU’ 378–379.
145 COM (2016) 815: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of so-
cial security systems and regulation (EC) No 987/2009 laying down the proce-
dure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004.
146 Procedure 2016/0397/COD.
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are inspired by this line of case law. A new recital (5a) is to be inserted in
the Regulation No 883/2004 stating that
‘The Court of Justice has held that Member States are entitled to make
the access of economically inactive citizens in the host Member State
to social security benefits, which do not constitute social assistance
within the meaning of Directive 2004/38/EC subject to a legal right of
residence within the meaning of that Directive. The verification of the
legal right of residence should be carried out in accordance with the
requirement of Directive 2004/38/EC. For these purposes, an economi-
cally inactive citizen should be clearly distinguished from a jobseeker
whose right of residence is conferred directly by Article 45 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In order to im-
prove legal clarity for citizens and institutions, a codification of this
case law is necessary’ (Article 1(1) of the Proposal).
According to the Proposal, ‘the application of Directive 2004/38/EC to the
Regulations has been elucidated by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in
Cases C-140/12, Brey, EU:C:2013:565, C-333/13, Dano, EU:C:2014:2358 and
C-308/14 Commission v United Kingdom, EU:C:2016:436’.147
For this purpose, Article 4 of Regulation No 883/2004 is proposed to be
amended. The current provision (‘Unless otherwise provided for by this Regu-
lation, persons to whom this Regulation applies shall enjoy the same benefits and
be subject to the same obligations under the legislation of any Member State as
the nationals thereof.’) is to become Article 4 (1). Article 4 (2) will state, if
the amendment is approved, that
‘2. A Member State may require that the access of an economically in-
active person residing in that Member State to its social security bene-
fits be subject to the conditions of having a right to legal residence as
set out in Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of
the Member States’.
Thusly, the UK child benefit or child tax credit decision is to become written
law, a direct consequence of the UK ‘Remain-Leave’ referendum, effective-
ly changing the interpretation of the principle of no discrimination to all
the social benefits included in Regulation No 883/2004.
147 V. the Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal, p. 9.
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Several questions remain, leaving social solidarity as an element of EU
citizenship at crossroads.148
What motivated this change? Is the CJEU being influenced by the politi-
cal debates in the Member States on ‘social tourism’? Is it another long-last-
ing effect of Brexit?149 Or is the Dano/Alimanovic case law driven by the
view that the previous EU citizenship case law is now seen as having been
too judicially activist?150 How far will the Court go? What is then left of
the previous jurisprudence on this matter? How will the other institutions
respond? Will the Citizens’ Directive or Regulation No 883/2004 be
amended in light of this?
If, in terms of access to social assistance, EU citizens can only claim
equal treatment if their residence in the territory of the host State complies
with the conditions to lawfully reside there, established in the Citizens’ Di-
rective, what happens to those EU citizens whose right to reside in the host
Member State is based on other EU instruments, such as Article 45 TFEU
as in the Saint-Prix case151, or on national law which is more favourable
than the Directive (as in the Martínez Sala and Trojani cases)? As Advocate
General Wathelet pointed out, it is likely that the residence of non-nation-
al EU citizens will be jeopardised in the event of being excluded from enti-
tlement to subsistence benefits. 152 However, the Court has drawn a clear
distinction between the right to reside and the right to social benefits in
the Tarola case. Without sufficient means of subsistence, the Union citi-
zens could be considered “illegal”, which means that a consequence of the
Dano jurisprudence is to allow for EU citizens to be classified as “illegal
migrants”.153 Can they be expelled?
Is a right to Member States to discriminate economically inactive citi-
zens being recognised? A kind of licence to discriminate unwritten in the
Treaties, but established in a Directive can be used to such an end?
One can accept that there are financial reasons shared and approved by
all Member States, which justify restrictions to the principle of equal treat-
ment regarding the granting of social assistance benefits to non-nationals
residing in the territory of the host State. However, one cannot forget that,
148 Mantu/Minderhoud, ‘EU citizenship and social solidarity’ 720.
149 J Shaw, ‘EU citizenship: Still a Fundamental Status?’ in R Bauböck (ed) Debating
European Citizenship (Luxembourg, Springer, 2019) 1–17.
150 AP van der Mei, ‘Overview of Recent Cases before the Court of Justice of the
European Union (July-December 2015)’, 77.
151 Case C-507/12 Saint Prix ECLI:EU:C:2014:2007.
152 Case C‑333/13 Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:341, Opinion AG Wathelet, para125.
153 D Thym, ‘The Elusive limits of solidarity’, 45.
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from the point of view of adversely affected citizens, this means that the
free movement of citizens and workers in the European Union is still in-
complete.
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Immigration after Brexit:
Ironies and Challenges
Daniel Thym and Mattias Wendel
This contribution argues that Brexit could facilitate legal control over the entry
and stay of EU citizens, but might paradoxically render control of immigration
of third country nationals, including asylum seekers, more difficult compared to
the status quo. The first section examines this irony with regard to third country
nationals, the second section addresses the challenging question of the British-
Irish border while the third and final section relates to the migration of EU citi-
zens and UK nationals.
Introduction
Immigration was a hot topic throughout the Brexit debate. The prominent
slogan of ‘taking back control’ aimed particularly at taking back control of
immigration to the United Kingdom. Many readers will remember the
‘breaking point’ poster used by UKIP before the referendum with a picture
of migrants and asylum seekers trotting across the Western Balkans. That
poster seemed to capture (and foster) a certain perception that associated
the EU with chaos and open borders – both for EU citizens and third
country nationals. In her Lancaster speech of January 2017, Prime Minister
Theresa May was adamant that control of immigration was a central objec-
tive of the ongoing Brexit negotiations: ‘The message from the public be-
fore and during the referendum campaign was clear: Brexit must mean
control of the number of people who come to Britain from Europe. And
that is what we will deliver.’1
From a legal perspective, there is a certain irony in the ‘breaking point’
poster. Our argument will be that while Brexit could facilitate legal control
over the entry and stay of EU citizens, it need not necessarily make it easier
for the UK to control the immigration of third-country nationals, includ-
ing asylum seekers. It might even, paradoxically, render control of immi-
I.
1 T May, ‘A Global Britain, Speech at Lancaster House’, 17 January 2017.
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gration of non-Europeans more difficult to some extent. In our first section
we’ll try to explain this irony, before we move on, secondly, to the chal-
lenging question of the British-Irish border and, thirdly, to the migration
of EU citizens and UK nationals. The paramount importance of these as-
pects is also demonstrated by the fact that the British-Irish border and the
protection of citizens’ rights formed already part of the first of the two
phases of the negotiations.
Immigration of Third Country Nationals: Reversed Dynamics
In the field of third country immigration, Brexit might ironically lead to
reversed dynamics compared to the status quo.
Status Quo: Extended Opt-out
From a legal perspective, the UK has always retained widespread control of
its external borders insofar as the entry and stay of third-country nationals
are concerned. A major reason for this lies in the fact that the UK rejected
to participate in the border-free Schengen area. It did not sign up to the
Schengen Implementing Convention of 1990 and it secured an opt-out
when the letter was integrated into the framework of the European Union
on the occasion of the Treaty of Amsterdam.2
Moreover, successive British Governments decided not to participate in
most legislative initiatives on immigration, visas and border controls in the
so-called area of freedom, security and justice,3 which have been adopted
during the past 15 years and which have substantially reshaped the immi-
gration law systems of countries in continental Europe.4 The UK does not
participate, for instance, in the Family Reunion Directive, the Long-Term
II.
A.
2 See today‘s Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework
of the European Union ([2008] OJ C 115/290), which builds upon the original
1997 version attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam ([1997] OJ C 340/93).
3 The Schengen Protocol, ibid, is complemented by the Protocol (No 21) on the Pos-
ition of the United Kingdom and Ireland in Respect of the Area of Freedom, Secu-
rity and Justice ([2008] OJ C 115/295).
4 For a legal analysis of the UK’s opt-out and corresponding institutional practice in
recent years, see K Hailbronner and D Thym, ‘Constitutional Framework and Prin-
ciples for Interpretation’ in ibid (eds), EU Immigration and Asylum Law. Commen-
tary, 2nd edn (Munich, C.H. Beck/Hart, 2016) 1, 21–23.
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Residents Directive, the Blue Card scheme for highly qualified migrants or
any other instrument facilitating the entry or stay of third-country nation-
als. The UK can determine autonomously which third country nationals
are subject to visa requirements, are allowed to take up employment or
have to leave the UK. There is little primary or secondary law limiting UK
sovereignty in this respect, with the notable exception of those third coun-
try nationals who are relatives of EU citizens and benefit from a derivative
right of residence rooted in EU free movement law.5
The situation is different for the ECHR and corresponding limits to
State discretion, on the basis of Articles 3 and 8 ECHR, on the expulsion of
those staying illegally, including suspects of terrorism.6 Both the human
rights based principle of non-refoulement under Article 3 ECHR and the
right to private and family life under Article 8 ECHR have limited the po-
litical room for manoeuvre of the national legislator considerably. That is
why Theresa May apparently went as far as promoting a withdrawal from
the ECHR or at least a repeal of the Human Rights Act when she was
Home Secretary.7 While leaving the ECHR or repealing the Human Rights
Act might have indeed extended UK sovereignty over third-country nation-
als to a certain extent, it would have arguably been accompanied by a con-
siderable constitutional price also for British citizens and a potential loss of
international credibility. Such a step might even have struck a devastating
blow to the already struggling system of human rights review in Stras-
bourg. Leaving the EU seems to appear even more costly at all levels, as the
current implosion of the British political system tragically demonstrates.
But it won’t arguably change much regarding immigration control.
Brexit: Loss of the Opt-in Option
What is more, in a post-Brexit world the UK might even lose regulatory
leverage insofar as immigration controls vis-à-vis third-country nationals
are concerned. The underlying reason is simple: at the time of the Treaty
of Amsterdam, the British Government of Tony Blair secured not only an
B.
5 For two classic examples, see ECJ, judgment of 11 July 2002, Case C-60/00, Carpen-
ter and ECJ, judgment of 19 October 2004, Case C-200/02, Zhu and Chen.
6 For two prominent examples, see ECtHR, judgment of 17 January 2012, No.
8139/09, Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom; and ECtHR, judgment of 12
Jan 2010, No 47486/06, A.W. Khan v. the United Kingdom.
7 Cf A Asthana and R Mason, ‘UK must leave European convention on human
rights, says Theresa May’, Guardian.com on 25 April 2016.
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opt-out from the Schengen regime. It also won an opt-in option for all im-
migration, visa, asylum and border control measures, which are not insep-
arably linked to the abolition of border controls.8 This opt-in option was
reinforced by the Treaty of Lisbon which established a hitherto unprece-
dented possibility of ‘cherry picking’ in the field of justice and home af-
fairs legislation.9 The UK has used this opt-in option quite extensively –
and selectively – over the years,10 including during the time when Theresa
May was Home Secretary.
This selective opt-in practice focused on those measures enhancing the
control powers of States, such as the Schengen Information System (SIS),
in which the UK participates although it never signed up to order-free trav-
el.11 The UK also subscribed to many EU measures against illegal immigra-
tion, while not being bound by the rules on legal migration.12 Most impor-
tantly, the UK participates in the Dublin system without, however, con-
tributing to the solidarity measures, such as the relocation decisions on re-
settling 160,000 asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to other Member
States.13 To be sure, the Dublin system was originally based upon a con-
vention outside the EU framework, but it has always been doctrinally
linked to EU law14 and, moreover, it ceased to exist as an instrument of
public international law when it was supplanted by EU legislation in
which the UK participated.15
8 See Article 4 of the Schengen Protocol No. 19 (note 2) and Article 3–4a Protocol
No. 21 (note 3); and the analysis by Hailbronner and Thym (note 4), at 22–23.
9 See C Ladenburger, ‘Police and Criminal Law in the Treaty of Lisbon’(2008) 4
European Constitutional Law Review 20, 28.
10 See House of Lords European Union Committee, The UK’s opt-in Protocol: im-
plications of the Government’s approach, 9th Report of Session 2014‒15, paras
31–37; and F Tekin, Differentiated Integration at Work (Baden-Baden, Nomos,
2012).
11 Cf Council Decision 2000/365/EC of 29 May 2000 concerning the request of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take part in some of
the provisions of the Schengen acquis ([2000] OJ L 131/43).
12 See D Thym, ‘Legal Framework for EU Immigration Policy’ in ibid/Hailbronner
(note 4) 271, 273–274.
13 Cf Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 ([2015] OJ L 248/80)
and Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 ([2015] OJ L
239/146).
14 See Recital 3 and Article 21 of the Convention determining the State responsible
for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the
European Communities of 15 June 1990 ([1997] OJ C 254/1).
15 See Recital 19 and Article 24(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18
February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the
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In short, as an EU Member State the UK participated in the field justice
and home affairs in a highly selective and lopsided manner: it enhanced
State control without promoting the rights of migrants and refugees. As a
member of the EU, the UK could use the justice and home affairs Proto-
cols to enhance control of its external borders towards other Member
States through à la carte participation. The irony is that Brexit will likely
reverse these dynamics.
The Future: Reversed Dynamics
In the post-Brexit legal environment, the UK will not be able any longer to
decide unilaterally whether or not to participate in Dublin and the SIS by
means of a simple declaration notifying the Council that it wants to exer-
cise the opt-in option. Instead, the UK will have to negotiate with the EU
post-Brexit whether it will be allowed to participate – and these negotia-
tions will be defined, like any negotiation, by a quid pro quo, by reciprocal
give-and-take.16
Thus, the UK will likely have to pay a price for being allowed to partici-
pate in the future Dublin IV Regulation or the Schengen Information Sys-
tem- something it got for free in the past. The EU could demand, for in-
stance, that the UK contributes to the relocation of asylum seekers from
Greece or Italy. If that happened, Brexit would entail into the opposite of
what Brexiteers had promised to the British when putting up the ‘breaking
point’ poster.
That need not happen, of course.The UK could decide, alternatively, to
stay out of Dublin or it could negotiate a cross-sectoral package deal. The
price the EU may wish to extract from the UK for continued Dublin par-
ticipation may relate to any other policy field.
One thing, however, seems certain: the UK will not get Dublin for free
any longer – like Switzerland, which was allowed to join Dublin under the
condition that it subscribed to border free travel within the Schengen area
C.
Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of
the Member States by a third-country national ([2003] OJ L 50/1).
16 It is assumed that the UK has a genuine interest in keeping Dublin, since it tends
to be a beneficiary of the Dublin rules due to its geographic location; even if the
numbers of those moving to the UK are relatively low at present, they might rise
in the future, i.e., Dublin is a safety net in case of any future increase in the num-
ber of arrivals.
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at the same time.17 Ever since, border controls have been abolished be-
tween Germany and Switzerland. That, to us, is the irony of Brexit for im-
migration law sensu stricto: it might become more difficult for the UK to
control the entry and stay of third-country nationals.
British-Irish Border: The Search For Pragmatic Solutions
To retain an open border between the Republic of Ireland and the UK is a
political objective shared by the EU and the UK. Already the European
Council’s guidelines and the White Paper of the British Government were
clear that they want to retain the Common Travel Area (CTA).18 And in
the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland which forms an integral part of
the not (yet, if ever) ratified withdrawal agreement,19 the EU and the May
government agreed on the goal of preventing a hard border after the tran-
sition period, i.e., the period of around two years following the UK’s with-
drawal from the EU.20
III.
17 In the framework of the so-called ‘bilateral II’ agreements, the entry into force of
the Schengen and the Dublin association agreement are linked, cf Article 14
Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation con-
cerning the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the State responsible for ex-
amining a request for asylum lodged in a Member State or in Switzerland of 26
October 2004 ([2008] OJ L 53/5), which entered into force on 1 March 2008
([2008] OJ L 53/18).
18 See European Council, 29 April 2017, Guidelines Following the United King-
dom’s Notification Under Article 50 TEU, Doc. EUCO XT 20004/17, para 11 as
well as the Department for Exiting the European Union: White Paper. The Unit-
ed Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union, February
2017, pp 21–23.
19 Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU of 14 November
2018.
20 Initially the transition period should have started after the UK’s withdrawal on 29
March 2019 and last until December 2020. Currently, however, it remains unclear
when (if at all) a withdrawal will take place and trigger the transition period. Dur-
ing the transition period (see Articles 126 et seq of the draft agreement), the UK
would be, in principle, treated like an EU Member State with the notable excep-
tion of participation in the institutions and governance structures of the EU.
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Immigration and Border Controls
The CTA is a set of reciprocal legal rules and administrative practices
which have secured the absence of border (and immigration) controls be-
tween the Republic and Northern Ireland ever since Irish home rule.21
In this respect, the European Council called for ‘flexible and imagina-
tive solutions’22 regarding the British-Irish border. Such flexibility might
be necessary, indeed, for a number of economic and trade issues. From a
purely legal-technical perspective things appear to be less problematic inso-
far as immigration and border controls are concerned. The reason for this
lies in the fact that the status quo facilitates the search for legal solutions in
three inter-related ways.
Firstly, Protocol No. 20 attached to the Treaty of Lisbon states explicitly
that the UK and Ireland ‘may continue to make arrangements between
themselves relating to the [CTA]’ and that ‘nothing in [the EU Treaties] or
in any measures adopted under them shall affect any such arrangements.’23
The European Council is adamant that the Protocol will continue to apply
post-Brexit, and indeed, it is difficult to argue that it will lose its relevance.
Thus, the CTA can be maintained as a matter of principle on the basis of
Protocol No. 20, which, moreover, is quite clear that it allows for the ar-
rangements to be modified and developed further if necessary.
Secondly, not much would have to change in terms of policy substance.
Already at present, the British-Irish border is an external border of the
Schengen area, although we do not have physical border controls between
the Republic and Northern Ireland. There may be the need for continued
practical and legislative coordination, both at present and in the future,
also taking into account the legal and practical consequences of Brexit. But
this coordination can be agreed upon in the framework of the CTA or, if
necessary, in the Brexit agreement.
A legal side aspect is whether the UK and Ireland could agree on a bilat-
eral mechanism on asylum jurisdiction, a sort of ‘Mini-Dublin’. It seems to
us that the legal answer is not crystal clear: While one can argue, on the
one hand, that Protocol No. 20 allows for such bilateral mechanism to be
A.
21 See B Ryan, ‘Irish Aspects, Brexit briefing’, https://www.freemovement.org.uk on
18 May 2016.
22 European Council (note 18), para 11.
23 Article 2 of Protocol (No. 20) on the Application of Certain Aspects of Article 26
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to the United Kingdom
and to Ireland ([2008] OJ C 115/293).
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established in the future,24 one may maintain, on the other hand, that the
EU has acquired an exclusive, ERTA-style competence for cooperation
with third States on asylum jurisdiction,25 mirroring the agreement with
Switzerland.
Thirdly, we have to distinguish between border controls for immigra-
tion purposes and customs controls for economic issues. While Brexit has
little impact on the former (border controls), the latter (customs control)
are a different matter.
Customs Controls and the so-called “Backstop”
At present, customs controls do not exist at the British-Irish border, since
both the UK and Ireland are a member of the single market and the cus-
toms union. If the UK left the single market, as advocated by May and a
considerable part of the Tories, such controls might have to be introduced
in the future. Under that premise, ‘flexible and innovative solutions’
would indeed be required, so as to minimise the negative impact on cross-
border exchanges across the British-Irish border.
In the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland the EU and the British
Government negotiated, in essence, a three-step approach in order to pre-
vent a hard border after the transition period. The first step or priority, en-
shrined in Article 2 of the Protocol, is to reach an agreement on the future
relationship that would per definition eliminate the need for a hard bor-
der. The second step, laid down in Article 3 of the Protocol, would be to
extend the transition period in order to reach such an agreement. The
third step is a fall-back position, the so-called "back stop solution". Its core
provision is Article 6 § 1 of the draft agreement, according to which a sin-
gle customs territory between the EU and the UK shall be established until
the future relationship becomes applicable. That this temporary solution
might, in the absence of an agreement on the future relationship, become
a permanent one, is one of the core arguments for a majority of MPs in the
British House of Commons to refuse- three times already – to ratify "May’s
deal". At the moment, it is not at all clear how this problem might be
B.
24 This argument could be maintained in particular, if there was already a bilateral
asylum seekers transfer agreement between the UK and Ireland before the entry
into force of the Dublin Convention; if that was not the case, it would be difficult
to maintain that the introduction of such an agreement concerns the ‘con-
tinu[ation]’ of arrangements’ on the free movement of persons on the island.
25 Cf Article 3(2) TFEU and corresponding case law.
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solved in the future. It is not excluded, however, that a cross-party alliance
between Tory and Labour MPs might reach an agreement on a future rela-
tionship that would, as a permanent solution, include a customs union be-
tween the EU and the UK.
From a personal experience it seems that it should be even possible to
find a pragmatic solution in case a customs union would not be a perma-
nent solution. The University of Konstanz is situated geographically on the
Swiss border, that is an internal Schengen border (mirroring the CTA), but
an external border of the customs union (as might be the case with the
Irish-British border post-Brexit). One of us, Daniel Thym, crosses that bor-
der up to four times a week. On normal occasions, traffic is hardly inter-
rupted at all – and the flow would be even smoother, if the customs for-
malities took place beyond the official border-crossing points that still exist
between Germany and Switzerland. It should be possible, therefore, to
maintain a ‘green border’ on the ‘Emerald Isle’ post-Brexit.
EU Citizenship and Free Movement Of Persons
As regards the rights linked to EU citizenship and the right to free move-
ment in particular, Brexit raised at least two core challenges.
Securing Citizens’ Rights
The first challenge was how to secure the legal situation of EU-27 citizens
residing in the UK and of UK citizens living in the EU-27 before and after
Brexit. This aspect was the top priority in the first phase of the negotiation
process. According to the Council’s negotiation directives, “[s]afeguarding
the status and rights of the EU-27 citizens and their families in the [UK]
and of the citizens of the [UK] and their families in the EU-27 Member
States is the first priority for the negotiations because of the number of
people directly affected and of the seriousness of the consequences of the
withdrawal for them”.26
IV.
A.
26 Council of the European Union, 22 May 2017, Directives for the negotiation of
an agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union -Annex
to the Council Decision authorising the Commission to open negotiations on an
agreement with the United Kingdom setting out the arrangements for its with-
drawal from the European Union, doc. 21009/17 BXT 16 ADD 1, para 11.
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The actual number of citizens affected varies considerably, depending
on the method of calculation. The most common set of numbers – often
quoted in the media and reflected also by the work of the institutions –
suggests that apparently 1.2 mio UK citizens live in the EU-27, while up to
3.2 mio EU-27 citizens in turn reside in the UK.27 These numbers are es-
sentially based on calculations by the UK (ONS)28 and the United Nations.
But, as pointed out in the literature, in particular the UN statistics do not
sufficiently distinguish between country of birth and nationality29 which is
why the numbers could also be lower, with around 700.000 UK nationals
living abroad in the EU-27 and 2.9 mio EU-27 nationals living in the UK.
But also these numbers are quite significant and demonstrate the impor-
tance to come to terms.
In legal terms, the challenge is how to secure rights acquired and de-
rived from EU citizenship before the end of the transition period. This
starts with the definition of the personal scope of application. In this re-
spect, the EU wanted to follow as closely as possible the existing acquis.
According to the Council’s negotiation directives, the personal scope
should be equated with that of the directive 2004/38 on free movement,
covering both economically active persons and economically inactive citi-
zens, i.e., workers and self-employed, as well as students or pensioners.30
Furthermore, the EU aimed at including family members who accompany
or join mobile EU citizens as well as individuals covered by the Regulation
883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems irrespective of their
place of residence.31 In this respect, the EU was successful in the negotia-
tions, as demonstrated by Article 10 and Article 30 of the draft agreement
which widely correspond to the EU’s negotiating goals.
The EU was also quite successful regarding the scope of rights that shall
be guaranteed to UK nationals who live in the EU-27 or EU-27 nationals
who reside in the UK before the end of the transition period and keep do-
ing so afterwards. Also in this respect, the EU managed to achieve a close
27 See, amongst others, European Commission, document TF50 (2019) 59, p 14.
28 UK Office for national statistics.
29 S Carrera, E Guild and N C Luk, ‘What does Brexit mean for the EU’s Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice’, CEPS Commentary 2016, at https://www.ceps.eu/sy
stem/files/What%20does%20BREXIT%20mean%20for%20the%20EU.pdf
(accessed 30 March 2019) 4 et seq.
30 Council of the European Union, negotiation directives (note 26), para 21 lit. a).
31 Ibid.
Daniel Thym and Mattias Wendel
194
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748903246, am 21.11.2019, 13:37:49
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
approximation to the existing acquis.32 The same applies for frontier work-
ers and family members.
Technically such an approximation is far from being trivial, however.
Part II of the draft agreement – related to citizens’ rights -bears witness as
to the complexity of the issue. A core provision is Article 13 § 1, according
to which EU citizens and UK nationals who lived in the host State before
the end of the transition period and keep living there afterwards shall have
the right to reside in the host State under the limitations and conditions as
set out in Articles 21, 45 or 49 TFEU and in the relevant provisions of Di-
rective 2004/38. Article 13 § 2 and 3 grants rights of residence to family
members (EU citizens, UK or third country nationals), while Article 13 § 4
bars the host State to impose any limitations or conditions for obtaining,
retaining or losing residence rights of these groups of persons, other than
those provided for in the agreement. The provision also stipulates that
there “shall be no discretion in applying the limitations and conditions”
other than in favour of the person concerned. Such specifications were
considered to be necessary, given that EU law ceases to apply in the UK
once the withdrawal takes effect.
Even more important, Article 39 of the draft agreement makes clear that
the individuals concerned shall enjoy the rights provided for in Part II “for
their lifetime, unless they cease to meet the conditions set out” there.
Hence, the draft agreement would provide for continuity and legal certain-
ty far beyond the transition period as long as the respective legal status
would have been gained before the end of that period and the conditions
would still be met.
The migration regime which is intended to substitute the current acquis
for rights and legal status acquired until the end of the transition period is
spelled out in detail in Articles 14 to 29 of the draft agreement. These stip-
ulations pay attention to specific transitional problems, like the calculation
of periods, relevant i.a. for the right to permanent residence, or status
changes, for example between student, worker, self-employed person and
economically inactive person.
The status quo is not only widely perpetuated with regard to residence
rights, but also with regard to equal treatment and access to social security.
§ 23 of the draft agreement replicates Article 24 of Directive 2004/38, in-
cluding the exceptions according to which Member States can refuse to
grant social assistance. Finally, Articles 30 et seq. contains a specific regime
32 Ibid, para 21 lit. b).
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on the coordination of social security systems, essentially substituting regu-
lation 883/2004.
To conclude, the EU has managed to widely perpetuate the current ac-
quis on the free movement of persons for EU citizens, UK nationals and
their relatives who reside in the host State before the end of the transition
period and keep doing so after its expiry. However, this achievement de-
pends on entering into force of the agreement – an instance which may
never happen when taking into consideration that ratification has been re-
jected three times already in the House of Commons.
Intra-European Mobility and Immigration After Brexit
How could the design of the future relationship between the EU-27 and
the UK with respect to intra-European mobility and immigration look
like? Will there be a future regime of free movement between the EU and
the UK? Unfortunately, things have not become clearer in this respect, al-
though almost three years have passed since the memorable referendum of
23 June 2016.
The uncertainty starts with the question whether or not Brexit will hap-
pen at all, given that a unilateral withdrawal of the declaration under Arti-
cle 50 TEU is, in principle, possible at any time.33 The European Court of
Justice has, in the context of the Dublin-III-regulation, also implicitly de-
nied a preventive or pre-effect of Brexit before the withdrawal is actually
put into effect.34 As of today, the status quo still applies and the UK even
participates in the European elections in May 2019.
The uncertainty is particularly apparent when it comes to concrete plans
on the future regime of mobility and immigration between the EU-27 and
the UK. The House of Commons, for instance, has made much more artic-
ulate what it does not want than what it actually favours. Against the back-
drop of the political Brexit chaos in early 2019 it is almost impossible to
give any meaningful estimation as to what is going to happen. In the light
of the fruitless votes in the House of Commons and the political battles be-
B.
33 See ECJ, judgment of 10 December, case C-621/18 – Wightman.
34 ECJ, judgment of 13 January 2019, case C‑661/17 – M.A. et al, para 54 with refer-
ence to Wightman and with regard to the discretionary clause under the Dublin-
III-regulation. On the discretionary clause in the context of the migration crisis
see in more detail M Wendel, ‘The Refugee Crisis and the Executive: On the Lim-
its of Administrative Discretion in the Common European Asylum System’
(2016) 17 German Law Journal 1005.
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tween and within the major political parties in the UK, it appears to be
rather unlikely that the UK will, in the future, opt for a full participation
in the internal market, because this would – as the EU negotiators have re-
peatedly stressed – necessarily include the free movement of persons.
Against this background, it also seems unlikely that the future relation-
ship between the EU and the UK could be aligned to the model of the
European Economic Area which would lead to a de facto full integration in
the internal market without major exceptions – and without participation.
It could very well be that the future relationship will, in the end be based
at least on a customs union with some additional elements. For the free
movement of persons between the UK and the EU-27 this would certainly
mean a major step backwards.
Conclusion
The analysis of the law of immigration after Brexit is situated in a volatile
context which makes it difficult to give any substantial assessment at the
moment. As far as immigration of third country nationals is concerned,
there lies a certain irony in the fact that Brexit will likely produce results
that openly run counter to the Brexiteers’ promise of taking back control.
When it comes to the delicate question of the British/Irish Border, much
will depend on the reasonableness of political actors, given that the legal
dimension does not pose a major challenge. Finally, in the field of intra-
European migration, it currently seems unlikely that the future relation-
ship between the EU and the UK will be based on the continuity of the
internal market and the free movement of persons once the transition peri-
od is over. It is here that Brexit could lead to a major rupture with the sta-
tus quo in the future.
V.
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The Future of Monetary and Financial Policy after Brexit
Jean-Victor Louis
Abstract
This chapter starts with recording the essential features of the Brexit negotiations
up to recent developments, and stresses in particular the importance for the sub-
ject treated in this chapter of the so-called non-binding ‘Political declaration set-
ting out the framework for the future relationship between the EU and the UK’.
The first section of the chapter relates to the more straightforward institutional
consequences of the Brexit in monetary and financial affairs, the UK loosing in
particular the possibility to interfere from within the Union in the preparation of
legislation on economic and financial affairs. The second section bears on the re-
maining participation of the UK to international fora from which it keeps the
ambition of influencing the drafting of norms and the adoption of policy orienta-
tions by the EU. Section 3 describes the economic and social consequences for the
UK of leaving the EU, especially for the finance industry. This is an important
challenge for the City of London and other financial places in the UK. Section
four analyses the impact of Brexit on the continental financial markets. The re-
spective standpoints on this matter from UK and EU authorities are analysed.
The section evokes in particular the question of the localisation and surveillance
of Central Counterparties (CCP).
The chapter closes by some considerations about the attitude of Britain to-
wards European integration. It expresses the hope of a cooperation between the
UK and an EU remaining faithful to its objective to build ‘an ever closer Union’.
Introduction
This report will sketch, from a legal standpoint the presumed effects of
Brexit on Monetary Policy as well as on financial regulation and supervi-
sion. Competences of the EU legislator and of the ECB are at stake. The
relationship between monetary stability and the smooth functioning of fi-
nancial markets (both banks and non-banks) and the specific role played
by the ECB and National Central Banks in supervision are well-known.
I.
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The Delors report of 1989 described a complete single market as a basic el-
ement of EMU.1 This relation is evident if we contemplate the role of an
effective free movement of capitals for the smooth transmission of mone-
tary policy.
But before entering into our subject we think necessary to recall some
essential features of the context of Brexit negotiations up to the present no-
deal and the new delay which was conceded at her request to the British
Prime Minister, after the triple rejection by the House of Commons (on 15
January, 12 March and 29 March 2019) of the draft Agreement on the
withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union.
The latest date for the ratification of the Agreement was on 29 March
2019, two years after the notification of the UK decision to withdraw from
the EU. A first request for extension was introduced by the UK Govern-
ment on 20 March 2019 until 30 June. With the agreement of the UK, the
European Council decided to extend the period until 22 May in the event
the House of Commons approved the Withdrawal Agreement by 29
March 2019. ‘If that were not the case, the European Council agreed to an
extension until 12 April 2019.’ A new prolongation was asked for until 30
June 2019, which was denied. On 10 April, the European Council agreed
to a further extension which ‘should last as long as necessary and, in any
event, no longer than 31 October 2019’. So, the withdrawal should take
place ‘on the first day of the month following the completion of the ratifi-
cation procedures or on 1 November 2019, whichever is the earliest.’ The
conceded extensions were indeed conditional to the prior ratification of
the Withdrawal Agreement.
At the moment of revising this text, it was far from certain that the UK
will, at the end, ratify the Withdrawal Agreement. It seems useful to recall
some important points of the negotiations, without entering in a descrip-
tion of the successive, negative and sometimes incoherent votes of the
House of Commons.
Six days after the vote of the UK to leave the EU and Euratom, the
Heads of State and Government at 27, as well as the Presidents of the Euro-
pean Council and the European Commission, adopted on 29 June 2016 a
‘Statement’ including a number of principles which would guide the atti-
tude that will be adopted by the EU in the negotiation. The first points
1 Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, Report on economic
and monetary union in the European Community, 1989: ‘Economic and Monetary
Union in Europe would imply complete freedom of movement for persons, goods,
services and capital, as well as irrevocably fixed exchange rates between national
currencies and, finally, a single currency.’ p 13.
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raised were on the procedure to be followed under Article 50 TEU which
is applicable if a Member State decides to leave the Union. Other elements
refer to the substance of the future agreement, which would have to be
built ‘on a balance of rights and obligations’. And the statement recalls one
of the crucial points for the EU that ‘Access to the Single Market requires
acceptance of all four freedoms.’ It so opposed the intention expressed by
the UK Government to seriously limit the persons’ freedom of movement.
It was at this early stage an advertisement that the EU would not accept a
‘cherry-picking’ among the very bases of the Single Market.
After the UK notification under Article 50 TEU, on 29 March 2017, the
European Council adopted on a draft prepared by the Commission, the
first guidelines2 for the negotiations that it was from then possible to open.
Considering the ‘significant uncertainties’ created for people and business
by the UK’s decision to leave the Union, the European Council proposed a
‘phased approach giving priority to an orderly withdrawal. National au-
thorities, businesses and other stakeholders should take all necessary steps
to prepare for the consequences of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal.’
For the EU, the first phase of the negotiations which was thereafter fa-
miliarly called ‘the conditions of the divorce’ would aim to ‘provide as
much clarity and legal certainty as possible to citizens, businesses, stake-
holders and international partners on the immediate effects of the UK’s
withdrawal from the Union’ and ‘settle the disentanglement of the UK
from the Union and from all the rights and obligations the UK derives
from commitments undertaken as Member State’.
It would only be in a second phase, when the UK has become a third
country, that an ‘agreement on a future relationship between the Union
and the UK as such could be ‘finalised and concluded’. This phasing which
prevented the UK to start negotiations with third States, for example on fu-
ture trade relations, was a surprise for the British negotiators. Nevertheless,
the future relations could be in some measure considered as Article 50
TEU requires to take into account the framework for the future relation-
ship with the Union of the exiting Member State. That inevitably would
determine the kind of relations that the UK would be able to develop in
the future, on trade and tariffs for example, with the outside World. The
Union declares itself ready to identify ‘an overall understanding on the
framework for the future relationship…during a second phase of the nego-
tiations under Article 50 TEU.’ The Union stands also ready ‘to engage in
preliminary and preparatory discussions to this end …if the European
2 Council of the European Union, 22 May 2017, XT 210116/17, Add 1 Rev 2.
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Council decides that sufficient progress has been made in the first phase
towards reaching a satisfactory agreement on the arrangements for an or-
derly withdrawal’.
The UK directives of negotiation made evident the two different con-
ceptions of the object of the negotiations which were conceived by the
British negotiators essentially as the building of a new partnership.3 Michel
Barnier, a former Commission member and French minister, head of the
EU delegation, received the mandate from the European Council to nego-
tiate in a first period, with his counterpart, Brexit secretary David Davis,
about three politically sensitive questions: the respective rights of the citi-
zens of both the EU and the UK, the conditions of the so-called ‘divorce’ in
budgetary figures and the regime for Ireland. If the two first points were
not easy to solve, the last one still remains today a serious point of con-
tention.
This latest question is surely one of the most delicate to settle in order to
avoid any risk to compromise the ever fragile implementation of the so
called Good Friday agreement between the two parts of the island.4 The
most rational solution would be to consider the unification of the island.
This idea appears however to be unacceptable for the UK and its realisa-
tion could endanger the peace in the Northern part of the island. Further-
more, the Irish Prime Minister has repeatedly affirmed that to build a hard
frontier between the North and the South of the island would be vetoed
by Ireland, a position of which the other EU members have taken note.
The Brexiters were opposed to the possibility under the Protocol on Ire-
land, for the EU to require the temporary recourse to a so-called backstop.
3 See www.gov.uk/government/publications/the/united/kingdoms-exit-from-and-ne
w-partnership-with-the-european-union-white-paper 2 February 2017. See also the
Lancaster speech of the Prime Minister of 17 January 2017, ‘The government’s ne-
gotiating objectives for exiting the EU: Prime Minister speech’, in an updated ver-
sion of 3 February 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governmen
ts-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech on the theme: ‘we are leaving
the European Union but we are not leaving Europe’, and the Florence speech of
Mrs. May of 22 September 2017 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-flo
rence-speech-a-new-era-of-cooperation-and-partnership-between-the-uk-and-the-eu.
de
4 Ireland is opposed to the building of a rigid frontier with Norther Ireland (which
now is a very theoretical one) and the UK refuses to consider the option of the
building of a frontier at the border of the island, which would mean a physical sep-
aration with the rest of the UK, i.e. a loss of sovereignty on the island. This
question has received a very enigmatic solution in the 8th December joint report
mentioned in n 7.
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This would result in ‘keeping the UK in a customs union which would tor-
pedo their dream of a ‘global Britain’ able to strike trade deals around the
World, and set its own regulatory path, free from Europe.’5 The acting gov-
ernment of the Northern Republic, and Mrs May, UK Prime Minister who
led a minority government supported by the Belfast Government could
not accept either the division of the United Kingdom through the creation
of customs barriers in the Ocean. Some opponents to the backstop would
be satisfied by a ‘ready exit mechanism, or time-limit’. It was the object of
the so-called Strasbourg agreement, signed by the Union and the United
Kingdom, on 11 March 2019.6 It was said and repeated in this agreement
that the backstop was à provisional solution but it remained to be decided
what would be the definitive regime.
After various rounds of negotiations, a joint report was adopted on 8
December 2017 on progress during phase 1 of difficult negotiations under
Article 50 TEU “on the United Kingdom’s orderly withdrawal from the
European Union”.7 On this basis and on a report from the Commission on
the state of the negotiations8, the European Council which met on 15 De-
cember 2017,9 without the UK Prime Minister, decided that ‘it is sufficient
to move to the second phase related to transition and the framework for
the future relationship’. So it called
5 See The Guardian, 13 December 2018.
6 Instrument relating to the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom
of Great-Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European
Atomic Energy Community, published on the TF50 website on 11 March 2019.
On the legal force of this agreement, see among others, Michel Dougan, Brexit: le-
gal analysis of May’s Strasbourg deal, https://news.liverpool.ac.uk/2019/03/12. See
also HM Government, UK Government Commitments to Northern Ireland and its
integral place in the UK, 9 January 2019, referring to and complementing the Pro-
tocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland guaranteeing that ‘there will not be a hard
border between Northern Ireland and Ireland or a splitting of the UK customs ter-
ritory.’ All these efforts by the British Government were not sufficient in order to
rally opponents who supported the rejection of the deal by the acting Northern
Irish Government.
7 TF50 (2017) 19 – Commission to EU 27, 8 December 2017. We will not comment
on the content of this report which has been analysed by a good specialist of Euro-
pean Affairs, Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, in a short paper under the title: ‘Britain Opts
for ‘Brexit in Name Only’’, (2017) Peterson Institute for International Economics
(PIIE), Washington, December 11, referring specifically to the Irish border
sketched solution which many consider as ambiguous. We will see later on that the
December 2017 ‘Guidelines’ of the European Council are very clear on the fact
that the UK will not be bound anymore with the rules on the single market.
8 COM (2017) 784 final.
9 EUCO XT 2011/17.
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‘on the Union negotiator and the United Kingdom to complete the
work on all withdrawal issues, including those not yet addressed in the
first phase, in conformity with the European guidelines of 29 April
2017, to consolidate the results obtained, and to start drafting the rele-
vant parts of the Withdrawal Agreement. It underlines that negotia-
tions in the second phase can only progress as all commitments under-
taken during the first phase are respected in full and translated faith-
fully into legal terms as quickly as possible’.
Time was indeed pressing. In principle, and if no prolongation of the ne-
gotiations were agreed within two years after the Brexit decision,10 the UK
would have had to leave the EU without an agreement with the EU on the
conditions of exit. Such a solution would have been damaging for both the
UK and the EU. For trade relations, it would have meant that the regime
between the two parts would be determined by the WTO rules and
(lengthy) discussions in this framework should take place of the UK with
all the membership of the Geneva institution.
The risk of a cliff-edge, i.e. no agreement between the two partners and a
rough breakdown so often mentioned in the UK would have materialised.
In order to avoid, temporarily, a situation of vacuum, also if negotiations
were in the end successful, the UK had repeatedly asked for a transitory pe-
riod allowing UK the necessary time for organising the new regime in the
relationship of the UK, as a third country and the EU at 27. In its report on
Brexit and financial services, the House of Lords EU Committee recom-
mends, ‘both for the business environment and for financial stability, a
considered and orderly transition to any new relationship.’11 The UK
Prime Minister ‘has made a clear commitment to avoid a disruptive cliff-
edge and associated risks to UK and EU financial stability and business cer-
10 The notification of the demand to exit the EU under article 50 TEU was made on
29 March 2017. If a prolongation of the deadline is not decided by a unanimous
vote of the European Council, under Art 50, para 3, the treaties will cease to be
applicable to the UK on 29 March 2019.
11 9th Report of session 2016-2017, 15 December 2016, Conclusions, n°4, p 39. See
also in favour of transitional arrangements in proportion of the time required be-
tween agreement on any new rules and their required implementation by market
participants within a financial services regulation context, the letter of the Chief
Executive of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) to the Chairman of the Trea-
sury Committee of the House of Commons, of 13 January 2017: “…transitional
arrangements should facilitate, rather than hinder, the eventual establishment of
the future framework.”
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tainty.’12 Although this appeared as a reasonable request, the organisation
of such transition raised a number of questions. One of the difficulties con-
sisted in the judicial control during the transition between the application
of common EU rules and the new regime as agreed during the negotia-
tions. The refusal of continued jurisdiction of the Court of justice ap-
peared as one of the problems of the transition.
In its guidelines adopted on 15 December 2017,
‘the European Council noted the proposal put forward by the UK for a
transition period of around two years, and agreed to negotiate a transi-
tion covering the whole of the EU acquis, while the UK, as a third
country, will no longer participate in or nominate or elect members of
the EU institutions, nor participate in the decision making of the
Union bodies, offices and agencies.’
The European Council specifies (point 4) that in order to ensure a level
playing field in the single market, ‘changes in the acquis adopted by insti-
tutions, bodies, offices and agencies ‘will have to apply both in the UK and
the EU’ and ‘all existing Union regulatory, budgetary, supervisory, judicia-
ry and enforcement instruments and structures will also apply, including
the competence of the Court of Justice of the EU’.
It is in the same guidelines (point 6) that the European Council envis-
aged ‘identifying an overall understanding of the framework for the future
relationship’ which ‘should be elaborated in a political declaration accom-
panying and referring to in the Withdrawal Agreement.’ A full paragraph
of the Guidelines was devoted to the consequences of the UK’s intention
to no longer participate in the Customs Union and the Single Market after
the transition period. The European Council announced that it will
‘calibrate its approach as regard to trade and economic cooperation in
light of this position so as to ensure a balance of rights and obligations,
preserve a level playing field, avoid upsetting relations with other third
countries, and to respect …in particular the need to preserve the in-
tegrity and proper functioning of the Single Market.’
A ‘Political declaration setting out the framework for the future relation-
ship between the European Union and the United Kingdom’, was offi-
cially adopted by the European Council and the United Kingdom on 25
November 2018 in parallel with the Withdrawal Agreement. This non-
12 See Government response to the House of Lords European Union Committee Re-
port, of 15 December 2016, (2017) ‘Brexit: financial services’ 21 March, p 2.
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binding instrument should serve as a basis for hypothetical further negoti-
ations on the basis of Article 50(2) TEU.
The declaration mentions in its introduction the determination of the
Union and the United Kingdom
‘to work together to safeguard the rules-based international order, the
rule of law and promotion of democracy, and high standards of free
and fair trade and workers’ rights, consumer and environment protec-
tion, and cooperation against internal and external threats to their val-
ues and interests.’ (Point 2).
Without the list of subjects covered by the Declaration being exhaustive
(other areas of cooperation are possible), it mentions the establishment of
the parameters of an ambitious, broad, deep and flexible partnership across
trade and economic cooperation, law enforcement and criminal justice,
foreign policy, security and defence and wider areas of collaboration. Ref-
erence is made on the shared values of the Union and the UK and on their
shared heritage… (Point 3). In point 4, is mentioned the need for the rela-
tionship to be ‘based on balance of rights and obligations taking into ac-
count the principles of each Party’. That means for the EU, to ensure the
autonomy of decision making and the consistency with Union’s principles,
‘in particular with respect of the integrity of the single market and the in-
divisibility of the four freedoms’. For the UK, it means ‘to ensure its
sovereignty and the protection of its internal market, while respecting the
result of the 2016 referendum including the development of its indepen-
dent trade policy and the ending of free movement of people between the
Union and the UK’.
Point 5 mentions, on the basis of the large period of membership of the
UK to the Union, a ‘unique context’ that will inevitably needs to be taken
into account. This means that the future relationship ‘should be ap-
proached with high ambition’.
We cannot analyse here the 147 points of the Political Declaration. We
should only limit the developments to what concerns the Services and
more specially, the Financial services in Part II, Economic Partnership, I.
Objectives and Principles, III. Services and Investment, and IV. Financial
Services.
Section I, on Objectives and Principles, point 16 – valid for the whole eco-
nomic partnership – starts with an obvious but important observation: the
recognition by the Parties of the ‘particularly important trading and invest-
ment relationship, reflecting more than 45 years of economic integration’,
‘the size of their two economies and their geographic proximity’. All that
‘has led to complex and integrated supply chains’.
Jean-Victor Louis
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Points 17 and 18 develop the principles enounced in the introduction.
The objective of the parties is to develop ‘an ambitious, wide-ranging and
balanced economic partnership’. This partnership ‘will be comprehensive,
encompassing a free trade area as well as wider sectoral cooperation where
it is in the mutual interest of both Parties’. This is particularly important in
financial services where the authorities are well used to such bilateral and
multilateral cooperation. Provisions ensuring a level playing field for open
and fair competition are also mentioned as well as the objective of facilitat-
ing trade and investment ‘between the Parties to the extent possible’ with-
in the limits already mentioned in point 4 of the Introduction (quoted
above) to which is added the recognition of ‘the development of an inde-
pendent trade policy by the United Kingdom beyond this economic part-
nership.’ Point 18 is related to the ‘autonomy and the ability’ of the Parties
to ‘regulate economy activity’ pursuing objectives deemed appropriate of
which a non-exhaustive list is produced. Sustainable development is men-
tioned as ‘an overarching objective’ of the economic partnership. The text
also mentions ‘appropriate general exceptions’ with, as an example, securi-
ty. Point 19 recalls the determination of the Parties to replace the backstop
solution on Northern Ireland by a subsequent agreement.
Section III. Services and Investment under A. Objectives and principles
refers first (in Point 29) to the intention of the parties (‘should’) of con-
cluding ‘ambitious, comprehensive and balanced arrangements on trade
and services and investment in services and non-services sectors, respecting
each Party’s right to regulate.’ Furthermore, ‘the Parties should aim to de-
liver a level of liberalisation in trade and services well beyond the Parties’
WTO commitments and building on recent EU Free Trade Agreements
(FTAs), an evident allusion to CETA concluded with Canada.
Point 30, referring to Article V of the GATT, requests to the Parties to
aim (should) at ‘substantial sectoral coverage, covering all modes of supply
and providing for the absence of substantially all discrimination in the cov-
ered sectors, with exceptions and limitations as appropriate.’ A non-ex-
haustive list of sectors follows with among them: financial services.13
Under B. Market access and non-discrimination, are included provisions
related to market access, national treatment in order to facilitate non-dis-
crimination ‘including with regard to establishment’ (Point 31), ‘tempora-
13 This doesn’t exclude any kind of services. Cp with the content of a declaration
made one year before by Michel Barnier to The Guardian (and other newspapers):
‘UK cannot have a special deal for the City’, 18 December 2017: ‘There is no place
[for financial services]. There is no single trade agreement that is open to financial
services.’
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ry entry and stay of natural persons for business purposes in defined areas
(Point 32). Under C, Regulatory aspects, point 33, ‘while preserving regu-
latory autonomy’, arrangements should include ‘horizontal provisions
such as on licensing procedures, and specific regulatory procedures in the
sectors of mutual interest such as telecommunication services, financial
services, delivery services, and international maritime transport services’ as
well as ‘provisions on the development and adoption of domestic regu-
lation that reflect good regulatory practices.’ Point 35 adds in this text that
Parties should establish a framework for voluntary regulatory cooperation
in areas of mutual interest, including exchange of information and sharing
of best practice. Point 36 encourages the development of arrangements on
those professional qualifications which are necessary to the pursuit of regu-
lated professions, where in the Parties’ mutual interest.
What strikes in the formulation of the Political Declaration is the open-
ended way in which its provisions are drafted. Perhaps this has been made
possible by the non-binding feature of it. This remark could also apply to
Section IV exclusively dedicated to Financial Services. Point 37 relates to the
objectives of their financial policy: ‘preserving financial stability, market
integrity, investor and consumer protection and fair competition’ with the
traditional caveat: ‘while respecting the Parties’ regulatory and decision-
making autonomy’ with the addition of ‘their ability to take equivalence
decisions in their own interest’. Point 38 is entirely on equivalence. As we
will see later on in the text, equivalence seems to sometimes appear as a
second best to the establishment of a subsidiary in the positions defended
by ECB supervision authorities. Point 39 includes an agreement on the
need of ‘close and structured cooperation on regulatory and supervisory
matters which is in their mutual interest.’ A cooperation grounded in the
economic partnership and based ‘on the principles of regulatory autono-
my, transparency and stability.’ The declaration also lists the fields where
the cooperation should apply.
After this sketch of the content of the Political Declaration, that we
hope will be useful in an indeterminate time in the future, let us come
back to the presumed effects of Brexit in monetary and financial matters.
The more straightforward institutional consequences of the Brexit in
monetary and financial matters
Protocol No 15 to the Lisbon Treaty on the so-called British opt out under
which “the United Kingdom shall not be obliged or committed to adopt
the euro without a separate decision to do so by its government and Parlia-
II.
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ment” would be abrogated. The UK could not anymore candidate for
adopting the euro, after the Brexit, without having first applied for re-ac-
cession to the EU and after the end of the negotiations under Article 49
TEU.
The Bank of England’s governor would not any more participate in the
European System of Central Banks General Council,14 an organ grouping
all the governors of Central Banks in the EU and which has very limited
competences under the ESCB statutes. The Bank of England would recu-
perate the modest part of its participation in the capital of the European
Central Bank15, to which it had to subscribe on the same basis as Central
Banks of countries with a derogation, in order to participate to the func-
tioning costs of the institution.
The EU rules in the field of banking and payment services would no
longer apply to the United Kingdom.
The UK would cease to participate to the authorities constitutive of the
ESFS (European System of Financial Supervision): EBA (European Bank-
ing Authority), ESMA (European Securities and Markets Authority),
EIOPA (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and
the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and of the Single Resolution
Mechanism (SRM) and the Single Resolution Fund (SRF).
As a consequence, the UK would lose the benefit of the double majority
arrangement that it obtained in the voting rules for important decisions in
the EBA,16 which provides that some of these decisions adopted with a
simple majority should require the positive votes of a majority of represen-
tatives of competent authorities of countries having adopted the euro and
of a majority of the representatives of such authorities of non-euro coun-
tries.
14 We recall that all the EU National Central Banks form, with the ECB, the Euro-
pean System of Central Banks. Only those having adopted the euro are members
of the Eurosystem with the ECB, see art 282, para 1, TFEU and Art 1, Protocol No
4.
15 ESCB and ECB Statutes, Protocol n°4, art 47. See also Protocol No 15, art 8, c.
16 See Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No1091/2010 establishing a
European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regard of spe-
cific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU)
No 1024/2013, Article 1 (24) amending article 44 of Regulation No 1091/2010.
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The UK will also lose the possibility, opened for all EU Member States
“wishing to participate”,17 to enter into a ‘close cooperation’ with the Sin-
gle Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), through a decision adopted by the ECB
under article 7 of the Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. A close cooperation
which would also include the automatic participation to the Single Resolu-
tion Mechanism (SRM), and .to the intergovernmental agreement about fi-
nancing the Single Resolution Fund.
The UK would also have to leave the European Investment Bank
(EIB).18
In any regard, it would become a third country in these fields.
In a Notice to stakeholders of 8 February 2018, the Commission has
produced a document listing the legal provisions, ‘subject to any transi-
tional arrangement that may be contained in a possible withdrawal agree-
ment, as of the withdrawal date’, that will not apply to the UK.19 The No-
tice includes provisions related to authorisations, arrangements and expo-
sures and contracts.
The unchanged situation of both the UK, EU and national authorities in the
international financial institutions and a future cooperation
The Bank of England and other financial authorities participate at the in-
ternational standards-setting bodies, like the Basle Committees (parts of
the Bank for International Settlements – BIS structure), or the Financial
Stability Board (FSB), an organism under the guidance of the G20, which
will continue after Brexit to inspire national and EU legislative action, and
so to act as an instrument of convergence. One should also allude in this
respect to the International Organisation of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO), a private institution which has an important coordinating role.
We have mentioned that the Political Declaration provides for an obliga-
tion of cooperation of the UK and the EU Member States in the interna-
tional financial ‘institutions’. For the UK, the participation to these stan-
III.
17 See at this regard, Christos V. Gortsos, The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).
Legal aspects of the first pillar of the European Banking Union (NomikiBibliothi-
ki SA, Athens 2015), p 183 ff.
18 See article 308 TFEU and Protocol No. 5, art 3.
19 European Commission, Notice to stakeholders. Withdrawal of the United King-
dom and EU rules in the field of Banking and Payment Services, 8 February 2018,
at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/180208-notice-withdrawal-uk-banking-s
ervices_en.pdf.
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dards setting bodies offers an indirect possibility to influence EU legisla-
tion from the outside, and especially the Euro area Member States. The Re-
port of the House of Lords of 15 December 2016, already quoted, men-
tions in its paragraph 59: ‘The UK’s influence on international standard-
setting bodies, such as the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability
Board, will be crucial to ensuring that changes in regulation are consistent
internationally’. It added that ‘…it is in the UK’s and EU’s mutual interest
that the UK should maintain direct influence within the EU, especially in
areas where there are less well-developed international standards.” And the
report continues with a suggestion to the Government which ‘should en-
courage direct regulatory cooperation between UK and EU authorities
and, as part of its negotiation, should seek UK input to EU regulation-set-
ting upstream’.20 This suggestion is on the same line of thinking than the
Political Declaration.
The answer given by the Government to this request of the House of
Lords also deserves a full quotation:
‘While we are leaving the EU, we will remain close partners with our
neighbours in Europe and will continue taking a leadership role in in-
ternational regulatory forums…The report is correct in noting the
close relationship between UK and EU markets and regulators. The
government is looking for a sensible discussion in negotiations about
how the UK and EU financial markets can continue to serve one an-
other, and what is needed to support that. This is very much in the in-
terests of both parties.’
If an ‘upstream’ influence on EU legislation as wished by the House of
Lords, appears as difficult to conceive, a cooperation in some fields could
be explored. It could be the case, as we will see infra, in some limited al-
though sensitive fields.
The continued participation of some Euro area Member States in inter-
national standards setting bodies in fields on which they have lost their
competence in favour of the EU and the ECB is not compatible with EU
law. One may suspect that the presence of the UK in these organs will en-
20 See in the same line of thinking, the third report of the International Regulatory
Strategy Group (IRSG), an emanation of the City, a report produced in coopera-
tion with Hogan Lovells, London, September 2017, which suggests ‘the establish-
ment of a joint committee called ‘‘Forum for Regulatory Co-operation’’ for the
purpose of ensuring a strong relationship, promoting regulatory alignment and
addressing questions of divergence’, Section 6, Summary, p 61.
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courage these countries to resist to a possible substitution of their national
authorities by a European institution.
The same is true for the G20, especially for its financial branch (where
Finance ministers meet) and the IMF. How to persuade countries like
France or Germany to progressively renounce to some aspects of their rep-
resentation in the IMF21, if the UK remains a full member in all the organs
of this institution? How, in the same context, to progress towards a Euro-
pean Monetary Fund that is the object of a proposal of the EU Commis-
sion22 if the UK preserves, with some EU Countries, its individual seat in
the Washington’s organisations?
The economic and social consequences for the UK
A ‘hard Brexit’ for the City of London and the other financial places in the
UK – meaning the loss for banks located in the UK of the famous passport
allowing for doing business in the EU – would (will) have important nega-
tive consequences for the UK as in all other sectors.23 We should refer to
some data in order to illustrate the present weight of the UK in the finan-
cial industry: from figures given by the British Government on 21 March
2017,24 the sector employs approximately 1.1 million people and generates
approximately £60-67 billion. In a recent article, The Economist mentions
that ‘The sector and its ecosystem of lawyers, consultants, lobbyists and the
IV.
21 See infra.
22 See the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European
Monetary Fund, COM(2017) 827 final, 6 December 2017 (which implied a trans-
formation in a EU body of the present Financial Stability Mechanism (FSM)
which was based on an international treaty; this proposal was not accepted by a
number of Member States which marked a preference for keeping the European
Stability Mechanism as an intergovernmental organisation) and the earlier pro-
posal for a Council Decision laying down measures in view of progressively lay-
ing down measures in view of progressively establishing a unified representation
of the Euro area in the International Monetary Fund, COM(2015) 603 final, 21
October 2015, a proposal that seems also to have no chance to be adopted.
23 See Adam S. Posen, (2017) ‘Drawbridge Economics: The Brexit Reality Check Is
Coming’, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, Novem-
ber 13, p 8.
24 See Government response to the House of Lords European Union Committee Re-
port, (2016) ‘Brexit: financial services’, 15 December, on file with the author. See
also the figures mentioned by Governor Mark Carney, in his speech on (2014)
‘The high road to a responsible, open financial system’, Thomas Reuters, Canary
Wharf, London, 7 April, p 4.
Jean-Victor Louis
214
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748903246, am 21.11.2019, 13:37:49
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
like employ 2.2 m people, not only in the wealthy centres of the Square
Mile, Canary Wharf and Edinburgh but also in places like Cardiff and
Bournemouth’.25 The UK is a global leader in complex insurance, whole-
sale/investment banking, market infrastructure, portfolio management –
associated with asset management – and other areas of financial activities.
Other data given by the British Government confirm the importance of
the volume of activities involved: over 75 per cent of the EU 27 capital
market business is conducted through the UK, and the financial industry
in the UK manages £1.2 trillion of pension and other assets on behalf of
EU clients. In December 2017, the IMF gave the following figures: ‘the fi-
nancial sector in the UK represents about 7 per cent of GDP but accounts
for around 10 per cent of tax revenues and 14 per cent of exports’.26 In the
already quoted article, The Economist, referring to a paper written by
economists of the Bank for International Settlements, mentions ‘the City’s
centrality to EU financial operations. About half of all the €2.6trn of euro
area bonds bought by the ECB’s asset-purchase programme came from in-
stitutions outside the Eurozone. Banks in Britain were the main facilitators
of bond sales.’ Moreover, ‘the City of London is the leading global player
in trading and clearing of derivatives: more than US dollars 450trn of
swaps and derivatives are processed through London. Meanwhile, London
dominates the processing of euro-denominated interest rate swaps, with 75
per cent of the cleared in the UK. The Bank of England has estimated that
about GBP 41trn of these contracts will be affected by Brexit.27 The Con-
servative Manifesto for the June 2017 elections observed: ‘Our global busi-
nesses and London’s position as the global centre of finance make us more
interconnected with the global economy than any comparable nation.’ 28
This explains why the British Government ‘believes that an agreement that
secures deep market access, on a reciprocal basis, is in both the EU and the
UK’s interests.’ If not, one can expect a transfer to the Continent of sys-
temic international banks.29
25 ‘City under siege. Brexit and political turmoil have broken London’ spell as the
‘capital of capital’, The Economist June 29th –July 5th 2019, p 67-70 ad 68.
26 See IMF. Mission concluding statement. United Kingdom: Staff Concluding
Statement of the 2017 Article IV Mission, December 20, 2017.
27 Anthony Morton, ‘Clearing the Euro: temporary solution only on offer in a no-
deal Brexit’, March 2019, https://nortonrosefullbright.com/en-de/knowledge/publ
ications/9e4b5910/
28 The Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2017, https://www.conservatives.com
/manifesto
29 See Marie-Claude Esposito, ‘La City de Londres en attendant le Brexit’, (2017)
Michel Korinman (dir.), BREXIT !, L’ esprit du temps, Paris, 77-83.
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The transfer to the Continent of Global Systemic banks (which will
have lost their European passport) and a great part (most?) of the activities
of Central Counterparties (CCP) or compensation rooms could mean the
loss of more than 100.000 jobs in favour of the EU and the US.30
There are predictable consequences for the employment market and the
exchange rate of the Pound, which has already lost value in comparison
with its more important competitors.
The diminution of fiscal revenue from financial institutions is also to be
predicted.
The removal from London of the European Banking Authority (EBA)
(and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) is both a symbolic and a ma-
terial loss.31
The impact on the continental financial markets32
Is there a risk of disordered competition of financial places on the basis of
attractive regulation for British institutions: a race to the bottom? National
authorities involved in the admission of delocalised bank entities are up to
resist but they are confronted with uncertainty, time constraint and new
problems. The ECB and the national supervisory authorities it coordinates,
as well as the banking industry, were already preparing for the hypothesis
which appeared to be the more plausible considering the rhythm of the ne-
gotiations: the hard Brexit. Would this be the outcome, in spite of the neg-
ative vote of the Parliament of 14 March 2019, or could no appropriate so-
lution be found in an agreement on the future relationship of the UK with
V.
30 See ibid, p. 80, the declaration of the president of the London Stock Exchange, in
September 2016. Paris mobilises at this regard for attracting banks leaving the
UK. See also, Laure Baquero, (2019) ‘Brexit: déclinaison financière, les grandes
lignes’, Eco. Conjoncture, March, economic-research.bnpparibas.com.
31 The European Council has adopted on May 24, 2017 a document presented by
President Tusk and President Juncker, on the criteria for relocating agencies es-
tablished in the UK, EMA and EBA for a decision to be taken by the Council, in
October 2017, after an assessment by the Commission, see “EU sets out criteria
for relocating UK agencies” by Eszter Zalan, EU Observer, 24 May 2017. The dead-
line for a decision was postponed. On 20 November 2017, the decisions were fi-
nally taken by drawing lots after votes were tied: Amsterdam got the EMA
(against Milan) and Paris, the EBA (against Dublin).
32 See in this respect: (2017) André Sapir, Dirk Schoenmaker and Nicolas Véron,
‘Making the Best of Brexit for the EU-27 Financial System’, Peterson Institute for
International Economics, Policy Brief, Washington, February,17-8.
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the EU, a number of problems remain: It was generally admitted that only
a small number of countries are really attractive to British banks and this
feeling was confirmed. The criterion is said to be the quality of the local
supervisory authorities and the infrastructure as well as the effectiveness of
the resolution process. Many questions are new. For example, how much
local management could be integrated in the global management chain?
Which interference should be allowed from the group in the management
of subsidiaries in the Euro area?33 Would the localisation of EBA in Paris
be positive for the French capital? This was believed by the Government
but what has been the real benefit?
The ECB appears decided to ‘stick to [their] standards’34. As a matter of
fact, there is no place for a smooth Brexit either, especially as far as supervi-
sion of significant banks is concerned; it means that there can be no doubt
about who is in charge. The ECB, as a supervisor, will have many different
interviews with banks intending to establish themselves in the EU area,
getting the business plans for several years to come. How banks want to
structure their activities, how they want to grow, what kind of booking
they want to do, what kind of risk management. There are already experi-
enced methods, like the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process
(SREP), and there is a new instrument: the ‘Targeted Review of Internal
Models’ (TRIM) which can be used in order to control the internal model
adopted by the banks. Mrs Lautenschläger has a definitive view on this
question: ‘The ECB has a great quality, which distinguishes it from nation-
al authorities: it is neutral in its judgment; it does not fight for one loca-
tion in lieu of another.’
What is firmly stated is that there will be no ‘grandfathering’ of British
models. We quote again Sabine Lautenschläger, vice chair of the Single Su-
pervisory Board, on this specific point:
‘We are aware that banks would like us to simply grandfather existing
model approvals that were given by the British supervisor. We will not
do that. It is not feasible from a legal point of view, and it would not
be the most prudent thing to do. Internal models need to be approved
by the relevant supervisor, also to meet the obligation of equal treat-
ment: therefore, banks that relocate to the euro area would have to
seek a new permission from us’.35
33 Questions raised at a Bruegel think-tank meeting in Brussels, 2 June 2017.
34 S. Lautenschläger, vice president of the Single Supervisory Board, 4 May 2017.
35 Speech of May 4, 2017, p 2.
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The message of S. Lautenschläger, speaking in Dublin recently, was the
same:
‘From the start, we identified areas of concern for individual banks –
particularly those that plan to relocate from the United Kingdom to
the EU. We made it clear that we would not accept “empty shells”.
And we made it clear that we would not accept comprehensive back-
branching practices, where banks would provide services to EU clients
from branches in the United Kingdom’.36
This standpoint doesn’t exactly seem to concord with the one expressed
two years ago by Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England37
who proclaimed in 2017:
‘Brexit will be a litmus test of the future of international cooperation.
The UK and the rest of the EU have exactly the same rules and the
most highly developed frameworks of supervisory cooperation. Their
capital and banking markets are already highly integrated. They have
the potential to create the template for trade in financial services’.38
This extraordinarily open statement – but which could seem near to the
perspectives opened in 2018 by the ‘Political Declaration’ – contrasts with
views expressed by the Governor in a recent past on the specificities of the
UK financial system, and the need to preserve them, considering in partic-
ular the importance of its financial sector in a widely open economy.
Hence the accent put by the Bank of England and its Governor on specific
rules, especially on the control of variable compensation (bank bonuses)
for banks senior employees in order to fight misconduct with international
36 ‘A supervisory perspective on 2019 and beyond’, 17 January 17 2019, p 1. The
whole speech should be quoted where the speaker marks her clear preference for
subsidiaries in lieu of branches, because it gives to the European banking supervi-
sion ‘a whole picture’. But she observes that ‘it is not us supervisors who make the
rules.
37 We do not pretend by this quotation and the followings to give a complete pic-
ture of the position of Governor Carney and the BoE before and after the referen-
dum of June 2016. For a description, see Sylviane de Saint-Seine, ‘La Banque
d’Angleterre face au Brexit: une campagne houleuse’, in Michel Korinman, Brex-
it !, (Bègles, L’esprit du Temps, 2017) Collection Outre-Terre, 68-76. It is, indeed,
well-known that some positions adopted by the Governor were criticised by the
Brexiters, the Governor being accused to be ‘defeatist’ on the effects of Brexit for
British economy.
38 Mark Carney, ‘What a Difference a Decade made’, Remarks at the Institute of Fi-
nance’ s Washington Policy Summit, 20 April 2017, p10.
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repercussions (LIBOR, EURIBOR …)39 and on ensuring really fit and
proper managers.
We must add that the coincidence of rules at a given moment (under-
scored by Mr Carney40), doesn’t include any guarantee for the future, after
the materialisation of Brexit. The Governor nevertheless observes that the
EU and UK are…ideally positioned to create an effective system of defer-
ence to each other’s comparable regulatory outcomes, supported by com-
mitments to common minimum standards and open supervisory coopera-
tion’ (ibid) and he adds that ‘Such an outcome would be entirely consist-
ent with the UK Government‘s stated aim of a new comprehensive, bold and
ambitious free trade41 relationship with the EU that embraces goods, ser-
vices and network industries.’ He nevertheless recognised that financial
services are only part of the negotiation and ‘Given our responsibilities to
promote financial stability, the Bank – like its counterparts on the conti-
nent – must plan for all eventualities.’
What precedes demonstrates that in the reaction of the Euro area super-
visors we are far from kind of automatic mechanisms of recognition as the
principle of equivalence, traditionally applied with banks of third coun-
tries. One has to take into account that both the application of a (two
years) transitory period provided in the Leaving agreement and the nego-
tiation under the terms of the Political Declaration depends on the entry
into force of the agreement itself. Hence, the initiatives of the European
Commission, the advertisements of the European and supervisory authori-
ties as well as of professional associations addressed to national authorities,
stakeholders and private parties. The Commission published a Contingen-
cy Action Plan on 13 November 2018.42 In the ‘Questions and Answers’
document quoted in note 39, the Commission mentions that ‘after exam-
39 The Bank of England observes that limitation by EU law of variable compensa-
tion (banker bonus) in relation with fixed salaries results in an uncontrollable in-
flation of the fixed salaries, on which the authorities have no power.
40 ‘The High Road to a responsible, Open Financial System’, 7 April 2017, p 9.
41 The words are borrowed to the letter of Mrs May to the President of the European
Council, Donald Tusk, 29 March 2017.
42 See, for example, European Commission, Notice to stakeholders. Withdrawal of
the United Kingdom and EU rules in the field of Banking and Payment Services,
Brussels, 8 February 2018; European Commission, Preparing for the withdrawal
of the United Kingdom from the EU on 30 March 2019: Implementing the Com-
mission’s Contingency Action Plan, 19 December 2018, Com(2018) 890 final
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX%3A52018DC0
890; European Commission, MEMO, Questions and Answers: the consequences
of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union without a ratified Withdraw-
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ining the risks linked to a no deal scenario in the financial sector, and tak-
ing into account the views of the European Central Bank and the Euro-
pean Supervisors Authorities, the Commission has concluded that only a
limited number of contingency measures are necessary to safeguard finan-
cial stability in the EU27.’ The two temporary and conditional measures
are necessary ‘because preparedness actions from market operators alone
are clearly insufficient to address these risks by the withdrawal date’. They
concern the regulatory framework applicable to central counterparties and
to central securities depositories. In these two cases, the UK regulation
would temporarily be judged equivalent to the EU regulation in these
fields.
The ECB will not accept ‘empty shells’ companies. ‘Any bank that oper-
ates in the euro area must be a “bank”. And any “real” bank has adequate
risk management, sufficient local staff and operational independence.’43
The ECB will be cautious of regulatory and supervisory arbitrage. Some
banks requiring entrance in the EU would be significant; in that case, they
will be subject to direct supervision by the ECB. If they are not, they will
be supervised by national authorities ‘under the common European super-
visory approach by the ECB’. The third-country branches of banking
groups (and investment firms) may pose a problem for their integration in
the Euro area because there are different rules applying to branches in
third countries. That ‘will run counter to the idea of a level playing field in
the euro area’. What Ms. Lautenschläger holds for a fragmented approach
could be treated in the present revision of the Capital Requirement Regu-
lation (CRR) and Directive (CRD) (ibid.). So there could be a possibility to
get ‘a holistic view of all the activities within a banking group’.
Anyway, as said by Mrs. Nouy, chair of the Supervisory Board of the
ECB:
‘What is sure for us is that the UK will always be important. We will
always have very important and intense relationships with our col-
leagues on the other side of the Channel.’44
The correct reaction would consist in more integration in lieu of fragmen-
tation of the Euro area banking industry. There is now a revision in
al Agreement (no deal Brexit). 19 December 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/i
nfo/files/contingency_qanda_on_pdf.
43 S. Lautenschläger, ‘Some supervisory expectations for banks relocating in the eu-
ro area’, speech, Frankfurt, 4 May 2017, p 16.
44 D. Nouy, Introductory statement to the press conference on the ECB Annual Re-
port on supervisory activities 2016, 27 March 2017, p 1.
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progress of the legislation that has made possible the transfer of compe-
tences from the Member States Authorities to the ECB and the SRM. Pro-
gressing is an answer to Brexit: the strengthening of the regulatory and su-
pervisory powers of ESMA and EIOPA is necessary along the model of the
European Supervisory Board of the ECB. The relocation of Central Coun-
terparties (CCP), which was stopped by the General Court for the reason
of the absence of a legal basis in the EU primary law,45 was also a possibili-
ty if article 22 of the Statutes of the ESCB and the ECB would have been
revised, but other ways are open. It is precisely this sector which was men-
tioned by Governor Carney as an example for cooperation in the frame-
work of a renewed cooperation. In a speech of 20 June 2017 the Governor
of the Bank of England specifically mentioned the case of CCP’s, cen-
tralised compensation organs in the field of derivatives, as a specific exam-
ple of such a process46 but his remarks could have a broader meaning.
They could apply to any critical cross-border infrastructures for financial
markets. So LCH in London which works in eighteen currencies for the
undertakings in 55 jurisdictions, handling more than 90 per cent of com-
pensated swaps of interest rate and 98 per cent of compensated swaps in
euro.
From another speech, we will extract a sentence which sums up the
thinking of Governor Carney: ‘The combination of robust international
standards and greater trust as a consequence of transparent implementa-
tion and intensive supervisory cooperation can create a system of equiva-
lence and mutual deference’.47
In this context, the question of the localisation and surveillance of
CCP’s is particularly striking. The Commission has proposed in 2017 to
strengthen the rules applicable to the supervision of these mechanisms in
the perspective of the departure of the EU from the more important Euro-
pean financial centre. Two regulations have been adopted at this regard.
The first one, called EMIR Review1, is Regulation (EU) 2019/834 of the
European Parliament and the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Regu-
lation (EU) No 648/2012 as regards the clearing obligation, the suspension
of the clearing obligation, the reporting requirements, the risk-mitigation
techniques for OTC derivatives contracts not cleared by a central counter-
party, the registration and supervision of trade depositories and the re-
45 See infra, p xx: GC 4 March 2015, T-496/13, United Kingdom v ECB, ECLI:
T:2015:133.
46 ‘A Fine Balance’ speech at the Mansion House, London, 20 June 2017, p 11.
47 ‘What a Difference a Decade Makes’ Remarks at the Institute of Finance’s Wash-
ington Policy Summit, The Reagan Centre, Washington DC, 20 April 2017, p 8.
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quirements for trade repositories.48 The other regulation, EMIR Review2,
is more specifically relied to the Brexit. The proposal COM(2017) 331 has
been agreed by both the EP and the Council but it will be at the agenda of
the European Parliament after the Summer 2019 due to the need for the
Plenary to adopt a corrigendum. It will amend Regulation (EU) No
1095/10 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (ESMA) and Regu-
lation (EU) No 648/12 as regards the process and authorities involved for
the authorisation of the procedures and authorities involved for the autho-
rization of CCPs and requirements for the recognition of third-country
CCPs.
At the same time the European Central Bank had adopted a draft for a
decision of the European Parliament and the Council, taken under the
simplified revision procedure foreseen in Article 129, par. 3 TFEU for the
modification of article 22 for the ESCB and ECB Statutes. This proposal
aimed at adding a competence for the ECB to set up rules on compensa-
tion systems in the field of financial instruments.
It is well-known that the General Court, in a case opposing the UK to
the ECB (Case T-496/11 4 March 2015 ECLI.EU.T.215.113) denied that ar-
ticle 22 of the Statutes of the ESCB and the ECB which allows it to regu-
late clearing and payments systems in euro could extend to the regulation
of all clearing systems, including those related to transactions in securities.
Using for the first time the procedure, provided by articles 129, par.3
TFEU and 40 of the statutes of the ESCB and ECB which allows to the
ECB to propose by an unanimous recommendation the revision of some
articles of its statutes, which could then be adopted by the ordinary legis-
lative procedure, the ECB made a recommendation for a decision amend-
ing article 22 of the statutes.49 In its opinion of 3 October 2017, on this rec-
ommendation, the Commission which positively welcomes the initiative
of the ECB complementing its proposal on clearing systems for financial
instruments denominated in euro, suggests amendments in order to, on
the one hand, refer to the ‘objectives of the ECB’ and to the carrying of its
tasks and on the other hand, to the imperative of the future ECB regula-
tions to be ‘consistent with acts adopted by the European Parliament and
the Council and with measures adopted under such acts’.50On 20 March
2019 the ECB withdrew its recommendation amending Article 22 of the
48 OJ L141, 28 May 2019, p 42-63.
49 See the ECB recommendation (ECB/2017/18), OJ C212, 1-7.2017, p 14.
50 OJ C340, 11.10.2017, p 1; see European Parliament. Legislative train schedule.
Updated rules on Central Counterparty (CCP) Supervision/EMIR Review 2, 20
June 2019.
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Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Cen-
tral Bank because it considered that the changes introduced by the legisla-
tor during the trilogue would have drastically limited the powers of the
ECB on this matter, have seriously distorted its proposal and interfered
‘with some fundamental principles of the Treaty, with the institutional
balance and with the independent exercise by the ECB of its monetary pol-
icy competence’, as mentioned in the Press communiqué of 20 March
2019, including a letter from which we draw the quotation from President
Draghi to Mr Tajani, President of the European Parliament.51
The second regulation (EMIR review 2) includes a modification of the
regulation on markets infrastructures (EMIR) as well as procedures and au-
thorities related to the authorisation of CCP’s of third countries.52 It aims
to equip the Capital Markets Union with a more effective and coherent
system of surveillance of the CCP’s in the interest of pursuing the integra-
tion of capital markets, financial stability and a level playing field. Third
countries CCP’s would be classified as not important (tier 1) and systemat-
ically important ones or susceptible to become so (tier 2) which could
compromise the financial stability of the Union. The first ones would be
submitted for their recognition to the same rules as the organisms active
within the Union, the others would be submitted to supplementary mea-
sures. An executive specific section of ESMA would be in charge of estab-
lishing whether or not rules applicable in third countries to the CCP’s un-
der tier 2 are comparable to the rules imposed to CCP’s established under
EU legislation. If ESMA, with the agreement of the central bank issuing
the related currency, recommends to the Commission to not recognise a
tier 2 mechanism, the Commission could adopt an execution act requiring
the organism in question to be established within the EU and authorizing
it to exercise there its functions.
In a Communication prior to its regulation proposal53 the Commission
affirms its remaining engagement in favour of the integration of financial
51 See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2019/html/ecb.pr190320~df3e12da5
a.en.html. A letter was also addressed to the Bulgarian Presidency.
52 Proposal of the Commission, 13 June 2017, COM (2017) 331 final.
53 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council
and the European Central Bank, Responding to the challenges for critical finan-
cial market infrastructures and further developing the Capital Markets Union,
COM(2017) 225 final, May 4 2017. See also Proposal for a regulation of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 as
regards the clearing obligation…, 4 May 2017 COM (2017) 208 final. This propos-
al was approved on plenary by the European Parliament, on 18 April 2019.
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markets, of its international obligations and the possibility of [recognising]
the equivalence for the CCP’s, and states that it is conscious of the necessi-
ty to avoid an undue fragmentation of the global system. It nevertheless in-
sists that specific arrangements based on objective criteria are necessary for
ensuring that, where CCP’s play a systemic key role for financial markets
and have a direct impact on the responsibilities, including financial stabili-
ty and monetary policy of institutions and authorities of the EU and its
Member States, that they are submitted to safeguards provided by the legal
framework of the EU. And the Commission concluded with these words:
‘This includes, where necessary, enhanced supervision and/or location re-
quirements.’ We may see in these considerations a kind of answer to the
speeches of the Bank of England Governor: cooperation among authorities
is needed but responsibilities in future will be separated. A common inter-
est to be preserved.
The remaining links between the UK and the Continent in financial
matters will be important. Let us briefly quote as examples:
1. The participation to international organisations: IMF, BIS and Basel
committees, FSB, G7, G20, with a more central role for EU institutions.
As already mentioned, the continued presence of the UK in these or-
ganisms could make the substitution of the EU to its Member States
and institutions not easier. We particularly refer to ‘the progressively es-
tablishing unified representation of the euro area in the IMF’, as in-
cluded in a proposal of the Commission for a Council decision in line
with the so-called Five Presidents report of June 2015 on Completing
Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union.54 This proposal opts for a
‘gradual approach’ involving “intermediate transitional steps for repre-
sentation in the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IM-
FC) and the IMF Executive Board. This cautious approach derives from
the fact that if the ECOFIN Council has agreed in the past (2006) on
the necessity of a representation of the EU in the IMF, it considered
this move as a longer-term goal, the move to a single euro area as does,
it should be noticed, the Commission in the Explanatory Memoran-
dum of its proposal: ‘the external representation of the euro area will
also depend on the future status of the euro area in the IMF that mem-
ber countries of the IMF would be willing to grant.’55
54 COM (2015) 603 final, 21 October 2015.
55 The European Central Bank, on 6 April 2016, has issued an opinion on this pro-
posal, CON/2016/22, OJ C216, 16 June 2016, which includes some reservations.
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2. Swap agreements and other kinds of bilateral agreements, more or less
formal, between respective central banks, will be ready to be activated
in consideration of the remaining role of the City in financing conti-
nental banks and the general practice among global currencies in time
of crises.
Some short conclusive remarks
The continuity in British official attitude since the beginning of European
integration is remarkable: from the initial refusal of the UK Government
to participate to the building of the Communities and its intend to dilute
the young EEC in a free trade area, the five so-called economic tests of Gor-
don Brown to be met for the adoption of the euro by the UK, the addition
of opt-outs from crucial realisations of the Union, to the David Cameron’s
Bloomberg speech of 23 January 2013, the short-lived Arrangement of 18
and 19 February 2016 concluded within the Council between Cameron
and his counterparts, but which didn’t prevent the negative result of the
referendum in June 2016, the extraordinary favourable referendum of 1975
and the more than 40 years of membership of the EU both appear as al-
most incredible exceptions in the history of the relations between the UK
and the Continent after the second World War during which we ought so
much to its resistance.
Perhaps an opportunity exists to manage a reasonable cooperation on
common vital interests between the two entities should Brexit really hap-
pen: a UK having become a third country and the EU progressing towards
a sui generis federal construction.
While outlining the objectives of the negotiation in her Lancaster
speech of January 2017,56 she mentioned first ‘Certainty and clarity’, com-
menting that this ‘first objective is crucial’. This remains true now.
The Brexit is bad for the British financial sector as it is in general a disas-
ter for Britain. It should encourage us, anyway, despite of all odds to re-
form the process of continental integration and cultivate a sound relation
with our difficult neighbour.
VI.
56 See the reference in note 3.
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Comments on Jean-Victor Louis
Stefan Griller
Abstract
Should the UK indeed leave the EU, there is a fair chance that the dynamics of
EMU-deepening could change, including the Banking Union. Of course, there is
no guarantee for that. But a heavyweight with the tendency of decelerating
progress will disappear.
After a ‘No-Deal-Brexit’ any directly enforceable right to establishment for
British financial institutions under EU law would be dependent on secondary
EU legislation. This should not be too high a hurdle given that secondary legisla-
tion allows for the establishment of financial institutions owned by third country
nationals of third country enterprises.
A specific issue concerns Clearing Houses. It would be preferable if at least
those of them providing services of systemic relevance would be established within
the Euro area. However, there is need for a transitory arrangement. An ESMA-
decision would be advisable in order to guarantee the smooth transition of clear-
ing services into the post Brexit era.
Introductory Remarks
These comments are brief, for the simple reason that I fully concur with
Jean-Victor Louis’ analysis, be it the identification of the most salient issues
or be it his respective observations. Some complementary aspects shall nev-
ertheless be added.
Given that, at the time of writing, still no agreement under Article 50
TEU could be reached, my working hypothesis is that there will be no
such agreement and that the UK would on 31 October 2019, find itself as a
third country without specific treaty arrangement with the EU (‘no deal
Brexit’);1 but that it would, with some adjustments of its WTO-commit-
ments, remain a WTO-member, and that, consequently, its trade relations
1 COM (2018) 556 final/2, Communication from the Commission, Preparing for the
withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union 30 March 2019, p 4.
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with the EU and its members would thus be regulated by WTO law.2 Gov-
erning the business of financial service providers and thus closely EMU-re-
lated is the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), including the
Understanding on commitments in financial services, together with coun-
try specific schedules.3 The latter would have to be adjusted at the occasion
of the UK leaving the EU, which might equally take some time.
The envisaged alternative scenario:4 that there would be a transition pe-
riod until 1 January 2021 for negotiating the future relations between the
EU and the UK, would make a smooth transition into such relations much
more likely.
As always, the legislator, in this case, the EU and the UK could by con-
cluding an agreement under Article 50 TEU render most (but not all) of
the following irrelevant from one day to another.
On the Dynamics of EMU-participation and EMU-reform
At a very general level we may ask: Will the dynamics of EMU‑participa-
tion change once the UK would have left? Legally, there is not much to
say. Protocol 15 will be abrogated. That Protocol provides, side by side
with Protocol 17 on Denmark, for an exemption from the general obliga-
tion to participate in the 3rd stage of the EMU. It is well known that the
Council’s decision to end derogation could, once the convergence criteria
are met, be taken by qualified majority, theoretically even against the will
of the Member State in question. This obligation is now to be found in Ar-
ticle 140 TFEU. Nevertheless, some of the younger Member States like
Poland used to point at the UK when it comes to debates on the obligation
to join the EMU. Once the UK will have gone, Denmark remains the only
Member State without such an obligation. This might result in an in-
I.
2 Compare more in detail, stressing the numerous complicated problems which are,
also under WTO law, being caused by Brexit: Christoph Herrmann, ‘Brexit and the
WTO: challenges and solutions for the United Kingdom (and the European
Union)’, in ECB Legal Conference 2017. Shaping a new legal order for Europe: a
tale of crises and opportunities (2017), 165–179.
3 Compare the Understanding on commitments in financial services: https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/21-fin_e.htm and the current EU schedule
on specific commitments: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/
FE_S_S009-itsDP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=31391 or http://i-tip.wto.org/
services/GATS_Detail.aspx/?id=23178&sector_path=0000700044 (accessed Septem-
ber 2018).
4 COM(2018) 556 final/2, at p 4.
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creased pressure on the others to respect their obligation including Swe-
den. However, in times of differentiation and disintegration, also the con-
trary might be true. For we have to realise that exerting pressure on a
Member State might in the near future even more easily result in initia-
tives to trigger Article 50 TEU. Therefore, the resulting perspective is am-
biguous.
The second point is closely related: will the dynamics of EMU-deepen-
ing change, including the Banking Union? We might remember that the
UK has a reputation of watering down draft initiatives sometimes to a
point where the original idea had almost been lost, only to in the end
block the remains anyway. The most famous example in recent years was
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic
and Monetary Union, including the so-called Fiscal Compact. Earlier, both
a treaty amendment and secondary legislation had been envisaged. It had
been mainly the UK blocking these solutions, which led to the famous es-
cape from EU law to international law.5 After Brexit we could expect that
the fiscal compact could be integrated into the Treaties, possibly even by
secondary legislation,6 considering that it’s watered-down final version
comes very close to the respective obligation under the six pack. However,
it remains to be seen whether this incorporation will happen. Brexit could
thus turn out as revitalising the Community method also in the field of
EMU. However, we cannot rule out that the poison of intergovernmental-
ism has already done its work and that nothing would happen. What I
would, at any event, not expect is that the remaining Member States
would, at the occasion of integrating the matter into EU law, revitalise the
more ambitious first drafts of the fiscal compact rules.
Similar, but, as far as details are concerned, different examples can be
found in pieces of secondary legislation, namely banking union legislation,
where the UK had strongly influenced the outcome, not the least by argu-
ing that it would otherwise face disadvantages as a nonparticipating mem-
ber, and sometimes by even pointing to possible later EMU accession,
which would be more likely if the UK’s ideas would be reflected. Also
here, the remaining Member States could take or accept fresh initiatives,
5 Compare Paul Craig, The Stability, Coordination and GovernanceTreaty: Princi-
ple, Politics and Pragmatism, ELRev (2012) 231, 232 f.
6 In fact, this is the core of the Commission proposal COM(2017) 824 final from 6
December 2017, to enact, mainly on the basis of Article 126 (14) TFEU, a Council
directive laying down provisions for strengthening fiscal responsibility and the
medium-term budgetary orientation in the Member States.
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once the heavy stumbling block is no longer there.7 However, we can only
speculate whether that will happen.
On the Importance of Commercial Presence on 31 October 2019
My third point is related to the freedom of establishment and the strategic
options of British financial service providers, mainly credit institutions
during the transitory period to Brexit. A first assumption is that the single
licence to do business by way of providing services (in the sense of Articles
56 et seqq. TFEU) would disappear in the case of a no deal Brexit.8 Anoth-
er assumption is that the EU commitments under the GATS would in
principle remain unchanged, and thus also be applicable to the UK as a
third country.9
Would it, under such circumstances, be better for British banks to move
or to establish subsidiaries before or after the lapse of the (prolonged) two
year period? Again, all of that may be irrelevant from one day to the other
once an arrangement between the EU and the UK is reached.
WTO-commitments of the EU regarding financial services would, under
the assumption that they will, without any substantive change, be applied
to UK financial service providers after the leave of the EU, not include the
right to “actively” provide services within the EU without any establish-
ment – the so-called “presence of natural persons” in WTO-terminology.10
Thus, UK service providers would need to obtain a licence in one of the 27
II.
7 Compare, in this regard, COM (2017)291 final, Reflection paper on the deepen-
ing of the economic and monetary union, p 19; COM(2017) 592 final, Communi-
cation on completing the Banking Union, both with further references.
8 Generally, compare COM(2018) 556 final/2, at p 14 et seq.; as well as the ‘Notice
to stakeholders’ issued by the European Commission, 8 February 2018: ‘With-
drawal of the United Kingdom and EU Rules in the Field of Banking and Pay-
ment Services’.
9 This assumption is not self-evident, but, it is argued, likely. To a certain extent
this would probably also depend on reciprocity: that the UK in turn would, in the
absence of a specific trade agreement with the EU, treat EU Member States’ finan-
cial institutions as third countries’ institutions, and to apply the standards it used
to apply as an EU vis-à-vis third countries.
10 Compare the Understanding on commitments in financial services: https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/21-fin_e.htm and the current EU schedule
on specific commitments: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/
FE_S_S009-its DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=31391 or http://i-
tip.wto.org/services/GATS_Detail.aspx/?id=23178&sector_path=0000700044 (ac-
cessed September 2018).
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EU Member States. Regarding such authorisation, there will be no au-
tomatism in accepting the prudential supervision arrangements that
British financial service providers established with their home authori-
ties.11 By contrast, e.g. in the field of banking, the ECB would, in the case
of “significant” banks, have to fully scrutinise all relevant conditions be-
fore an eventual authorisation to take up the business of a credit institu-
tion under regulation 1024/2013. However, such decisions should be taken
without any discrimination, flowing from the right to national treatment
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), including the
Understanding on commitments in financial services.12
Such non-discriminatory scrutiny applies already today for UK financial
service providers who seek getting established in another EU Member
State, i.e. through commercial presence especially by creating a new service
provider or a subsidiary. As long as the UK is an EU member, however,
there is a right to establishment flowing from the treaties. There doesn’t
seem to be a point for restricting that right resulting solely from triggering
the exit procedure.13 Once established, the financial service provider would
later benefit from fundamental rights protection when it comes to a possi-
ble withdrawal of the existing authorisation, even after Brexit. Paradoxical-
ly, the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property14 would
provide firm protection for established banks even after a no deal Brexit,
probably even better if compared to the rights of natural persons.
However, after the materialisation of Brexit, and in the absence of any
agreement, any directly enforceable right to establishment under EU law
would be dependent on secondary EU legislation.15 UK banks would then
be third country banks. This should not be too high a hurdle, though, giv-
en that secondary legislation allows for the establishment of financial insti-
tutions owned by third country nationals of third country enterprises.
11 Compare also Louis’ contribution.
12 Compare supra n 3.
13 Compare in this regard, even if in a totally different field, the judgment of the
ECJ on the validity of a European arrest warrant: Case C-327/18 PPU, RO,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:733.
14 Articles 16 and 17 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
15 This applies also to the right to establishment flowing from WTO law, given the
reluctance of the ECJ to directly enforce WTO obligations according to its stand-
ing jurisprudence, starting with Case C-149/96, Portugal vs. Council,
ECLI:EU:C:1999:574.
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However, Regulation 1024/201316 establishes that the ECB, when deciding
on authorisation requests, has to apply also national legislation. Should a
Member State restrict the establishment of third country banks -even if this
should happen mainly to reduce competition for its own banks – that
could be disadvantageous for British banks. Such restriction appears rather
unlikely given that Member States might feel tempted to draw advantage
from offering investment opportunities, and the established bank would
then benefit again from its right to establishment in any other EU Member
State. Consequently, economically speaking this should not be a big issue.
There is an alternative solution to this scenario: equivalence decisions to
be issued by the European Commission.17 This might be done on the basis
of individual scrutiny of the third country, here: the UK after a no deal
Brexit. Such a decision is to be drafted for specific services and require-
ments and includes broad discretion for the European Commission.18
Therefore, this can also be seen as a bargaining chip in the ongoing negoti-
ations.
Even if we might assume that, given the common standards which have
been developed during the last decades, the UK system should in many in-
stances qualify as equivalent, there is no guarantee of such respective deci-
sion, nor that it would be swiftly taken by the Commission. At any event,
compared to a financial service provider established within the EU, there is
surely a disadvantage in legal certainty and enforceability. Hence, if British
financial service providers want to be on the safe side it would be advisable
to move or to create subsidiaries before the materialisation of a no deal
Brexit.
16 Article 4 Council Regulation 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the European
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions, OJ 2013/L 287/63.
17 It should be added that doing business for third country financial institutions can
be simplified by a number of so-called equivalence decisions to be issued by the
European Commission; compare the overview at https://ec.europa.eu/info/busi-
ness-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/international-relations/recognition-non-
eu-financial-frameworks-equivalence-decisions_en#documents; https://
ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/overview-table-equivalence-decisions_en.pdf (last
visited October 2018); compare also European Parliament, Directorate General for
Internal Policies, Implications of Brexit on EU Financial Services (2017).
18 For more details compare European Parliament (above n 17) at pp 53 ff.
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On the Systemic Importance of Clearing Houses
While, generally speaking, creating establishments for financial service
providers within the EU-27 is mainly a question of (continuity for) busi-
ness opportunities, this might be different when it comes to the specific is-
sue of authorising central counterparties’ (CCPs) businesses;19 a CCP is a
‘legal person that interposes itself between the counterparties to the con-
tracts traded on one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to ev-
ery seller and the seller to every buyer’.20 Today, around 99% of the Euro
denominated Union Market is being cleared by UK based CCPs – with es-
timated daily values of repos and open positions in interest-rate swaps of
respectively € 101 billion and € 33 trillion.21
Consequently, in respect of CCPs, smooth transition might be of sys-
temic importance for the EMU in general.22
To start with, disturbances in clearing systems might impact on the pri-
mary objective set for the ECB’s monetary policy: price stability. Effects
might weaken the liquidity position of credit institutions which in turn
might harm the payment system. Moreover, such disturbances might im-
pair the transmission system of the ECB’s monetary policy.
Against this background there is, as the ECB has pointed out,23 even a
case for requiring CCPs to be located within a Euro area Member State. Al-
ready today, specific supervisory arrangements between the ECB and the
Bank of England are in place, the smooth functioning of which is not be-
III.
19 Compare also Louis, in this volume, at p. 221 ff.
20 Article 2(1) of Regulation 648/2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties
and trade repositories, OJ 2012/L 201/1, last amended by Commission Delegated
Regulation 2017/979, OJ 2017/L 148/1.
21 ECB/2017/18), Recommendation for a Decision of the European Parliament and
of the Council amending Article 22 of the Statute of the European System of Cen-
tral Banks and of the European Central Bank, OJ 2017/C 212/14, p. 15.
22 Compare, on the risk reducing purpose of regulating such business Commission
Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying the documentPro-
posal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Councilamending
Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority
(European Securities and Markets Authority) and amending Regulation (EU)No
648/2012 as regards the procedures and authorities involved for the authorisation
ofCCPs and the requirements for the recognition of third-country CCPs,
SWD(2017) 246 final, 13 June 2017.
23 ECB/2017/18), Recommendation for a Decision of the European Parliament and
of the Council amending Article 22 of the Statute of the European System of Cen-
tral Banks and of the European Central Bank, OJ 2017/C 212/14. Compare also
the respective Commission Opinion of 3 October 2017, 2017/C 340/1.
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yond doubt. Consequently, even with the UK as an EU member, it would
be preferable if CCPs – at least those providing services of systemic rele-
vance – would be established within the Euro area and thus being subject
to the regulatory power of the ECB. This is even more so once the UK
would be a third country. For any authorisation of a CCP under Article 14
of Regulation 648/2012 would lapse after Brexit. Consequently, any such
CCP would, in order to smoothly continue with its clearing activities,
need an authorisation as a legal person established in the EU. Otherwise,
the smooth continuation not only of the CCP’s business, but moreover of
the European clearing system as such would be endangered with the UK
becoming a third country.
This might be somehow mitigated by the possibility for third country
CCPs to get recognised for providing clearing services in the EU.24 How-
ever, this is only possible on the basis of a respective decision by ESMA,
interacting with the Commission, and including a certain margin of appre-
ciation. Consequently, action is paramount in order to guarantee the
smooth transition of clearing services into the post Brexit era.
The background for this initiative is a judgment handed down by the General
Court, Case T-496/11, UK vs ECB, ECLI:EU:T:2015:133, denying the competence
of the ECB to set such a requirement.
24 Article 25 of Regulation 648/2012.
See also COM(2017) 331 final of 13.6.2017, with a proposal to amend that regu-
lation (not yet passed).
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Common Foreign and Security Policy After Brexit
Maria José Rangel de Mesquita
Abstract
Within the wider context and scope of CFSP the EU Global Strategy and some
subsequent developments on CSDP may be relevant to the shaping of the future
EU-UK relationship after Brexit raising the question of what could be the status
of the UK regarding participation in CFSP: a mere third State or ex-EU third
State. Different forms of future cooperation have been envisaged in several initia-
tives, both from the EU and the UK side, addressing the issue of CFSP and CSDP
after Brexit. The contents of both the texts of the Withdrawal Agreement and of
the Political Declaration of 25 November 2018 regarding the area of CFSP/
CSDP may indicate that the future EU-UK relationship in this area, on one
hand is rather programmatic and modest and that the concrete terms of the par-
ticipation are rather narrow and still need to be detailed (in future agreements)
and that no specific ex-EU Member State statute is envisaged; and, on the other
hand, that some of the concrete areas in which closer cooperation is envisaged (in
particular PESCO and defence capabilities development) relate to the sub-area of
CSDP. However, the guidelines laid down in both texts appear to still leave room
to shape a differentiated third State status in the field of CFSP/CSDP. Even in
areas where the status of third State is clearly mentioned – PESCO and EU mis-
sions and operations – neither the rules of third States participation are defini-
tively defined nor is the envisaged Framework Participation Agreement necessar-
ily bound to follow a single model. The next step – negotiating and agreeing on
more detailed rules – appears to be an opportunity to envisage the features of a
possible differentiated third State status in the field of CFSP/CSDP.
Introductory remarks: External Action, Global Strategy and beyond
The wider context: EU External Action and CFSP and CSDP within the
CFSP
Addressing the issue of the future of European Union (EU) Common For-
eign and Security Policy (CFSP) after Brexit requires two previous remarks
I.
A.
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regarding its context – the EU External Action as the wider (area of compe-
tences) context of CFSP – and its scope – the CFSP itself including the sub-
area of competences regarding specifically the Common Security and De-
fence Policy (CSDP). And this is so for two main reasons: firstly, whatever
the model of the future relations between the EU and the United Kingdom
(UK) within and beyond the framework of the withdrawal agreement may
be in the specific area of CFSP, it cannot exclude the overall framework
and approach in the field of EU External Action, including CFSP, laid
down in the Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (EU
Global Strategy) and the subsequent developments; secondly, within the
(largest) CFSP the CSDP raises particular issues regarding the future possi-
ble cooperation between the EU and UK, especially regarding participa-
tion in EU CFSP instruments and international (either regional or univer-
sal) organizations in the field of international security and defence involv-
ing military capacities, in particular NATO.1
Within the wider context and scope of CFSP the EU Global Strategy
and some subsequent developments may be particularly relevant to the
shaping of the future EU-UK relationship (see B. below), raising the
question of what could be the status of the UK regarding participation in
CFSP: a mere third State or ex-EU third State. The text will further address
initiatives regarding CFSP and CSDP after Brexit, both in the EU and UK
perspective (see II. below), as well as the final text of the Withdrawal
Agreement and the Political Declaration of 25 November 2018 (see III. be-
low) and the way they envisage the future EU-UK relationship in the field
of CFSP and CSDP – and whether they admit or, at least, do not exclude
the participation of the UK in CFSP and CSDP and respective initiatives
with a status that may differ from the status of the third States that have
already been allowed to cooperate with the EU in that field of CFSP and
CSDP. Finally, the text will focus on the issue of shaping a possible differ-
entiated third State status in the field of CFSP and CSDP (see IV. below).
1 The text corresponds essentially to the intervention in the European Constitutional
Law Network, Lisbon Workshop 23–24 June 2017, Brexit – Challenge or end of EU
constitutional law? The future of EU policies after Brexit although some subsequent de-
velopments have been further considered in the text. In order to avoid overlapping
with other External Action-related topics addressed in the Conference, the text fo-
cuses mainly on CFSP (as a significant part of External Action), including the CS-
DP and does not address as well the issue of the consequences of a UK break out
on the possible design of the relationship with the EU (see T Oliver, ‘What if the
UK were to break up? A closer look at an English Foreign policy’, available at
www.blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/06/09/english-foreign-policy-what-if-the-uk-were-t
o-break-up/).
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The Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy and follow-up:
trends on the EU side
The presentation of the Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Poli-
cy (EU Global Strategy)2 by the High Representative of the Union for For-
eign Affairs and Security Policy intends to establish a new (although ambi-
tious) overall framework and approach – a political vision – in the field of
EU External Action, including CFSP and establish the EU priorities in this
respect.
The EU Global Strategy assumed that present times are times of «exis-
tential crisis, within and beyond the EU» and that the European project is
being questioned in many ways, thus proposing a «stronger Europe» – that
EU citizens deserve and the wider world expects – based on shared inter-
ests (and values) and oriented by clear principles (and principled pragma-
tism) and focused to pursue five clear priorities – the security of the Union;
promoting State and Societal Resilience to EU East and South; developing
an integrated approach to conflicts and crisis; promoting and supporting
cooperative regional orders; and, finally, reinforcing global governance for
the 21st Century, based on International law, including the principles of
the UN and the Helsinki Final Act3 – which are related to the macro-area
of competences of the EU External Action as such, as foreseen by the
Treaty of Lisbon.4 The intention to assume the responsibility of the EU as
a global stakeholder, as the Treaty of Lisbon announced, is envisaged by
the EU Global Strategy as a shared responsibility meaning being engaged
with other players and partnerships in a connected (networked) world.
Moreover, and concerning the priorities established in the EU Global
Strategy, three features must be underlined: first, regarding promoting se-
curity of the Union (in the fields of defence, cyber, counter terrorism, en-
ergy and strategic communications) the idea of an «appropriate level of
ambition and strategic autonomy» is announced – possibly (also) meaning
a shift of strategy to the further development of an own EU defence policy;
second, the idea of promoting resilience (of States and societies), both at
east and south, within and beyond European neighbourhood policy, as a
B.
2 Shared Vision, Common Action: a Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the
European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (June 2016) – consulted as well as
the other EU documents further mentioned in www.eeas.europa.eu.
3 See EU Global Strategy (2016), 3.1 to 3.5.
4 See also Conclusions on the Global Strategy for the External and Security Policy of the
Union approved by the EU Foreign Affairs Council (FA Council), 17 October /
2016, CFSP/PESC 814, CSDP/PSDC 572.
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way to achieve transformation and attraction towards the EU- namely
through the establishment of closer relations within the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy (ENP) in order to spur transformation in neighbour (and
also other) third countries and the targeting of the most acute cases of gov-
ernmental, economic, societal and climate/energy fragility and the devel-
opment of more effective migration policies for Europe and its partners;
third, the clear aspiration, as a global player, to aim at transformation
(rather than preservation) of the existing international order – mainly
through striving for a strong UN as the bedrock of the multilateral rules-
based order and the development of global coordinated responses and also
its commitment to global governance by the determination to reform the
UN, including the Security Council.5
Two connections may be established between the EU Global Strategy
and the future EU-UK relationship in the field of CFSP/CSDP: on one
hand the timing of its presentation can be read (also) as a ‘reaction’ to the
Brexit referendum (since the EU announces its political will to reinforce its
role as a global player); on the other hand the translation of the EU «politi-
cal vision» (as presented in the EU Global Strategy) into action has led to a
significant development in the field of CFSP, mainly CSDP, through the
adoption of three main categories of initiatives – political, institutional
and financial – in some of which the UK may participate during and after
the transition period.
In fact, the subsequent translation of the ‚political vision‘ and the five
broad priorities expressed in the EU Global Strategy into concrete initia-
tives and actions has led to the significant development of the CSDP, lead-
ing to the EU Security and Defence package» based on three pillars:6
i) a ‘new level of ambition in security and defence’ agreed within the Coun-
cil7 as new political goals and ambitions for Europeans to take more
responsibility for their own security and defence;
ii) the European Defence Action Plan,8 aimed at facilitating and incentivis-
ing defence cooperation between Member States through the establish-
5 See EU Global Strategy (2016), 3.2 and 3.5.
6 See European Defence Action Plan, Introduction, 3.
7 Council Conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the Area of Se-
curity and Defence – (Foreign Affairs) Council Conclusions of 14 November 2016,
especially Level of Ambition, 7, a., b. and c., and Actions, 11–18.
8 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European
Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of Regions – European Defence Action Plan (COM(2016)950 final of
30 November 2016).
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ment of a research and of a capability window and foreseeing new fi-
nancial tools to help Member States and the European defence indus-
try to develop defence capabilities, including the European Defence
Fund (EDF);
iii) a set of concrete actions (as a follow up to the Warsaw EU-NATO Joint
Declaration of 8 July 20169 which identified seven key areas of coopera-
tion10) adopted in parallel by the Council of the EU and Foreign Min-
isters of NATO on 6 December 201611 which foresees forty-two con-
crete proposals for implementing in the seven areas of cooperation.
Therefore, in the specific field of CFSP/CSDP and in the period 2016–
2019, the three main categories of initiatives above mentioned were adopt-
ed by either sources of binding secondary law or soft law instruments: (i)
political and strategic; (ii) institutional and operational; and (iii) financial ini-
tiatives.
Within the first category – political and strategic – several instruments
were adopted by the EU. The above-mentioned Commission’s European
Defence Action Plan, contributes to ensuring that the European defence
industrial base is able to meet Europe’s current and future security needs
and, in that respect, enhances the Union’s strategic autonomy, strengthen-
ing its ability to act with partners. It focuses on capability needs and sup-
ports the European defence industry and is based on three main pillars –
launching a European Defence Fund, fostering investments in defence sup-
ply chains and reinforcement of the single market for defence – and aims
also at maximising civil/military synergies across EU policies.
Afterwards, the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence12 sets out
proposals to implement the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and
defence and mainly it sets up the aims of the proposed «new Level of ambi-
9 Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the
European Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization of 8 July 2016 (see www.natolibguides.info).
10 Ibid. The seven key areas of cooperation identified are: countering hybrid threats;
operational cooperation including maritime issues; cyber security and defence;
defence capabilities; defence industry and research; parallel and coordinated exer-
cises; defence and security capacity-building.
11 Statement on the implementation of the Joint Declaration signed by the Presi-
dent of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and
the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of 6 December
2016 and Annex (Common set of proposals for the implementation of the Joint
Declaration).
12 Implementation Plan on Security and Defence presented to the Council of 14
November 2016 (14392/16).
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tion» – developing a stronger Union in security and defence, which is able
to tackle today’s threats and challenges more effectively, with the right ca-
pabilities, tools and structures to deliver more security for its citizens.
Moreover, it outlines the goals that the EU and its Member States set out
to achieve within the three priorities which are mutually reinforcing – re-
sponding to external conflicts and crisis, capacity building of partners and
protecting the Union and its citizens – and puts forward concrete actions
(actionable proposals) to implement the level of ambition in respect of set-
ting capability development priorities, deepening defence cooperation, ad-
justing structures, tools and (financial) instruments, drawing on the full
potential of the Treaty regarding PESCO and actively taking forward CS-
DP Partnerships13.
Subsequently the Commission’s Reflection Paper on the future of the Euro-
pean defence,14 the Reports on the implementation of the EU Global Strate-
gy (Years 1 and 2),15 the Civilian Capability Development Plan, the Civil-
ian CSDP Compact16 (which aims to strengthen EU’s capacity to deploy
civilian crisis management missions whose objectives are to reinforce the
13 See Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, Level of Ambition, 5 and ff., espe-
cially 5 and 6, and Implementing the Level of Ambition, 19 and ff.
14 Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence (COM(2017)315 of 7 June
2017) – which followed the Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of Europe
(COM(2017) 206 of 26 April 2017), the Reflection Paper on Harnessing Globali-
sation (COM(2017)240 of 10 May 2017) and the Reflection Paper on the Deepen-
ing of the Economic and Monetary Union (COM(2017) 291 of 31 May 2017). It
was published to launch a debate on how the EU (now) 27 might develop by
2025 in the area of defence. – This 4th Reflection Paper followed the White Paper
on the Future of Europe. Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025
(COM(2017)2025 of 1 March 2017.
15 From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1,
June 2017; From Shared Vision to Common Action: Global Strategy for the European
Union’s Foreign and Security Policy – Implementation Report Year 2, June 2018.
16 Council Conclusions on strengthening civilian CSDP (document 9288/18 of 28
May 2018, COPS 171, CIVCOM 89, CFSP/PESC 475, CSDP/PSDC 475, RELEX
451, JAI 493), namely Next Steps, n.ºs 8 e 9. – On 22 May 2018 a provisional
agreement was reached on a regulation establishing the European Defence Industri-
al Development Programme (EDIDP) that will be submitted to the EP for a vote
and subsequently to the Council for final adoption and which is expected to fi-
nance the first capability projects in 2019. See also Conclusions of the Council
and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting
within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP compact, as adopted
by the FA Council in its meeting held on 19 November 2017 (14305/18, COPS
432, CIVCOM 231, POLMIL 207, CFSP/PESC 1046, CSDP/PSDC 656, JAI 1135
of 19 November 2018) – see I (Strategic Guidelines) and II (Commitments).
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police, the rule of law and the civil administration in fragile and conflict
setting) and the EU Action Plan on Military Mobility (aiming at improv-
ing mobility of military personnel, material and assets within and beyond
the EU, both in PESCO and in the context of EU-NATO cooperation, by
addressing the existing legal, infrastructural and procedural barriers be-
tween the EU Member States)17 were adopted.18
Within the second category – institutional and operational initiatives – in
March 2017 the Council of the EU approved Conclusions on progress in im-
plementing the EU Global Strategy in the Area of Security and Defence19 that
address four main issues: i) improving CSDP crisis management structures,
including a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) for its
non-military missions within the EU Military Staff (EUMS) to be reviewed
by the end of 2018; ii) Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); iii)
Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), to be implemented on a
voluntary basis; and iv) developing civilian capabilities.
Two of these issues and respective initiatives may be particularly rele-
vant to the EU-UK relationship after Brexit: PESCO and CARD.
According to Articles 42(6) and 46 of the TEU, as well as Protocol 10,
the PESCO provides a framework to deepen defence cooperation among
the Member States participants – in which the participation of the UK will
be admitted. After presenting in September 2017, a list of common com-
mitments in the main areas foreseen in Protocol 10, notably defence in-
vestment, capability development and operational readiness, 23 Member
States signed a joint notification on the PESCO on 13 November 2017, set-
ting out the principles, a list of 20 binding common commitments they
have agreed to undertake as well as proposals on the governance of
17 See Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council of
28.2.2018 (JOIN(2018) 5 final of 28 March 2018) and European Commission Fact-
sheet on Military Mobility (available in www.eeas.europa.eu). See previously Joint
Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Improving Mili-
tary Mobility in the European Union (Join(2017) 41 final, of 10 October 2017) ac-
cording to which by March 2018 the High Representative and the Commission
would submit an Action Plan on Military Mobility for Member States’ endorse-
ment.
18 The various initiatives have been supported at highest political level – see in par-
ticular Conclusions of the European Council of 28 June 2018, II. Security and De-
fence, 13. See also Conclusions of the European Council of 18 October 2018, III.
External Relations (10–14).
19 Council Conclusions on progress in implementing the EU Global Strategy in the
area of Security and Defence of 6 March 2017 (see Press Release 110/17 of
06/03/2017).
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PESCO.20 Afterwards, the Council adopted a decision establishing PESCO
and its list of (25 Member States) participants2122, leading to the adoption
by the Council (in formation of the PESCO) of a first set of 17 projects
(which cover areas such as training, capability development and opera-
tional readiness in the field of defence) and their participants.23
PESCO represents therefore a step further within the CSDP, through
the implementation of 17 collaborative projects in three different areas
(common training and exercises (2) operational domains (land, air, mar-
itime and cyber (6)) and joint and enabling capacities ((9) bridging opera-
tional gaps)). The Roadmap for the implementation of PESCO (12/2017–
12/2019) namely provides strategic direction and guidance on how to
structure further work on processes and governance, sets out a calendar for
the review and assessment process of the national implementation plans,
provides a timeline for agreements on possible future projects and the
main tenets of a common set of governance rules for projects. Finally, the
FA Council24 adopted a Council Decision establishing a common set of
governance rules for PESCO projects,25 in order to provide a framework
able to ensure coherent implementation compatible with PESCO projects.
20 Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to the Council and
to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
21 Council Decision establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and
determining the list of the Participating Member States (all except Denmark, UK
and Malta – 14866/17, CORLC 548, CFSP/PESC 1063, CSDP/PSDC 667, FIN
752, 8.11.2017) – Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 estab-
lishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of
participating Member States, OJ L 331, 14/12/2017, p. 57.
22 See also Declaration on PESCO projects by member states participating in
PESCO.
23 Council Decision establishing the list of projects to be developed under PESCO
(6393/18, CORLX 98, CFSP/PESC 169, CSDP/PSDC 83, FIN 145, 1.3.2018) and
Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/340 of 6 March 2018 establishing the list of
projects to be developed under PESCO (OJEU L65 of 8/3/2018, p. 24). – See also
Council Recommendation concerning a roadmap for the implementation of
PESCO (6588/1/18 VER 1, CORLX 123, CFSP/PESC 196, CSDP/PSDC 93, FIN
174, 6.3.2018).
24 Conclusions on Security and Defence in the context of the EU Global Strategy,
document 10246/18 of 25 June 2018, Annex (CFSP/PESC 589, CSDP/PSDC 351,
COPS 227, POLMIL 91, CIVCOM 122). The informal meeting of the EU Minis-
ters of Defence of 4–5 May 2018 decided to adopt more projects later in the end
of 2018, including military mobility, most relevant within EU-NATO cooperation
25 Ibid, Annex, Permanent Structured Cooperation, 1. and Council decision estab-
lishing a common set of governance rules for PESCO projects.
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In the perspective of the future EU-UK relationship after Brexit PESCO
is rather relevant since it is one of the new instruments in the field of CS-
DP in which the participation of the UK would be expressly envisaged dur-
ing the transition period and after its end (see below III.) – although the
conditions for third State participation in PESCO projects have not been
yet established by the Council.
Moreover, since the EU Global Strategy called for a gradual synchroni-
sation and mutual adaptation of national defence planning cycles and ca-
pability development practices to enhance strategic convergence between
Member States and facilitate and promote defence cooperation among
them, CARD is envisaged as an instrument to help foster capability devel-
opment addressing shortfalls, deepen defence cooperation and ensure
more optimal use, including coherence, of defence spending plans. Its ob-
jective is to develop on a voluntary basis a more structured way to deliver
identified capabilities based on greater transparency, political visibility and
commitment of Member States.26
Although UK participation in CARD is not expressly foreseen after the
end of the transition period it may not be completely out of question that
the UK may have some participation in CARD within one of the guide-
lines regarding the EU-UK future relationship in the field of CFSP (coordi-
nation).
Finally, within the third category, three financial initiatives were adopted
and/or proposed: the launching of the European Defence Fund in 2017;27
the new European Peace Facility (EPF) proposed by the High Representa-
26 The EDA in cooperation with the European External Action Service (EEAS) sub-
sequently produced a concept paper detailing the various CARD elements. The el-
ements and procedural steps are the following: initial information (analysis of all
CARD relevant information available in EDA databases or being made available
by Member States), bilateral dialogues (between EDA and each member State),
CARD analysis (produced by EDA that will present aggregate data and identify
trends regarding defence spending plans, implementation of priorities resulting
from the Capability Development Plan and relevant to defence research pro-
grammes, as well as opportunities for cooperation) to be further discussed with
Member States and will form the basis of the final report to be submitted to Min-
isters that will present the main results of the review as well as associated recom-
mendations (see CARD Factsheet, available at www.eeas.europa.eu). The Council
agreed to initiate a CARD which a ‘trail run’ involving all Member States as of
autumn 2017, in view of a first CARD report within 2018 and the first full CARD
cycle occurs in 2019.
27 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions –
Launching the European Defence Fund (COM(2017)295 final, 7/6/2017).
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tive, as a new financial tool outside the EU multi-annual budget; and the
proposal to reinforce the EU budget allocated to CFSP/CSDP in the frame-
work of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–27, meaning a
reinforcement of € 27, 5 billion.
The EDF presents two main strands – Research and Development and
acquisition – and is able to generate a total investment of €5 billion per
year after 2020. Moreover, the Commission’s proposal regarding the future
MFF 2021–27 confirms the EDF as a key initiative within CFSP since it
proposes, besides other initiatives (such as the dedicated budget for the
Connecting Europe facility connected to military mobility), an envelope of
€13 billion (over the 7 year period) to be dedicated to the EDF in order for
the EU to step up its contribution to Europe’s collective security and de-
fence, working with its partners, especially NATO.28 In addition, the EPF
is an EU off-budget fund (i.e., outside of the EU’s multi-annual budget)
worth of € 10.5 billion (and financed through contributions by EU Mem-
ber States based on a Gross Nacional income distribution key) over a peri-
od coinciding with the next MFF, to build peace and strengthen interna-
tional security since it is intended to enable the financing of operational
actions under the CFSP that have military or defence implications (not
funded under the EU budget according to Article 41 (2) TEU) on a perma-
nent basis, thus facilitating rapid deployment and enhancing flexibility29
to the extent that the framework of the future EU-UK relationship does
not exclude the participation of the UK in EU military missions and opera-
tions, the terms of participation of the UK in its financing, (namely
through the EPF), will have to be further considered.
Finally, besides the outlined developments and adoption of new initia-
tives, by the EU in the framework of EU Global Strategy, a last develop-
ment must be mentioned concerning EU-NATO’s closer cooperation. In
this respect, both the above mentioned Warsaw EU-NATO Joint Declaration
of 8 July 2016 in order to strengthen and deepen the cooperation and the
28 This increase, including in respect of EU-NATO projects, probably takes into con-
sideration the weight of the UK in defence spending within NATO (see the docu-
ment Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2010–2017), 29 June 2017 (Com-
munique PR/CP(2017) 111, available at nato.int). – See also European Commis-
sion Press Release EU budget for 2021–2027: Commission welcomes provisional
agreement for the future European Defence Fund (IP/19/1296 of 20 February
2019).
29 The EPF will also draw together existing off-budget mechanisms, namely the
Athena and the African Peace Facility, increasing the common financing of the
cost of military operations.
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endorsement of a common set of (42) proposals for its implementation
demonstrates that despite the evolution on the field of EU defence the
partnership with NATO remains essential to its future in a complementary
(by the time not competing) perspective on key areas of mutual interest.
Furthermore, in order to consolidate progress and ensure further advances
in all areas, both the EU and NATO Councils endorsed in 2017 a common
set of new proposals,30 including a total of further 32 concrete actions for
the implementation of the Joint Declaration and addressing new topics,
namely counter-terrorism, military mobility and promoting the role of
women in peace and security.31 Finally, a new Joint declaration of EU-NA-
TO cooperation was signed on 8 July 2018 according to which the progress
will continue to be reviewed on a yearly basis.
The issue of EU-NATO cooperation is also relevant to the shaping of the
EU-UK relationship, since the UK seems to envisage NATO as a corner-
stone of European defence – and therefore it is possible that it will not ful-
ly participate in EU CSDP initiatives that may jeopardize the prominence
of NATO’s role in such respect.
The above mentioned developments show that after a long period since
the approval of the European Security Strategy (2003)32 and almost a decade
after the signature of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU is trying hard to push
forward further developments in the field CFSP and CSDP within EU’s
External Action – although not yet at the stage of taking a (unanimous)
European Council decision on the establishment of a ‘common defence’
(as foreseen in Art. 42 (2) TEU).
30 Common set of new proposals on the implementation of the Joint Declaration
signed by the President of the European Council, the President of the European
Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
of 5 December 2017.
31 See also Council Conclusions on the implementation of the Joint Declaration by
the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commis-
sion and the Secretary General of NATO (14801/17, CFSP/PESC 1057, CSDP/
PSDC 661, COPS 372, POLMIL 153, EUMC 147 of 5 December 2017). The next
report on progress on implementation was expected to be presented in June 2018
(see Conclusions, no 7) and was presented in 31 May 2018.
32 European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World» of 12/12/2003.
See also, afterwards, the 2008 Report on the implementation of the ESS – Provid-
ing Security in a Changing World.
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It may be concluded from the 2016–18 CFSP, especially CSDP,33 devel-
opments and the whole of the concrete initiatives and instruments adopt-
ed by the EU within the framework of the EU Global Strategy and its am-
bitious goals, that a new path seems to arise in this field of competences: i)
the reinforcement of the EU autonomous strategy regarding CFSP/CSDP
(and at the same time of the cooperation with the EU partners in the
framework of a multilateralism approach); ii) strong efforts to strengthen
effective cooperation between Member States in the area of CSDP through
a wide range of initiatives, including PESCO, to improve Member States
defence capabilities; iii) clear reinforcement of the (EU and Member
States) financing of CFSP/CSDP either through the increase of EU budget,
or through specific financial instruments within the EU budget (EDF) or
outside (EPF); iv) despite the aim of reinforcement of the EU autonomous
strategy regarding CFSP/CSDP and the strengthen of CSDP cooperation
between EU Member States, the simultaneous reinforcement of the partici-
pation of the EU in collective defence in the framework of NATO with a
complementary approach.
That is therefore the overall context and framework which the design of
the future relationship between the EU and the UK regarding CFSP and
CSDP will have to consider and on which the terms of the future coopera-
tion (during and after the transition period) may depend regarding its
scope, nature and instruments.
Regarding the concrete participation of the UK in the CFSP and CSDP,
four main periods can therefore be identified in the light of Brexit: (i) pre-
EU Global Strategy, (ii) post-EU Global Strategy, (iii) transitional period
(from the entering into force of the Withdrawal Agreement until the end
of the transitional period) and finally (iv) post-transitional period.
Until the endorsement of the EU Global Strategy at political level, the
UK participated in the CFSP/CFSP as a full Member State, namely in the
CFSP decision making process, in the financing of the CFSP through the
EU budget, in the CSDP initiatives and in some of the EU missions and
operations (on a voluntary basis). After the post-EU Global Strategy, the
UK can also fully participate in the CFSP/CSDP decision making process
and initiatives as an EU Member State, even though it has chosen not to
participate fully in all new CFSP initiatives since it has not signed the joint
declaration on PESCO as a participant Member State and therefore will
33 For an overall view see Jochen Rehrl (ed.), Handbook on CSDP, The Common Secu-
rity and Defence Policy on the European Union, 3rd edition, 2017 (available at
eeas.europa.eu).
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only participate as a third State (according to the requirements that will be
adopted by the EU in this respect). The participation of the UK in the
CFSP/CSDP during the transition period and after the end of the transi-
tion period ending 30 May 2020 are foreseen, respectively, in the With-
drawal Agreement and in the Political Declaration setting out the frame-
work for the future relationship between the EU and the UK of 25 Novem-
ber 2018 – and the terms of the UK participation in the CFSP and PCSD
during those two periods (and further explained in III., A. and B. below)
are progressively limited and will probably evolve mainly on the basis of a
third State status.
Before the analysis of the final versions of the Withdrawal Agreement
and in the Political Declaration some indicators concerning the future EU-
UK relationship in the field of CFSP/CSDP may be found in some initia-
tives and documents addressing this subject, both in the EU and the UK
perspectives (II, A. and B. below).
Moreover, as addressed above (see III. and IV), the future EU-UK rela-
tionship in the field of foreign policy, security and defence will take into
consideration the values on which the post-EU Global Strategy, including
in the field of CFSP/CSDP, is based – as a common ground for coopera-
tion – and will also consider the participation of the UK in EU instruments
and structures aimed at achieving some of the objectives laid down in the
EU Global Strategy, such as the EU integrated approach to conflicts and
crisis in which EU missions and operations play an important role (and the
participation of the UK is also envisaged), or the European Defence Agen-
cy.
Initiatives addressing CFSP and CSDP after Brexit: the EU and the UK
perspectives
The EU Perspective
After the 23rd June referendum and following the United Kingdom’s noti-
fication under Article 50 TEU on 29 March 2017 of its intention to with-
draw from the EU and Euratom, several documents have been adopted
since then by different EU institutions: the European Council, the Coun-
cil, the European Parliament (EP) and the Commission, under the form of
either guidelines, negotiation directives, resolutions and finally the Withdrawal
Agreement.
From the EU perspective – and in the sequence of the principles set out
in the statement of Heads of State or Government and of the Presidents of
II.
A.
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the European Council and the European Commission on 29 June 2016 –
the most relevant political documents to the shaping of the EU-UK rela-
tionship in the field of CFSP/CSDP, during and after the transition period
(to be addressed either in the Withdrawal Treaty and in a Political Declara-
tion) are those adopted by the European Council and the European Parlia-
ment.
The EP Resolution of 14 March 201834 addresses, besides other issues,
the Framework of the future relationship of the EU and the UK, under the
form of a political declaration associated with the Withdrawal Agreement,
the (nine) principles that are a condition of the endorsement of such
Framework by the EP, the future negotiation of an association agreement
as an appropriate framework for the future relationship and the four pillars
on which the future relationship should be based according to the EP35. In
those four pillars, the EP includes, besides trade and economic relations,
internal security and thematic cooperation, also foreign policy, security coop-
eration and development cooperation. Specifically regarding foreign policy
and security cooperation (and development cooperation), the EP namely
admits that, although the UK as a third country will not be able to partici-
pate in the EU’s decision-making process, consultation mechanisms are
not excluded in order to allow the UK to align with EU foreign policy pos-
itions, joint actions or multilateral cooperation, especially in the frame-
work of the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe, and supports coordination
on sanction policy and implementation; that such partnership (under the
Framework Participation Agreement) would make it possible for UK par-
ticipation (with no lead role) in civilian and military missions and EU op-
erations, programmes and projects in different areas, including projects de-
veloped under PESCO; that any cooperation in such areas that involves
shared EU classified information including on intelligence is conditional
on a security information agreement; that the UK could participate, based
on other similar third country arrangements, in EU programs in support
of defence and external security and the EU is open to the possibility of the
34 Guidelines on the Framework of the future EU-UK Relations – European Parlia-
ment Resolution of 14 March 2018 on the Framework of the future EU-UK rela-
tionship (2018/2573(RSP) – P8_TA-PROV(2018)0069), following its previous res-
olutions of 5 April 2017 on negotiations with the United Kingdom following its
notification that it intends to withdraw from the European Union and of 3 Octo-
ber 2017 and of 13 December 2017 on the state of play of negotiations with the
United Kingdom (respectively Texts adopted, PA_TA(2017)0102,
PA_TA(2017)0361 and PA_TA(2017)0490).
35 Ibid, especially 2, 4, 5 and 6.
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UK continuing to contribute to EU’s external financing instruments in
pursuit of common objectives, especially in the common neighbourhood
policy; and finally that EU-UK cooperation in development, cooperation
and humanitarian aid would be mutually beneficial.36
The Guidelines approved by the European Council that are relevant to
the future EU-UK relationship are those adopted, successively, on 29 April
2017, 15 December 2017 and 23 March 2018.
Firstly, in the Guidelines approved on 29 April 2017 that define the
framework for negotiations under Article 50 TEU and set out the overall
positions and principles that the Union will pursue throughout the nego-
tiation37 have not set aside the issue of CFSP and CSDP. In fact, besides
some other references to the international relations field and international
(EU or mixed) agreements,38 a specific mention is made to security, defence
and foreign policy stating that the EU ‘stands ready to establish partnerships
in areas unrelated to trade, in particular the fight against terrorism and in-
ternational crime, as well as security, defence and foreign policy’.39 Al-
though relevant, the CFSP and CSDP seemed not to be, from the EU per-
spective, a top priority to be addressed within the first phase of the negotia-
tion of the withdrawal agreement.40
36 Ibid, (ii) Foreign policy, security cooperation and development cooperation, no
21–25.
37 Special meeting of the European Council (Art. 50) of 29 April 2017, Guidelines
following the United Kingdom’s notification under Article 50 TEU. See also the
resolution of the European Parliament of 5 April 2017 (EUCO XT 20004/17, BXT
10, CO EUR 5, CONCL 2 of 29 April 2017).
38 Ibid, II.A phased approach to negotiations, especially 4 and 13 (this regarding the is-
sues of (international) agreements concluded by the EU or by the Member States
on its behalf or by the Union and its Member States acting jointly).
39 Ibid, IV. Preliminary and preparatory discussions on a framework for the Union –
United Kingdom future relationship, 22.
40 In the subsequent Guidelines adopted at the Special meeting of the European
Council (under art. 50 TEU) following the United Kingdom’s notification under
Article 50 TEU on 29 March 2017 of its intention to withdraw from the EU and
Euratom the abovementioned trend was a constant. – The Directives for the nego-
tiation of an agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union
(Annex to the Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations with the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for an agreement setting
out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union (XT 21016/17,
ADD 1 REV 2, BXT 24 of 22 May 2017)) does not expressly address CFSP and CS-
DP but includes a reference to a constructive dialogue on a common possible ap-
proach towards third country partners, international organisations and conven-
tions in relation to the international commitments contracted before the with-
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Afterwards, in the Guidelines adopted on 15 December 2017, the Euro-
pean Council reconfirms its readiness to establish the above-mentioned
partnerships, including security, defence and foreign policy – although no
specific guidelines are set in this respect.41
Finally, in the Guidelines adopted on 23 March 2018, the European
Council reiterates the determination of the EU to have as close as possible
a partnership with the UK in the future that should cover other areas than
trade and economic cooperation, in particular the fight against terrorism
and international crime, as well as security, defence and foreign policy.42 In
this document the European Council also took into account the stated pos-
itions of the UK, which limit the depth of future partnership, thus setting
out further guidelines with a view to the opening of negotiations on the
overall understanding of the framework for the future relationship, that will
be elaborated in a Political Declaration accompanying and referred to in the
Withdrawal Agreement.43 The European Council considers that in view of
the shared values between EU and UK ‘there should be a strong EU-UK co-
operation in the fields of foreign, security and defence policy’ while ‘a fu-
ture partnership should respect the autonomy of the Union’s decision-
making, taking into account that the UK will be a third country, and fore-
see appropriate dialogue, consultation, coordination, exchange of informa-
tion, and cooperation mechanisms. As a pre-requisite for the exchange of
information in the framework of such cooperation a Security of Informa-
tion Agreement would to have to be put in place’.44 No further indication
regarding such strong EU-UK cooperation is given by the 2018 guidelines.
drawal date, by which the UK remains bound (and therefore to mixed agree-
ments) – cf no18.
41 European Council (Art. 50) meeting (15 December 2017) – Guidelines (EUCO XT
20011/17, BXT 69, CO EUR 27, CONCL 8, 15 December 2017), no 8. These
Guidelines were preceded by the Communication from the Commission to the
European Council (Article 50) on the state of the progress of the negotiations
with the United Kingdom under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union
(COM(2017)784 final of 8 December 2017) and the Joint report from the negotia-
tors of the European Union and the United Kingdom Government on progress
during phase 1 of negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom’s
orderly withdrawal from the European Union of 8 December 2017.
42 European Council (Art. 50) meeting (23 March 2018) – Guidelines on the frame-
work for the future EU-UK relationship (EUCO XT 20001/18, BXT 25, CO
EUR 5, CONCL 2, 23 March 2018), no 3.
43 Ibid, no 5.
44 Ibid, no 13, ii). The European Council will follow the negotiations closely, in all
their aspects, and will return to the remaining withdrawal issues and to the
Framework for the future relationship at its June meeting (no 16).
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Afterwards,45 the Chief negotiator M. Barnier stated that the UK’s com-
mitment to Europe’s security as restated in the UK paper Framework for the
UK-EU Security Partnership of 9 May 2018 was welcome and that the future
EU-UK relationship could be underpinned by a set of the (above men-
tioned 5) mechanisms set up in the 23 March 2018 European Council’s
Guidelines – dialogue, consultation, coordination, cooperation and exchange of
information. Elaborating further on these mechanisms, the Chief negotia-
tor indicates that future partnership could include five dimensions: i) close
and regular consultations with the UK on foreign policy; ii) when project-
ing the EU’s support worldwide, EU will be open to the UK’s contribu-
tion; iii) in defence matters the UK should have the possibility (where it
adds value) to actively take part in a number of the European Defence
Agency’s Research and Technology projects; iv) exchanging information in
incidents that makes the partners more effective in fighting cyber-attacks;
v) a EU-UK Security of Information Agreement.
From the point of view of the EU-UK post-Brexit relationship, it can be
concluded that the above-mentioned documents contributed to shape the
draft of the Withdrawal Agreement and the subsequent Political Declara-
tion setting out the framework for the future EU-UK relationship specifi-
cally in the field of CFSP/CSDP. Some main ideas arise from these docu-
ments. First, that both parties, despite their respective autonomy, agree to
a partnership in the foreign, security and defence policy, based on a set of five
instruments (dialogue, consultation, coordination, cooperation and ex-
change of information) and where concrete thematic areas of mutual inter-
est exist (and therefore allowing UK alignment or participation – at least –
as a third State) are already identified: policy of international sanctions; EU
civilian and military missions and operations; EU defence projects through
the EDA; and, more generally, cooperation within International Organisa-
tions (UN, Council of Europe, OSCE) and exchange of information. Sec-
ond, the UK participation can take place either through existing instru-
ments (used with third States, such as a Framework Participation Agree-
ment for EU missions and operations or an Administrative Agreement re-
garding the EDA) or new models of closer cooperation. Therefore, al-
45 See Speech/18/3785, delivered on the 14th May High Level panel discussion on
‘The future of EU foreign, security and defence policy post Brexit’ at EU Institute
for Security Studies, Brussels (available at TF50, www.ec.europa.eu.) – where he
stated that the security of the EU and the UK is bound together, although there is
still a lot of uncertainty, and there should be no uncertainty about the EU com-
mitment to a future security partnership since the challenges are by their nature
cross border.
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though the participation of the UK as a (mere) third State can be admitted,
the envisaged EU-UK ‘strong cooperation’ in the fields of foreign policy,
security and defence neither explicitly admits nor excludes a different third
State status.
All the topics addressed by the EP Resolution and the European Coun-
cil Guidelines still would have to be more detailed in the text of With-
drawal Agreement and in the Political Declaration which the first refers to
(as well as in subsequent future EU-UK agreements that will apply after the
transition period).
Within the framework of the Guidelines adopted by the European
Council (29 April 2017 and 15 December 2017), the Commission adopted
on the 28 February 2018 a Draft Withdrawal Agreement46 which contains ar-
ticles with references to CFSP and Security and Defence both in Part Four
(Transition) and Part Five (Financial provisions). The main steps of the
subsequent path that led to the approval of the (final) text of the Agree-
ment on the Withdrawal of the UK from the EU can be summarized as fol-
lows.
At the informal meeting of the heads of State or government held on
19–20 September 2018 in Salzburg, EU’s 27 leaders agreed to have a joint
political declaration setting out the framework of the future relations between
the EU and the UK in different areas, including in the area of security and
defence, thus providing as much clarity as possible in the future rela-
tions.47
46 Draft Withdrawal Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atom-
ic Energy Community,TF50 (2018) 33 – Commission to EU 27 (to be presented
to the Chief negotiator to the CRP Art. 50 and to the Brexit Steering Group on 28
February 2018 and to be further discussed with the Council (Art. 50) and the
Brexit Steering Group before transmission to the UK authorities for negotiation
(see the TF50 at www.ec.europa.eu). The subsequent document TF50(2018) 35 –
Commission to EU27, of 19 March 2018 contains the Draft Agreement highlight-
ing the progress made (coloured version) in the negotiation round with the UK of
16–19 March 2018. The text of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement was published at
the website of the UK Government (www.gov.uk/policies/brexit).
47 In this informal meeting the EU leaders also agreed that there will be no With-
drawal Agreement without a solid, operational and legally binding Irish backstop.
– See also Preparing for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European
Union on 30 March 2019 – Communication from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Central
Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Re-
gions and the European Investment Bank – COM(2018) 556 final of 19/7/2018, as
corrected by COM(2018) 556 final/2, of 27/8/2018.
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An understanding on pending issues was achieved and a final version of
text of the Draft Agreement on the Withdrawal of the UK from the EU, as
agreed at the negotiator’s level on 14 November 2018 was presented48 to-
gether with an outline of a Political Declaration setting out the framework
for the future relationship between the EU and the UK, as agreed at nego-
tiator’s level on the same date.49
Subsequently, the special meeting of the European Council (Art. 50) of
25 November 2018 endorsed the draft Brexit withdrawal agreement and
approved the draft Political Declaration on the future EU-UK relations.50
Subsequently, on 11 January 2019 the Council (Art. 50) adopted a deci-
sion on the signing of the withdrawal agreement as well as one draft deci-
sion on the conclusion of the withdrawal agreement which was forward to
the EP for its consent.51 Both the text of the Instrument relating to the with-
drawal agreement (which constitutes a document of reference that will have
to be made use of if any issue arises in the implementation of the With-
drawal Agreement having legal force and binding character to this effect)
and of the Joint Statement supplementing the Political Declaration setting out
the framework for the future relationship between the European Union
48 TF50 (2018) 55 – Commission to EU27 of 14 November 2018.
49 TF50 (2018) 56 – Commission to EU27 of 14 November 2018.
50 Conclusions, EUCO XT 20015/18, BXT 110, CO EUR 27, CONCL 8 of 25
November 2018. These Conclusions were reconfirmed in the special meeting of
the European Council (Art. 50) of 13 December 2018 (Conclusions, EUCO XT
20022/18, BXT 131, CO EUR 32, CONCL 9 of 13 December 2018). In the 25
November Conclusions the European Council also invited the EP and the Com-
mission to take the necessary steps to ensure that the agreement can enter into
force on 30 March 2019, so as provide for an orderly withdrawal. See previous
Document BXT 111 CO EUR-PREP 54 of 22 November 2018 and Annex.
51 Council Decision (EU) 2019/274 of 11 January 2019 on the signing, on behalf of
the EU and of the European Atomic Energy Community, of the Agreement on
the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, [2019]
OJ L 47 I/1, and attached text of the Withdrawal Agreement (published in [2019]
OJ C 66 I/01). The text of the Political Declaration was published in [2019] OJ C
66 I/02. – See also previous documents COM(2018) 833 final and COM(2018) 834
final of 5 December 2018; Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the EU
and of the European Atomic Energy Community, of the Agreement on the with-
drawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community – XT 21106/18,
BXT 125 of 7 January 2019; Council Decision on the conclusion of the Agree-
ment on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community
– XT 21105/18, BXT 124 of 9 January 2019.
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and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland52 were ap-
proved in the special meeting of the European Council (Art. 50) of 21
March 2019.53
Following the position of the House of Commons declining to approve
the Withdrawal Agreement and the subsequent request of the UK on 5
April 2019 for a further extension54 to the Article 50 period until 30 June
2019, the special summit of the EU leaders on 11 April finally agreed to a
further extension of Article 50 in any event no longer than 31 October
2019 and the EU decision taken in agreement with the UK extending the
period of Article 50 was approved.55 During the extension period, the UK
will remain a Member State with full rights and obligations in accordance
with the same Article 50; the UK has a right to revoke its notification at
any time; and the Withdrawal Agreement may enter into force on an earli-
er date, should the parties complete their respective ratification procedures
before 31 October 201956.
Finally, Council Decision (EU) 2019/642 on the signing of the With-
drawal Agreement was adopted57 – an adapted draft decision on the con-
52 Annex to the document XT 21014/19, BXT 15, CO EUR-PREP 10 of 20 March
2019 (Instrument relating to the Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and
the European Atomic Energy Community); annex to the document XT 21018/19,
BXT 24, CO EUR-PREP 11 of 20 March 2019. Both these texts have been agreed
at the negotiator’s level, agreed between UK Prime Minister and the President of
the European Commission on 11 March 2019 in Strasbourg and have been en-
dorsed by the Commission on the same day.
53 Conclusions, 2 (EUCO XT 20004/19, BXT 20, CO EUR 7, CONCL 2 of 21 March
2019).
54 See European Council Decision (EU) 2019/476 taken in agreement with the Unit-
ed Kingdom of 22 March 2019 extending the period under Article 50(3)TEU
[2019] 80I/1); see also previous document European Council Decision taken in
agreement with the United Kingdom, extending the period under Article 50(3)
TEU (EUCO XT 20006/19, BXT 26 of 22 March 2019).
55 Conclusions of the special meeting of the European Council, 2 (Art. 50), EUCO
XT 20015/19, BXT 40, CO EUR 9, CONCL 4 of 10 April 2019; European Council
Decision (EU) 2019/584 taken in agreement with the United Kingdom of 11 April
2019 extending the period under Article 50(3)TEU ([2019] OJ L101/1); see also
previous document European Council Decision taken in agreement with the UK
extending the period under Article 50(3) TEU (EUCO XT 20013/19, BXT 38 of 11
April 2019).
56 Ibid, 6.
57 Council Decision (EU) 2019/642 of 13 April 2019 amending Decision (EU)
2019/274 on the signing, on behalf of the EU and of the European Atomic Energy
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clusion of such agreement58 was also adapted and attached to that Deci-
sion.59
From the point of the CFSP/CSDP post Brexit, three aspects of the 2019
developments and in particular of the European Council decision of 11
April 2019 must be underlined: i) since the further extension of the period
of Article 50(3) TEU must not undermine the regular functioning of the
Union and its institutions, the UK fully participates on the decision mak-
ing procedures regarding CFSP/CSDP in this period; ii) since the exten-
sion excludes any re-opening of the Withdrawal Agreement and cannot be
used to start negotiations on the future relationship, it does not affect the
terms laid down in the Withdrawal Agreement regarding CFSP/CSDP
which would apply during the transition period; iii) the Joint Statement
supplementing the Political Declaration setting out the framework for the
future relationship between the EU and the UK agreed in March 2019 does
not affect the framework already set in the Political Declaration (of 22
November 2018) concerning the future relationship in the field of CFSP/
CSDP (see III, A. and B. below).
The UK perspective
On the UK official side, the consequences of the Brexit regarding the fu-
ture relationship with the Union regarding the CFSP and CSDP were
worth attention, both at the government and at the Parliament level. In
B.
Community, of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European
Atomic Energy Community ([2019] OJ L 110 I/1) and previous document Coun-
cil Decision on the signing, on behalf of the EU and of the European Atomic En-
ergy Community, of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European
Atomic Energy Community – XT 21027/19, BXT 44 of 11 April 2019.
58 Council Decision on the conclusion of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European
Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (adapted text) – XT
21105/18, REV 2, BXT 124 of 11 April 2019.
59 Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy
Community, XT 21028/19 BXT 45 of 11 April 2019 – the adapted text was pub-
lished in [2019] OJ C144 I/1 and attached to Council Decision (EU) 2019/642.
The subsequent references to articles of the Withdrawal Agreement will refer to
this final (adapted) text.
Common Foreign and Security Policy After Brexit
255
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748903246, am 21.11.2019, 13:37:49
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
this respect are, among others, worth mentioning: the so called ‘Brexit
White Paper’ – The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the
European Union60 – since it details out the (12) principles which would
guide the Brexit, including regarding European security; short afterwards
the Evidence session held by the EU External Affairs Sub-Committee on Com-
mon Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) post Brexit;61 as well as the previous
House of Lords Library Note Leaving the European Union: Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy Cooperation62 – the last two because they address a wide range of
issues in respect of the EU-UK relationship in the field of CFSP/CSDP and
possible models for the future cooperation.
Afterwards, more recent documents are also relevant in respect of the
EU-UK relationship after Brexit in the area of CFSP and CSDP, namely the
Framework for the UK-EU Security Partnership of 9 May 201863 or the Techni-
cal note on consultation and cooperation on external security of 24 May 2018
(DExEU Policy paper)64 which in particular contains a more detailed list of
proposals of what the future UK-EU consultation and cooperation in that
60 17 January 2017 (text available at www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploa
ds/attachment_data/file/589191/The_United_Kingdoms_exit_from_and_partners
hip_with_the_EU_Web.pdf).
61 One-off Evidence session with Professor Richard Whitman and Professor Karen
Smith held on 6 April 2017 by the EU External Affairs Sub-Committee on Com-
mon Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) post-Brexit (www.parliament.uk/business/co
mmittees/committees-a-z/lords-select/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/news-parlia
ment-2015/academics-common-foreign-security-policy/ and video and audio at
www.parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/e6a38ead-7c7e-4a97-9d72-ec93b0d3dd62).
The reference of the transcript of the evidence taken in public in this paper is
made considering the contents of numbers 1 and 2 on the ‘Use of the transcript’.
62 House of Lords Library Note Leaving the European Union: Foreign and Security Poli-
cy Cooperation of 13 October 2016 (LLN 2016/051). See also House of Commons
Library, Briefing Paper Number CBP7798, 31 March 2017, Brexit: implications for
national security (by Joanna Dawson, text available in www.researchbriefings.files.
parliament.uk) and House of Commons Library, Briefing paper Number CBP
7742 12 June 2017, Brexit reading list: defence and security, in particular 5. Future
cooperation (text available in https://www.researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk).
63 Policy paper, Framework for the UK-EU Security Partnership, published on 9 May
2018, Department for Exiting the European Union (available at www.gov.uk/
Department for Exiting the European Union).
64 Available at www.gov.uk/ Department for Exiting the European Union – see also
www.parliament.uk/brexit (see Committees/Exiting the European Union Com-
mittee). See more recently House of Lords, European Union Committee, 16th Re-
port of Session 2017–19, Brexit: Common Security and Defence Policy missions and
operations and Government response (available at www.publications.parliament.u
k).
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area may be – both subsequent to the Draft Withdrawal Agreement of
February 2018.
An overview of the contents of such documents (as detailed below) al-
lows a preliminary conclusion that a partial convergence may exist with
the EU position in respect of the EU-UK relationship after Brexit in the
field of the CFSP/CSDP. Firstly to an extent that dialogue, cooperation, co-
ordination and consultation in general are envisaged by both parties. Sec-
ondly, because the alignment of the EU-UK positions in foreign policy is
also a possibility for the EU and the UK, namely in respect of sanctions
and participation in international organisations and fora. Thirdly because
close participation of the UK in EU civilian and military missions and op-
erations and some EU agencies, such as the European Defence Agency, is
also admitted by both.
However, two main issues seem to drive the EU and the UK apart. First-
ly, the status of the UK, since the EU seems to admit UK’s cooperation and
participation as a third State – and expressly neither admits nor exclude a
differentiated third State status – while the UK in the mentioned docu-
ments does not put aside a model of cooperation and participation that
may go beyond the current model of participation of third States in EU
CFSP/CSDP. Secondly, the relationship with NATO as a corner stone of
European defence – that may be jeopardised by the development of a more
integrated CSDP within the EU which seems to be one of the more evi-
dent consequences of the implementation of the EU Global Strategy.
The (chronologically first) document – House of Lords Library Note
Leaving the European Union: Foreign and Security Policy Cooperation – ex-
pressly addresses current cooperation of the UK within the EU vs future
prospects regarding CFSP and CSDP65. The Note addresses a wide range of
issues, namely those regarding: the (direct) institutional consequences of
Brexit (the end of the participation of the UK in several EU organs such as
the FA Council or the EEAS); the consequences of Brexit in respect of in-
ternational agreements binding the UK, especially the issue of replacement
of international agreements in which the UK is part because of its mem-
bership of the EU (mixed agreements or EU agreements, depending on the
category of competences), Association agreements or Partnership Coopera-
tion agreements within ENP (renegotiation, changing the title of its bind-
ing nature (UK itself instead of UK as an EU Member State)); the future
65 See 2. Common Foreign and Security Policy, 2.3 Future Prospects, 3. Common
Security and Defence Policy, 3.3 Future Prospects (and 4. Security and Policy Co-
operation, 4.3 Future Prospects).
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possibility of alignment with EU foreign policy positions, including imple-
menting sanctions, as a third country, since the EU already allows non-
Member States to align themselves with EU common positions despite no
involvement in its formulation (vg cases of Norway and Switzerland); the
future possibilities regarding cooperation with the EU in the (sub-area of
CFSP) CSDP, bearing in mind naturally the terms of the current UK in-
volvement as a Member State within CSDP and its implementation – par-
ticipation in military CSDP missions/operations and CSDP civilian mis-
sions, participation in initiatives within the CSDP to improve the military
assets and capacities of EU Member States (European Defence Agency, EU
Battlegroups and UK as Lead Nation). In this regard, the main topics for
the future path seemed to envisage the UK as a ‘Key player in European
defence’ through NATO (and therefore US) and cooperation between NA-
TO and the EU (in the line of the Warsaw Declaration); the possibility of
future cooperation with the EU in missions that are in the UK interest, or
in theory even of participation in the EDA or EU Battlegroups. In fact,
non-EU members have already participated in EU CSCP (military and
civilian) missions and operations (though with different levels of involve-
ment) and can also participate in the EDA through Administrative Agree-
ments approved at the level of the EU Council (that is the case of Norway
(2006), Switzerland (2012), Republic of Serbia (2013), Ukraine (2015)).
Non-EU Member States can also be invited by Member State and therefore
participate in the EU Battlegroups (e.g. Norway and Nordic Battlegroup).
One of the issues worth attention in the Note was of course the impact
of Brexit on the prospects of further European defence integration and a
future European army because of the alleged risks to undermine NATO as
a cornerstone of European defence (to which the UK as EU Member State
has opposed). To sum up, three different models are envisaged, depending
upon the preferences both of the UK and the EU partners: commitment
on European security through NATO, continuing the participation in EU
structures and operations as a third country (nevertheless the fact that its
design may change after the Brexit towards a more integrated EU CSDP)
and bilateral relations with EU partners (such as France).
In January 2017 Brexit White Paper, the reference to the CFSP and CSDP
is rather short and generic.66 In this respect, it is intended in general that
the UK ‘will continue to be one of the most important actors in interna-
66 See 11. Cooperation in the fight against crime and terrorism, pp 61–64 (where the
topics The UK in the World and European Security are addressed), especially 11.8
and 11.9 and 11.11 – 11.14.
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tional affairs’ considering its specific features (vg the permanent seat on
the UN Security Council and the percentage of the GDP spent on de-
fence). Besides, it is intended to use national tools and the UK privileged
position in international affairs ‘to continue to work with the EU on for-
eign policy security and defence’, to continue to play a leading role along-
side EU partners in buttressing and promoting European security and in-
fluence around the world and to enhance the strong bilateral relationship
with the EU partners and beyond. Moreover, and remembering the UK
participation and role in several CSDP military missions/operations and
CSDP civilian missions the objective enounced is to ‘ensure that the EU’s
role in defence and security is complementary to, and respects the central
role of, NATO’ and to ‘remain committed to European Security and add
value to EU foreign and security policy’. The document also underlines the
intention that the UK will continue to play a leading role as a global for-
eign and security policy actor within NATO.
Finally in the second initiative above mentioned – Evidence session held
by the EU External Affairs Sub-Committee on Common Foreign Security Policy
(CFSP) post Brexit – the issue of the CFSP and CSDP post-Brexit is ad-
dressed in more detailed way, the contribution of the two Professor wit-
nesses allowing to identify the main questions and problems involved and
possible ways of shaping further relationship EU/UK in the area of EU
competences in question. In this respect, three of the topics seems to be
particularly relevant.
First, the one regarding the three possible models for future relationship
between the UK and the EU foreign, security and defence policy as pro-
posed by Professor Richard Whitman:67 integrated, associated and de-
tached. It is so because it raises the issue of the will of both parties to shape
a new model to address the future EU-UK relationship that goes beyond
the current model and instruments of participation of third States in the
present (especially in the EU sanctions policy which is more effective due
to its collective nature and in the EU missions, operations and bodies such
as the EDA, namely through a framework agreement or an administrative
agreement), raising therefore the issue of the (in)adequacy of existing mod-
els for participation of third States in CFSP and CSDP (e.g. Norway). If
such a path surely depends on both Parties political will, Brexit has put for-
ward the possibility of a different status, i.e., ex-third State – which in-
67 RG Whitman ‘The UK and EU foreign, security and defence policy after Brexit:
integrated, associated or detached?’ (2016), National Institute for Economic Re-
view, 238 (1), pp 43–50.
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evitably has a common past linked to the EU integration, including in the
field of CFSP/CSDP.
Second, if a new – or at least a different model – of participation of a
third State is envisaged, the issue of UK participation in decision making
process, or at least decision shaping process, is particularly sensitive, espe-
cially at the political level, since at present no regular participation (of
third States) appears to be envisaged. In this respect one could consider the
existing status of State participation in international organisations, such as
(formal or informal) observers. The example of the draft agreement on the
accession of the EU to the ECHR may be of interest since it foresees the
participation of the EU (without being a member) in the organs of the
Council of Europe that have competence regarding the ECHR.
Third, the issue of the relationship between the EU, the UK and NATO.
Despite the fact that the scope of NATO is defence and EU CSDP has a
wider scope, the closer EU-NATO relationship in the framework of the EU
Global Strategy is parallel to the increasing reinforcement of the EU CSDP
since 2017. In this respect, the approach of the EU to CSDP has changed
into more autonomous EU27 capabilities and even if no unanimous deci-
sion to proceed to a common defence is (ever) reached, the reinforcement
of the CSDP and of the EU Member States capabilities may have in the fu-
ture, despite different political views within the NATO, repercussion in its
leadership and the role of the UK in the organisation.
Therefore, it must be seen whether the (final) version of the Withdrawal
Agreement as well as the Political Declaration setting out the framework
for the future EU-UK relationship allows any space for new methods or in-
struments adapted to the UK capacity of ex-EU Member State; admit any
concrete form of participation of the UK in decision shaping and making
and under which terms; and foresee any particular rule regarding EU-UK
cooperation within the NATO.
Besides the documents above mentioned, the Framework for the UK-EU
Security Partnership on 9 May 2018, focuses on how the UK will look to
achieve a new partnership with the EU which builds on the shared inter-
ests and values and goes beyond any existing third country arrangements,
covering both internal and external security,and will form on the UK per-
spective the basis of ongoing negotiations with the EU. Furthermore, the
Technical note on consultation and cooperation on external security of 24 May
2018 (DExEU Policy paper) sets out a non-exhaustive list of proposals de-
scribing what a future framework of UK-EU consultation and cooperation
on external security might be, stressing that it should be flexible and scal-
able to enable both EU and UK to cooperate more closely when it is of
their mutual interest respecting both EU autonomy and UK sovereignty.
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The proposed framework in respect of foreign policy mainly envisages con-
sultation and cooperation: in Brussels (mainly UK/EEAS strategic talks and
consultations at various levels and where appropriate with the Commis-
sion); with the EU27 that may include ad-hoc meetings with the FA Coun-
cil as well as with the Political and Security Committee in informal ses-
sions; in multilateral fora and third countries (vg EU head of Delegation
and UK Embassy); on sanctions by exchange of information on listing and
their justification, an EU-UK sanctions dialogue and adoption of mutually
supportive sanctions – as well as the possibility of joint outcomes namely
joint statements, positions and demarches. Specifically in respect of CSDP
the proposed framework also foresees consultation and cooperation
through the various EU institutions and relevant organs (FA Council,
EUMC, EUMS); cooperation on diplomatic support for crisis manage-
ment; whenever the UK participates to a EU mission or operation, the par-
ticipation in the respective operational headquarters; administrative agree-
ments with the EDA and a coordinated approach to European capability
development and planning and UK participation in specific projects and
initiatives and in the EDF. In particular, the last document seem to take
into consideration the general rules on consultation and cooperation on
foreign policy, security and defence already laid down in the Draft With-
drawal Agreement.
Despite the wide range of issues and models for cooperation considered
in the documents detailed above and the convergence in some main topics
allowing to shape the grounds for the future EU-UK relationship in respect
of CFSP/CSDP, it cannot be ignored that the so-called (flexible and scal-
able) consultation and cooperation between the EU and the UK does not
exclude an autonomous foreign and security policy – meaning au-
tonomous (although convergent in some areas) internal decision making
process.
Despite the mentioned convergence, the exact terms of the future rela-
tionship in the field of CFSP/CSDP – either during or after the transition
period – would be definitively established both in the Withdrawal Agree-
ment (transitional period) and in the Political Declaration of 25 November
2018 applicable after the transition period (both analysed in III. below),
thus confirming some of the ways of cooperation already envisaged by
both parties but also stressing out the divergences between them.
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The Agreement on the Withdrawal of the UK from the European Union and
the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Political Declaration and
‘Foreign Policy, security and defence’
Both the texts of the Withdrawal Agreement and the Political Declaration
setting out the framework for the future relationship between the EU and
the UK68 (as mentioned in Article 184 of the Agreement and which terms
will be foreseen in future agreements to be negotiated and concluded by
the EU and the EU), include rules addressing issues and possible forms of
cooperation in the field of CFSP and CSDP.
On one hand, the Withdrawal Agreement addresses CFSP and CSDP is-
sues in three articles: both Article 127 (‘Scope of transition’), 2 and 7(a)
and 129 (‘Specific arrangements relating to the Union’s external action’),
mainly 2, 6 and 7, of Part Four on Transition; and Article 156 (‘The United
Kingdom’s obligations from the date of entry into force of this Agree-
ment’) in Part Five on Financial provisions. On the other hand, the Political
Declaration addresses CFSP and CSDP issues in its Part III (Security Part-
nership, III. Foreign policy, security and defence, A. to G. (92–109).
The main differences regarding the scope of application and the con-
tents of both texts, specifically in respect of CFSP/CSDP, can be identified
as follows:
First of all, the Agreement foresees rules defining the UK legal status
(rights and obligations) regarding CFSP/CSDP during the transition period
(starting on the date of entry into force of the Agreement and ending on
31 December 202069); and the Political Declaration, mainly foresee objec-
tives and principles (III, 92–94) and guidelines (III, 95 and A. to G, 96 and
following) regarding the future relationship in the field of ‘Foreign policy,
III.
68 All the references mentioned in the text refer to their respective versions as adapt-
ed and supplemented by 11 April 2019 – Agreement on the withdrawal of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European
Union and the European Atomic Energy Community ([2019] OJ C144 I/1); and
Political Declaration setting out the Framework for the future relationship be-
tween the European Union and the United Kingdom (XT 21095/18, BXT 111, CO
EUR-PREP 54 of 22 November 2018) endorsed by the European Council of 25
November 2018 ([2019] JO C 66I/02), as supplemented by the Joint Statement
supplementing the Political Declaration setting out the Framework for the future
relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland (XT 21018/19, BXT 24, CO EUR-PREP 11 of 20
March 2019) as endorsed by the European Council (Art. 50) of 25 November 2018
and of 21 March 2019.
69 See Arts 2(e) and 126 of the Withdrawal Agreement.
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security and defence’ (as a part of a broader ‘Security partnership’) after the
end of the transition period.
Secondly, the specific articles included in the Agreement regarding
CFSP and CSDP defining the UK legal status during the transition period
mainly address two forms of derogation of the general rule of Article 127
(1) of the Agreement according to which (unless otherwise provided in the
Agreement) EU law, including in the field of CFSP/CSDP (Chapter 2 of
Title V of the TEU i.e. ‘Specific provisions on the CFSP’70) shall apply to
and in the UK during the transition period: (i) a full derogation of EU
rules before the end of the transition period depending on an EU-UK
agreement governing their relationship in the area of CFSP which be-
comes applicable during the transition period (Art. 127, 2)71 as well as (ii)
specific thematic derogations and an ‘opt-out’ clause which apply during
the transition period.The specific paragraphs of the Political Declaration
regarding the issue of ‘Foreign policy, security and defence’ mainly address
guidelines identifying the mechanisms to be used in the future relation-
ship between the EU and the UK in this field which is based, despite some
common objectives, in parallel EU and UK foreign policies according to
their respective strategic and security interests and in close cooperation
when those interests are shared – through dialogue, consultation, coordi-
nation, exchange of information and cooperation mechanisms (Part III,
III, 94–95).
Thirdly, the articles of the Agreement regarding CFSP and CSDP that
foresee thematic derogations refer specifically to the application of CSDP
rules – permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and EU missions and
operations (Art. 127, 7(a) and 129, 7) – while the ‘opt-out’ clause (based on
‘vital and stated reasons of national policy’ – Article 129, 672) regards the
non-application of a decision of the Council falling under CFSP including
70 Chapter 2 (Specific provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) of
Title V (General provisions on the Union’s External Action and Specific provi-
sions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) of the TEU – including both
Section 1 Common provisions (Arts 23 to 41) and Section 2 Provisions on the Common
Security and Defence Policy (Arts 42 to 46).
71 In which case the rules of the TEU and respective secondary law will simply cease
to apply to the UK from the date of application of that agreement. – Without
prejudice to Art 127 (2), Art 129 (5) of the Withdrawal Agreement foresees that
whenever there is a need for coordination, the UK may be consulted, on a case-by-
case basis
72 Art 129, 6 of the Withdrawal Agreement foresees that Following a decision of the
Council falling under Chapter 2 of Title V TEU, the UK may make a formal dec-
laration to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
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CSDP (Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU). The specific paragraphs of the Po-
litical Declaration regarding the issue of ‘Foreign policy, security and de-
fence’ foresee guidelines identifying firstly the establishment of general
structured consultation and regular thematic (general and sectorial) dia-
logues identifying areas and activities for close cooperation (III, A, 96–98)
and also some specific areas of future consultation and cooperation (sanc-
tions, crisis management missions and operations both civilian and mili-
tary, defence capabilities developments, intelligence exchanges and devel-
opment cooperation – III, B. to G., 99–109).
Some relevant details of both texts should still be underlined in the per-
spective of the CFSP and CSDP post-Brexit.
The Agreement on the Withdrawal and the Common Foreign and Security
Policy
Four aspects of the rules laid down in the Withdrawal Agreement must be
underlined.
The text of the Agreement envisages the possibility of an EU-UK agree-
ment governing their relationship in the area of CFSP, which becomes ap-
plicable during the transition period (Art. 127 (2)) ending on 31 December
2020. Such a thematic agreement on one hand may indicate that CFSP is a
sensitive political area in which the UK would like not be bound by EU
rules as soon as possible – that both the opt-out clause (CFSP) and the
derogations on CSDP (PESCO and EU missions and operations) may al-
ready confirm; and, on the other hand, cannot be understood and de-
signed outside of the framework and guidelines set out in the Political
Declaration regarding foreign policy, security and defence – namely the
specific areas of future consultation and cooperation and the mechanisms
already identified, which have to constitute a common basis for the future
relationship between the EU and the UK in this respect.
Moreover, the two derogations regarding CSDP – PESCO and EU mis-
sions and operations – may indicate the will of the UK not to be involved
in principle neither in the deepening and the development of the EU secu-
rity and defence policy nor in assuming leading responsibilities within EU
A.
Policy, indicating that for vital and stated reasons of national policy, in those ex-
ceptional cases, it will not apply the decision (and that in a spirit of mutual soli-
darity, the UK shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede
Union action based on that decision and the Member States shall respect the pos-
ition of the UK).
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missions and operations conducted under Articles 42, 43 and 44 TEU (or
operational actions under Article 28 TEU).73 In special, considering that
PESCO is a form of enhanced cooperation that is at the core of the recent
defence policy developments post EU Global Strategy, the derogation re-
garding PESCO is in line with the fact that the UK did not sign the Joint
Notification on PESCO in November 2017. However, this derogation does
not preclude the possibility for the UK to be invited to participate as a
third country in individual projects under the conditions set out in Coun-
cil Decision (CFSP) 2017/231574 on an exceptional basis, or in any other
form of cooperation to the extent allowed and under the conditions set out
by future Union acts adopted on the basis of those Articles 42(6) and 46
TEU75 – the latter still to be determined. Therefore, even if such rules of
the Agreement also clearly indicate that the participation of the UK as a
third State in PESCO project is admissible by both parties in a longer term
perspective, the conditions under which the UK may participate are not
yet fully determined.76
In addition, and despite the above mentioned derogations, concerning
financial support of CFSP/CSDP, the Agreement foresees that until the
end of the transition period (31/12/2020) the UK shall continue to con-
tribute to the financing of the European Defence Agency (and of the EU
73 Art 129 (7) foresees that during the transition period, the UK shall not provide
commanders of civilian operations, heads of mission, operation commanders or
force commanders for missions or operations conducted under Arts 42, 43 and 44
TEU, nor shall it provide the operational headquarters for such missions or opera-
tions or serve as framework nation for Union battlegroups and also that during
that period the UK shall not provide the head of any operational actions under
Art 28 TEU.
74 Arts 4 (2) (g) and 9 (1) of Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December
2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining
the list of participating Member States, and Council Recommendation of 6
March 2018 concerning a roadmap for the implementation of PESCO, no 13.
75 Art 127 (7) (a) of the Withdrawal Agreement.
76 According to the Council Conclusions on Security and Defence in the context of
the EU Global Strategy (Conclusions of 19 November 2018, 1378/18 of 19
November 2018), no 12, a Council decision on the general conditions under
which third States could exceptionally participate was expected to be adopted by
the end of 2018. However, the Conclusions already indicate some general rules in
this respect: a third State would need to provide substantial added value to the
PESCO projects, contribute to strengthening PESCO and the CSDP and meet
more demanding commitments, while fully respecting the principle of decision-
making autonomy of the EU and its Member States. – From the UK perspective
see House of Commons, Briefing Paper No 8149, Updated December 2018, EU
Defence: the realisation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), no 5.
Common Foreign and Security Policy After Brexit
265
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748903246, am 21.11.2019, 13:37:49
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Institute for Security Studies and the EU Satellite Centre) as well as to the
costs of CSDP operations, on the basis of the same contribution key, name-
ly in accordance with its Article 577.
Finally, although the Agreement on the Withdrawal of the UK does not
ignore the issue of CFSP/CSDP and the role of the UK during the transi-
tion period, it does not bring much light on the future EU-UK relationship
in that field: not only because none of the terms of the (future) agreement
is addressed but also because in the only area in which a future UK partici-
pation is foreseen as it was already a third State (PESCO), the rules of such
participation are still uncertain since not yet determined by EU secondary
law. Therefore, the terms of the EU-UK relationship and possible main is-
sues and forms of cooperation in the fields of CFSP/CSDP after the transi-
tional period are still rather uncertain and do not exclude a differentiated
third State status.
The Political Declaration and Foreign Policy, security and defence
However, the Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future
relationship between the EU and the UK on 25 November 2018 (foreseen
in Article 184 of the Withdrawal Agreement) may, to a certain extent, con-
tribute to clarify the general features of the future EU-UK relationship re-
garding CFSP/CSDP beyond the transitional period.
Considering its contents on ‘Foreign Policy, security and defence’, as
mentioned above, some of its features are particularly relevant to shape the
terms of that future relationship after the end of the transition period.
Three of such features should be underlined.
Firstly, the text of the Political Declaration indicates that both parties
accept common general grounds for their future relationship based in
common core values and rights, identification of areas of shared interests
B.
77 Within the financial provisions of Part Five, Art 156 (The United Kingdom’s obli-
gations from the date of entry into force of this agreement) of Chapter 7 (Agen-
cies of the Council and Common and Security Defence Policy operations) fore-
sees as follows: Until 31 December 2020, the United Kingdom shall contribute to the
financing of the European Defence Agency, the European Union Institute for Securi-
ty Studies and the European Union Satellite Centre, as well as to the costs of Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy operations on the basis of the same contribution key set
out in point (a) of Article 14(9) of the Council Decision (EU) 2016/1353, in Article
10(3) of Council Decision 2014/75/CFSP, in Article 10(3) of Council Decision
2014/401/CFSP and in the second paragraph of Article 41(2) of the TEU, respectively,
and in accordance to Article 5 of the Agreement.
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in which participation in Union programmes and dialogues are envis-
aged.78 These common general grounds are subsequently detailed in the
text of the Political Declaration regarding each area of the EU-UK future
partnership, namely in Part III: Security partnership within which the area
of ‘Foreign policy, security and defence’ is addressed (as mentioned above).
Secondly, within the EU-UK Security Partnership, the guidelines on
‘Foreign policy, security and defence’ foresee general guidelines and instru-
ments regarding dialogue, consultation, coordination and cooperation in
this area: (i) structured consultation and regular thematic dialogues identi-
fying areas and activities where closer cooperation could contribute to the
attainment of common objectives, namely the Political Dialogue on CFSP
and CSDP as well as sectorial dialogues at different levels (ministerial, se-
nior office, working), including invitation of the UK to informal Ministeri-
al meetings of EU Member States; (ii) seeking to cooperation in third
countries (including in security consular provision and protection and de-
velopment projects) as well as in international organisations and fora, no-
tably the UN, allowing the Parties to support each other’s positions, deliv-
er external action and manage global challenges in a coherent manner, in-
cluded through agreed statements, demarches and shared positions. The
latter may implicitly refer to the permanent seat of the UK and France in
the UN Security Council and cooperation within that organ but may as
well refer to the rules of coordination between Member States in interna-
tional organisations and conferences, including the Security Council, fore-
seen in Art. 34 TEU; to the rules on cooperation between the external dele-
gations of the EEAS and the diplomatic and consular missions of the EU
Member States laid down in Art. 221, 2 TEU – so that after the end of tran-
sition period similar coordination and cooperation may continue. How-
ever, the concrete terms of both mentioned consultation and cooperation
are not foreseen except for the level of consultation and dialogue, the case
by case invitation to the informal Ministerial meetings – and still have to
be determined in future agreements to be negotiated and signed on the ba-
sis of Article 148 of the Withdrawal Agreement.
Thirdly, CSDP is specifically addressed within the concrete areas where
EU-UK cooperation is already envisaged (Part III, III, B. to G.) despite their
strategic autonomy and freedom of action. In this respect, three of the ar-
eas of CSDP already addressed in the Withdrawal Agreement are also men-
78 See Political Declaration, Part I: Initial provisions, I. Basis for cooperation, A.
Core values and rights, 6–7 and II. Areas of shared interests, A. Participation in
Union programmes and B. Dialogues, 11–15.
Common Foreign and Security Policy After Brexit
267
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748903246, am 21.11.2019, 13:37:49
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
tioned: EU operations and missions, PESCO, and financing of CSDP
projects – either through the UK collaboration on existing and future
projects of the EDA or the participation of eligible UK entities in collabo-
rative defence projects bringing together Union entities supported by the
EDF.
Regarding PESCO, the Political Declaration merely assumes the UK’s
collaboration in projects in the framework of PESCO ‘where invited to
participate on an exceptional basis’ by the Council of the EU in PESCO
format and no further rules are foreseen (Part III, III, D., 104 (c)).
Concerning EU’s missions and operations (Articles 42 (1) and 43 (1)
TEU), the Political Declarations foresees close cooperation in EU-led ‘crisis
management missions and operations’ enabling the UK to participate on a
case by case basis in CSDP missions and operations – opened to third
countries – through a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA). In this
respect some specific rules are already laid down (Part III, III, C. 101–103):
the UK may indicate its intention to contribute to a planned CSDP mis-
sion or operation (open to third countries); in this case the parties should
intensify interaction and exchange of information at relevant stages of the
planning process and proportionately to the level of the UK’s contribu-
tion; and as a contributor to a specific CSDP mission or operation the UK
would participate in several relevant bodies meeting (Force Generation,
Call for Contributions and the Committee of Contributors meeting) and
would have the possibility, in case of CSDP military operations, to second
staff to the designated Operations Headquarters proportionate to the level
of its contribution. This outline for the future UK participation in EU-led
crisis management and operations, does not however envisages neither any
form of a differentiated statute of the UK (i.e., according to which the UK
could be envisaged as more than a third State) nor (apparently) a participa-
tion in all possible missions and tasks foreseen in Articles. 42 (1) and 43 (1)
TEU since it refers specifically (to ‘Union-led crisis management missions
and operations’ Part III, III, C., par. 101, first sentence) – which are re-
ferred to, among other tasks, in Article 43 (1) TEU (‘tasks of combat forces
in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisa-
tion’).
From the contents of both the texts of the Withdrawal Agreement and
the Political Declaration regarding the area of CFSP/CSDP in particular
some general conclusions can be drawn: 1) EU and UK foreign policies (in-
cluding security and defence areas) are autonomous despite common val-
ues and objectives; 2) on the grounds of shared security and defence inter-
ests close – ‘flexible and scalable’ – cooperation may exist; 3) a few general
guidelines for consultation and dialogue regarding foreign policy, security
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and defence are foreseen but those still need to be further detailed; 4) some
specific areas of close cooperation are already identified, namely sanctions,
intelligence exchanges, space and development cooperation; 5) in the con-
crete field of EU CSDP, the participation of the UK in PESCO projects and
in EU-led crisis management missions and operations both civilian and
military is admitted to be tough and exceptional, on a case to case basis
and apparently in the capacity of a (mere) third State; 6) in the concrete
field of defence capabilities development the UK and its eligible entities
may collaborate in relevant projects of the EDA through an Administrative
Arrangement and in collaborative defence projects supported by the EDF –
so that both parties may benefit from research and industrial cooperation
in order to facilitate inter operability and to promote joint effectiveness of
Armed Forces. Those conclusions may indicate that the future EU-UK rela-
tionship in the area of CFSP/CSDP, on one hand is rather programmatic
and modest and that the concrete terms of the participation are rather nar-
row and still need to be detailed (in future agreements) and that no specif-
ic ex-EU Member State statute is envisaged; and, on the other hand, that
some of the concrete areas in which closer cooperation is envisaged (in par-
ticular PESCO and defence capabilities development) relate to the sub-area
of CSDP in which EU policy post-EU Global Strategy has more quickly
evolved.
However, the guidelines laid down in the Withdrawal Agreement and
the Political Declaration appears to still leave room to shape a differentiat-
ed third State status in the field of CFSP/CSDP. Even in areas where the
status of third State is clearly mentioned – PESCO and EU missions and
operations – neither the rules of third States participation are definitively
defined nor is the envisaged FPA necessarily bound to follow a single mod-
el.
Shaping a (possible) differentiated third state status in the field of CFSP,
including CSDP
Common grounds as a basis of the future EU-UK relationship
Addressing the issue of the future of EU’s CFSP, including CSDP, after
Brexit cannot ignore the possibility of different scenarios, despite the in-
tentions of cooperation of both involved parties – the EU and its Member
States on one hand, and the UK as a (future) third State on the other side
–, including a more radical scenario in which the UK, once having left the
EU, would simply be treated as another third State that would only be able
IV.
A.
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to participate in the EU’s CFSP and CSDP to the extent that the EU allows
it and under the model and forms of participation that already exists today
regarding current third States. This scenario would mean basically none or
very weak involvement in the EU’s CFSP and CSDP decision-making pro-
cess and implementation of such policies – even if the EU would have to
relate to the UK as an autonomous international actor within several for-
mal international organisations and informal groups participating in the
global governance in the area (or related-areas) in question. However, and
being the first time that Article 50 clause is activated, it is arguable that in
the particular areas of CFSP and CSDP a stronger link between the EU and
its Member States and the UK may (and should) exist – although in terms
that are not yet completely clear. In fact, the EU’s CFSP and CSDP can un-
doubtedly proceed in its current course based on the EU Global Strategy
and the defined ‘three pillars’ strategy without the UK, but it is question-
able that it would be advisable to do so. And if that is not the case, com-
mon grounds for a future (different) relationship should exist.
Considering the contents of both the texts of the Withdrawal Agree-
ment (Article 184) and the Political Declaration it can be assumed that
such common grounds for the EU-UK future relationship in the field of
CFSP/CSDP do exist, despite possible divergent views regarding strategic
interests and specific issues. These common grounds can be found either
in the axiological basis of the European integration (democracy, rule of
law and fundamental rights values) as well as in the UN values and princi-
ples, or in shared objectives or shared need to address common threats and
increasing challenges to European foreign policy, security and defence – es-
pecially those that a single State or States in a bilateral relationship are not
able to cope with. Such common grounds can concretely be found, as
mentioned above, in the Political Declaration where common values and
shared objectives, are foreseen79. These shared objectives in respect of for-
eign policy, security and defence can be listed as follows (as enounced in
Part III, III, pars. 92–95): protect citizens from external threats, prevent
conflicts, strengthen international peace and security, including through
the UN and NATO; address the root causes of global challenges such as
terrorism or illegal migration, champion a rules-based international order
and project (their) common values worldwide; promote sustainable devel-
79 See Part I: Initial Provisions, I. Basis for cooperation, A. Core values and rights
and II. Areas of shared interest and in particular Part III: Security Partnership, I.
Objectives and principles (80–81) and III. Foreign policy, security and defence
(92–93).
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opment and the eradication of poverty and support the implementation of
the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the European Consensus on
Development. The shared objectives are in line with the EU CFSP objec-
tives foreseen in the TEU as well as with the broad priorities established by
the EU Global Strategy.
Moreover, even if autonomous EU and UK foreign policies and there-
fore different approaches and strategic and security interests (either by geo-
graphical, historical or political reasons) may (and do) exist, cross-spheres
of interest and activities may still be of interest for both parties allowing
each other to act on specific issues and matters but contributing to the
overall relevance of Europe within international scene. The Political Decla-
ration indicates that current areas of shared interests are already identified
(sanctions, operations and missions, defence capabilities development, in-
telligence exchanges, space and development cooperation) and new areas
of shared interests and close cooperation may be identified in order to at-
tain common objectives, namely through structured consultation and the-
matic dialogues.
In the field of CFSP and in particular in the field of CSDP the role and
contribution of the UK to the implementation of EU objectives up to the
present cannot be ignored, either because of its capabilities or different
forms of contribution, namely financial (mainly through the EU budget),
to the CSDP.
However the way in which the EU will deal with the UK desire to par-
ticipate, to some extent, in the field of CFSP and CSDP also depends on
the development of the implementation of the Global Strategy, the EU
new level of ambition and an eventual future decision on a common de-
fence policy (more autonomy vs deeper collaboration with relevant part-
ners in key areas, such as NATO) – and where is the razor’s edge in both
the perspective of the EU and UK (vg no common defence policy and
European army).
In the scenario in which the UK would be a third State, a close relation-
ship with the EU would still be possible by shaping a differentiated third
State status in the field of CFSP, including CSDP.
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Possible issues and forms of cooperation to be addressed
The consideration of the wider context, the EU trends, concerns expressed
on both sides80 and doctrine proposals81 allow to identify a wide range of
both, political and juridical issues regarding the post Brexit and post transi-
tional period future relationship between the EU and the UK, specifically
in the field of CFSP and CDSP.
Some of those issues, although not foreseen in the Withdrawal Agree-
ment, were further addressed in general terms and partially clarified in the
Political Declaration on 25 November 2018. According to that text: foreign
policy, security and defence are addressed together, as a part of a EU-UK
security partnership, based on common objectives; the UK may collaborate
to some extent in CFSP and CSDP; no other status than the status of third
State is expressly envisaged, in particular in respect of the participation of
the UK in EU missions and operations and PESCO projects; the envisaged
collaboration reveals – besides general structured consultation and themat-
ic consultation – a selective thematic approach in six identified areas; par-
ticipation of the UK in decision making and EU institutions and organs is
only foreseen to the extent that the UK can be invited by the High Repre-
sentative to informal Ministerial meetings (defence) and may participate in
certain EU missions and operations (crisis management) and therefore in
their respective structures and organs, although in proportion to the level
of its contribution; the mechanisms foreseen to ensure the EU-UK relation-
B.
80 See also House of Lords European Union Committee, Europe in the World: To-
wards a More Effective EU Foreign and Security Strategy, 16 February 2016, HL paper
97 of session 2015–16; House of Lords Commons Affairs Committee, Implications
of the Referendum on EU membership for the UK’s Role in the World, 26 April 2016,
HL 545 session 2015–16.
81 See M Chalmers, ‘UK Foreign and Security Policy after Brexit’ (2017), RUSI Brief-
ing Paper, January 2017; H Dijkstra, ‘UK and EU Foreign Policy Cooperation af-
ter Brexit’ (2016), RUSI Newsbrief, 5 September 2016; N Witney, ‘Brexit and De-
fence: Time to Dust Off the ‘Letter of Intent’?’ (2016), European Council of For-
eign Relations, 14 July 2016; S Peers, ‘The EU’s New Defence Plans Don’t
Amount to an Army – So the UK Can’t Veto Them’ (2016), London School of
Economics and Political Science Brexit Blog, 28 September 2016; I Bond, ‘Brexit
and Foreign Policy: Divorce? (2016), Centre for European Reform, 18 July 2016;
G Van der Loo and S Blockmans, ‘The Impact of Brexit on the EU’s International
Agreements’, 15 July 2016 (available at www.ceps.eu); C Major and A von Voss,
‘European Defence in View of Brexit’, SWP Comments 2017/C 10, April 2017, 4 p
(available at swp-berlin.org); as well as James Black et al., Defence and Security after
Brexit. Understanding the possible implications of the UK’s Decision to Leave the EU,
Compendium Report (Cambridge, Rand Europe, 2017, available at www.rand.org).
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ship and the model of (closer) cooperation regarding EU missions and op-
erations (Framework Participation Agreement) and EDA (Administrative
Arrangement), are not innovative since collaboration with third States
through those instruments already exist;82 participation in international or-
ganisations and international bodies is foreseen in terms of consultation,
coordination and mutual support of each other’s positions in such fora; fi-
nancial participation of the UK seems to be rather weak and relates mainly
to the financing of EU-led missions and operations as well as PESCO
projects.
It is therefore now certain that certain forms of cooperation between the
EU and the UK in the field of CFSP/CSDP after the end of the transition
period have already been addressed in general terms by the Political Decla-
ration as mentioned above – namely common objectives, general provi-
sions of consultation and cooperation in order to achieve them, areas of
(current) shared interests and instruments (dialogue, consultation, coordi-
nation, exchange of information and cooperation mechanisms).
However, those terms must still be further detailed in the text of the
treaty that will apply to the EU-UK relationship after the transitional peri-
od in order to translate such general guidance rules into more concrete
ways of EU-UK collaboration in the area of CFSP/CSDP (especially when
the guidelines are not detailed,vg Space and Development cooperation).
This next step – negotiating and agreeing on more detailed rules – ap-
pears to be an opportunity to envisage the features of a possible differenti-
ated third State status in the field of CFSP/CSDP.
In this respect, three points should be underlined in particular that may
require further reflection from both involved parties.
First, detailed rules still have to be negotiated and agreed between both
parties regarding the points addressed in the Declaration in general terms,
which is especially the case of the consultation and cooperation and the es-
tablishment of a structured consultation and regular thematic dialogues –
which seems to be the main instrument for EU-UK consultation and coop-
82 The participation of third States in EU operations was institutionalized through
the signing of FPA since 2004 (see Thierry Tardy, CSDP: getting third States on
board, EU Institute for Security Studies, Brief Issue, 6, 2014 (available in www.iss.
europa.eu) – vg Framework Agreement between the United States of America
(USA) and the EU on the participation of the USA in EU crisis management oper-
ations, [2011] OJ l143/2. Administrative Arrangements have already been con-
cluded with third States – Norway (2006), Switzerland (2012) Republic of Serbia
(2013) and Ukraine (2015) – enabling them to participate in EDA’s projects and
programs (see www.eda.europa.eu).
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eration in foreign policy and security. It is not yet quite clear whether the
mentioned closer cooperation will rely completely on a flexible and scal-
able cooperation built on a mere case by case approach, according to their
strategic and security interests eventually shared at a certain time, or
whether both parties want to build a medium and long term stronger part-
nership based on a continuous and effective cooperation on common
grounds enabling them to act together in foreign policy issues. The transla-
tion of the general prevision of the Political Declaration regarding the fu-
ture structured consultation and thematic dialogue into more concrete
procedures and rules (as vg those proposed in the DExEU Policy paper of
24 May 2018 above mentioned in II., B.) may be the opportunity to design
a status of UK that may clearly differ from the current status of a mere
third State. Also in this respect, the shaping of the concrete rules regarding
structured and thematic dialogue may lead to the regular contribution of
the UK if not to decision making (which is not probable since autonomy
of both parties is also foreseen) at least, to some extent, to decision shaping
in those topics of clear shared interest where a collective response to exter-
nal threats and problems is more effective (vg sanctions policy as an instru-
ment of CFSP or crisis management). This could be achieved by the regu-
lar (or even permanent) presence of UK representatives in EU EEAS and in
particular CFSP structures, such as the EUMS and crisis management
structures, or even on some EU delegations in third States. Moreover, the
consultation and cooperation at bilateral level and within international or-
ganisations could be further elaborated in order to envisage the alignment
of the UK with EU foreign policy positions and the possible establishment
of procedures to adopt in that respect to ensure coordination of positions
on a regular basis and even an actio pro communitate.
Second, and in particular in respect of PCSD, one may question why
the EU and the UK have not gone further and tried to envisage and design
a different status for the UK, ‘half-way’ between a full EU Member State
and a mere third Member State – even if such approach depends on the
political will of both parties. However weak the UK contribution (finan-
cial or in civil and military capacity) to the CFSP/CSDP may be, and even
recognising the lack of consensus on some foreign policy topics, a relation-
ship of decades as an EU ‘insider’, who participates in most of the post-
Global Strategy developments, should not be completely thrown away. In
this respect, some more detailed guidelines are foreseen in two of the (cur-
rent) areas of shared interests: EU missions and operations and defence ca-
pabilities development, including PESCO. However, such guidelines in-
cluded in the Political Declaration must still be further detailed – in partic-
ular in the text of the treaty that will apply to the EU-UK relationship after
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the transitional period. Moreover, further formal agreements – such as the
mentioned Framework Participation Agreement regarding EU CSDP mis-
sions and operations or Administrative arrangement regarding the partici-
pation in the EDA – as well as secondary EU law rules – at least regarding
the requisites of participation in PESCO projects – still have to be, respec-
tively, agreed upon by both parties and approved, as a sine qua non condi-
tion of a concrete and effective collaboration between the EU and the UK
beyond the term of the transitional period (31 December 2020) foreseen in
the Withdrawal Agreement. In this respect, the elaboration on the con-
crete terms of such agreements (old instruments with new contents) and of
secondary rules regarding the participation of third States in PESCO
projects will be an opportunity to further deepen the terms of the future
relationship foreseen in the Political Declaration and maybe not (com-
pletely) close the door to the possibility of having a different status and
model of cooperation (more and differentiated rights of participation in
CFSP and more financial and other duties), regarding the participation of
a (not mere, since ex-Member State) third State.
Finally, the possible differentiated third State status on a basis that over-
comes a simply case by case cooperation (vg on thematic block or even ge-
ographical approach basis) could also be achieved – if the political will al-
lows – through the agreement on a formal (or informal) observer status,
with some rights of participation in EU institutions, bodies and structures
(decision shaping) with financial EU counterparty (‘value for money’) that
could be agreed namely through a contribution to the financing of the
most relevant CFSP financial instruments besides the EU budget.
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